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Judgment
9 paragraphs · 1,044 wordsR.L. Anand, J.
This is a criminal revision and has been directed against the order dated 22.11.1997 passed by the Court of Special Judge, Karnal, who vide impugned order decided to frame charges under Section 7 read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner, who was working as a Manager of the Assandh Primary Coop. Agricultural Development Bank Ltd., Assandh. As per the allegations of the prosecution on 6.8.1996 the petitioner was allegedly caught redhanded while having accepted a bribe of Rs. 3,000/ from one Sukha Singh for releasing the first instalment of Rs. 53,000/. After the investigation of the case, the petitioner was charge sheeted for the offence under Section 7 read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and at the stage of charge the petitioner took a plea that since he was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, therefore, he could not be chargesheeted under Section 7 read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This plea of the petitioner was rejected by the learned Special Judge, Karnal vide impugned order and aggrieved by the said order the present revision.
The learned Special Judge gave the following reasons in rejecting the plea of the petitioner :
"In the instant case the present accused was a Manager in Cooperative Bank. The object so apparent was of public dealing, so much so advancing loans and the recoveries thereof. This issue does not remain much controversial in view of the decision of our own High Court in case Prem Nath, Field Officer, Land Mortgage Bank, Rampure v. State of Punjab, 1991(3) Recent Criminal Reports 133 wherein the employee was of a cooperative bank and the case was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It has been held that once it is found that the petitioner is an employee of a Corporation, he is clearly covered under subclause (iii) of classes (c) of Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and he falls under the definition of term ''Public Servant''. Their Lordships also followed the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court rendered in Daman Singh''s case (supra) while deciding the said issue. Further it cannot be forgotten that Prevention of Corruption Act being a social legislation, its provisions must be liberally construed so as to advance the object of the Act. This can only be done if an extended meaning is given to the term "public servant" as referred to in Section 2 of the Act by applying the enlarged definition contained therein. Emphasis from the State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1835."
I have heard Shri Rakesh Gupta, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner, Shri S.S. Patter, AAG, Haryana and with their assistance I have also gone through the records of this case.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the petitioner had placed reliance on Full Bench judgment titled State of Punjab v. Kesari Chand and anr., 1987(1) Recent C.R. 297 , yet the Special Judge did not rightly appreciate the ratio of this judgment. The counsel submitted that it has been held by the Full Bench of this Court, after taking note of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Daman Singh''s case reported as AIR 1985 Supreme Court 973 that the employees of the Cooperative Society are not "public servants" because they are the employees of a cooperative society which is a body corporate and has a different meaning from the word "corporation". On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has relied upon the reasons advanced by the learned Special Judge and also the case law which has been referred in the impugned order itself.
No doubt, in Daman Singh''s case the Hon''ble Supreme Court was inclined to give a wider interpretation to the words "public servant" but the interpretation which has been given by the Hon''ble Supreme Court cannot be extended to the employees of a cooperative society which is a body corporate and has a different meaning from the ''corporation'' itself. According to Section 39 of the Haryana Coopearative Societies Act, 1984, a cooperative society registered under this Act shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to hold property, enter into contract, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all the things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted. This section has been introduced only for the purpose of giving a legal status to a cooperative society so that it may sue or it may be sued in its name. Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code defines "public servant" and as per clause Twelfth (b) the words "public servant" would denote a person who is in the services or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Cooperative Societies Act though is a State legislation but a cooperative is not a "corporation" which is to be understood differently from a "body corporate". Though in one sense a legal status has been conferred on a corporation as well as a body corporate but obvious and patent distinction would always remain. An employee of a corporation would be covered within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code but an employee of a body corporate like cooperative society will not fall within the definition of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. The extended meaning as given by the learned Special Judge by treating the petitioner being the employee of a corporation cannot be endorsed. Resultantly, the learned trial Court was not justified in framing a charge under Section 7 read with Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner.
In view of the above, the present revision is hereby allowed. The charge against the petitioner framed on 22.11.1997 is hereby set aside and quashed. However, the petitioner can be prosecuted under other penal provisions of the law on the allegations levelled against him.
Revision allowed.
