High CourtsSingle Bench

Suratyomal Sindhi vs Pradeep Kumar Jain

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 26 July 2006 · Citation: (2007) 2 MPJR 414

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.R. Waghmare, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 22 Rule 1, 37 · Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 — Section 23J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
C.R. No. 162 of 2006
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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 2,000 words

Mrs. S.R. Waghmare, J.

This revision has been preferred by the applicant against order dated 23.3.2006 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Khandwa in Case No. 1-A/90(7) of 2005-06 allowing the application preferred by the non-applicant Pradeep Kumar to be substituted by the legal representatives of the deceased landlady Smt. Chandabai in the proceedings before the rent Controlling Authority.

The counsel for the applicant had made a request that the matter be referred to Division Bench since there are two contrary views expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon''ble High Court on the question of the right of legal representatives to be substituted in place of the deceased landlord who has filed eviction proceedings before the Rant Controlling Authority u/s 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.

The learned Single Judge in the matter of Smt. Jarina Vs. Smt. Hazzanibai & Another 2001 (II) MPJR 326 has held relying on Shanti Lal Jain Vs. Narendra Kumar 1990 MPACJ 86 & Santosh Vs. Joseph and another 1999 (2) MPJR 19 that "the bonafide requirement is for profession of the plaintiff and the requirement does not survive on the death of the plaintiff and so also a landlady in the specified category (window) filed an application for eviction, after her death the Legal representatives cannot continue with the application since the bonafide requirement would come to an end on the death of the landlady.

Contrary to this judgment the learned single Judge of this Court in the matter of Indramal Vs. Dropdabai 2004 (II) MPJR 27 : 2004 (2) MPLJ 314 held that even after the death of the window landlady the requirement of her major sons subsisted and requirement of major son of a window was actually the requirement: of widow. Such major son of the widow is entitled to continue the application in view of Order 22 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. and the interest of the widow after her death would be represented by her major son. The Rent Controlling Authority has to follow the summary procedure for enquiry akin to that prescribed u/s 37 of the CPC and Order 22 of the said code would be applicable to such summary enquiry as legal representatives could continue the application. It was not a mere personal action which could abate with the death of the applicant. The application could definitely be continued by such son the widow as her legal representative. This Judgment has been considered in several of the decisions of this court.

Counsel for the applicant on the other hand also has referred to several judgments : Ashok Kumar Vs. Baboolal and Another, whereby more or less the same principle has been enunciated by the Courts and more recently the Apex Court in the matter of Shakuntala Bai and Others Vs. Narayan Das and Others, held that if the landlord died during the pendency of the appeal the bonafide requirement of the deceased applicant does not come to an end and the legal representatives/ sons of the land lord who has attained majority are entitled to defend the estate.

However, the counsel Shri Aradhe contended that all these judgments pertain to the prosecution in the event of the death of the landlord during the pendency of either the appeal or the revision and should not be confused with the proceedings pending before the Rent Controlling Authority.

However, counsel for the respondent/non-applicant has totally relied on the judgment in Indramal s/o Sujanmal Gogalia vs. Dropdabai w/o Chainsingh and others 2004 (II) MPJR 27 : 2004 (2) MPLJ 314 stating that the matter pertained to proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority and the conclusion drawn by the Rent Controlling Authority that special category of landlords entitled to use the special summary procedure for eviction of tenants u/s 23-A and the petitioner died during the pendency of the case then the legal representatives or son of the widow can continue the application. Counsel stated that entirely all the cases has been discussed in the said judgment and the learned Judge had rightly held that even on the death of the widow the right of the major sons subsists and after the death of the widow such major sons were entitled to continue the applications in view of Order 22 of the CPC and it did not call for any reference. Learned Judge in the said judgment had relied on Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, and hence the Judge held thus :

The earlier view as expressed in Phoolrani Vs. Naubatrai AIR 1973 SC 2120 that suit for eviction on ground of personal requirement of a relative could not have been continued by the L.Rs. Did not find favour in Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, , Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others, . Such an application was permissible under express language of section 23-A of the Act. After death of original applicant personal requirement of her son had not come to an end and the application had not abated as the cause of action continues." On perusal of Raghunathji Panhale Vs. Chaganlal Sunderji and Company supra the Apex Court has observed in placitum E thus :

E. Rent Control and Eviction - Abatement - Suit for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement of landlord - Held, would not abate if the suit was filed by landlord based on requirement for himself and his family members - The cause of action would then survive to the family members who can continue the suit - Phool Rani Case, (1973) 1 SCC 699, held, stood overruled by Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, on this point - Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Or. 22 Rr. 1 & 3.

After considering the arguments and the judgments cited above, I find that the recent judgment of this Court passed in Second Appeal No.424/2004 by Hon''ble Justice Shri K.K. Lahoti has also laid down the same principle and held that the legal representatives are entitled to continue the litigation on death of the original landlord under special category of Section 23-A. The judgment relied on was Shakuntala Bai and Others Vs. Narayan Das and Others, and the Apex Court has held thus :

Taking into consideration the subsequent events may, at times, lead to rendering the whole proceedings taken infructuous and colossal waste of public Lime. There is no warrant for interpreting a Rent Control legislation in such a manner the basic object of which is to save harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords. The objection is not to deprive the owners of their properties for all time to come" (emphasis mine).

However, counsel for applicant resisted the principle enunciated on the basis that in all the decision cited, the deceased/landlord was already in possession of an eviction decree passed by the Court below. Whereas in the present context, the proceedings are pending before the Rent Controlling Authority and the applicant has moved an application under Order 22, Rule 37 of the CPC for being substituted as the legal representatives in place of deceased Smt. Chandabai on the basis of the Will allegedly executed by her and the view taken by this Court in the matter of Indarmal Vs. Dropdabai (supra) was directly contradictory to the judgment of the Single Bench in the matter of Smt. Jarina Vs. Smt. Hazzanibai & Another (supra).

I am afraid that is not the correct position. This Court has already in the case of Swarnjee Singh Vs. Asharam Gamne, held that after the death of the original landlord, if the bonafide need continues, it cannot be said that the bonafide need has lapsed. The Court had considered the matter relying on Kamleshwar Prasad Vs. Pradumanju Agarwal (dead) by LR''s., and after an elaborate discussion stated that Phul Rani and Others Vs. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, relied on had been overruled by Supreme Court in the matter of Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, . That the counsel for the applicant Shri Aradhe had appeared in the matter and contested along the same lines and hence the controversy has already been set to rest. Moreover, the Apex Court has already enunciated that although the Rent Control legislation was to save the harassment of tenants from unscrupulous landlords; such litigation could not be entertained to deprive the owners from the property from all times to come by asking the legal representatives of the original landlord to reagitate the matter all over again. The principle has also been well founded in the matter of Indramal Vs. Dropdabai supra and hence there is no need to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The legal representatives of the original landlord as held by the Rent Controlling Authority are within their rights to continue the litigation and rightly allowed to contest by allowing the application under Order 22 Rule 1.

The only other question that remains and has been contested by the applicant is that the legal representatives have claimed their title under a will and the Rent Controlling Authority has exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the application under Order 22 Rule 1. In Indramal Vs. Dropdabai supra the learned Single Judge has already discussed the issue partly and held thus in para 8 that:

8.

Even after the death of widow the requirement of her major sons subsisted. Requirement of major son of a widow was actually the requirement of the widow. After death of the widow such major son of the widow is to be entitled to continue the application, in view of Order 22 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interest of the widow after her death would be represented by her such major son. The R.C.A. has to follow a summary procedure for enquiry akin to that prescribed under Chapter 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has to apply the procedure for formalities prescribed for decisions of small causes u/s 23-D (2) of the Act. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act 1887 make applicable, the procedure prescribed by the CPC for such summary inquiry. Order 22 of the said Code is also applicable to such summary enquiry. As such legal representative could continue the application. It was not a mere personal action which could await with the death of the applicant. The application can definitely be continued by such son of the widow as her legal representatives. Thus, the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent that the R.C.A was at error in continuing the application even after the death of the widow has not been sound and has to be repelled.

The other part of the ground that the Rent Controlling Authority had erred in allowing the substitution of the legal representatives without holding any enquiry regarding the genuineness of the will has been answered by this Court in the matter of Jagdamba Prasad Khandelwal Vs. Shanti Devi 2002 (1) MPWN (12) Page 23 whereby this Court held that in an ejectment suit, the Court has to satisfy whether the Estate of the deceased is represented. Unless the ''Will'' is disputed by other legal representatives, it is not open for tenant to challenge the ''Will''. The purpose of eviction suit will be lost if proceedings are protracted and if each interlocutory application is decided after recording evidence. The Court had ordered that the substitution of the legal representatives of the plaintiff be considered by the Trial Court in accordance with law without recording evidence. Thus, considering the contentions on the anvil of this judgment the ground does not withstand scrutiny. The judgment of the Trial Court is based on sound and cogent reasons and it is not necessary for the Rent Controlling Authority to deal with the genuineness of the ''Will'' by considering the evidence for substituting the L.Rs unless contested by other legal representatives.

Thus in view of the above nothing more remains in the revision the same is dismissed as sans merit. No order as to costs.