Suparna Bardhan (Chowdhury) & Ors vs Debasish Chowdhury

S. Datta Purkayastha, J

This is a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning a delay of 214 days in preferring the petition for revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against the final order dated 07.10.2024, passed by learned Judge, Family Court, Belonia, South Tripura, in case No. Maintenance 46 of 2022.

The petitioners are the wife and minor son [aged about 6 years] of the respondent.

Learned counsel, Mr. D. Pal for the petitioners, submits that in the impugned final order learned Judge, Family Court has awarded only a very meager amount of Rs.10,000/- in total, for maintenance of both the petitioners despite the fact that the respondent is a Govt. employee getting a net salary of Rs.52,857/- per month after all necessary deductions. According to Mr. Pal, learned counsel, the impugned order was passed on 07.10.2024 and the petitioner No.1 applied for certified copy of the said order on 29.01.2025 and the same was delivered on 03.03.2025. It is further contended that petitioner No.1 being a single mother is upbringing her child alone despite all hardships and difficulties coupled with increasing financial needs.

Learned counsel further submits that before applying for a certified copy of the said order, petitioner No.1 contacted learned counsel, Mr. Pal in the 2nd week of January, 2025 to find out whether there was any scope to challenge the said final order. Subsequently, after collecting said certified copy, she again contacted him on 04.03.2025 and then met him on 15.03.2025 to obtain his legal opinion. Learned counsel then kept the brief with him and she was asked to meet him again on 30.03.2025. Without any default, she met him on that very day and learned counsel informed her that original petition for maintenance was missing in the file. Thereafter the petitioner No.1 made her extensive search and met Mr. Pal, learned counsel again on 20.04.2025 with said copy. Then, as per the advice of her counsel, she met him on 17.05.2025 again and on that day, a draft revision petition was also prepared. The petitioner No.1 thereafter sought some time to peruse the same and to examine as to whether any modification or alteration was required therein or not.

Thereafter, as per the advice of learned counsel, she again met him on 06.06.2025 and suggested a few modifications to the draft petition. On that day, Mr. Pal, learned counsel advised her that a petition for condonation of delay would also required to be filed, as there was delay, and asked her to meet him after couple of weeks so that, in the meantime, such petition could be prepared.

Accordingly, petitioner No.1 met him on 27.06.2025. On that day, again learned counsel, Mr. Pal handed over said document to her for necessary perusal and thereafter, finding the same to be proper and correct, the petitioner returned the said petition with some changes on 24.07.2025.The revision petition was then filed on 07.08.2025 with a delay of 214 days in preferring such revision petition.

Learned counsel, Mr. Pal earnestly prays for condoning the delay submitting that there was no negligence and lack of due diligence on the part of petitioner No.1.

Learned counsel, Mr. S. Rahaman, however, strongly opposes the prayer and submits that when the petitioner No.1 applied for certified copy of the impugned order, the period of filing the revision petition had already expired. Despite this, the petitioner No.1 met Mr. Pal, learned counsel only on 20.04.2025 with all relevant documents and thereafter also they took more than three months’ time in filing the revision petition though, they were conscious of the fact that the requisite period for filing the revision petition had long expired. Learned counsel, Mr. Rahaman further submits that there are apparent laches and negligence in the conduct of the petitioner No.1 in preferring the revision petition and, therefore, the petition deserves no favourable consideration.

The Court has considered the submissions of both sides and the materials placed on record.

Truly speaking, there are certain amounts of laches and negligence from the side of the petitioner No.1 in preferring the revision petition and as it appears, the maximum delay was caused not by her, but rather, by her learned counsel. When the brief was handed over by her to her learned counsel and learned counsel was well aware of the fact that the period for limitation had already expired, despite the same, he took a significant period of time to prepare the revision petition and to file the same. There is also no justified reason shown as to why he did not draft the petition for condonation of delay when he prepared the revision petition itself.

Though, a liberal approach is taken while dealing with a petition for condonation of delay, where the delay is deliberate, the same is normally not condoned as a matter of generosity. However, in the present case, it appears that whenever the petitioner No.1 was asked to meet her learned counsel at Agartala, she without any sort of negligence, met him in due time and followed his instructions. Admittedly, the petitioner No.1 is residing separately from her husband at Belonia, South Tripura, and is alone bringing up the minor child; therefore, in such a situation, it is not quite easy for her to come to Agartala to meet her counsel immediately on his call. Despite this, she did not make any default in this regard and as indicated above, it was practically her learned counsel who consumed unnecessary time in preparing and filing the revision petition. Though there is certain extent of delay attributable to the petitioner No.1 herself in collecting the certified copy of the impugned order, etc. but such delay itself is not significantly long so as to deny her access to justice nor it can be termed as gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides on her part.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 752 observed that the expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is not imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.

In the given facts of the present case, this Court also otherwise feels that the matter deserves to be heard on merits to subserve the ends of justice, especially when the decision of the learned trial Court touches the stomach of the petitioners and one of whom is a minor child of 6 years, who does not even have the capacity to pursue his own cause.

Considering all these aspects, the petition for condonation of delay is allowed.

I.A. accordingly stands disposed of.