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Judgment
Ratnam, J.—The landlady is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition, which seeks to revise the orders of the courts below, dismissing an
application filed by her for an order of eviction against the respondent herein under S. 10 (3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
Control) Act. 1960, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. According to the case of the petitioner, she is
the owner of the house bearing door No. 5, Sir Thegaraya Road, Madras-17, having purchased the same under a registered sale deed, dated 10-
3-1975 and the first floor of the premises was even then tenanted by the respondents herein on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 the tenancy being
reckoned according to English calendar. After the purchase by the petitioner, the respondent attorney the tenancy in favor of the petitioner. The
petitioner claimed that the property was purchased by her with the intention of using the entire building for the residence of the petitioner and her
family. Elaborating this requirement, the petitioner claimed that her husband is looking after the family charities and estate and he requires enough
space in the building for the purpose of attending to the administration of the charities and their estate in order that it may facilitate proper
administration of the same and in order to secure this, the petitioner stated that accommodation was necessary to enable her husband to do so. In
addition, the petitioner also claimed that of her two daughters, one of them had reached marriageable age and separate and more convenient
accommodation for her is necessary. After issuing a notice terminating the tenancy, the petitioner filed an application for eviction on the grounds
referred to above. The respondent herein, contested this application on several grounds. The respondent admitted that it was a tenant of the first
floor right from 1-1-1964 onwards. It was also further contended by the respondent that there were disputes between the petitioner and the
respondent on account of a demand for increased rent by the petitioner which was not accepted by the respondent and this took the shape of
interference by the petitioner with certain amenities enjoyed by the respondent, which resulted in an application by the respondent in HRC 928 of
1976 for the restoration of those amenities. The respondent further contended that the grounds put forth by the petitioner for additional
accommodation are vague and totally devoid of particulars and that the provision of separate accommodation for the daughter of the petitioner is
inconsistent with the accommodation claimed on behalf of the petitioner''s husband. Another plea was also raised that the services of the
respondent would fall under the classification of essential services and therefore no orders for eviction can be passed. The application by the
petitioner was characterized as not bona fide and it was also stated that the application does not satisfy the requirements of S. 10 (3) (c) of the
Act.
The learned Rent Controller (7th Judge) Small Cause Court), Madras held that under Sec. 10(3) (c) of the Act, the petitioner cannot demand
additional accommodation for and on behalf of the members of her family. Dealing with the claim of the respondent that it is engaged in essential
services, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent is not entitled to claim any immunity from eviction on this ground. The learned Rent
Controller further held ''that the hardship, which may be caused to the petitioner, if this petition is not allowed, will outweigh the numerous
advantages put to the respondent herein''. On these conclusions, the application was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner herein preferred
an appeal in HRA No. 322 of 1977, to the Appellate Authority (Second Judges, Small Cause Court, Madras). The Appellate Authority held,
concurring with the learned Rent Controller, that under S. 10(3) (c) the landlord can seek additional accommodation only for the business which
she was carrying on and not for the purpose of her husband''s business''. On this finding, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal.
In this Civil Revision Petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contends that the interpretation of S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act by the
courts below is incorrect. According to him the words ''if he. requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a
business which he is carrying on, as the case may be ""should be given a liberal interpretation.and in order to attract the section, it is not necessary
that the need should be exclusively personal to the landlord. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the provision
has to be strictly interpreted and the personal requirement of the landlord either for business or by way of additional accommodation only is within
the contemplation of the section. Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions raised, the provisions of the section in so for as they are
relevant for the purpose of the present case may be referred to. S. 10 (3) (c) runs thus:
A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, not withstanding anything contained in clause (a)
apply to the controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord
in possession thereof, if be requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as
too case may be.
The question is what is the meaning to be given to the words ''if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a
business which he is carrying on''. In construing the words ''landlord and if he required under S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act, the Courts have understood
the words ''if he requires'' in S. 10 (3) (c) in the same liberal sense as the words ''his own occupation'' employed in clause (a) of that section, in
Kolandayelu Chetliar v. Koolayana Chettiar 1961 1 MLJ 184=74.L.W.164, Venkatadri, J. dealing with a case under S. 7 (3) (a)(i)of the Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 25 of 1949, comparable to S. 10 (3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act. 18 of 1960, had occasion to interpret the words ''his own occupation''. After referring to an unreported judgment of Chagla, C J. to the effect
that one should look into the customs of the society and the nature of socialites which subsist between the different members of the family in this
country, the learned Judge held that a landlord can maintain an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground that he requires the Premises for
setting up a separate family for his second son. In doing so, Venkatadri, J. referred to and relied on a Division Bench judgment of the Patna High
Court in Bidhubhusan Sen Vs. Commissioner, Patna Division and Another, . In construing the expression ''his own occupation'' the Bench held that
those words cannot be restricted only to the occupation of the landlord himself, but should be given a wider and liberal meaning so as to include
the occupation of persons, who are living with the landlord and are economically defendant on him. If that case, the landlord requited the premises
for establishing his nephew, who was living with him and dependent on him in business. This interpretation would take in the requirement of the
landlord''s son also within the meaning of the words ''his own occupation'' even according to S 7(sic),(a) (i) as it then stood. To similar effect is the
judgment of V. V. Raghavan, J. in Mr. Rajzratnam v. Noronha 1972 3 MLJ 70=85 L. W. 298. Wherein the learned Judge followed the reasoning
of Venkatadri, J. in Kotandaivelu Chettiar v. Kaolayana Chettiar 1961 1 MLJ 184=74 L.W. 164. It must also be remembered'' that the lection hat
undergone an amendment and in S. (sic) (3) (1) (sic) of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, a clear provision has also been made and the words ''for
the occupation of his son and if he or his son is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned'' have been
inserted, presumably to accord with this interpretation put upon the words by the courts. I'' is therefore evident that the requirement for the son of
the landlord would fall within the requirement of the landlord with the meaning of S. 7(3) (a)(i) as it then stood and now under S. 10(3) (a) (i) as
amended and it is difficult to apply a different principle of interpretation to the words if be landlord requires additional accommodation for
residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on occurring in S. 10 (3). Indeed, Veeraswami, J. as) then was, had
occasion to interpret S. 7(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1949, as it then stood, in K.I. Kangu Vs. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, In that case, the
application was filed on the ground that the landlord''s son-in-law who was practicing medicine, required a portion of the premises for opening a
clinic. It was also not disputed that the son-in-law and the daughter with their children were living in the; same house. The learned Rent Controller
as well as the Appellate Authority construed the words his own 0ccupetion in S. 7(3) (e) of the Act liberally and held that that case would fall
within the ambit of those words. The propriety of the view was challenged before the learned judge. Before the learned Judge, a literal construction
of the words ''if be requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purpose of business which he is carrying on'' was
persisted in and the argument was raised that merely because the son-in-law happened to be living with the landlady, that would be no justification
to say that she requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which she was carrying on. On a close
examination ot the provision, Veeraswami, as he then was after referring to the judgment of Venkatadri, J. in Kotandavelu Chettiar v. Kootyana
Chettiar, observed thus at page 99 :
I am also inclined to take the view that the words for his own occupation'' should receive a liberal interpretation. It that is so, there is no reason
why a different principle should apply to clause (c) of sub. S. (3) of S. 7. The words if he requires in that provision should, in my opinion be
understood to the same liberal sense as the words this own occupation in clause (a) of that sub section have been understood. What. is meant, as I
think by the words his own occupation of it he require is that the requirement is not that of a stranger. I) (ct is not necessary to attract these words
that the need should be personal to the landlord. But where the line should be down will depend on the particular facts in each case. It may
however, be generally stated, without intending to be precise or exhaustive, that the need of close relation who happen to live with the landlord or
landlady may well satisfy the words his own occupation'' or it be require. I do not say that the relationship is the only test. Dependency on social
customs, and hours. Usage, practice of a particular community and like considerations may well be taken into account. In determining whether the
requirement of those words is satisfied.
Ultimately, the learned Judge held that the words ''if he requires'' should not be read as in a narrow sense of a landlord''s personal need, but that
the requirement of the landlord''s family would well fait within the statutory requirements and upheld the order of eviction.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the husband of the petitioner and her two daughters and sons are living with her and the petitioner
requites the premises in question only for the purpose of using the entire house as the residence for her and for other members of her family
including her husband, daughters and son. It is the case of the landlady that her husband has to be provided with accommodation in order to
facilitate his management of the charities and estate. It is in evidence that the husband of the petitioner is having his office for this purpose
elsewhere. This requirement cannot be in any manner characterized as unreasonable. The following observations of Ramaprasada Rao, J at he then
was, reported in Suraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar, are apposite:
I do not think that a beneficial construction, a construction in consonance with justice, reason, equity and good conscience would exclude a request
by a landlady for being put in possession of her building for the use and occupation by her husband for his business In Hindu society it is the
legitimate duty or the wife to provide comfort to her husband and a fortiori it is so for furtherance of the interest of the business of her husband in
which it can be safely presumed that the is vitally interested.
In view of the above, the petitioner certainly is entitled to ask for additional accommodation in the premises in quest on in order to enable her
husband to establish his office which is now being located outside.
Likewise, the requirement of the petitioner even for the other members of the family seems to be not only bona fide, but reasonable. It is not in
dispute that the first daughter of the petitioner has attained age and that she it to be mar. Led and evidence has been given to the effect that the
daughter and the son-in-law will have to be provided with accommodation. The evidence also discloses that the existing accommodation in the
ground floor is inadequate because it consists of two bed rooms, a hall and a kitchen and a bathroom. It is not in dispute that there is no drawing
room in the ground floor. Having regarded to the available accommodation the object of the land lad seems to be to locate her husband''s office
inside the premises and also to make a readjustment of the other accommodation for the daughter and the son-in-law who is to be brought into the
family as well as the other daughter and son. His not disputed that it is open to the landlady to seek additional accommodation either for residential
or for non-residential purposes and therefore, it is certainly open to the petitioner to recover possession of the premises in the occupation of the
respondent on the ground that the requires additional accommodation for the purposes aforesaid.
That leaves for consideration the question of bona fides though the respondent would claim that the application for eviction is the outcome of a
refusal by it to pay increased rent, yet, there is no acceptable evidence in regard to that. It admitted that the area in the occupation of the
respondent is about 1000 sq.ft. And the building it situated in the main road in a very important and busy locality. In respect of this premises, the
rent that is being paid by the respondent is Rs. 400 per menses. A suggestion has been put to P.W. 1, that there was a demand for increase of
rent, that the respondent refused to pay and thereafter the amenities were cut off and attempts were made to evict the respondent. This suggestion
has been denied. It is the evidence of P.W. 1 that he did not write to the head office about the alleged demand for enhanced rent by the petitioner.
There is, thus, no proof before the court that there was any demand as smell for increased rent by the petitioner and a refusal by the respondent
and in the absence of such proof, it must be held that there was no such demand by the petitioner. It is also not established by evidence that
amenities were cut off and that there were misunderstandings on account of the proceedings taken before the Rent Controller. Thongs the
respondent refers to certain proceedings In paragraph 4 of its counter, the orders passed thereon have not been made available to the court as
evidence and therefore, it is not possible to hold that the application for eviction was the outcome of a refusal by the petitioner to provide amenities
and a restoration thereof by the court in these proceedings. Under these circumstances, the application by the petitioner cannot be characterized as
not bona fide and the courts below were, therefore, in error in having rejected this reasonable request of the petitioner.
The question of relative hardship may now be adverted to. It is significant that R.W. 1 admits that it is not necessary for them to have the very
same premises for carrying on the business of the respondent but they would like to have a premises in the main road, which would not in any
manner affect their business. There is nothing to indicate that other premises having similar advantages like the one in the occupation of the
respondent are not available and it is only necessary that the respondent should be on the lookout for a suitable premises in the locality and being a
banking institution, whose occupation of premises is prized by some landlords at least, there is no likelihood of the respondent encountering any
difficulty in the matter of securing equally convenient accommodation. There is thus, no hardship that would be caused to the tenant by an order for
eviction being passed against it which would outweigh the advantages of the landlady. The result is the order of the courts below is set aside and
the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. The learned counsel for the respondent prays that some time may be given to vacate the premises
and the learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection to grant the respondent two months time. The respondent accordingly will have two
months time from today vacate the premises.