Suraj Narain vs The State

Mahajan, J.—This is a petition for revision against the order of the Additional District Magistrate passed u/s 514, Code of Criminal Procedure. The Petitioner stood surety for one Chaman Lal and was unable to produce him on the date of hearing. A number of opportunities were given to him to do so, but as he could not produce Chaman Lal, the learned Magistrate forfeited his surety bond in the sum of Rs. l,000/-. An appeal was taken to the Additional District Magistrate and was dismissed. It is against the decision of the Additional District Magistrate that the present petition has been preferred.

The first contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the Additional District Magistrate could not hear the appeal and, therefore, his order is without jurisdiction, and should be quashed. For this Contention, he relies on two Single Bench decisions of this Court in Santokh Singh v. State Cr. Rev. 138-D of 1961 (Criminal Revision No. 138-D of 1961) decided by Harbans Singh J. and State v. Ravinder Kumar Cr. Rev. 25-D of 1961 (Criminal Revision No. 252-D of 1961) decided by P.D. Sharma J. on the 2nd of August, 1962, but in view of the Supreme Court decision in The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad, . I am of the view that the authority of the decisions quoted above has been shaken. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad, as under:

Section l0 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the relevant time provided as follows:

10 (1) * * *

(2) The provincial Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code or under any other law for the time being in force as the Provincial Government may direct.

The notification which was issued about Mr. Brijpal Singh Seth and which has been quoted already, invested him with all the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as under any other law for the time being in force. He was thus competent to deal with an application under the Act for premission to file a civil suit without special authorisation from the District Magistrate. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that the definition of "District Magistrate" clearly showed that in addition to the District Magistrate only an officer specially authorised by him could act under the Eviction Act and he referred to Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided:

It extends to the whole of British India but, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force......

The argument was that the special jurisdiction created by the Eviction Act was not affected by Section 16(2) of the Code, in view of the provisions of this Sub-section. The argument overlooks the words ''in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary'', and because there is in the Code of Criminal Procedure such a provision in Section 10(2), Sub-section (2) of Section 1 is excluded, and an Additional District Magistrate must be regarded as possessing the powers under any other law including the Eviction Act.

So far as the present case is concerned, we have notification No. F. 2(24)/ 58-Home dated 30th July, 1958, issued in the Delhi Gazette. That notification is in these terms:

In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1892, the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is pleased to appoint Shri Mohammad Wasin Khan Yusufzai, P. C. S., being a Magistrate of the Ist Class to be an Additional District Magistrate in the Delhi district and to direct that as such, he shall have all the powers of a District Magistrate under the said Code and under all other laws for the time being in force. He shall have all powers to hear appeals against the orders of the Magistrate passed u/s 107 of the said Code.

In this view of the matter it must be held that the Additional District Magistrate had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the apppeal. So far as the merits of the matter go, it cannot be said that the decision is in any way erroneous, but considering the nature of the charge for which the accused was to be tried I think the ends of justice will be amply met if half of the amount of the security is forfeited. To this extent the petition is allowed.