Sunita Jaiswal (Smt.) vs State of Chhattisgarh and Others

Satish K. Agnihotri, J.—With the consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the petition is heard finally.

By this petition, the petitioner impugns the order of" termination dated 30-10-2009 (Annexure P-l) passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Bharatpur, District Koriya, on the ground that the authority is not competent to pass such an order.

Schedule I Rule 2 (b) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 2007 (for short "the Rules, 2007") clearly provides that in case of Shiksha Karmi Grade-Ill the Appointing Authority is the Chief Executive Officer of Janpad Panchayat with approval of General Administration Committee, Janpad Panchayat. Whether approval has been obtained or not, it is not clear.

Rule 13 of the Rules, 2007 provides for an appeal against any order passed under these rules. If the order has been passed either by the Chief Executive Officer or any other Authority, the same shall be appealable under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993.

Be that as it may, without going into the merits of the case, I have found that Statutory Appellate Provision is adequate, effective and efficacious. There is no reason to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner when the above Statutory Appellate Forum is available.

On the question of availability of alternative remedy, the Supreme Court in State of H.P. and Ors. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement and Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 499, observed as under:

We shall first deal with the plea regarding alternative remedy as raised by the appellant State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction.

In G. Veerappa Pilla v. Raman & Raman Ltd., CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Stale of Orissa; KB. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. Stale of Bihar, Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, this Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction.

Further, applying the said ratio in U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. Vs. R.S. Pandey and Another, , the Supreme Court observed as under:

In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Seta Nigam S. Karmachari Sangh, it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insist upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To the same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad and Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred.

In another decision on the concept of maintainability of writ petition vis-a-vis availability of alternative remedy, the Supreme Court in Secretary, U.P. High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad and Another Vs. H.K. Lal, observed as under:

From the records it is borne out that the question as to whether the respondent has a legal-right to alter his date of birth recorded in the certificate granted by the Board was pending consideration before the Appellate Court. The writ petition filed by the respondent should, therefore, not have been entertained particularly in view of the fact that the appeal thereagainst was pending. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy.

A common thread running into the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases is that normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedy before resorting to writ jurisdiction, except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure.

This Court also in Chandrika Prasad Sahu and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. W.P. (S) No. 4597/2008, decided on 28-8-2008, relying on various decisions of Supreme Court on the question of alternative remedy, observed that "normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate, efficacious, alternative remedy where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedy before resorting to writ jurisdiction, except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure".

For the reasons stated hereinabove and applying the well settled principles of law, without expressing any opinion on merits, this writ petition is dismissed, as not maintainable, at the motion stage itself.