Gulzari Lal S/O Late Shri Banwari Lal vs State Of Rajasthan

Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J

Heard.

This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner seeking issuance of mandamus for extension of his services, has been dismissed.

Learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently argue and contend that the appellant was treated discriminately and is a victim of arbitrary exercise of power in the matter of exercise of discretion under Rule 14 of the Urban Co-operative Banks, Employees Service Rules, 2006 (hereinafter to be referred as “Rules of 2006”), which enables the employer to re-employ a retiring employee. He would submit that the stand taken before the learned Single Judge by the respondents was that extension was not granted and only re-employment was granted to certain persons. It is argued that the reasons which were assigned by the respondents to reject appellant's application seeking re-employment are arbitrary, unreasonable and extraneous to the decision making process and, therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have examined this crucial aspect and granted relief in favour of the appellant. He would further submit that learned Single proceeded on the incorrect factual premise that no extension was granted to anyone, whereas according to the respondents, extension was granted. He would further submit that once other persons were admittedly granted re-employment, the appellant was also liable to be considered favourably.

We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone through the order passed by the learned Single Judge.

In the first place, it is quite clear from the records of the case and the stand which has been taken by the respondents, as also the rules governing in this regard that there is no provision for extension of service, but there is a provision only for re-employment, as provided under Rule 14 of the Rules of 2016. There is a clear line of distinction in service jurisprudence, in between re-employment and extension. A provision for re-employment is not an extension of service. The stand taken by

the respondents, was that there was no provision for extension of service. Learned counsel for the appellant also could not bring to the notice of this Court any provision with regard to extension of service. The only provision is with regard to re-employment of a retiring employee. The relevant provision contained in Rule 14 reads as below:-

“The age of superannuation shall be 58 years but the age of superannuation for class IV shall be 60 years subject to the proviso that service of an employee who attain the age of 55 years shall be terminable at a notice of 3 months of either side. Where it appears, desirable in the interest of the Bank, the Board shall have the discretion to re-employ a person who retires under this Rule for such period but not beyond the age of 60 years and on such terms and conditions as the Board may determine in each case.”

The rule gives complete discretion to the authority whether or  not  to  re-employ.  Re-employment  of  a  person  is  in  the absolute discretion of the employer, taking into consideration the nature of the exigencies of service, availability of experienced hands,  need  of  the  institution,  work  load  and  other  relevant circumstances. Even though there may be a need for re-employment, the re-employment of a retiring employee would be dependent upon subjective satisfaction of the employer, taking into consideration the service rendered by a retiring employee. A retiring employee cannot, as of right, claim that merely because there is a provision for re-employment, once he applies, he should necessarily be re-employed.

We have gone through the contents of the resolution dated 31.03.2018, wherein the Board of Directors of the Bank considered in great details the service record of the appellant and then resolved not to grant him re-employment. The reasons which have been assigned and the materials which have been taken into consideration only relate to service record and not any extraneous material. The nature and conduct of work of the appellant was also taken into consideration. It took into consideration that the appellant was proceeded against by issuance of charge-sheet issued in the year 2012. The departmental enquiry culminated in recovery, but later on, taking a lenient view the recovered amount was refunded. The resolution also refers to another charge-sheet issued to the appellant in relation to a misconduct. However, he was later on granted promotion. Another notice was given to him on 01.02.2007 and an incident of 11.10.2014, has also been mentioned in the resolution. The Board in this manner, has taken into consideration the entire service record of the appellant and then finally, a resolution has been passed not to grant him re-employment.

Submission of learned counsel for the appellant that in various departmental enquiries, no serious action was taken and ultimately all those charges which were dropped, does not come to his aid. A distinction has to be drawn in the matter of imposition of penalty and exercise of discretion in a case where an employee is re-employed. While there exists a right to continue in service till the employee attains the age of superannuation under the rules, there is no vested right to seek re-employment. Detailed consideration made by the respondents in its resolution dated 31.03.2018 reveals that the service record was taken into consideration. The decision making process, therefore, does not suffer from any procedural impropriety, arbitrariness or unreasonableness to such an extent that this Court should intervene much less substitute its own opinion. Once the material which has been considered to arrive at a decision is found to be relevant, sufficiency of reasons could not be gone into in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

There is obviously no case of violation of statutory provisions. No personal malice individually or collectively against the members of the Board of Directors have been levelled, much less found true in any of the proceedings.

Therefore, we are unable to grant any relief to the appellant. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed though for reasons in addition to those which have been supplied by the learned Single Judge.