Surender vs State

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.—These two appeals arise out of the judgment dated 25.11.1993 delivered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case 21/1992, which, in turn, arose out of FIR No. 89/1990 registered at P.S. Alipur under Sections 302/411/34 IPC. By virtue of the impugned judgment, both the appellants were found guilty of having committed the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellant Ravinder Kumar @ Gabbu was also convicted u/s 411 IPC for having been in possession of a scooter bearing No. DDO 2599 which did not belong to him, but to the deceased Sanjay @ Gandhi. These appeals are also directed against the order on sentence dated 25.11.1993 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi whereby both the appellants were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life u/s 302/34 IPC and were also liable to pay a fine of Rs 1,000/- each and in default of payment thereof, they were to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of two years. The appellant Ravinder was also sentenced to undergo one year.s rigorous imprisonment u/s 411 IPC alongwith a fine of Rs 500/-. In default of payment of the same, he was to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

This case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence. According to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the prosecution has been able to prove the following circumstances against the appellants:

(1) Motive;

(2) Last scene (sic: seen);

(3) Extra-judicial confession;

(4) Possession of the scooter by the accused which bore No. DDO 2599; and

(5) The wrong defence.

We shall comment upon each of these circumstances later. For now, let us see the case of the prosecution. On 13.09.1990, information was received vide D.D. No. 3-A from lady Constable Usha No. 2620- PCR over the telephone that at about 8.00 a.m., one Chaman Singh, resident of village Bakhtawarpur had made a call from a public booth to the effect that a dead body was lying near Shobha Ram.s tubewell and the police be sent. Inspector B.D. Sharma and his staff reached the spot on the field of one Tej Ram, son of Shera in the area of village Bakhtawarpur, Delhi where the dead body of an unknown man was found lying. On the blood stained dead body, there were injuries apparently caused by a sharp-edged weapon and at a distance of about seven paces from the dead body one spring-activated knife, whose pointed end was bent and the joint of the handle was open, was also found. Near this knife (Exhibit-P-6), one pair of leather chappals was also found and dried blood was found in abundance scattered at the spot. There was no label on the pant and the shirt nor was there any identification mark present on the dead body. There were no eye witnesses at the spot. The dead body could not be identified.

Thereupon, a case was registered vide FIR No. 89/1990 u/s 302 IPC and investigation was commenced by Inspector B.D. Sharma. The crime team and dog squad had been called. The scene of the crime was photographed, a rough site plan was prepared. Proclamation was made by hue and cry notices for the purposes of identifying the dead body. Wireless messages were also flashed. But the dead body could not be identified. The dead body was sent to the "Dead House. (mortuary). The post mortem examination was got conducted. The dead body was handed over to Seva Samiti. Perhaps, the dead body was cremated thereafter by the said Seva Samiti. Then, there is a complete blank as to what happened thereafter with regard to investigation till 06.04.1991. In the intervening period, Inspector B.D. Sharma, who had taken up the investigation earlier, had been transferred. PW-25 (Inspector R.P. Singh) took up the investigation of the case. Inspector R.P. Singh was posted at Police Station Alipur on 20.03.1991 and it is from that date that he took over the investigation from Inspector B.D. Sharma.

The prosecution case goes further that PW-23 (SI Shiv Prasad) of Police Station Jaffarpur Kalan was investigating the case arising out of FIR No. 70/1990 u/s 365/34 IPC registered at Police Station Jaffarpur Kalan in respect of the kidnapping of one Sanjay. PW-23 (SI Shiv Prasad) was allegedly informed by Inder Singh and Ranbir Singh at about 2.00 p.m. that Gabbu and Bawna, who had murdered Sanjay, would be coming to the Dhansa bus stand from Chhawla village. Thereupon, a raiding party was organised at Chhawla bus stand. After sometime, a two-wheeler scooter bearing No. DDO 2599 approached from the direction of Chhawla village. It was stopped by PW-23 (SI Shiv Prasad) on the pointing out of Inder Singh and Ranbir Singh. The scooter was being driven by the appellant Ravinder Kumar @ Gabbu and the appellant Surender @ Bawna was sitting on the pillion seat. Both the appellants were apprehended and the scooter No. DDO 2599 was taken into police custody. PW-25 (Inspector R.P. Singh) received information on 06.04.1991 itself at about 5.00 p.m. from the Police Station Jaffarpur Kalan that the accused persons involved in the present case were arrested by them and that they have made disclosure statements regarding the murder of Sanjay at village Bakhtawarpur. PW-25 (Inspector R.P. Singh) went to Police Station Jaffarpur Kalan and collected the disclosure statements, pointing out memos and a copy of the seizure memo of the scooter from PW-23 (SI Shiv Prasad). The present appellants were also interrogated by PW-25 (Inspector R.P. Singh), who also arrested them in this case.

After completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, who committed the case on 11.07.1991 to the court of Sessions. The charge was framed against the appellants u/s 302/34 IPC by an order dated 04.03.1992. The appellant, Ravinder Kumar was also charged u/s 411 IPC for receiving the stolen property, i.e., the scooter No. DDO 2599. Both the appellants pleaded not guilty to all the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution produced as many as 25 witnesses. The trial court, after having considered the evidence led by the prosecution and the arguments made by the counsel for the parties as well as the Section 313, CrPC statement made by the appellants, came to the conclusion that the prosecution case stood established.

The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial court has completely misdirected itself in considering the evidence on record. The learned Counsel submitted that this was a case which rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. It was incumbent upon the trial court to have examined the evidence thoroughly and to have seen as to whether the chain of circumstances was complete. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that there are far too many missing links and there is just no way in which any court could have convicted the appellants based on the material on record. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the circumstances relied upon, as indicated above, have not been established by the prosecution. The so-called motive based upon the testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) is no motive at all for committing such a serious crime. The last seen evidence allegedly to be again of PW-3 (Sunita) cannot be regarded as "last seen evidence. and, in any event, is not established and is of a very weak nature. The so-called extra-judicial confession made to PW-10 (Puran) cannot be believed by any stretch of imagination and cannot be construed to be a circumstance leading to the conviction of the appellants. Even the possession and recovery of the scooter bearing No. DDO 2599 is not free from doubt and, therefore, such circumstances cannot be used against the appellants. The trial court has also placed reliance on a circumstance which it has termed as "wrong defence". According to the learned Counsel for the appellants, a wrong or false defence raised by the counsel for the accused cannot, in law, be considered to be a circumstance which can be used against the appellants. It is for the prosecution and not the defence to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defence is only to demonstrate improbabilities and impossibilities in the prosecution case in order to establish that the prosecution case is not beyond doubt. As a result, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that neither is there any evidence on record to conclusively link the present appellants with the alleged death of Sanjay @ Gandhi. Nor has the trial court approached the matter in accordance with the established legal principles. He further submitted that the trial court has misdirected itself both on appreciation of evidence as well as on points of law. The trial court has, according to the learned Counsel, admitted hearsay evidence which is clearly inadmissible by misconstruing the provisions of Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The trial court has also relied upon a portion of the disclosure statement of the accused, which was clearly inadmissible, in view of the settled principles. It was submitted that for all these reasons, the impugned judgment and order on sentence are liable to be set aside and the appellants are entitled to an order of acquittal.

Mr Dudeja, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, fully supported the impugned judgment and order on sentence. He submitted that the motive was clearly established and that is that deceased Sanjay had teased PW-3 (Sunita) in the absence of the appellants (Ravinder Kumar and Surender Kumar) and when she informed them about this, they decided to put an end to Sanjay.s life. He submitted that the last seen testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) is also a material circumstance. According to him, Sanjay was last seen alive by PW-3 (Sunita) in the company of the present appellants when they all left together from her house. The third circumstance, which is of vital importance, according to Mr Dudeja, is the possession of the scooter bearing No. DDO 2599. The appellants were found with the said scooter on 06.04.1991 on interception by Sub-Inspector Shiv Prasad (PW-23) on receiving secret information.

Mr Dudeja submitted that the cumulative effect of all these circumstances, which have been established by evidence on record, clearly points in the direction of the guilt of the appellants. He, therefore, requested that the appeal be dismissed and the conviction and sentence be upheld.

At the outset, we may note that after considering the evidence on record and the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties, this is a case where the trial court has completely misdirected itself both on the point of appreciation of evidence as well as on points of law. The learned Counsel for the appellant is correct in submitting that the trial court has grossly erred in law in treating hearsay evidence of PW-7 (Kalu Ram) as admissible by misinterpreting the provisions of Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The trial court has also gone completely wrong in relying on a portion of the disclosure statement, which shall be pointed out hereinbelow, which was clearly inadmissible by virtue of the provisions of Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. From a reading of the impugned judgment, we get the impression that the learned Additional Sessions Judge was bent upon convicting the appellants and he kept on brushing aside all the lacunae and shortcomings in the prosecution case which were pointed out by the defence counsel. A glaring and gross example is the following observation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge with regard to the voluntariness of the disclosure statements allegedly made by the appellants:

As far the disclosure statements are concerned only the courts are to examine whether the disclosure statements made by the accused is a true and voluntarily made. True it is that this has been spoken by PW20 that some mild beatings were given to the accused in order to elicit the disclosure statements and this does not affect the prosecution case at all.

It is, indeed, surprising that a court of law, after noting the fact that a disclosure statement was elicited from an accused after he was beaten (mildly), could regard such a disclosure statement as being voluntary and, therefore, having no effect on the prosecution case at all. Nothing more needs to be said and it is only with wonder and amazement at the understanding (or lack of it) of the court below that we have to reject its decision.

Another example is that when the defence counsel argued that in the absence of disclosing the secret informant, the circumstance of the interception of the appellants at the Dhansa bus stand on 06.04.1991 and the consequent alleged recovery of the scooter bearing No. DDO 2599, cannot be considered against the appellants, the learned Additional Sessions Judge felt that this argument had no force because, according to him, it was "not necessary to disclose who supplied the secret information". The court observed that the fact that the man who gave the information has not been disclosed or examined as a prosecution witness will not affect the prosecution case. The law with regard to secret information being used as a circumstance is entirely different. As indicated in Kanhai Mishra @ Kanhaiya Misar Vs. State of Bihar, , secret information alleged to have been received by an investigating officer without disclosing its source cannot be made the basis to prove a circumstance. In Bhugdomal Gangaram and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, , the Supreme Court with regard to information, which the prosecution had received, observed as under:

But since the informant has not been examined as a witness, the evidence of P.W. 12 that he was informed that accused Nos. 3 and 4 would be coming behind the truck in a taxi is not admissible.

Furthermore, the fact that the secret informer has not been produced before court also creates doubts about the recovery of the scooter No. DDO 2599 from the appellants on 06.04.1991 as indicated by the prosecution.

PW-7 (Kalu Ram) stated that on 03.04.1991, he had gone to his village Gumman Hera where he met one Raghunath Singh. They both drank liquor. The said Raghunath Singh is said to be his co-brother-in- law. As per PW-7 (Kalu Ram), Raghunath Singh told him that Sanjay was murdered by Ravinder Kumar and Surender Kumar. According to PW-7 (Kalu Ram) on 04.04.1991, he told PW-8 (Jai Chand) that his son had been murdered by the accused persons. Jai Chand asked Kalu Ram as to who told him about it, to which he replied that his co- brother-in-law Raghunath Singh told him about the murder of Sanjay by the accused persons. When the defence counsel objected to this portion of the testimony of PW-7 (Kalu Ram) as being hearsay and, therefore, could not be taken into account, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had this to say:

No doubt the evidence of PW7 Kallu Ram is hear-say evidence but he is the first man to hear it and the statement of PW7 is admissible u/s 60 of the Evidence Act where it is provided that "Hear-say evidence is admissible if the man who heard says that he heard", so the argument of the ld. defence counsel is devoid of force.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge has completely misdirected himself and has misconstrued Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 60, on the contrary, stipulates that oral evidence must, in all cases, be direct. In other words, if oral evidence refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it. This cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be extended to mean that direct evidence of hearsay evidence would be admissible as a circumstance to establish a fact. The Section refers to a case with regard to a fact which could be heard in a manner that if "A. hears something, then it is "A. who should come and give evidence of what he heard. In the present case, what PW-7 (Kalu Ram) has stated in his testimony is that Raghunath Singh told him that Sanjay was murdered by Ravinder Kumar and Surender Kumar. The allegation is that Sanjay was murdered by Ravinder Kumar and Surender Kumar. Even Raghunath Singh does not claim to be an eye witness and, in any event, from where he acquired this knowledge is not clear as Raghunath Singh himself has not been produced as a witness. If what the learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed is to be taken as the true state of affairs in law, then, in a case where "A. says that "B. told him that he had come to know from "C. that "X. had murdered "Y., then "A.s. testimony to this effect would amount to direct evidence of "X. having murdered "Y..Direct evidence with regard to hearsay evidence would not convert the hearsay evidence into direct evidence and would remain to be hearsay. Therefore, no reliance whatsoever ought to have been placed on the hearsay evidence of PW-7 (Kalu Ram) and in doing so, the court below has clearly erred in law.

PW-3 (Sunita) is a key witness insofar as the prosecution case is concerned. It is as per her testimony that the trial court has concluded that the motive stands established. Her testimony has also been construed as the last seen evidence. PW-3 (Sunita) came to depose as a prosecution witness on 09.04.1992. It is also extremely relevant to point out that her examination-in-chief is in two parts. One before lunch and the other after the lunch break. This is a very material circumstance because her testimony prior to the lunch break is completely different from what she stated in her examination-in-chief after the lunch break.

Let us see what she stated in the pre-lunch session. She stated that about 5-6 years back, she was married to one Dharam Pal, resident of village Khaira, P.S. Jaffarpur. She knew both the accused persons present in court and disclosed their names as Surender and Ravinder. She stated that about a year and six months back, both the accused persons came on a scooter at about 9.00 a.m. She served the accused persons with food and tea. She did not know whether anybody else was with the accused persons or not. She again said that a third man was also there. All the three enjoyed their food at her residence. At the time of eating food, she had no occasion to talk with any of the three persons. The third man did not tease her or do anything objectionable which she did not approve of. After having food, all the three persons left. She did not know where they went.

This was the story given by her in her examination-in-chief in the pre-lunch session. There is nothing in this part of the testimony which implicates any of the persons. In fact, she negates the theory of the third man teasing her or doing anything objectionable. It is also significant to note that in this pre-lunch portion of her examination-in- chief, she does not name the third person. It is also significant to note that she was giving her testimony on 09.04.1992 and she stated that about one year and six months back, the appellants had come to visit her. This would fix the date of their visit to be sometime in October, 1990. She did not give the exact date on which the said visit was made by the accused persons. It must be remembered that the unidentified body was found on 13.09.1990. From her testimony, it cannot be said that the alleged visit by these persons was made on 12.09.1990 as alleged by the prosecution.

Anyhow, after lunch, when PW-3 (Sunita) continued with her deposition, she changed the story. She stated that Ravinder and Surender left her house for some time and that the third person, who had accompanied them, remained with her at her house. Ravinder and Surender returned to her house after about 45 minutes. The third person, whom she now named as Sanjay, remained at her house and teased her in the absence of Ravinder and Surender. She further stated that on the return of Ravinder and Surender, she told them that in their absence, the third person Sanjay had teased her. After that, Ravinder, Surender and Sanjay left her house.

From this two-faced testimony of PW-3 (Sunita), the prosecution has tried to set up a case of a motive for the murder and the last seen evidence. Insofar as the question of motive is concerned, we find that even if what PW-3 (Sunita) stated in the post-lunch session of her examination-in-chief were to be true, it would not result in such an aggravating circumstance that Ravinder and Surender would decide to kill Sanjay. In fact, as disclosed by PW-16 (Dr L.K. Baruah), who conducted the post mortem examination, the dead body examined by him had 8 stab wounds and also other blunt injuries which could have been caused by fist blows and kicks. This demonstrates that if the dead body was that of Sanjay, he was brutally beaten up and then stabbed 8 times. We do not think that even if what PW-3 (Sunita) has stated is taken to be true, the mere teasing by Sanjay would have resulted in such a brutal murder at the hands of Ravinder and Surender. However, the testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) cannot be believed because she has clearly contradicted herself in the two parts of her examination-in- chief. It is more than obvious that something happened during the luncheon interval which caused PW-3 (Sunita) to change her testimony altogether. Apart from that, in cross-examination, PW-3 (Sunita) admitted that when the three persons had gone to her house, her mother and two brothers were present. It would be highly unlikely that in the presence of her mother and two brothers, a third person would have teased her and she would not have raised any objection or alarm. After having named the third person as Sanjay in the second part of her examination-in-chief, in her cross-examination, PW-3 (Sunita) goes on to say that she did not know the third person who accompanied the accused persons. It is also to be noted that if Ravinder and Surender had been also angered by the said third person.s conduct, they would have started to remonstrate Sanjay there and then even before they left PW-3 (Sunita.s) house. For all these reasons, the testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) cannot be relied upon at all. The implication of this is clear and that is that the prosecution.s case with regard to motive and last seen evidence goes out of the window.

There is another aspect of the matter with regard to the testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) which has escaped the attention of the court below. How do we know that the dead body that was found on 13.09.1990 was that of the third person who is said to have accompanied Surender and Ravinder to PW-3 (Sunita.s) house? Neither the photograph of the dead body nor the clothes, which were allegedly on the dead body, nor the scooter bearing No. DDO 2599 was shown to PW-3 (Sunita) for the purposes of identifying the same. Merely because she named the third person as one Sanjay in the post-lunch session of her examination-in- chief, it cannot be inferred that the third person, whose name was Sanjay, was the one whose dead body was recovered on 13.09.1990. The present case relates to the murder in respect of the dead body which was found on 13.09.1990 and does not, in any way, concern any other person who may be named Sanjay and who may have visited PW- 3 (Sunita). For this reason also, the testimony of PW-3 (Sunita) is absolutely useless insofar as the prosecution case is concerned.

This takes us to consider yet another important aspect of the case. This is an aspect which has again been completely overlooked. While it is true that a dead body was recovered on 13.09.1990, where has this body been identified to be that of Sanjay son of PW-8 (Jai Chand). The first person who ought to have identified the dead body as being that of Sanjay would be his father PW-8 (Jai Chand). Unfortunately, from the testimony of PW-8 (Jai Chand), it does not appear that the body that was found on 13.09.1990 was that of his son Sanjay. What is strange is that two post mortem witnesses PW-20 (Inder Singh) and PW-9 (Ranbir Singh) were said to be present when the appellants were shown photographs of the dead body and the clothes that were on the dead body and it is the appellants who identified the dead body as being that of Sanjay. Why were the photographs of the dead body and the clothes that were on the dead body not shown to PW-8 (Jai Chand) ? Normally, it is only the next of kin who are asked to identify dead bodies. In these circumstances, we cannot even be sure as to whether PW-8 (Jai Chand.s) son Sanjay is dead or alive. We must remember that the present case is with regard to the murder of Sanjay, son of Jai Chand, and not of anybody else. When we are unsure of whether the dead body was that of Sanjay, where does the question arise, at all, of convicting the present appellants for the murder of Sanjay ?

We have indicated that about seven paces away from the discovery of the dead body, a knife being Exhibit P-6, was also recovered. The said knife is said to be the murder weapon. PW-16 (Dr L.K. Baruah) had stated in his cross-examination that the incised wound mentioned in his report has been caused by a sharp-edged weapon. He further stated:

The injuries on the person of deceased were possible by the knife Ex. P6 if it was not bent, but at present this is in bent position and the injuries are not possible.

It is obvious that when the knife was found, it was in a bent position. PW-16 (Dr L.K. Baruah) has clearly opined that in the present condition, this could not have caused the injuries found on the dead body. This is a clear circumstance which goes against the prosecution. Unfortunately, this has been swept under the carpet by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the following manner:

As the knife is found in a bent position from near the dead body it is not strange that the accused might have bent it after causing injures to the deceased only to create an evidence otherwise.

We do not agree with these observations as they are in the realm of conjecture. The condition in which the knife was retrieved being incompatible with the nature of injuries caused on the dead body is certainly a circumstance which runs counter to the prosecution case and cannot be brushed aside by imaginative conjecture.

We now come to the so-called extra-judicial confession supposedly made by the appellant Ravinder to PW-10 (Puran). As per the testimony of PW-10 (Puran), which was recorded on 30.07.1992, about two years prior to that, appellant Ravinder had come to his house on a scooter which had the number DDO 2599. He said that the appellant Ravinder stayed with him for two or three days and one day he told him that he killed one boy. The witness again said that he told him that he and Surender killed the boy. According to PW-10 (Puran), the appellant Ravinder also told him that the scooter belonged to the deceased whom they had murdered. PW-10 (Puran) further stated that upon hearing this, he asked Ravinder to leave his house, but in the same breath, PW-10 (Puran) says that he never stated this fact to anybody else. There are several difficulties with this testimony. The first being that there is only reference to "one boy". He has not been named. The second and more important difficulty is that after PW-10 (Puran) came to know of such a serious crime having been committed, it is not believable that if he, in fact, had come to know of such a fact, he would not have told anybody else about it, leave alone the police. Therefore, not much reliance can be placed on the testimony of PW-10 (Puran), if at all.

With regard to the recovery of the scooter No. DDO 2599 from the possession of the appellant Ravinder, we have already indicated that the entire episode is suspect. The secret informer has not been produced in court and, therefore, the secret information which forms the basis of such seizure is not admissible. In any event, the recovery of the scooter from the possession of the appellant Ravinder has been used as a circumstance to convict him for the offence u/s 411 IPC. A reference ought to be made to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which deals with presumptions. The presumption that can be raised with regard to stolen property having been found in the possession of a third person is qualified by the expression "soon after". That presumption cannot be raised in the present case. The prosecution.s case is that Sanjay was murdered on 12.09.1990 and his scooter bearing No. DDO 2599 was taken away / stolen by the appellant Ravinder on that date itself. However, the scooter was found to be in the possession of the appellant Ravinder much later, on 06.04.1991. The period of time between 13.09.1990 and 06.04.1991 cannot be construed to be falling within the expression "soon after" employed in Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, the presumption cannot be raised against him that he dishonestly received the stolen property. The prosecution would, therefore, have to prove that the appellant Ravinder did, in fact, dishonestly receive the stolen property. That proof is not forthcoming.

For all these reasons, the impugned judgment and order on sentence are liable to be set aside and the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of all charges.

Before we part with this case, we would also like to point out the manner in which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has completely gone wrong with regard to how much of a disclosure statement is admissible and how much is not. According to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the following portion of the disclosure statement is entirely admissible:

Main oos jagah ki nishan dehi kar sakta hun jahan par Sanjay alias Gandhi ko maine tatha Surinder ney mil kar maara tha aur jahan par maney bad men chhaku ko faika thaa.

We do not agree with this. In fact, the only portion out of the above extract which could be admissible would be:

Main oos jagah ki nishan dehi kar sakta hun...jahan par maney....chhaku ko faika thaa....

This aspect of the matter has been amply demonstrated by the Privy Council decision in Pulukari Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 and other decisions following the same, including the decision of this Court in the case of Mahender and Anr. v. State (Crl. A. 25/1993, decided on 12.02.2009).

Consequently, the impugned judgment and order on sentence are set aside. The appellants are acquitted of all charges in this case. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand cancelled and the sureties stand discharged. The appeals are allowed.