Sunilbhai Chaturbhai Vasava vs Vs State Of Gujarat & Anr.

Hasmukh D. Suthar, J

[1.0] RULE. Learned APP Mr. H.K. Patel waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent No.1 – State of Gujarat. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. Y.N. Oza assisted by learned advocate Mr. Pinakin M. Raval for the petitioner and learned APP for the respondent No.1 – State of Gujarat.

PROLOGUE:

[2.0] By way of present petition under Articles 14, 21 and 226/227 of the Constitution of India read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”), the petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR being CR No.03 of 2023 dated 07.12.2023 registered with ACB Police Station, District Surendranagar for the offences under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as under Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as “PC Act”).

FACTUAL MATRIX:

[3.0] The brief facts as culled out from the petition are as follows:

[3.1] The petitioner herein was working at Navsari, Palsana, Vyara (Tapi) and Patdi during the check period of job i.e. 01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018. It is alleged in the FIR that during his service from 01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018, the petitioner intentionally adopted various corrupt methods to enrich himself illegally, practiced corruption, obtained money and invested the money in immovable / movable properties in the name of himself and his wife and children. It is the case of the petitioner that on 06.06.2018, FIR being CR No.04/2018 was registered with ACB Police Station, Surendranagar for the offences under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act against the petitioner though the trap was unsuccessful against the petitioner and petitioner was released on regular bail by this Court. Further, during the investigation of the said offence, pursuant to the letter addressed by the Director of ACB, Ahmedabad, further investigation was carried out and pursuant to the said further investigation, another offence for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act is registered which is nothing but abuse of process of law as the same offence was in continuation of investigation. Hence, second FIR is not permissible. In connection with the said offence, anticipatory bail application was preferred by the petitioner before the learned Sessions Judge which was rejected and thereafter, anticipatory bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No.493/2024 was preferred before this Court which was also rejected. Then the petitioner approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of filing Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No.2601/2024 which came to be withdrawn vide order dated 26.02.2024. He has further submitted that no opportunity is given to the petitioner to explain the known source of income and wrongly clubbed the bank accounts and high income is mentioned.

[3.2] It is further the case that on 07.12.2023 i.e. after a delay of 5 years, the FIR impugned herein came to be filed and therefore, present petition is being filed for quashing of the impugned FIR.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

[4.0] Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Y.N. Oza assisted by learned advocate Mr. Pinakin M. Raval for the petitioner has submitted that impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law and petitioner has nothing to do with the offences alleged against him. The impugned FIR is filed after a huge and unexplained delay of 5 years.

[4.1] He submits that during the investigation of Trap offence during the search at the house of the petitioner nothing incriminating had been discovered or recovered which amounts to the case of any disclosure of any alleged offence does not warrant recording of any new or fresh FIR and the said issue is now settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in series of legal pronouncements that recording of subsequent FIR for the same transaction is abuse of process of law. The CrPC clearly provides that, if Investigating Officer commences to complete an investigation and collects the evidence for that detail provisions are made. Even after filing of final report also, if any further information or material is received, there is no need to register a fresh FIR as Investigating Officer is empowered to make further investigation with permission of the Court and where during further investigation, the Investigating Officer collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he has to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of section 173 of the CrPC. But in any case, fresh FIR is not permissible and such exercise is nothing but an abuse of process of Court. In support of his submission, Mr. Yatin Oza, learned Senior Counsel has relied on the judgment of (1) T.T. Antony vs. State of Kerala reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181; (2) Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010)12 SCC 254 and (3) Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2013) 6 SCC 348 contending that if an offence is part and parcel of the same transaction forming different facts then also on such basis, separate FIR cannot be registered. As alleged allegation is nothing but offshoot of investigation of trap case investigation and same series of act and transaction and hence, investigation may go on by clubbing FIR but registration of separate offence is not permissible and accused cannot be forced each time to face fresh investigation in respect of either same incident or giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. A registration of second FIR is nothing but amounts to violation of fundamental rights of accused. Hence, this is a fit case to exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and requested to allow petition and to quash and set aside the impugned proceedings.

[4.2] Further, it is submitted that the income of the petitioner is not calculated properly by the investigating agency and while calculating the income, they considered income of only two accounts of the petitioner i.e. Bank of Baroda and State Bank of India rather than considering all bank accounts of the petitioner i.e. Axis Bank, Kotak Bank and Dena Bank and it is submitted that if all the bank accounts of the petitioner are considered then the ratio of income of petitioner will exceed and ratio of disproportionate assets as shown in the FIR will decrease. Similarly, income of wife of petitioner is considered from only one account i.e. Bank of Baroda and have not considered the account of wife of the petitioner held with State Bank of India. He has submitted that considering all the five bank accounts of petitioner as well as his wife would show income of the petitioner more than the one shown in the impugned FIR.

[4.3] Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that amount of PPF deposits as well as interest accrued in all the bank accounts of the petitioner and his wife is actually more than the one shown in the FIR. Thus, he has submitted that correct figure of income would be Rs.2,46,50,095/- whereas in the FIR the income is shown as Rs.1,58,33,893/- and therefore, the marginal amount would be Rs.68,780/- meaning thereby, amount of disproportionate assets will be around 1%. Further, it is submitted that the petitioner has not been given details regarding expenses by the investigating agency otherwise the petitioner could have provided proper explanation about the same and figures of expenditure mentioned in FIR is misleading and misconceived. The preliminary enquiry is conducted for check period from 01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018 for calculating disproportionate assets.

[4.4] Further, he has submitted that petitioner has addressed several representations to the investigating agency for providing details of petitioner’s expenses as shown in the FIR but petitioner has not been provided with the information sought for under the pretext of on-going investigation.

[4.5] He has submitted that ACB has been issued guidelines to given allowance of a reasonable margin of 20% on the total income of the government servant. If the petitioner gets an opportunity to explain his case and all income which is not considered by the Investigating Officer so that the actual figure of amount of disproportionate assets can be calculated as all presumptions are rebuttable one. Lastly, he has submitted that impugned FIR is a second FIR. Hence, he has requested to allow the present petition and quash and set aside the impugned FIR.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1:

[5.0] Learned APP Mr. H.K. Patel for respondent No.1 – State of Gujarat has vehemently opposed the present petition and submitted that in the present case, after conducting inquiry for a long period of three years and after collecting important and material evidences it has been found that the petitioner is having disproportionate assets worth more than Rs.88 lakh and present prosecution has been lodged after taking opinion from financial advisor appointed by Government. He has further submitted that before registering the FIR, the petitioner was sufficiently heard and has been afforded all the opportunity to defend himself and investigation is still going on.

[5.1] Learned APP further contended that, the submissions advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner are misconceived. In case on hand two distinct offences are alleged. First was for demand of illegal gratification and during investigation it was found that at various places while working as public servant accused has committeed criminal misconduct and for different check period, separate offence is registered for which allegation, place, charge and witnesses are also different one. Further, learned APP has submitted that, the subsequent FIR cannot be termed as second FIR, as it is only against the present petitioner, as he was found to be in possession of cash and property worth more than the income from his legal source of income and he could not satisfactorily account for it and hence, FIR under sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act was lodged. The said instance has been made genesis for the investigation of the possession of disproportionate assets of the petitioner. In the earlier FIR, the charge-sheet is filed against one Mr. Dilipkumar Valjibhai Prajapati and the present petitioner. While investigation is still in progress in the impugned FIR.

[5.2] Insofar as submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Oza that all the details of all the bank accounts of the petitioner and his wife have not been taken is concerned, learned APP has submitted that said submission is false and baseless as all the bank accounts held by the petitioner and his wife have been considered while calculating the income and assets of the petitioner and the said fact is also stated in the report of the Investigating Officer. Even, Rs.1 Crore in cash deposited in the bank account of petitioner – accused.

[5.3] He has further submitted that, the petitioner by misusing his position as Deputy Collector has adopted corrupt practices to achieve illegal monetary gain and thus have accumulated income and assets disproportionate to his known source of income and that investigation of the impugned FIR is at very nascent stage and if the FIR is quashed at threshold then it will adversely affect the possibility of exploring more disproportionate assets and hence, he has requested not to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and has requested to dismiss the petition.

ANALYSIS:

[6.0] I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments canvassed by learned advocate appearing for the respective parties. It would be relevant to consider whether the impugned FIR is a second FIR on the same set of facts and allegations or not? To advert said contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner, details of FIR impugned herein as well as earlier FIR is required to be considered, which is as under:

CR No.

I-CR No.04/2018

I -CR No.03/2023

Date of offence

05.06.2018

01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018

Date of FIR

06.06.2018

07.12.2023

Sections

7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

13(1)(e) & 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

13(1)(b) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018

Police Station

ACB Police Station, Surendranagar

ACB Police Station, Surendranagar

Complainant

Dipakkumar Gunwantrai Patel

M.D. Patel, Police Inspector, ACB Police Station, Surendranagar

Details of accused

Sunilbhai Chaturbhai Vasava

Dilipkumar Valjibhai Prajapati

Sunilkumar Chaturbhai Vasava

Crux of allegations

Being a public servant, present petitioner – accused made a demand of illegal gratification of an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- to decide RTS Appeal in six cases in favor of uncle of complainant Shri Ashwin Nandlal Patel on 02.06.2018 and after negotiations, amount of gratification was fixed at Rs.3,00,000/- out of which Rs.27,000/- was paid to accused No.2 and remaining amount of Rs.2,73,000/- was accepted on 05.06.2018. In this regard, offence was registered qua making the demand of illegal gratification by accused.

During his service from 01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018, the petitioner intentionally adopted various corrupt methods to enrich himself illegally, practiced corruption, obtained money and invested the money in immovable / movable properties in the name of himself and his wife and children. Thus, as against the total income of Rs.1,58,33,893/- from his legal source of income, the petitioner has made expenses / investments to the tune of Rs.2,47,18,875/- i.e. disproportionate assets worth Rs.88,84,982/- i.e. 59.26% and thus committed the offence.

[6.1] Perusing the aforesaid both the complaints, it appears that, FIR being I-CR No.04/2018 was registered on 06.06.2018 at the instance of complainant viz. Shri M.D. Patel, Police Inspector, ACB Police Station, Surendranagar for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act and as accused No.2 had abetted in aid of Section 12, section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the criminal misconduct came to be filed wherein the demand of illegal gratification was made there and after accepting the said demand, trap was laid and then offence was registered. Considering the aforesaid fact, in the impugned offence, prosecution must have to prove demand of illegal gratification, then acceptance and recovery has to be proved and then offence is made out, which is said to be criminal misconduct by a public servant. For that, different witnesses, different time and different criteria is fixed.

[6.2] In order to prove offence under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act, prosecution has to prove about the disproportionate assets of accused. In absence of any satisfactory explanation on the part of accused about the known source of income prosecution being lodged. Accused has to prove his reliable or known source of income which is within his special knowledge. Further, considering the witnesses of both the offences and commission of offence at different time and criteria is also different to decide the said offence. Considering the aforesaid fact, merely because during the further investigation of trap case, disproportionate assets were inquired and it was noticed that the present petitioner – accused has amassed disproportionate assets worth more than his known source of income and then during the check period of 2008 to 2018 when accused had rendered service at different places during the aforesaid check period, offence is registered. Once prosecution has proved and established that the accused has accumulated disproportionate assets then the burden shifts on accused to prove that he has not amassed any disproportionate assets. Considering the aforesaid fact, criteria of both the offences is different. The said case in connection with offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act has nothing to do with the earlier case of bribery which is not the impugned offence and has nothing to do with the series of act culminating into an offence. Hence, question does not arise to decide that both the offences are same and one and hence, second FIR is not permissible. In this regard, reference is required to be made to the decision in the case of V.K. Puri vs. CBI reported in (2007) 6 SCC 191 wherein offence under Sections 7(2), 13(1)(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act is distinguished.

[6.3] The FIR being I-C.R. No.04/2018 was registered on 06.06.2018 with ACB Police Station, Surendranagar for the offences under sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act. Whereas, impugned subsequent FIR being I-CR No.03/2023 for the offences under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 is assailed on the ground that neither second FIR nor fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same series of act or same occurrence leads to alleged cognizable offence.

[7.0] Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act is about the public servant said to have committed the offence of criminal misconduct by abusing his position, obtains himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, which becomes punishable under section 13(2) of the PC Act. Section 13(1)(e) with the explanation as along with penal provision under Section 13(2) of the PC Act reads thus:

“Section 13(1)- A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-

(a) …

(b) …

(c) …

(d) …

(e) “if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.

13(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than [four years] but which may extend to [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.”

Prior to registration of FIR, the present petitioner was asked to clarify about the cash and assets and time and again he appeared through an Advocate, in person and in presence of Chartered Accountant which is revealed from the investigation papers and report submitted by the IO.

[7.1] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.T. Antony (Supra) has been pleased to observed that if the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirement of the section, there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence. The Investigating Officer has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and to submit final report under Section 173 of the CrPC.

[7.2] The impermissibility of registering the second FIR is to protect the fundamental right of an accused double jeopardy. The legality of the second FIR was extensively discussed in T.T. Antony (Supra). The Court established the test of sameness which means that unless in both the two cases, where the first and second FIR is registered respectively, the FIRs appear to be substantially different from each other such as in facts and circumstances, the second FIR cannot be filed. This means that the facts and circumstances giving rise to two FIRs must be different, or the offence committed in two must be different, or the person accused of committing the offence is different. Only then, the second FIR is permissible.

[7.3] The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2010)12 SCC 254 explained that the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Court can apply the test of sameness when:-

(i) it has to examine the facts and circumstances that are giving rise to two FIRs;

(ii) in trying to find out whether it relates to the same incident, the Court has to either look at the occurrence of the two incidents and their relationship with each other or the transactions of the occurrence if it has occurred in parts;

(iii) if it finds out that the occurrence of the offence is the same or the different transaction forms the part of the same occurrence, the second FIR is liable to be quashed;

(iv) but if the two occurrences are based on different versions and two different crimes, the second FIR shall sustain;

[7.4] Further, one more aspect which is required to be considered is Test of Consequence. Where the offence registered under the second FIR occurs as a consequence of the offence alleged to have occurred in the first FIR the ‘test of consequence’ is to be applied. In the case of C. Muniappan vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2010) 9 SCC 567, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the offences alleged to have occurred in both the FIRs are the same and thus, the second FIR will not be permissible. This test of consequence has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2013) 6 SCC 348. The ‘test of consequence’ is also to be applied in cases where the offence disclosed in the first FIR is not the same, as the offence disclosed in the second FIR. In this case, a second FIR is permissible. This may also include a situation where the second FIR is lodged by different persons and in different police stations.

[7.5] Another situation that has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is where an accused comes with a different version or counterclaims, the same has to be investigated differently as maintained in the case of Babubhai & Ors. (Supra). Further, a similar position was observed in Surendar Kaushik & Ors. vs. State of U.P. reported in (2013)5 SCC 148, where the Court concluded that the concept of sameness precluded the counter-FIR filed by the victim relating to the same offence. The meaning of the concept of sameness is restricted and what is precluded is any further complaint by the complainant for the registration of the case for an investigation that has already begun. This essentially means that the counter-version of the FIR takes two different shapes. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the position of these two above-mentioned cases in P. Sreekumar vs. State of Kerala reported in (2018) 4 SCC 579 and concluded that, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction and then the second FIR is not permissible and liable to be quashed; In case where separate transaction is not a part of same transaction it cannot be considered as a part of same transaction. The word ‘same transaction’ cannot be given technical meaning and for that common sense is to be applied to find out whether the facts of the case form a part of same investigation. In this regard, reference is required to be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Baitha vs. State of Bihar reported in (2001) 4 SCC 350. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nirmalsingh Kahlo vs. State of Punjab reported in (2009) 1 SCC 441 held that second FIR is permissible where new discovery made factually but the second or subsequent FIR based on same cause of action is not permissible but second FIR is permissible.

[8.0] In present case the incident is separate. During the period of 01.04.2008 to 31.05.2018, petitioner served as a public servant at different places viz. Navsari, Palsana, Vyara (Tapi) and Patdi and by adopting and indulging in corrupt practice petitioner – accused amassed the property which is disproportionate and more than reliable and known source of income and thus the accused has committed an offence of criminal misconduct, which does not fall within the ambit and scope of offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act i.e. demand of illegal gratification for motive or reward. The FIR recorded first is in this regard and second FIR is for criminal misconduct for disproportionate assets more than the known source of income. In such separate set of facts, there was no prohibition in law to file second FIR. The checking was on the basis of investigation of the accumulation of assets worth of Rs.2,47,18,875/- and the petitioner could not provide satisfactory account of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income and thus, the property was out of corruption made by the accused. In light of these facts, thorough investigation in the present case is required in a proper and objective manner as the investigation is at nascent stage.

[8.1] Further, so far as the allegation of sameness is concerned, the issue involved in present matter is squarely covered by pronouncement of the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Vrujeshkumar Hemaji Umat vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in 2018 (3) GLR 1954 while dealing with the same issue has been pleased to decide the maintainability of second FIR, which was an off-shoot of investigation of offence registered under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and wherein after considering all the pronouncements i.e. T.T. Antony (Supra); (2) Babubhai (Supra) and (3) Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra) come to conclusion that there is no sameness or no series of offence and both the offences are different and offence under Section 13(1)(e) is a different one and in such circumstances quashing is not permissible as both the offences are distinct one. As both the offences are different and no sameness is there. Hence, the argument canvassed by learned Counsel for the petitioner that both the offences are same is not acceptable as there is no commonality in any of the FIR and both the FIRs emerge from different circumstances and not a part of same transaction. Hence, impugned FIR cannot be termed as a second FIR for common offence and hence, argument canvassed by the learned Counsel for common trial is also not acceptable and the authorities relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.T. Antony (Supra); (2) Babubhai (Supra) and (3) Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra) would not avail any assistance to the petitioner as elaborately discussed in the aforesaid pronouncements. Considering the said fact as also considering the allegations in the impugned FIR, act is not committed in series of earlier offence and present offence is independent offence and the concept of sameness is also not applicable.

[9.0] Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the FIR is filed malafide and no opportunity is given to explain his defence. So far as said argument is concerned, prior to lodgment of the FIR, opportunity is given to the accused. The petitioner – accused appeared through his Advocate and through Chartered Accountant and has given explanation and time and again opportunity was given. Even, whatever defence raised qua calculation, it is a matter of defence and cannot be looked into at this juncture. Insofar as malafide is concerned, no any particular or material is placed on record or no any such ground emerges from the petition which supports the said contention. In order to establish malafide specific averment is required to be made in the pleading. The petitioner has raised all contentions about his income which are disputed questions of fact and cannot be gone into while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. The criteria is different to establish the known or reliable source of income by the accused which are within the special knowledge of the petitioner – accused and in such corruption cases, quashing of FIR at investigation stage is not permissible and for that Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Chhatisgarh and Another vs. Aman Kumar Singh and Others reported in (2023) 6 SCC 559 has laid down as to what approach should be adopted while considering petition for quashing of FIR under the PC Act. In the said decision it is observed that though it is the preambular promise of the Constitution to secure social justice to the people of India by striving to achieve equal distribution of wealth, it is yet a distant dream. If not the main, one of the more prominent hurdles for achieving progress in this field is undoubtedly ‘corruption’. Corruption is a malaise, the presence of which is all pervading in every walk of life. It is not now limited to the spheres of activities of governance; regrettably, responsible citizens say it has become a way of one’s life. Indeed, it is a matter of disgrace for the entire community that not only on the one hand is there a steady decline in steadfastly pursuing the lofty ideals which the founding fathers of our Constitution had in mind, degradation of moral values in society is rapidly on the rise on the other. Not much debate is required to trace the root of corruption. Further, while deciding the challenge to the FIR, the High Court should bear in mind the note of caution in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; further that, the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint; and also that, the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. It seems that such note of caution did not have the desired effect in all cases re-emphasizing the need for the High Court to bear in mind the settled principle of law that whenever its powers are invoked either under Article 226 of the Constitution or section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing a first information report/complaint, the Courts would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. In this regard, reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Court while dealing with a case under the P.C. Act in State of Maharashtra Vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri reported in (1996) 1 SCC 542 would be profitable. Thus, to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if a hands-off approach is maintained and not quash a first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a PC Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for this Court would be to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case.

[10.0] Only delay in lodging of the FIR is not a ground for quashing of proceedings but in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. In this regard, reference is required to be made to the decision in the case of Mohammad Wajid and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in 2023 INSC 683. In case of delay with attending circumstances coming forth on the record of the case, Court has to consider the allegations and if considering the entire case put up by the prosecution is inherently improbable then delay may become a good ground to quash the said proceedings. Herein, considering the attending circumstances emerging from the record, it is proved that prosecution has not filed the impugned FIR with any ulterior motive and therefore, the argument canvassed by learned Counsel for the petitioner that FIR is filed belatedly and therefore, same is required to be quashed and set aside is not sustainable.

[11.0] Further, in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharshtra reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

“iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its petition for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;”

CONCLUSION:

[12.0] In wake of aforesaid discussion, there is no commonality in any of the FIRs and both are different. Even, present case does not satisfy any of the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC vis-à-vis the quashing of impugned FIR. Further, the Court will not be justified in embarking upon any enquiry as to the reliability of genuineness / otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint and also that, the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and caprice.

[13.0] Hence, present petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. Rule is hereby discharged.

[14.0] It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are tentative in nature and only for the purpose of deciding present petition and shall not have any bearing on the merits of the pending proceedings.