Sunder vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another

Appellant has filed this Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Cr.P.C. being aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.07.2018, in Special Session

Trial No.3900126/2016, passed by Special Judge/IXth Additional Sessions Judge (POCSO) Act, 2012 Sagar, District-Sagar, whereby the learned

Session Judge found guilty the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 354 (A) 1 (ii) and Section 354 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo

R.I. for one year with fine of Rs.1000/- in each offences. In default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 1 month in each offences has also been

imposed by the trial Courtt.

During pendency of this appeal, parties have entered into compromise and want to close the proceeding by way of settlement for which they have

preferred an applications bearing I.A.No.6563/2019 and I.A.No.6565/2019 for compromise.

Vide order dated 10.04.2019, this Court has directed to the parties to record their statements in respect of compromise application before the

Registrar J-II and in compliance of that Registrar J-II has recorded the statements of both the parties and prepared the report dated 25.04.2019.

According to the report, they are willing to resolve their dispute voluntarily without any threat and inducement and now their relation is cordial.

The learned counsel for the appellant submits that parties have made a compromise, thus, there is no need to keep the matter pending and on the

basis of compromise, the appellant may be acquitted from the said offences. He has also requested to the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in this regard.

It is true, Section 354 (A) 1 (ii) and Section 354 of IPC are involved in the case are non-compoundable offence and the appellant has already been

convicted by the Appellate Court for the such offences. The appellant do not come before this Court by way of filing a petition under Section 482 of

the Cr.P.C. or he has also not filed any application in this regard, but on the oral request of appellant’s counsel and in the interest of justice, this

Court shall also consider the case under the light of provision of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

In such circumstances, it would be necessary to consider the legal aspect first. From careful reading of the pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex

Court in the case of Gian Singh V/s. State of Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, it has been held as under:-

The power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different

from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Cases where power to quash criminal

proceedings may be exercised where the parties have settled their dispute, held, depends on facts and circumstances of each case. Before exercise of

inherent quashment power under Section 482, High Court must have due regard to nature and gravity of the crime and  its societal

impact. Offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or like transactions or offences arising out of matrimony relating to

dowry etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and parties have resolved their entire dispute, High Court may

quash criminal proceeding.

In another Judgment, in the case of Anita Maria Dias and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in (2018) 3 SCC 2 9the Hon'ble

Apex Court has held as under:-

“The principles on this point relevant to this case are, that where offences are predominantly of civil character, particularlyarising out of

commercial transactions, dispute should be quashed when parties have resolved their dispute. Further, timing of settlement would be

crucial for exercise of power or declining to exercise power. Where settlement is arrived at between parties immediately after commission

of offence and matter is still under investigation, High  Court may be liberal in accepting settlement to quash proceedings/investigation

as investigation is in its early stage and charge-sheet has not been filed. Where charges are framed and recording of evidence is yet to commence or

is at early stage, proceedings can be quashed after prima facie assessment of circumstances/materials. Where trial is at fag end, High Court should

refrain from exercising its power as trial court would be in position to decide matter on merits. Where accused already convicted and appeal against

conviction is pending, mere settlement or compromise between victim and accused is not ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of offender

(Under linning added)

In view of the pronouncement passed in the case of Gian Singh (Supra) and Anita Maria Dias (Supra), it is manifested that the High Court can

exercised its inherent power to quash the proceeding even in respect to non-compoundable offences on the basis of compromise when the case is

pending, but once a final order has been passed, the High Court can not exercise its inherent power which resulting in acquittal of offender.

The issue before this Court is whether when the complainant and appellant have settled their dispute amicably and they are ready to keep good

terms in future, is there any useful purpose would be served to keep the matter pending specially when the grievance of the complainant has been

satisfied by the present appellant ? In this regard, in the case of Manohar Singh Vs. State of M.P. and another reported in (2014) 13 SCC 75, the

Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the similar issues and has given the relief to the appellant, by reducing the sentence period, keeping the fact of

compromise in priority. In para 8 and 9, it has been held as under:-

“8. In the instant case, the appellant is convicted under Section 498-A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment. He is

convicted under Section 4 of the Dowry Act and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment. Substantive sentences are to run concurrently. Even

though the appellant and respondent No. 2-wife have arrived at a compromise, the order of conviction cannot be quashed on that ground because the

offences involved are non-compoundable. However, in such a situation if the court feels that the parties have a real desire to bury the hatchet in the

interest of peace, it can reduce the sentence of the accused to the sentence already undergone. Section 498-A of the IPC does not prescribe any

minimum punishment. Section 4 of the Dowry Act prescribes minimum punishment of six months but proviso thereto states that the Court may, for

adequate or special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may be less than six months.

Therefore, sentence of the appellant can be reduced to sentence already undergone by him.

Now the question is whether a case for reduction of sentence is made out particularly when the appellant has undergone only seven days sentence

out of six months sentence imposed on him. We see no reason why in this case we should not reduce the appellant’s sentence to sentence already

undergone by him. There can be no doubt about the genuine nature of compromise between the appellant and respondent No.2-wife. The appellant

has offered to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- to respondent No.2- wife as compensation. A demand draft drawn in the name of respondent No.2 is

brought to the Court. As directed by us even litigation costs of Rs.25,000/- has been deposited by the appellant in the Court. Respondent No.2-wife

has appeared in this Court on more than one occasion and requested this Court to take compromise into consideration and pass appropriate orders.

Learned counsel for the parties have requested us to take a kindly view of the matter. The affidavit filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh opposing

the prayer of the parties does not impress us.â€​

Admittedly, the parties have entered into compromise voluntarily and they want to close the proceeding by way of settlement and they have settled

their dispute in the interest to establish peace among them.

On the case in hand, appellant has convicted for the offences under Section 354 (A) 1 (ii) and Section 354 of IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I.

for 1 year with fine of Rs.1000/-in each offences. There is no minimum punishment is prescribed for the offence punishable under Section 354 (A) 1

(ii), but so far as offence under Section 354 of the IPC is concerned, by the Amendment Act 2013, it has been amended that the punishment for the

Section 354 of the IPC shall not be less then one year and same may extend to five years. Accused shall also be liable to fine.

Therefore, in such circumstances in the light of pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court in Manohar Singh (Supra) case, this Court is of the

opinion that the judgment of conviction in non-compoundable offences can not be quashed on the ground of compromise, but in such situation, to

secure the ends of justice, the sentence can be reduced of the accused person to the sentence already undergone by him, if minimum punishment is

not prescribed. As already discussed above for the offence under Section 354 of the IPC, there is minimum punishment of one year is prescribed.

In the present case, the appellant has been convicted for one year imprisonment, which is minimum punishment as prescribed under Section 354 of

the IPC. He has suffered the jail sentence from 26. 02.2016 to 29.02.2016 (04 days) in out of one year conviction, thus, his jail sentence cannot be

reduced to sentence as already undergone by him. Therefore, I.A.No. 6563/2019 and I.A.No.6565/2019 are hereby dismissed, however, the effect of

compromise shall be considered when the case was finally argued by the appellant’s counsel.

List the matter for final hearing in due course.