Sumatibala Sen vs Heramba Kumar Roy and Others

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—These two second appeals arise out of two suits for ejectment, brought by the plaintiff appellant on December 22, 1952. The suits were brought on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for the plaintiff''s own use and occupation. The Courts below have dismissed the suit and hence the present appeals by the plaintiff appellant.

In both the suits, the tenancy comprises one room. Admittedly also, the plaintiff has in her occupation one single room, a store room and a small verandah. The number of members in the plaintiff''s family is seven, namely, the plaintiff, her husband, four sons, of whom two are adults and two minors, the adults reading in colleges, and one unmarried daughter. Clearly, on these facts, the accommodation in the plaintiff''s occupation is inadequate. But the Courts below have refused the plaintiff''s prayer for ejectment on the ground that there are certain materials on the record to show that the present suits are mala fide. The reasons, given by them, are that, when the plaintiff purchased the suit premises in or about the year 1949, her family was practically the same, but she purchased with her eyes wide open that she could get possession only of the limited accommodation that is now at her disposal. The second reason is that, in an adjoining part of the building, which also belongs to the plaintiff, there were tin sheds, some of which fell vacant and were re-let in 1950 and 1951, by the plaintiff, thus showing that the plaintiff had really no genuine need for additional accommodation. A third reason was given, namely, that the plaintiff in asking for ejectment of the two tenants from the two rooms in question had not sought to disturb the tenant occupant of the intermediate room and that shows that the plaintiff''s case for ejectment against these two tenants (who are respondents before me) was not bona fide.

I am not impressed by any of the above reasons in the circumstances of this case. A person may be completed to be content with a limited accommodation under certain circumstances. That does not necessarily mean that he cannot have reasonable requirement for additional accommodation. The fact that the plaintiff purchased the suit premises with her eyes wide open that only the present limited accommodation would be available to her for her occupation does not also necessarily disentitle her to claim additional accommodation if the size of her family and her needs on a proper consideration entitle her to the same. The fact again that at some past period some rooms fell vacant and, for some reason or other, the plaintiff did not choose to occupy those rooms but re-let the same to other persons does not also, in my opinion, necessarily disentitle the plaintiff from making out a case of reasonable requirement. We do not know, under what circumstances or under what conditions or considerations, the plaintiff had to re-let those rooms even if we accept that they were actually re-let to new persons. The other fact again that the plaintiff has chosen to evict some of her tenants to the exclusion of others or that she has chosen not the contiguous rooms but two rooms separated by a tenanted room, does not also, in my opinion, necessarily make any case against the plaintiff''s plea of reasonable requirement. The circumstances will have to be considered as a whole and, on the materials before me, in view of the admitted fact that the plaintiff''s family consists of about seven members and her present accommodation, even according to the learned Judge of the Court below, is inadequate, I have no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff has made out a case of reasonable requirement for further accommodation. I am not, however, satisfied that this reasonable requirement will extend to the occupation of both the two rooms, involved in the two suits, and, considering the position of the parties and the location of the different rooms, I am inclined to allow the plaintiff a decree in respect of the room, contiguous to her present accommodation, namely, the room or the premises in the occupation of the tenant H. K. Roy, which is the subject-matter of Second Appeal No. 768 of 1955, arising out of Title Suit No. 16 of 1953. That premises in my opinion, ought to satisfy the plaintiff''s case of reasonable requirement.

I have also to consider in this connection the question of comparative advantages and disadvantages, but in the light of the materials before me, I do not think that, on that consideration, the plaintiff''s case for requirement of the above premises of the tenant H. K. Roy can be defeated.

I would, accordingly allow second Appeal No. 768 of 1P55, on terms which I shall indicate below. The other Second Appeal No. 769 of 1955, will be dismissed in view of what I have said above.

The tenant respondent H. K. Roy (Heramba Kumar Roy) in Second Appeal No. 768 of 1955 will be given time to vacate his premises until the end of November, 1955, in the first instance, and, if within this period, he gives an undertaking to this Court to vacate the said premises and deliver peaceful vacant possession thereof to the plaintiff appellant within April, 1956, the time for quitting the premises will be extended until the end of that period, namely, until the end of April, 1956. The said tenant respondent, however, must continue to pay for his occupation of the suit premises at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month and, accordingly, he must deposit in the trial Court to the credit of the plaintiff decree-holder a sum of Rs. 20/- every month according to the English calendar within the 15th of the next succeeding month, the first of such deposits is to be made for the month of September, 1955, within the 15th October next. In default of any of these deposits, the provision for time will become inoperative and the decree for ejectment will become executable at once.

In the result, Second Appeal No. 768 of 1955 is allowed as above, the decree of the Court of Appeal below is set aside and the plaintiff''s suit (T. S. No. 16 of 1953) is decreed subject to the condition, noted above. The other second appeal, namely, Second Appeal No. 769 of 1955. is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in any of these appeals, either in this Court or in the two Courts below.