High CourtsSingle Bench

Sunita Devi vs State of Jharkhand and Another

Jharkhand High Court · Decided on 17 December 2004 · Citation: (2005) 2 DMC 96

HON’BLE JUDGES
Hari Shankar Prasad, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 323, 325, 498A
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Cr.M.P. No. 810 of 2003
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

6 paragraphs · 1,241 words

Hari Shankar, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Counsel for the State and the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2.

2.

This is an application for cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the opposite party NO. 2/accused by this Court in A.B.A. No. 190 of 2002.

3.

The case of the petitioner/informant is that she is legally married wife of the opposite party/accused No. 2 and the marriage was solemnized on 10.5.1996 according to Hindu rites and customs. The father of the complainant/petitioner had given Rs. 51,000/- cash, 10 tolas of golden ornaments, etc. and other articles, such as T.V., clothes, bed, Palung and after "Bidai ceremony" the complainant went to her Sasural keeping golden dreams of happy conjugal life but her all dreams shattered into pieces when she had to face greedy, cruel and heartless husband and in-laws who were not satisfied with the articles given to the complainant at the time of marriage with Prabhas Chandra Mahto. There was demand of Hero Honda Motor Cycle and a Godrej Almirah from the complainant and she was pressurized for fulfilling the demand of the aforesaid articles from petitioner and other accused persons. The complainant refused to complain about the threat, pressure of the accused persons and asked her father to provide all these articles to her Sasural people including the O.P. No. 2/accused, who is her husband but her father was not in a position to provide these articles and thereafter torture continued and, ultimately, as a result of non-fulfilment of demand, she used to be assaulted by shoe, chappal, fists, slaps and painas by her husband, Sasur, Sas. The complainant was carrying pregnancy of about six months at the relevant time but her father brought her to his residence seeing no way out. Her first pregnancy was terminated on 17.1.1997 due to ill-treatment and assault by her husband and others. On 3.10.1999 she gave birth to a female child and when the Sasural people came to know that she has given birth to a female child, none of the family members from her Sasural came to see the baby. Thereafter abuse and torture, etc. continued and she was driven out from her Sasural. At the time of her departure, she was brutally assaulted by all the accused persons and thereafter she was hospitalized and the doctor issued injury report and thereafter she lodged a complaint case which was sent to the concerned police station for institution and Investigation on the basis of which, Bekaro (Gomla) P.S. Case No. 83 of 2001 (G.R. No. 805 of 2001) was registered under Sections 498A/325/323, IPC. Thereafter the accused/husband impressed the complainant/wife that he will now keep her with honour and dignity and on his assurance, a compromise was entered into between the wife and husband and at the time of hearing of anticipatory bail petition filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 2/accused that compromise petition was filed and the complainant/petitioner was also present in the Court, the learned Sessions Judge with some observation directed the opposite party/accused to surrender in the Court below and the learned Court below will consider the matter and will dispose of the bail application in terms of the compromise petition. Thereafter he did not take his wife and terminated the compromise petition entered into between the parties and both went to their respective homes. Thereafter the aforesaid anticipatory bail application was filed in this Court and on the basis of compromise petition, anticipatory bail was granted to the accused/opposite party No. 2.

4.

The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that at the time when anticipatory bail application was moved before this Court, by that time, compromise has broken down and by suppressing this fact, the accused/ opposite party No. 2 has been able to get the order of anticipatory bail in his favour from the High Court on the same compromise petition which had broken down and, therefore, by suppressing the fact and by playing fraud upon the Court, the opposite party No. 2/accused has got his anticipatory bail and, therefore, the anticipatory bail granted to him is fit to be cancelled.

5.

On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2/accused submitted that there is no merit in the cancellation application because the opposite party/accused was granted anticipatory bail by this Court on the basis of compromise petition and even if the terms of compromise are violated by the husband/accused, still then, the bail granted, whether anticipatory bail or regular bail, cannot be cancelled. In this connection, reliance has been placed upon 2004(2) CCSC 746, Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee and Anr., wherein it has been held that even if there was no compromise between the parties, bail cannot he cancelled. In the case cited above on behalf of the opposite party No. 2, accused was granted bail on the ground that there was possibility of compromise between the parties and when the terms of compromise were violated then the cancellation petition was filed on behalf of the wife/petitioner but the Hon''ble Apex Court held, that even if there was violation in terms of agreement, the bail already granted cannot be cancelled and, therefore, there is no merit in this application and this should be dismissed.

6.

From going through the entire material available on record, it is clear that this is a case where compromise entered into between the parties was not subsisting at the time when this plea was taken by the opposite party/accused before this Court that the parties have entered into compromise because by the time this plea was taken before this Court the compromise had already broken down and bail has not been granted to the petitioner till then. But when compromise entered into between the parties had broken down, by suppressing the fact, even the plea of compromise between them was taken before the Court and this Court believing that the compromise is still subsisting, granted anticipatory bail to the opposite party No. 2/accused, and, therefore, this is not a case of violation of terms of agreement after grant of bail but it is a case of violation of terms even before bail was granted and this plea was taken on behalf of the opposite party No. 2 knowing fully well that the compromise has already broken down and he should not have take such plea before this Court but by suppressing this fact, the accused/opposite party No. 2 has played fraud with the Court that the compromise is still subsisting. Therefore, the case law cited here, in my view, does not apply to the fact and circumstances of this case because this is not a case on the basis where even assurance was granted or on the basis of compromise between the parties, bail was granted and, thereafter, there was violation of the terms of agreement on behalf, of assurances, accused/opposite party No. 2 got bail. But this is a case where at the time of taking this plea, compromise had already broken down and it was not expected that such plea should have been taken by suppressing this fact, the opposite party No. 2/accitsed has got bail and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case by playing fraud with the Court, the anticipatory bail has been obtained. Therefore, this application is allowed and anticipatory bail granted to the opposite party No. 2/accused is hereby cancelled.