Sundararajan N. vs Indian Overseas Bank and Another

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—It is unfortunate that the once settled matter was sought to be reopened at the instance of the respondents and

thereby causing harassment to the petitioner for no fault of his.

The brief background of the case was that the petitioner who was appointed as a Clerk on April 22, 1981 was issued with the chargesheet,

dated December 13, 1997, in which it was alleged that he unauthorisedly made fraudulent debit entries totalling Rs.75,500/- in the S.B. A/c. No.

40723 of one Master Kaushik and misappropriated the said amount. It was stated therein that by virtue of the said conduct of the petitioner, it

amounted to commission of gross misconduct falling within paragraphs 17.5 (d) and 17.5(j) of the Bipartite Settlement. It is relevant to note that

the said chargesheet dated December 15, 1997 was issued by one Thiru R. Sudarsanan in his capacity as the disciplinary authority. On submission

of the explanation by the petitioner, the said disciplinary authority himself held an enquiry and he submitted his findings on July 12, 1999 holding

that none of the allegations levelled against the petitioner was proved. He, therefore, concluded that the petitioner was innocent and that he was

only made a scapegoat. Thereafter, when the defence representative wrote to the first respondent Bank on August 7, 1999 for the reinstatement of

the petitioner, a letter came to be issued on September 9, 1999 at the instance of one Thiru S.S. Sharma, Deputy General Manager, also claiming

to be the disciplinary authority, stating that the action initiated against the petitioner fell under the category of composite cases, as it involved both

officer employees and award staff and, therefore, the said case was entrusted to him in his capacity as disciplinary authority. It was further stated in

the said communication that on going through the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, Thiru R. Sudarsanan, he observed that relevant

witnesses were omitted to be examined and relevant documents were also omitted to be marked in the enquiry proceedings. According to Thiru

S.S. Sharma, in his opinion, a fresh enquiry was required for examining relevant witnesses/documents for arriving at appropriate findings in the

matter. In that view, Thiru S. Sharma entrusted the case to one Thiru N. Krishnamoorthy for holding a fresh enquiry. When a detailed reply to the

said letter was addressed on behalf of the petitioner on September 27, 1999 to the Chairman of the first respondent Bank, Thiru S.S. Sharma,

taking a sudden ''U'' turn, by his letter dated October 29, 1999 addressed to the petitioner expressed that this letter dated September 9, 1999

stood cancelled and that he would hear further from the previous disciplinary authority Thiru R. Sudarsanan. Thereafter, when the impugned

communication, dated May 3, 2000 came to be issued, the petitioner approached this Hon''ble Court by way of this writ petition.

In this context, it is also relevant to point out that under the procedure prescribed for taking disciplinary action, it is provided that the disciplinary

authority can either conduct the enquiry himself or appoint any other officer as Enquiry Officer for the purpose of conducting an enquiry. Time and

again, it has been repeatedly pointed out by the Courts that actions at the instance of the management with a view to some how or other fix an

employee even after the conclusion of the detailed enquiry in which the concerned delinquent was found innocent, should not be proceeded with. It

is unfortunate that a public sector bank of very wide set up like that of the first respondent should resort to such an extremely unwarranted action

against the petitioner. The present attempt of the respondents only demonstrates the arbitrary move of the first respondent bank as part of its

vengeanceful action against the petitioner to do away with him irrespective of its own disciplinary authority giving a clean chit to the petitioner after

holding an elaborate enquiry in this case.

On a persual of the materials placed before me, I find that the disciplinary authority conducted the enquiry on February 1, 1999, March 31,

1999 and April 1, 1999 when two witnesses were examined on behalf of the management and as many as 11 documents were filed on its side.

Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer analysed the evidence threadbare and gave its conclusions by adducing elaborate reasons as to why he was not

able to hold that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. Further, the Enquiry Officer, after holding that the petitioner was innocent,

also made an observation that he was made a scapegoat. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the respondents were deprived of the

relevant materials when the proceedings were initiated originally against the petitioner, in order to justify their present action for reopening the

enquiry. In any case, it is not in dispute, that there is absolutely no provision for either review or for reopening the enquiry, available in the

regulations relating to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. A persual of the subsequent communications commencing from September 9, 1999

only discloses the utmost casual manner in which the first respondent bank has dealt with the case of the petitioner. When Thiru S.S. Sharma in his

communication, dated September 9, 1999 wanted to reopen the enquiry by giving a goby to the earlier findings of Thiru R. Sudarsanan and when

the illegality was pointed out at the instance of the petitioner in the communication dated September 27, 1999, Thiru S.S. Sharma by a one line

proceedings dated October 29, 1999 came forward to cancel his earlier communication dated September 9, 1999 and stated that the petitioner

would hear from the earlier disciplinary authority Thiru R. Sudarsanan in due course. Thereafter, the impugned proceedings came to be issued at

the instance of Thiru R. Sudarsanan stating that upon consideration of the entire materials, consequent to the reversion of the case to him as

disciplinary authority, he could now come to a conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. I am at a loss to understand

as to under what provision of law, the second respondent was empowered to issue the impugned proceedings. Even assuming that he had the

necessary authority to reopen the enquiry, it is not known how the findings issued by Thiru R. Sudarsanan running to several pages after due

analysis of the various materials placed before him could he just like that thrown overboard and a conclusion reached holding that the charges were

proved by writing just three sentences without disclosing as to how the earlier conclusion reached by the very same officer was not properly

reached. The above factors go to show that the first respondent bank has absolutely no respect for any rule or law in the matter of taking

disciplinary action against its employees. Such conduct at the instance of the first respondent bank is highly reprehensible and deserves to be

condemned. It is high time that the authorities of the first respondent bank should raise up to the occasion and devote utmost concentration in

matters of disciplinary action against employees instead of handling it in such a light hearted manner in as much as the ultimate result of such

disciplinary action may some time even result in total deprivation of the livelihood of the concerned employees.

In the circumstances, having regard to the fact that the impugned proceedings are not valid in law the same is liable to be set aside. In this

context, it would be relevant to refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Hon''ble Court rendered in W.A. No. 603 of 1991 (The

Kancheepuram Co-operative House Mortgage Society Limited. Kancheepuram v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour Appeals. Madras-6 and

Ors.), dated June 10, 1991, wherein our Division Bench has categorically held that such kind of repeated disciplinary enquiries cannot be held

against a chargesheeted employee when once in the first instance in an enquiry they were found to be innocent. Applying the ratio of the abovesaid

Division Bench judgment to the case on hand, I find that the impugned order is not sustainable .The order impugned in this writ petition is therefore,

set aside. The writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 5000/-. The first respondent bank is directed to reinstate the petitioner within fifteen days

from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.