Sunil Kumar Agarwal vs Raghabendra Pathak And Ors

Heard Mr. S. S. Sarma, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. J. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. R. L.

Yadav, the learned counsel for the respondents.

The present petitioner is the defendant No.2 in Title Suit No.7/1997 filed by amongstothers, the present plaintiffs/respondents for ejectment of the

present defendant/petitioner along with two others on the ground of default in rent, bonafide requirement and subletting of the suit premises.

In order to get the proper picture and the issues involved in this petition, it would beappropriate to mention here the manner in which the suit was

filed and against whom. The suit was filed by the wife and the children of one Sachi Bhushan Pathak as plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 and one Babbanji Pathak

as the plaintiff No.6 against the defendant No.1, Nandalal Prabhudayal shown as proprietor of M/S Arun Stores and defendant No.2, Sri Sunil Kumar

Agarwala, son of Ramawatar Agarwala (the present petitioner) and the defendant No.3, Sri Jayanta Das for their ejectment from the suit premises on

the grounds of default in paying rent, sub-letting of the tenanted premises to the defendant No.3 along with bonafide requirement.

The plaintiff No.6 is the owner of the land measuring 2 kathas 8 lechas comprising thesuit premises which is a room measuring 9 feet X 20 feet

described in the Schedule of the plaint. The plaintiff No.6 let out the suit premises with effect from 01.06.1975 at a monthly rent of Rs.140.00 and to

that effect, a rent agreement was entered into between the plaintiff No.6 and the defendant No.1. The rent falls due and payable within the first week

of subsequent month. Initially monthly rent was Rs.140.00 and later on enhanced to Rs.180.00 and the plaintiff No.6 received rent and issued receipt

thereof regularly. In the year 1995, the plaintiff No.6 transferred the ownership of the land to the plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 and the ownership of the suit

premises vested on the said plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 who in turn, entrusted the plaintiff No.6 to act as manager of the said tenancy. The change in

ownership was informed to the defendant No.1 asking him to pay the rent to plaintiff No.6 and as per the practice, rent was collected and issued

receipt by plaintiff No.6. Rent was received up to the month of February, 1996. The defendant No.1 sublet the suit premises to defendant Nos.2 and 3

without intimating to the plaintiff Nos.1 to 6 and the defendant No.1 discontinued paying the rent from March, 1996. The defendant No.1 violated the

terms of tenancy as per Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and as such liable to be evicted from the suit

premises. The plaintiffs No.2 and 3 are educated unemployed youths, so the suit premises is required urgently for their accommodation for carrying

out the business. Along with the relief as aforesaid, the plaintiff also claimed a sum of Rs.2,340.00 as arrear rent.

The defendant Nos.2 and 3 filed joint written statement. In the joint written statementit is pleaded that the plaintiffs have no right to file the suit and

the same is bad for nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties. The defendant No.1, M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal, a HUF business firm, took the suit premises

on rent with effect from 01.06.1975 from the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak. Members of the HUF were Shri Banowarilal Agarwalla @ Budhia, Shri

Ramawatar Agarwalla, Shri Mohanlal Bansal, Shri Nandalal Agarwalla and Prabhudayal Agarwalla. They were all brothers and Banwarilal

Agarwalla was the Karta of the said HUF. The said business continued for some years from the suit premises and the brothers decided to partition

their joint property including the said joint family business. Accordingly, in the year 1979, the joint family business was dissolved and the suit premises

was given to Shri Ramawatar Agarwalla, the father of defendant No.2 who continued the business and possession of the suit premises along with the

defendant No.2, Sunil Kr. Agarwalla. They have been paying the monthly rent to the landlord Sachi Bhushan Pathak through the said Babbanji

Pathak, the plaintiff No.6 in the name of M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal as before and rent receipts were issued as usual showing Sachi Bhushan Pathak

as the landlord and the plaintiff No.6 collected the said rent on behalf of the said landlord. So, Sachi Bhushan Pathak and Ramawatar Agarwalla are

necessary parties to the suit and non-joinder of them is fatal to the suit. Denied about the transfer of ownership of the suit premises and land, to

plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 and the subsequent entrustment to plaintiff No.6 by plaintiff Nos.1 to 5 as manager. As per the rent receipts of March, 1996 and

prior to that, same were issued in the name of Sachi Bhushan Pathak by the plaintiff No.6. Denied the fact of subletting asserting that the suit

premises is used for business by Ramawatar Agarwalla and defendant No.2. Rent was collected as per convenience of plaintiff No.1, even for 3/4

months at a time and even as advance. The plaintiff also used to receive articles and goods from the shop of defendant No.2 on the condition that

price of such articles be adjusted with the rent. After receipt of the rent for February, 1996, the plaintiff No.6 received an advance of Rs.1,384.00

from the defendant No.2 for adjustment in the monthly rent of March, 1996 and subsequent thereto. On 26.04.1996, some other articles were taken on

credit on the condition of adjustment of the said price of the articles to be adjusted against the future house rent along with Rs.1,385.00. In this

manner, total amount became Rs.2,610.00 to be adjusted for future 14 months. As such the defendants are not defaulter. Thereafter the defendant

demanded for rent receipt after adjustment of the said advance but the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak failed to issue the receipt. So the defendant

No.2 paid in the Court the rent for the period March, 1996 to January, 1997 on 17.01.1997 vide Misc (N/J) Case No.10/1997 with notice to the

plaintiff No.6 and Sachi Bushan Pathak, the landlord. Since rents are being paid in the Court regularly so they are lawful tenants and also denied the

bonafide requirement of the premises.

On the basis of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the following issues:

Whether there is cause of action for the suit?

Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form?

Whether the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties and misjoinder of parties?

Whether the defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit premises and whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of khas possession in

respect of the suit premises as prayed for?

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs.2340/- from the defendant No.1?

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of future house rent from defendant No.1 until the eviction of the defendants from the suit

premises?

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of damage at the rate of Rs.20/per day in respect of the suit premises as prayed for?

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree as prayed for?

To what relief or reliefs if any the plaintiffs are entitled?

The plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak adduced his evidence and exhibited the rentreceipts along with two other witnesses on behalf of the

plaintiffs’ side. On the other hand, on behalf of the defendants side, one Shyam Sunder Agarwalla, the younger brother of the defendant No.2,

Sunil Kr. Agarwalla, deposed as DW1 on the strength of the power of attorney given by the said defendant No.2 along with the defendant No.3 as

DW2 and one Joy Prakash Shah as DW3. The said witnesses of the defendant side exhibited some bills purchasing goods on credit along with the

power of attorney dated 18.03.2000 executed by the defendant No.2 in favour of DW1, various N.J. cases etc. The learned trial court decided all the

issues except Issue Nos.6 and 7 in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit for eviction from the suit premises along with the arrear rent of

Rs.2,340.00, i.e., for the month of March, 1996 to March, 1997 from the defendant No.1.

Being aggrieved the defendant No.2, Sunil Kr. Agarwalla preferred Title AppealNo.07/2010 against the plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 and one Smti. Kunti

Devi who is the daughter of plaintiff No.6 and was substituted on his death during the pendency of the suit after his deposition as PW1 on 18.07.2000.

The said appeal was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 07.06.2012 thereby upholding the findings of the learned trial court. Thereafter the said

defendant No.2, Sunil Kr. Agarwalla preferred this revision application against the plaintiffs/respondents who were parties in the said Title Appeal

No.07/2010.

Mr. Sarma, the learned senior counsel submits that the suit was bad for nonjoinder ofnecessary parties inasmuch as the First Appellate Court simply

accepted the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak as a landlord only on the ground that tenancy agreement entered in the year 1975 by the said plaintiff

No.6 and the defendant No.1, Nandalal Prabhudayal was admitted.

On the other hand, rent receipts which were exhibited, clearly shows that Sachi Bhushan Pathak was the landlord and not the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji

Pathak. Assailing the finding of the lower appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce documentary or oral evidence that M/S Nandalal

Prabhudayal was a HUF is perverse finding as the rent receipts exhibited by the plaintiffs/respondents and proved by the plaintiff No.6 coupled with

the oral evidence of DW1, clearly proved the said fact. Moreover, the finding that dissolution of the firm in the year 1979 or that the business fell in

the share of Ramawatar Agarwalla were not proved is also not a correct finding considering the evidence of DW1. On the other hand, it is also

submitted that the finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the defendant/petitioner accepted the plaintiff No.6 as the landlord is not a correct

finding which is contrary to the documentary as well as oral evidence. It is further submitted that the father of the present petitioner Ramawatar

Agarwalla is also a necessary party if looked into, from the pleadings of the defendant/petitioner wherein the fact of partition amongst the coparceners

of the HUF was specifically pleaded and further it was pleaded that the business carried out from the suit premises fell in the share of Ramawatar

Agarwalla. The court below considered the defendant No.1, M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal as the tenant and as the matter proceeded ex-parte against

the said defendant No.1 and as there was default on the part of the said defendant No.1 and the tenancy having derived from the said defendant No.1

by the defendant/petitioner, as such, the said defendant/petitioner is a mere trespasser and liable to be ejected. While coming to the said finding, the

learned First Appellate Court failed to take into consideration that the said defendant/petitioner has pleaded and submitted that rents were deposited in

the Court by the said defendant/petitioner in the name of Sachi Bhushan Pathak and the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak. In addition to that, the

practice of adjustment of credit bills against purchase of articles from the defendant/petitioner was followed and as such the finding with respect to the

defaultership is also perverse and liable to be set aside.

Mr. Yadav, the learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed thesubmission of Mr. Sarma on the ground that under no circumstances

the suit is bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties namely Sachi Bhushan Pathak and the father of the defendant/petitioner Ramawatar Agarwalla. It

is submitted that as per the terms of the tenancy agreement executed in the year 1975 and from the pleadings of the defendant/petitioner in the written

statement it is clear and apparent that Babbanji Pathak entered into rent agreement with Nandalal Prabhudayal. Subsequent dissolution of the said firm

and the information to that effect to the plaintiff No.6 or any of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be proved by the defendant/petitioner and under

such circumstances as there was no written statement filed by M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal, the defendant No.1, the said version cannot be accepted.

The court below considered that after the agreement in the year 1975, the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak started collecting the rent on behalf of Sachi

Bhushan Pathak as apparent from the rent receipts and under such circumstances, keeping in view the definition under Section 2 (c) of the Act it is

sufficient to hold that the said plaintiff No.6 was accepted as the landlord by the defendant No.1 and there is no dispute to that effect. The fact of

tenancy agreement is an admitted one and the court below rightly held the same to be an admitted one and on the basis of the said admission, the court

below came to the conclusion that the defendant/petitioner accepted the plaintiff No.6 as the landlord. Mr. Yadav accordingly submits that there is no

perversity in the findings which are concurrent in nature and the revisional jurisdiction is very limited against the concurrent findings until and unless

perversity crept into the findings of the court below. He relies (2017) 5 SCC 69, Durga Prasad vs. Narayan Ramchandaani and (2012) 6 SCC 430, A.

Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam, represented by its President and Others. It is

further submitted that the revision petition merits no interference by this Court inasmuch as after the said concurrent findings of the court below there

is no scope for any further interference rather, the same ought to have been dismissed at the threshold.

Considered the submission of the learned counsel. The pleading of theplaintiffs/respondents is that the defendant No.1, M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal

which has been projected as a proprietorial firm in the plaint entered into the tenancy agreement with the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak started with

effect from 01.06.1975. It is the claim of the present petitioner in the written statement that the said defendant No.1, firm was a HUF carrying on the

business. The rent so fixed as per the said tenancy with effect from 01.06.1975 was accepted by the plaintiff No.6 on behalf of the landlord Sachi

Bhushan Pathak and as against that, rent receipts were issued by the said plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak. It is further claimed that the said HUF

family business was dissolved in the year 1979 and the suit premises fell in the share of the father of the present defendant/petitioner. Thereafter rent

was paid regularly to the said Babbanji Pathak who issued rent receipts in the name of the defendant No.1, Nandalal Prabhudayal. Even thereafter,

that too in the month of March, 1996, in the rent receipts it was shown that the rent was collected by the plaintiff No.6 on behalf of the landlord Sachi

Bhushan Pathak. Accordingly, as per Mr. Sarma, the suit ought to have been filed by the said landlord Sachi Bhushan Pathak and not by the plaintiff

No.6 though it is pleaded in the plaint that during the existence of the tenancy he, as the owner of the suit premises, transferred the same to the

present plaintiffs/respondents leaving aside the respondent No.5 which could not be proved. Similarly, Ramawatar Agarwalla is also a necessary party

after the said partition.

The learned First Appellate Court held that both Sachi Bhushan Pathak and RamawatarAgarwalla are not the necessary parties to the suit and the

same is not bad for nonjoinder of parties and the suit is maintainable. While holding so, the learned First Appellate Court took into consideration the

admitted facts regarding the tenancy as hereinabove stated and as such at the time of creation of the tenancy agreement, the said Babbanji Pathak

was accepted as the landlord by the said defendant No.1, Nandalal Prabhudayal. The present defendant/petitioner claimed his right of tenancy to be

derived from the said defendant No.1 through his father Ramawatar Agarwalla and contested the suit. It is also observed by the learned First

Appellate Court that except the said tenancy agreement, no other tenancy agreement subsequent to the one admitted by the parties, has been referred

in the written statement. Thus, the status of the plaintiff No.6 still existed at the time of filing the suit as the landlord. For the said reason the learned

First Appellate Court held that the defendant/petitioner is estopped from denying the title of the landlord, plaintiff No.6 under Section 116 of the Indian

Evidence Act. The learned First Appellate Court also considered the definition “landlord†as defined under Section 2 (c) of the Act and the

defendant/petitioner paid the rent to plaintiff No.6 without any objection which shows that the defendant/petitioner accepted the plaintiff No.6 as the

landlord. As such Sachi Bhushan Pathak is not a necessary party.

Similarly, the learned First Appellate Court while deciding that Ramawatar Agarwalla asnot a necessary party held that in support of the stand of

the defendant/petitioner he failed to show that the defendant No.1, Nandalal Prabhudayal to be the HUF business by any documentary or oral

evidence nor they could produce any document regarding the partition and the subsequent dissolution of the firm in the year 1979. The

defendant/petitioner also failed to show that the plaintiffs/respondents including the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak knew about the status of defendant

No.1, HUF business firm and also aware with the share of Ramawatar Agarwalla including the business carried out by Ramawatar Agarwalla from

the suit premises and as such Ramawatar Agarwalla is not a necessary party.

The aforesaid findings, in my opinion, are not perverse. Section 2 (c) of the Act defines“landlord†and it covers any person who is for the time

being receiving or entitle to receive rent in respect of any house whether on his own account or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other

person and includes every person not being a tenant who from time to time derive title under the landlord. Keeping in view the said definition of the

term “landlord†it is important to note that landlord means any person who is “for the time being†receive or entitle to receive rent. In Pakhraj

Jain, vs. Mrs. Padma Kashyap and Another, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1133, the Hon’ble Apex Court interpreted the term “landlord†in

Section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act ( 59 of 1958) which provides any induction of tenant for a limited period and whether under such circumstances

the landlord obtaining prior permission of the Controller for such induction of tenant for a limited period under Section 21 includes the legal

representatives of the landlord in order to initiate proceedings for recovery of possession. In the said Delhi Rent Control Act, Section 2 (e) defines

“landlordâ€​ which is reproduced herein below:

“2 (e). “landlord"" means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own

account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if

the premises were let to a tenant.â€​

The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the expression “for the time being†makes it clearthat the landlord has to be understood in praesenti,

i.e., anyone entitled to receive rent is landlord and it does not visualize past or future landlord. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the

word “landlordâ€​ on plain reading of Section 21, does not warrant construction of the word in any other manner.

Bringing the said ratio into reference in this present case in hand it is clear and explicitthat the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak was collecting the

rent since the inception of the tenancy in the year 1975. Even the defendant/petitioner has also not disputed that the said plaintiff No.6, Babbanji

Pathak did not collect the rent. Now if we consider the definition under Section 2 (c) of the Act, similar expression “for the time being†is

stipulated and as such Babbanji Pathak is to be considered as the person entitled to receive the rent in praesenti which can very well be inferred that

at the time of filing the suit Babbanji Pathak was the landlord and there cannot be any visualization of the past or future landlord. From the factual

matrix of the pleadings of the parties to the suit the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak fulfills the requirement under Sec.2 (c) of the Act to be the

“landlord for the time being†and there is no dispute to it. For the said reason the findings of the courts below are correct and the same is not

perverse.

Similarly, the defendant/petitioner failed to bring on record any evidence to show thatthere was partition amongst coparceners of the HUF and

the suit premises fell in the share of Ramawatar Agarwalla. Such being the position and considering that there was no objection raised by the

defendant/petitioner, even if it is presumed that the alleged partition took place in the year 1979, while Babbanji Pathak issued the rent receipts

thereafter in the name of M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal, the defendant No.1, it can very well be concluded that Ramawatar Agarwalla is not a necessary

party to the suit. The defence that the suit is fatal for nonjoinder of necessary parties is a defence normally taken by the defendant. The onus lies upon

the said defendant in order to show that the suit is not maintainable for nonjoinder of necessary parties and the plaintiff is aware of such person who

ought to be made party/parties and such person/persons who ought to be arrayed as necessary party to the suit was left out intentionally by the

plaintiffs. The defendant/petitioner miserably failed to prove that aspect of the matter and as such there is no perversity in the findings of the learned

First Appellate Court.

The next contention of Mr. Sarma, the learned senior counsel is with regard to thefindings that the defendant/petitioner is a defaulter. On

examination of the findings of the courts below it is seen that the learned trial court took note of the fact that the defendant/petitioner failed to show

that defendant No.1, M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal is a HUF business concern nor the subsequent fact of partition. The suit proceeded ex-parte against

the said defendant No.1 and the order was not challenged. The fact of sub-letting was also could not be proved by the plaintiffs/respondents.

Considering the rent receipt issued by the plaintiff No.6, Babbanji Pathak for the month of February, 1996 it was held that the suit premises was under

possession of defendant No.1. The courts below rightly came to the finding that the defendant/petitioner could not be ejected on the ground of sub-

letting.

The contention that the defendant/petitioner is not defaulter as because the plaintiffNo.6 had taken an amount of Rs.1,385.00 in presence of

witness and another amount of Rs.1,225.00 against credit for purchasing some household articles to be adjusted in future rent and on demand by the

defendant/petitioner, plaintiff No.6 did not issue rent receipts for which the rent with effect from March, 1996 to January, 1997 were deposited in the

court was not accepted by the courts below holding such deposit has no bearing to the case. Such conclusion arrived at because the

defendant/petitioner failed to establish that the tenancy was derived from the defendant No.1 on the strength of alleged partition. The said

defendant/petitioner who was impleaded as defendant No.2 nor his father Ramawatar Agarwalla came to the witness box in support of such plea

which is correct. The suit proceeded ex-parte against defendant No.1, M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal nor there was any written statement filed by the

defendant No.1. On the other hand, defendant No.2 filed his written statement and raised the said plea of partition and derivation of the tenancy by his

father Ramawatar Agarwalla from the defendant No.1, HUF business so there was the onus to discharge it and prove the said defence plea on the

face of total denial of the same by the plaintiff No.6 as PW1 in his cross-examination. The courts below rightly held that the defendant No.1, Nandalal

Prabhudayal defaulted in paying the house rent from the month of March, 1996.

The findings on the fact of sub-letting were held by both the courts below in thenegative and under such circumstances the defendant No.1 must

logically remain as the one possessing the suit premises as tenant who failed to disprove the default in paying the rent on the admitted tenancy which

started with effect from 01.06.1975 so necessary logical conclusion is that the defendant No.1 is a defaulter and liable to be evicted. There is no

perversity in the findings. The contention of Mr. Sarma that as the rent receipts show the defendant No.1 as M/S Nandalal Prabhudayal, the holding

of the courts below that the said defendant No.1 is an individual has no bearing which can be termed to be perverse on the face of the reasoning of

the courts below while deciding the Issue No.4.

Thus, I do not find any merit in this revision application and the same is dismissed upholding the concurrent findings of the courts below. The

defendant/petitioner is liable to vacate the tenanted premises within a period of 90 (ninety) days from the date of judgment passed in this revision

application. Failing which the plaintiffs/respondents are entitled to take necessary steps for ejectment of the defendant/petitioner. Interim order stands

vacated.

Send back the LCR.