Sunita Rani vs Ranjit Kaur

K.K. Srivastava, J.

By means of this petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) the petitioners seek the quashing of a criminal complaint (annexure P1) and the order dated 18.4.1992 of summoning them as accused (annexure P2), as being illegal. Respondent Smt. Ranjit Kaur filed the said criminal complaint against the petitioners alleging that she was married with Harinder Pal son of Shri Sardar Chand on 15.1.1990 at Ludhiana according to the Sikh religion and rites. Petitioner No. 1 Smt. Sunita Rani is the sister of Harinder Pal and is married with petitioner No. 2 Joginder Singh. Petitioners reside at Purani Khalasi Line, House No. OLL 143, Ferozepur Cantt. In the marriage of Harinder Pal, his parents Sardar Chand and Smt. Saroj Kanta had also participated. After marriage the respondent came to live with her husband in Manglore Puri in a house consisting of two rooms. Apart from the respondent Smt. Ranjit Kaur and her husband Harinder Pal, the parentsinlaw and two brothersinlaw of the respondentwife also resided in the said house at Manglore Puri. It was alleged that the petitioners, Harinder Pal and his parents were dissatisfied with the dowry given at that time of the marriage of the respondent and these persons demanded more dowry. They dowry which articles which were given to the respondent at the time of her marriage were entrusted to the petitioners and other accused persons including her husband, his brothers and his parents and they promised to return on demand these dowry items to the respondentwife Smt. Ranjit Kaur. It is alleged that the father of the respondent/complainant had spent a sum of Rs. 40,000/ on the marriage aforesaid which was beyond their reach and they performed the marriage in decent manner in order to satisfy the demands regarding dowry of the accused persons. The respondent alleged in the complaint that after barely two months of the marriage she was tortured by her parentsinlaw and her husband for bringing less dowry. The demanded more items in dowry included a motorcycle, a gold ring and cash and forced her to convey their demands for being fulfilled, to her parents. The father of the respondentwife reluctantly paid Rs. 9,000/ in cash by selling some machines in order to see his daughter happy in her matrimonial house. The torture of the resondentwife, however, continued and she was living under constant apprehension of danger to her life at the hands of the accused persons. The parents of the respondentwife were unable to satisfy the everincreasing demands for more dowry of the accused persons. The accused persons denied even the two square meals to the respondentwife and on the other hand they forced her to work hard in the house and to do all household work. The accused persons are also alleged to have given physical beating to the respondent who was even turned out of the matrimonial house in bare three clothes in the month of January 1991. The respondent came to reside with her parents. Subsequently on 14.4.1991, the accused persons came to the house of the father of the respondentwife and took her with them and at that the time she took four pairs of clothes and gold earrings. At that time the accused persons gave a written note admitting about the demand of dowry and accepting more dowry from the parents of the respondent. The accused persons, however, did not mend themselves and again stated torturing the respondent. On 4.12.1991 the husband of the respondent wife under the influence of liquor and at the instigation of other accused kicked his wife (respondent) out of the matrimonial home in the clothes she was wearing at that time. She had been openly threatened by the accused that she would be killed if she dared to return to their house without bringing the dowry demanded by the accused persons. It has been further alleged that the accused persons retained with them the dowry items which were entrusted to them. A Panchayat was convened by the parents of the respondent and in the Panchayat the accused persons flatly refused to accept the respondent in their house and also refused to hand over the dowry items that were entrusted to them.

Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana after examining the complainant wife as P.W. 1 and her witnesses Kehar Singh, P.W. 2, Badri Nath, P.W. 3 and Sohan Singh, P.W. 4 ordered for the summoning of the opposite parties of the complaint as accused under Sections 406/498A of Indian Penal Code.

The petitioners have prayed for the quashing on the grounds, inter alia, that there is no material worth reliance to show even prima facie that the petitioners committed an offence under Sections 406/498A of Indian Penal Code. The petitioners resided separately from the family of the husband of the respondentwife, his parents and brothers. The petitioners have been falsely implicated in the case with a view to implicate all the relatives of the husband of the respondentwife. It has been further submitted that the witnesses produced by the respondentRanjit Kaur in support of her allegations belong to Ludhiana and they could not probably have seen any act or conduct which would show that the respondent was subjected to cruelty for bringing more dowry. The details of the Panchayat alleged to have been held, have not been furnished in the complaint. Even the date of the holding of the Panchayat has not been mentioned. Regarding the summoning order it was alleged that it suffered from vagueness and the order did not discuss the details regarding the particular entrustment of the dowry articles to the petitioners by the respondentwife Ranjit Kaur or her parents. It has been alleged that the petitioners are residing in Ferozepur Cantt. whereas the complainant Ranjit Kaur, her husband and her inlaws are residing at New Delhi but in the complaint, common address of all the accused has been given. The complaint is an abuse of the process of law and the order of summoning is not based on legally admissible evidence and the same has been passed without properly applying judicial mind. The summoning order has resulted in miscarriage of justice to the petitioners who are third parties so far as the complainant and her husband are concerned.

Notice of motion was issued to the respondent who put in appearance and filed reply by way of her affidavit denying the averments made in the petition and alleging that the controversy regarding the facts can be gone into only at the time of the trial of the case and at this stage no enquiry can be held regarding the truthfulness of the allegations made in the complaint. The allegations made in the complaint had been described to be correct on facts and the same allegations have been repeated in the reply regarding the demand of dowry and harassment and torture for the sake of more dowry. She has defended the summoning order as being in accordance with the material paced on record and in accordance with the provisions of law. It has also been denied that the petitioners are residing with their parents at Ferozepur. The respondent has maintained her stand that the petitioners are in fact residing with the family of her husband. The complaint has been described as legal and valid.

I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent.

The petitioners are the sister and brotherinlaw of the husband of the complainant Smt. Ranjit Kaur. The petitioners alleged that they are living separately at Ferozepur where the parents of petitioner No. 2 are also residing. The petitioners have alleged further that the complainant has wrongly shown their residence at the address of the other coaccused i.e. the parents of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Sunita Rani. According to the petitioners, the complainant has shown the residence of the petitioners with her husband and inlaws in order to lend support to her allegations of harassment and torture even at the hands of these petitioners for the sake of dowry demand. It is not disputed that the petitioner Smt. Sunita Rani is the wife of petitioner No. 2 i.e. Joginder Singh are residents of Purani Khalasi Line, House No. OLL 143, Ferozepur Cantt. The allegations made in the complaint do not show that these petitioners were residing with inlaws of the complainant. Petitioner No. 1 Smt. Sunita Rani after her marriage is normally expected to reside with her husband. The normal residence of the husband i.e. petitioner No. 2 is in Ferozepur. Unless and until there are specific allegations regarding petitioner No. 2 residing at the house of his inlaws with his wife petitioner No. 1, it cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the address of the petitioners in the complaint has been shown as that of the parentsinlaw of the respondentwife, that they were in fact residing there. The occasional visits of the petitioners to the house of the parents of petitioner No. 1 cannot be ruled out and under normal circumstances such visits are quite probable. In view of the fact that there are no specific allegations in the complaint regarding the actual residence of the petitioners at the house of the parents of petitioner No. 1, the averments made by the petitioners in the petition about their residing at Ferozepur Cantt. with the parents of petitioner No. 2 deserve to be prima facie believed.

The main grounds for quashing the complaint as mentioned in the petition and which have already been mentioned in this order are as under:

1) The allegations regarding the entrustment of the dowry articles to the petitioners soon after the marriage of the respondent are vague and not specific.

2) The allegations of harassment and torture for the sake of dowry demand in respect of the petitioners are also vague and not specific.

3) The respondentwife has implicated the entire family of her husband in the complaint.

So far as the order of summoning is concerned, the petitioners have alleged that the summoning order is vague and it did not discuss the material before the Court regarding the entrustment of the dowry items to the petitioners by respondentRanjit Kaur or her parents. Apart From it, there is no discussion as to what cruelty has been committed by the petitioners on the respondent for bringing more dowry.

A careful perusal of the complaint, a copy of which is on record as annexure P1, would go to show that all the accused persons named in the complaint are alleged to have demanded dowry as per annexure A appended to the compliant and the same was given by the parents of the complainant in the presence of witnesses Jagat Ram, Avtar Singh Fauji, Badri Nath and Kehar Singh, all residents of Ludhiana. It has been further alleged that the dowry articles were entrusted to all the accused persons on the clear understanding and admittance by them the same shall be handed over to the complainant on her reaching the house of the husband of the complainant or as and when the complainant made a demand for the same. These allegations have been made in para 3 of the complaint. In para 4 of the complaint it was averred that after the marriage the complainantwife started residing with the her husband Harinder Pal at her matrimonial house and the accused also resided in the same house and they had joined mess and residence. In Para 5 of the complaint it was alleged, inter alia, that the father of the complainant spent a sum of Rs. 40,000/ in the marriage in order to satisfy the dowry demands of the accused persons. The accused persons were, however, not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of the marriage. The harassment and torture of the complainantwife started after barely two months of the marriage at the hands of the parents of the husband accused Harinder Pal as also by the husband himself for bringing less dowry and also bringing more dowry in the shape of motorcycle, gold ring and cash. These allegations regarding the harassment and torture of the complainantwife, as made in para 5 of the complaint, relate specifically to husband Harinder Pal and his parents, namely, Sardar Chand and Saroj Kanta (Accused Nos. 3 and 2). Therefore, it has been alleged in the same para that the accused persons used to instigate Harinder Pal, accused No. 1 to press the complainant to bring more and more dowry to let her live peacefully in her matrimonial life, but the complainant could not satiate ever increasing demands of the accused persons. These allegations qua the petitioners are quite vague, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The main allegations made in the aforesaid paragraphs of the complaint are with reference to the husbandHarinder Pal and his parents Sardar Chand and Saroj Kanta.

In para 6 of the complaint, there is general averment made about the accused persons that they are cruel persons and they denied two square meals and used to get work from her as a menial. These allegations about the denial of food and taking work from the complainant are general in nature in so far as the petitioners are concerned and they have not been specifically named in respect of these allegations. Similar is the nature of allegations made in para 7 of the complaint wherein the complainant narrated about the incident where she was beaten by the accused persons and turned out of the house in bare three clothes in January 1991. A general allegation has been made that the accused persons connived with each other and changed their mind for reasons best known to them and visited Ludhiana on 14.4.1991 and took the complainant with four pairs of clothes and gold earrings and also gave a writing in their own hand which bore testimony to their having demanded and taken more dowry and about the parents of the complainant having given the same. Para 8 of the complaint refers to an incident which took place on 4.12.1991 wherein Harinder Pal, accused No. 1 under the instigation of other accused kicked the complainant out of her matrimonial house when she came to the house of her parents. It has been alleged that the accused had openly exhorted that she will be killed if she dared to return to their home without bringing the demanded dowry and the accused also retained the dowry articles of the complainant and never permitted her to use the same at any time. In para 9 of the complaint there is reference of convening a panchayat by the parents of the complainant and about accused persons flatly refusing to return the dowry articles to the complainant. In para 10 of the complaint, an apprehension has been expressed about the accused persons misappropriating the dowry articles by disposing of the same to deface the evidence. It has also been averred that the accused were utilising the articles with immunity. In Para 11 of the complaint, it has been averred that the accused are guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 406/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code which have been committed by them and they are liable for punishment. Para 12 of the complaint relates to the jurisdiction of the Court at Ludhiana to entertain the complaint. These are the entire allegations made by the complainant in the complaint.

Learned counsel for the petitioners cited the case of Parkash Kaur and others v. Kulwant Kaur, 1992(1) R.C.R. 348 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court held that:

"Keeping in view that in the presence of the mother of the bridegroom, brothers or sisters of the latter are not usually expected to accepted the Istri Dhan on the occasion of her marriage unless special circumstances are disclosed or it is averred that some brother or sister of the bridegroom were entrusted with such articles. Thus the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners except Mst. Parkash Kaur would certainly amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. However, the case of mother of the bridegroom stands on a different footing as rebuttable presumption of entrusting the property is available from the natural behaviour of human beings."

Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there is a tendency to implicate all the members of the family of the husband in a criminal case whenever the relations between the wife and the husband are strained. Referring to the allegations made in the complaint, the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that in the presence of the parents of the husband as also the husband himself, it was not expected in the normal circumstances that the dowry items would have been entrusted to the married sister and her husband i.e. the present petitioners. Referring to the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the averments regarding the petitioners about entrustment of the dowry items appear to be highly suspicious, unnatural and unbelievable. He also argued that in the absence of specific averments made in the complaint against the petitioners, the petitioners cannot be said to have committed the offences under Sections 406/498A of the Indian Penal Code and particularly, in view of their separate residence from the husband of the complaint and his parents.

Learned counsel for the respondentwife argued that the trial into the allegations made in the complaint has to take place and the complaint cannot be quashed merely on inferences and presumptions. He has relied on a number of authorities in support of his contention. The first authority cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others, 1990(1) R.C.R. 173 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that:

"In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court."

The other authority relied on Gurdip Singh and others v. Dalijit Kaur, 1991(3) R.C.R. 2 , wherein learned Single Judge of this Court repelled the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners of that case that the allegations of entrustment were in general terms and there was no specific allegation with regard to various articles of dowry visavis particular accused. He held that such allegation could not be held to be unspecific. The learned Single Judge observed as under:

"After giving the matter my anxious consideration, I find that there is no merit in the above submissions. In substantially similar facts and circumstances in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 62, it was held that the allegations of instrument were specific (vide para 7 of the report). I had examined this very point and had come to the conclusion that such allegations made could not be deemed to be unspecific (see Bhim Singh v. State, 1990(3) Recent C.R. 221). It cannot be said that the allegations made in the compliant did not constitute any offence. It is settled law that proceeding and specially the summoning order P.4 duly passed by the learned Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the Code of Criminal Procedure can be quashed only in the rarest of the rare cases."

Further reliance has been placed on the case of Puran Singh and others v. Surjit Kaur, 1995(3) R.C.R. 121 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this court held that the contention that allegations in the complaint pertaining to entrustment and demand were vague and it was not stated as to whom articles were entrusted, was repelled.

The learned Single Judge cited that case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, 1985(1) R.C.R. 539 ; and A.I.R. 1985 (SC) 628 and quoted the relevant extracts of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as under:

"It is further alleged that all the accused attended and actively participated in the marriage of the complainant and demanded dowry. The most important allegation made by the appellant was that parents and relatives gave by way of dowry articles worth Rs. 60,000/ inclusive of gold ornaments, clothes and other things which were entrusted to accused Nos. 1 to 6 on 5.2.1972 which were taken into possession by them. Soon after the marriage, accused No. 1 started harassing, teasing and beating the complainant and ultimately turned out her along with her children some time in the year 1977."

On perusal of this fact, the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment held as under:

"A perusal of the allegations made in the complaint undoubtedly makes out a positive case of the accused having dishonestly misappropriated the articles handed over to them in a fiduciary capacity. To characterise such an entrustment as a joint custody or property given to the husband and the parents is wholly unintelligible to us. All the ingredients of an offence under Section 405 IPC were pleaded and a prima facie case for summoning the accused was made out. In such circumstances the complainant should have been given an opportunity by the High Court to prove her case rather than quashing the complaint. Such an exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is totally unwarranted by law."

In other words, assertions that entrustment is in the joint custody of the parents and the husband is not wholly unintelligible. On the basis of the allegations it was concluded that a prima facie case was drawn. Subsequently, in para 58 the Supreme Court again concluded and the relevant portion is being reproduced as under:

"Taking all the allegations made above, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the allegations do not prima facie amount to an offence of criminal breach of trust against the respondent. Thus, there can be no room for doubt that all the facts stated in the complaint constitute an offence under Section 406 IPC and the appellant cannot be denied the right to prove her case at the trial by preempting it at the very behest by order passed by the High Court."

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the summoning order passed by the learned trial Court was only an interim order and not a judgment and the trial Court can vary, recall the proceedings if upon reconsideration of complaint it does not disclose prima facie case against the accused. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on the case of Bhagat Ram and others v. Gurbhej Singh, 1993(3) R.C.R. 194 where a learned Single Judge placed reliance on the case of K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala and another, 1992(1) R.C.R. 232 (SC) and held that the summoning order is an interim order and not a judgment. The Supreme Court in the case of K.M. Mathew (supra) held as under:

"The High Court seems to be too technical in this regard. If one reads carefully the provisions relating to trial of summons cases, the power to drop proceedings against the accused cannot be denied to the Magistrate. Section 204 of the Code indicates that the proceedings before the Magistrate commences upon taking cognizance of the offence and the issue of summons to the accused. When the accused enters appearance in response to the summons, the Magistrate has to take proceedings under Chapter XX of the Code. But the need to try the accused arises when there is allegation in the complaint that the accused has committed the crime. If there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime, it is implied that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed against the accused.

It is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused."

The law relating to the quashing of the F.I.R./Criminal complaint is now well settled and the Apex Court in the case of Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, 1995(3) R.C.R. (SC) 700. held that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in following cases, but this is not exhaustive:

1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a congnizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

Now coming to the facts of the present case as contained in the allegations made in the complaint, Annexure P1, there are allegations qua the accused referred to in the complaint which include the petitioners and about whom it has been alleged that they along with other accused actively participated in the marriage of the respondentwife with coaccused Harinder Pal and the dowry articles at the time of the marriage were entrusted to the accused persons including the petitioners and further the accused persons including the petitioners participated in the demand and harassment and torture of the respondentwife for bringing more dowry and in refusing to return the dowry items entrusted to them. These allegations cannot at this stage be held to be prima facie absurd, unreliable and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent persons can even reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners (accused). The criminal complaint and the criminal proceedings have not been shown to be manifestly attended with mala fide and/or instituted maliciously with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the petitioners accused with a view to spite them due to private and personal grudge. The allegations and counterallegations are all to be gone into at the trial of the case which cannot and ought to be brought to an abrupt end at the threshold of the criminal proceedings by quashing the same. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has in the case of State of Tamil Naidu v. Thirukkhural Perumal, 1995(2) Recent Criminal Reports 124 : 1995 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 387 held that the power of quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be held with extreme care and caution. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in a rather casual manner. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while dealing with a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of the FIR and the criminal proceedings.

The JUDGMENT of summoning as mentioned above is only an interim order which cannot be said to be contrary to the provisions of law. It is not a judgment requiring an elaborate discussion of the evidence of the complainant. The learned Magistrate after perusal of the material brought before him found a prima facie case to proceed against the accused aspersions including the petitioners. The persons of the petitioners at the matrimonial house of the respondentwife at the time of the alleged occurrence is a question depending upon facts and the same has to be gone into at the trial of the case.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it cannot be said to be rarest among the rare cases where this Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the criminal complaint, order of summoning and the consequential criminal proceedings. Resultantly, the petition for quashing is dismissed as being devoid of any substance.