Surendra Nath Gupta and Others vs The State of Haryana and Others

Municipal Committee, Hissar, was superseded by the Governor Haryana through an order appearing in the Haryana Government Gazette Extraordinary notification dated 22nd July, 1968. This order was passed u/s 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter called the Act). It was stated therein that until the new Committee was constituted, General Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner would function as the Administrator. The reasons for the impugned order as are to be found in the notification are stated hereunder:-

"(1) The arrears of house tax are quite heavy (Rs. 595868.10) and part of them date back to the year 1958-59. The Municipal Committee has not been able to recover these old arrears, which have been mounting up thereby failing to discharge the duties in this respect.

(2) The amount of arrears on account of missing transit passes has risen by about Rs.3,000/- since last inspection. The Committee has failed to plug loop holes in this behalf and thus failed to recover the amount.

(3) The arrears on account of house rent amounted to Rs.28,207/- at the end of March, 1968, which amount was too heavy. The Municipal Committee has failed to discharge its duties in making proper recovery in respect of house rents.

(4) There are as many as 1,133 pending cases of unauthorised constructions. The Committee has been unable to get these unauthorised constructions demolished or to take necessary action against the defaulters.

(5) The number of encroachment cases pending is very large viz. 533. Some of these cases have been pending since the year 1954-55. The Deputy Commissioner had issued instructions that overhanging structures should be compounded but these instructions have also not been compiled with by the Committee. The Committee has, therefore, failed to discharge its functions in this respect."

Before the Committee was superseeded, the State Government served a show-cause notice with a statement of allegations, on the President of the Municipal Committee, somewhere in June, 1968, calling upon the Committee to submit an explanation within fifteen days from receipt of the communication. A copy of the statement of allegations is appended as Annexure ''E'' with the writ petition. There were in all six charges, last of them being of favouritism but the same does not find mention in the impugned notification whereas the remaining five have been specifically stated as constituting the basis of the order of supersession.

It is necessary at this stage to give a few details of the charges for the proper disposal of the writ petition. Charge No. (1) relates to arrears of house tax covering a period commencing from 1958-59 to 1967-68 and the total amount is shown as Rs. 5,95,868.10. The figures giving the amount of arrears, collections made in respective financial years, remissions allowed from time to time and the balance due have been stated in the charge. The petitioners along with 11 others were elected as members of the Municipal Committee on 14th November, 1964. The relevant period in the matter of accumulating arrears and default of the Committee in recovering the same covered three financial years, namely, 1965-66, 1966-67 and 1967-68. The second charge refers to the arrears of Rs. 3,000/- said to have risen on account of missing transit passes since the last inspection which took place on 1st January, 1967. In other words, from January, 1967, up to June, 1968, Rupees 3,000/- were the arrears under this head. Rents to the tune of Rs. 28,207/- were due to the Committee at the end of March, 11968, and this formed the subject-matter of the third charge. This amount of arrears was considered by the State Government to be quite heavy. Unauthorised constructions on municipal land constituted the fourth charge and the gravamen of the charge was that as many as 1133 cases of unauthorised construction were pending with the Committee whereas out of them, the Committee had demolished such constructions only in two cases and compounded 107 of them but the composition fee was deposited in regard to 9 such cases only.

The break-up of the pending case was that 1106 were pending on 1st January, 1967, and to that were added 136 cases detected up to 31st December, 1967, making a total of 1242, out of which 109 were disposed of during this period, that is, from 1st January, 1967, to 31st December, 1967, the balance of pending cases on the date of annual inspection on 1st January, 1967, thus was 1133. This total relates to the entire period from 1954-55 upto 1966-67. The number of encroachment cases was also considered to be quite large, worked at a figure of 533, some out of which were pending since 1954-55. This included encroachments of hanging over structures which were about 200 in number. The allegation was that the Deputy Commissioner had issued instructions that hanging over structures should not be compounded but those instructions had not been compiled with. It is not suggested that there was non-compliance because of the encroachment cases having been compounded or the hanging over structures not being demolished. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the State Government thought that the total number of encroachments covering a period of several years commencing from the year 1954-55 was quite large. The last charge bearing serial number (6) was with regard to the acts of favouritism shown by the Committee. Reference in this connection was made specifically to five cases, namely lease to Roshan Lal, encroachments by Ram Singh, Municipal Commissioner, Sita Ram brother of Ram Parshad, Vice-President, petitioner Kalu Ram father of Parshotam Das petitioner, and Smt. Chandro Devi wife of Ram Dhari Mal Municipal Commissioner.

An explanation on behalf of the Committee through its President, was submitted to the State Government. It was described as incomplete as the extension of time asked for was not allowed. At the outset it was stated that the proposed action was actuated by mala fides because of rivalry amongst different parties on political grounds and the Chief Minister respondent being opposed to Shri Balwant Rai Tayal, M. L. A., who is the uncle of the President of the Municipal Committee, and also because of the suspicion lurking in the mind of the Chief Minister that most of the Municipal Commissioners had supported Shri Tayal in the mid-term election to the State Legislative Assembly against the defeated Congress candidate, respondent 4. On merits, detailed explanation was furnished with regard to each charge. A copy of the order passed by the Minister was not placed on record by either of the parties but the same was produced in the course of arguments by Mr. C. D. Dewan, learned Additional Advocate-General, and it has been marked as ''I''. In reply to the show-cause notice, the Committee tried to absolve itself of the charges and the President met the Minister to support the written explanation. It was after discussion with the President that the Minister, respondent 3, found the explanation to be unsatisfactory.

Mr. R. S. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contended that the impugned order was not a speaking one made with a judicial approach inasmuch as no reference is made therein to the various points raised in the explanation. He, in this connection, placed reliance on my judgment in Civil Writ No. 608 of 1969 (Punj): (Chander Parkash Angrish v. The State of Punjab), wherein I observed that the State Government must pass a speaking order and the mere reproduction of the words of the section or saying that the Minister concerned had seen the file was not enough. The facts of the instant case are, however, distinguishable. What we actually find in the instant case is that respondent 3 has written a very exhaustive order and there is no indication to show that he was influenced by the office noting or comments or that the charges and explanation of the Committee thereto were not present to his mind. It is a detailed order wherein he has specifically said that the arrears of over Rs. 61/4 lakhs on account of house tax, missing transit passes and house rent could not be treated as a nominal amount. He has also made a mention of belated recoveries that stood in the way of the progress of the town. The over-all assessment of the Minister, after considering the explanation and hearing the President in support thereof, was that the Committee was not performing its duties honestly and efficiently and that it was a fit case where the same should be superseded.

There is no quarrel with the proposition that the Minister while acting u/s 238 of the Act performs quasi-judicial functions and is required to make a judicial approach. At the same time, it cannot be reasonably urged that the order so passed by him should be capable of being equated with a judgment of a civil, revenue or a criminal court. As to whether a particular order is a speaking one or not depends on the facts of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. This court, in the exercise of its extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, has to examine each case only to find out if an order superseding a Municipal Committee is a speaking one and made with a judicial approach but it is not to covert itself into a Court of appeal. The learned counsel for the petitioners has taken me through every charge and the reply of the Committee thereto in his attempt to spell out that the decision taken by the Government is not correct. He fails to appreciate that extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court is not intended to be converted into that of a regular Court of appeal in order to determine the correctness or otherwise of the decision of a competent authority acting within its jurisdiction. Decision howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed so long as there is evidence in support of it. I find none of the requisite elements of judicial approach lacking in this case and the impugned order which gives reasons must be held to be a speaking one.

The allegations of mala fides are just a storm in a tea cup and have no substance. The evidence to establish mala fides must be of a standard required for proving guilt of an accused person in a criminal case and it must satisfy the Court beyond reasonable doubt that an impugned action has been motivated by bad faith. The State Government was indisputably possessed of power to pass the impugned order superseding the Committee and there is not objective data to come to the conclusion that the said power was exercised in a colourable way to achieve an ulterior purpose of wreaking vengeance on all the Municipal Commissioners for their allegedly opposing a Congress candidate in the general elections to the State Vidhan Sabha. Suspicion however strong cannot take the place of proof and there must be evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn so as to connect the order of supersession with the alleged hostility on the part of respondents 2 and 3 as cause and effect. What is alleged is that there was a feeling of animosity between Shri Bansi Lal, Chief Minister, respondent 2, and Shri Balwant Rai Tayal, referred to above extending back to as early as the year 1952 when the latter was elected President of the Committee and also a member of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on a Congress ticket defeating a Jan Sangh candidate.

It is alleged that in 1957, Shri Tayal was again elected to the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on Congress ticker, and an election petition filed against him was dismissed by the High Court. What is sought to be proved is that there is a group of person consisting of Sarvshri Anand Bhargav, Gulab Singh Jain and others who are constantly working against Shri Tayal. Elections to the Committee were held on 14th November, 1964, and the petitioners alongwith 11 other persons were elected as Municipal Commissioners. Respondent 2 is stated to have sought election to the then Punjab Legislative Council from the constituency of local bodies but was defeated. The respondent, according to the petitioners, believed that Shri Tayal had a hand in his defeat and complained against Shri Tayal to the Congress High Command for opposing him in the election. Again, in the year 1967, after the formation of the State of Haryana, Shri Balwant Rai Tayal contested the general election as an Independent against the Congress candidate, and Shri Gulab Singh Jain, respondent 4, who was the District Convenor of the Congress party, along with others, opposed him. Mid-term elections in Haryana Vidhan Sabha on the Bharitya Krantidal ticket. The case of the petitioners is that the election petition was filed by Shri Hunna Mal at the instance of Shri Gulab Singh Jain. The petitioners seem to believe that Shri Gulab Singh Jain was instrumental in getting the Committee superseded because he believed that the petitioners actively supported Shri Balwant Rai Tayal in various elections.

Affidavits by way of reply to the personal allegations as made against them have been filed by respondents 2, 3 and 4. Shri Bansi Lal, Chief Minister, respondent 2, admits that he made a complaint against Shri Tayal that he had worked against him in the elections inspite of being a member of the Congress organisation and that it might be that as a result of his complaint and some other complaints, Shri Tayal had to quit the Congress organisation. It is admitted by this respondent that he knows Shri Gulab Singh Jain as one of the leading lawyers of Hissar and also Shri Hunna Mal who had been a Member of the Legislative Assembly, but it is denied by him that the group of Shri Gulab Singh Jain ever influenced him in the matter of supersession of the Committee. The Chief Minister emphatically denied the insinuation that he took interest in the supersession of the Committee because of his strained relations with Shri Balwant Rai Tayal.

Respondent 3 who was actually the Minister Incharge, Local Government Department, and had passed the impugned order has stated hi his sworn affidavit that he visited Hissar on 19th July, 1968, and gave a full, frank and personal hearing to the President of the Committee. It is stated by him that while taking the decision, he took into consideration the entire record connected with the matter and the explanation of the Committee and that the allegations of mala fides against him are baseless. Gulab Singh Jain, respondent 4, denied in his affidavit the allegation that he along with other persons formed any group against Shri Balwant Rai Tayal and also the assertion of the petitioners that it was at his instance that Shri Hunna Mal filed the election petition. It is stated by him that being incharge of the Congress election campaign in Hissar district, he was rather duty bound to help all Congress candidates and that opposition to Shri Tayal was not on any personal level. He admitted that he delivered a welcome speech at a function arranged at Hissar to welcome the Chief Minister and that in that speech he mentioned some of the difficulties which the public of Hissar was experiencing and for which the Committee was also responsible. The Deputy Commissioner too filed an affidavit in which he denied any knowledge of a group led by Shri Gulab Singh Jain.

The crux of the entire case of the petitioners as regards mala fides seems to be that it is Shri Gulab Singh Jain who is responsible for getting the Committee superseded. I am afraid, it is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioners in this regard. The affidavit of the Chief Minister, respondent 2, seems to be a very straightforward statement with regard to the facts within his knowledge and I have no reason to disbelieve him, nor respondent 3 who actually passed the order of supersession. The allegations as made by the petitioners are more or less conjectural and they seem to be drawing on their imagination in attributing the supersession of the Committee to the hostility of respondent 4 and his alleged group of persons who are believed by the petitioners to have exercised their influence on respondents 2 and 3 in getting the Committee superseded. In my opinion, the allegations of the petitioners are wholly ill-founded and no case of any abuse or misuse of power on the part of these respondents has been made out.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in the writ petition which is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

Petition dismissed.