Suraj Mal vs Kamla Sharma

Bhawani Singh, J.—This revision petition arises out of the order of Senior Sub-Judge, Lahaul and Spiti, in Execution No. 3-x/89 decided on 3-7-89 thereby upholding the objections preferred by the tenant and consequently rejecting the execution application of the landlord.

The landlord preferred a suit for the abetment of the tenant before the civil court and as a result of the abetment order, the tenant came before the Appellate Court where the parties compromised the matter whereby the tenant was to vacate the premises on or before 31-3-1989 failing which the landlord could take possession of the premises in accordance with law by way of execution of the decree in question. The tenant had agreed to pay arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 28/- per month from 1-4-1986 to 30-6-1988 amounting to Rs. 756/- before 31-7-88. It was to be deposited by the tenant before 31-7-1988 in the trial court. The tenant also agreed that in case she failed to vacate the premises on or before 31-3-1989, she would be liable to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 100/-per month to the landlord for the period during which she continues in possession of the premises in question after 31-3-1989 till she is evicted in due course of law. However, in case of default aforesaid, the previous rent up to 31-3-1989 was to be paid at the rate of Rs. 28/-per month. Accordingly, the matter was compromised in the terms aforesaid and the trial court decree was modified accordingly.

The tenant, when failed to act upon this compromise, was sought to be evicted by execution proceedings moved by the landlord before the executing court. This application was moved sometime before the application of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act (hereafter shortly ''the Rent Control Act''). However, it was pending final adjudication with the result that the tenant came forward with the plea that the decree could not be executed in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Rent Control Act. This plea prevailed with the Court which rejected the execution application after relying on the Supreme Court decision in Mani Subrat Jain Vs. Raja Ram Vohra, This is how the aggrieved landlord has moved the present revision petition seeking to set-aside this order of the Senior Sub-Judge.

The sole question for determination is whether the impugned order is legally permissible as held by the Senior Sub-Judge. Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that the execution application is maintainable in view of the fact that the abetment of the tenant was sought by way of a suit before the civil court and the decree was sought to be executed before the same court since till this time the Rent Control Act had not come into force in the notified area declared by the State Government. In support of his submission, reliance was placed on certain decisions. The first case is ILR 1972 HP 85 (Bhagat Ram v. Smt. Lilawati Galib). Although the learned Counsel submitted that the facts of the case are similar to the present case, however, in my opinion, this is not so for the reason that this case moved on the ground that application of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 had been exempted by a notification dated August 18, 1986 to the building in question for a period of five years from the date of its completion. This period of five years was to expire on December 26, 1971 and the Rent Control Act came into force before the expiry of this period of five years and it was held that the Punjab Notification dated August 18, 1966 continued to have its application although the Rent Control Act was made applicable. Due to the exemption of the building from the operation of the Rent Control Act and initiation of execution proceedings before the expiry of the tenure of exemption, it was held that the consent decree was not rendered inexecutable. Therefore, in view of the fact that the decree sought from the civil court at a time when neither the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act nor the Rent Control Act was applicable, the initiation of execution proceedings after the coming into force of the Rent Control Act should not make any difference due to the application of the exemption notification already issued under the Punjab Act. Although the view of the Court was that the definition of ''tenant'' in the Rent Control Act is quite broad, however, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not applicable to a tenant against whom a decree is obtained in a civil court on the basis of a compromise and execution proceedings initiated during the exemption period. With respect, the court did not examine the definition of ''tenant'' with the provisions of Section 14 of the Rent Control Act which is necessary for the correct understanding of the matter as is apparent from Mani Subrat Jain''s case (Supra).

The other cases on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner were AIR 1946 Lah 47 (Dr. Lok Nath v. Anup Chand) and 1977(1) RCJ 199 (Dalip Singh v. Tirath Ram and Ors.). In the latter case, the view of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was that after the compromise in the case before the civil court where the tenant agreed to vacate the premises after the expiry of two years, the coming into force of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 did not make any change in the status of the parties and their position after the compromise decree continued to be that of licensor and licensee and the provisions of Section 13(1) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act could not be invoked to make the decree inexecutable. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also submitted that appeal against this decision was dismissed in limine on December 17, 1987 by the Supreme Court of India.

In my humble opinion, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mani Subrat Jain''s case (supra) is the last word on the subject and decides the present controversy between the parties. It is important to quote pares 5, 6 and 7 of this judgment:

It is too platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake, the proposition that rent control legislation in a country of terrible accommodation shortage is a beneficial measure whose construction must be liberal enough to fulfil the statutory purpose and not frustrate it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction. That intendment must, by interpretation, be effectuated. This is the essence of rent control jurisprudence. 6. Section 2(i) reads:

"tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favor, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal, town or notified area committee (exphasis added).

In this context, we may also read Section 13(1) which is integral to and makes impact upon the meaning of Section 2(i) even if there be any marginal obscurity.

Eviction of tenants.-(1) A tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted there from in execution of a decree passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section or in pursuance of an order made u/s 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended (emphasis added).

The expression ''tenant'' includes ''a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour''. It thus includes, by express provision, a quondam tenant whose nexus with the property is continuance in possession. The fact that a decree or any other process extinguishes the tenancy under the general law of real property does not terminate the status of a tenant under the Act having regard to the carefully drawn inclusive clause. Even here, we may mention by way of contrast that Subudhi''s case (supra) related to a statute where the definition in Section 2(5) of that Act expressly included "any person against whom a suit for abetment is pending in a court of competent jurisdiction" and more pertinent to the point specially excluded "a person against whom a decree or order for eviction has been made by such a court." We feel no difficulty in holding that the text, reinforced by the context, especially Section 13, convincingly includes ex-tenants against whom decrees for eviction might have been passed, whether on compromise or otherwise. The effect of the compromise decree, in counsel''s submission, is that the tenancy has been terminated. Nobody has a case that the Appellant is not continuously in possession. The conclusion is inevitable that he remains a tenant and enjoys immunity u/s 13(1). The execution proceedings must, therefore, fail because the statutory road-block cannot be removed. Indeed, an application under the Act was filed by the landlord-Defendant which was dismissed because the ground required by the Act was not made out.

We have been told by counsel, and supporting citations have been brought to our notice, that the High Court at Chandigarh has taken the contrary view for sometime. It is better to be ultimately right rather than consistently wrong. The interpretation we have given in Section 2(i) is strengthened by our conviction that a beneficial statute intended to quieter a burning issue affecting the economics of the human condition in India should be so interpreted as to sub serve the social justice purpose and not to subvert it. Even apart from this value-vision, the construction we have adopted is sustainable.

K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the tenant, also referred to the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court reported in AIR 1951 P&H 52 (Sham Sundar v. Ram Das) to fortify the principle laid down in Mani Subrat Jain''s case.

The result of the aforesaid discussion is that Section 14 of Rent Control Act gives protection to the tenant in this case and the objections raised by the tenant against the execution proceedings are legally permissible and there is no justification to set-aside the impugned order.

There is no substance in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.