High CourtsSingle Bench

Suman @APPELLANT@Hash Gurcharan Singh

Rajasthan High Court · Decided on 11 April 2018 · Citation: (2018) 04 RAJ CK 0173

HON’BLE JUDGES
DR. VIRENDRA KUMAR MATHUR, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 397, 401 · Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — Section 3, 12, 18, 19, 20, 22, 29 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 406, 498A
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision No. 470 of 2016
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Judgment

69 paragraphs · 1,481 words

This Criminal Revision under sec.397/401 CrPC has been filed against order dated 30.03.2016 passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Removal of

Atrocities cases), Hanumangarh in Cr. Appeal No.35/2014, whereby the order dated 30.01.2014 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh in

Cr. Regular Case No.179/2011 has been reversed.

Briefly stated, the petitioner filed an application under sec.12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 {herein after referred to

as ‘the Act’} against the respondent and contended that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 16.02.2009 at Hanumangarh. It

was also submitted that after the marriage, petitioner started living with the husband at Sriganganagar. Since marriage the respondent has been

working at Bhabha Atomic Research Center, Vishkhapattanam. It was averred that the respondent was harassing the petitioner physically and

mentally. The respondent used to demand dowry from petitioner and always scolded the petitioner for gifts & articles given by her parents in wedding.

The petitioner further alleged in that application that the respondent did not maintain her properly and sent her back to her parents’ house. It was

also averred that that petitioner’s father was middle-class man and having obligation to maintain his family also. The respondent is working as

Scientist and earning salary of Rs.60,000/- per month. Besides, the respondent is having agriculture lands, residential and commercial properties at

various places and he is in very wealthy position. Therefore, the petitioner claimed relief under secs.18, 19, 20 & 22 of the Act for protection,

residential, monetary and compensatory relief.

The application of petitioner was contested by the respondent by way of filing reply denying the allegations.

After hearing both the parties, the trial court vide order dated 30.01.2014 allowed application filed by the petitioner in part and ordered the respondent

to pay Rs.4000/- per month to the petitioner from date of filing of the application i.e. 09.09.2010.

Being aggrieved by the order dated 30.01.2014, the respondent filed an appeal under sec.29 of the Act and after hearing both the parties, the learned

appellate court allowed respondent’s appeal vide order dated 30.03.2016 and reversed order of the trial court dated 30.01.2014. Being aggrieved

by the order dated 30.03.2016 passed by the appellate court, the petitioner has filled this Revision Petition.

It was contended that the respondent in his reply to the application filed by the petitioner categorically stated that respondent and his entire family is

having belief that the petitioner is responsible for the death of her father-in-law and this very fact is enough for establishing verbal and emotional abuse

against the petitioner by the respondent. It was also contended that the trial court in its order specifically held the respondent guilty of harassing the

petitioner but the appellate court without any reason reversed said well-reasoned order of the trial court. Learned appellate court has not considered

this important aspect and as such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

It was also contended that the learned appellate court has further erred while allowing the appeal on the ground that the petitioner has not furnished

exact details like dates of alleged incidents and by this fact the petitioner does not seem bona fide and the allegations levelled by her are falsified. The

observation of the appellate court is not only logically incorrect but also against various judicial pronouncements.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the arguments raised by the petitioner and contended that the allegation of demand

of dowry is false. The trial under charges of secs.498A and 406 IPC against the respondent has been concluded and the court passed its judgment on

30.06.2017 whereby the respondents are acquitted of the charges under secs.498A and 406 IPC. There is no iota of evidence on record from which it

can be inferred that the respondent has committed any act of domestic violence against petitioner.

Heard rival contentions of the parties and perused evidence placed on record.

I have perused original complaint of the petitioner, in which she has written that after the marriage on 16.02.2009, she started residing in her

matrimonial home at Sriganganagar. Her husband was posted at Vishakhapattnam in Bhabha Atomic Research Center. She further made allegation

regarding demand of dowry that at the time of “Vidayi†after the marriage, respondents demanded a Swift car and rupees Two Lacs. The

allegation of demand of dowry could not be proved during trial of respondent for charge under secs.498A & 406 IPC. The respondents have placed

before this Court judgment dated 30.06.2017 in Cr. Case No.158/2010 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Hanumangarh.

From the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioner Suman left matrimonial home after May 2010. It is further evident that during period of one &

half years, petitioner Suman went to stay with in-laws’ family for one or two times. She never gave detail as to on what dates she went there and

for how many days she stayed there. She has not mentioned fact that during her stay at Sriganganagar whether respondent came there to stay with

her and it is also not clear when alleged act of domestic violence said to be committed.

It would be pertinent to note that the “domestic violence†as defined under sec.3 of the Act, “any act, omission or commission or conduct of

the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or

physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic

abuse; or harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her, to meet any

unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to

her by any conduct mentioned above or otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.â€​

Definition of domestic violence rest upon not only the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim but also upon norms of

acceptable behaviour. The core of definition of domestic violence consists of all the acts that constitute violence. Any continuous deprivation of

aggrieved woman from economic or financial resources or prohibition of access to shared household would be a domestic violence. In determining

whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violenceâ€, the overall facts and circumstances of the

case shall be a guiding factor.

Learned appellate court, after considering over-all evidence has right observed as follows:

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Obviously, for granting relief under the Act, it is for the petitioner to prove that alleged act of violence has been committed to her. This Court concurs

with aforesaid observation recorded by the learned appellate court.

In view of the above, I find no ground of interference in the order dated 30.03.2016 passed by the appellate court below. The Revision petition filed by

the petitioner has no merit and the same is dismissed.