High CourtsDivision Bench

Sundaram Ayyar vs The King-Emperor

Madras High Court · Decided on 21 November 1917 · Citation: (1918) ILR (Mad) 533

HON’BLE JUDGES
Phillips, J · Ayling, J
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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 347 words

Ayling, J.—The question for decision in this case is whether we can give an extended meaning to the word ""cheating"" in Section 562 of the

Criminal Procedure Code so as to cover an offence u/s 420 of the Indian Penal Code (cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property,

etc.).

2.

We should be glad to do so, as we recognize that equally strong reasons on public and humanitarian grounds may exist for lenient treatment of

an offence under either section. On the other hand a careful consideration of the wording of Section 562 of the Criminal Procedure Code seems to

preclude the possibility of such a construction. If the term ""cheating"" is to be held to cover offences u/s 418, 419 and 420 of the Indian ! Penal

Code which are included with Section 417 in the same group in Schedule II to the Criminal Procedure Code, a similar extension must be allowed

to the terms ""theft"" and ""dishonest misappropriation."" The former must be held to cover offences under Sections 380, 381 and 382 of the Indian

Penal Code and the latter offences u/s 404 of the Indian Penal Code. But such a construction is impossible in face of the fact that the legislature has

specifically mentioned ""theft in a building"" (Section 380, Indian Penal Code), in Section 562 of the Criminal Procedure Code in addition to simple

theft (Section 379). The inference is irresistible that ""theft in a building"" was not intended to be included in the term ""theft,"" and we cannot give a

narrow interpretation in the case of ""theft"" and a wide one in the case of ""cheating.

3.

The view we have taken is in accord with that expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Ramjan Dadubhai (l915) Cri.L.J.

781.

The only authority to the contrary is that of a single Judge in Harnarain v. Ramji Das (1915) 12 A.L.J. 465, from which we must respectfully

dissent.

4.

We set aside the Order of the Subdivisional Magistrate and direct him to dispose of the case according to law.