Surendra Singh Thakur vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

Sanjay Yadav, J.—Petitioner vide this petition seeks quashment of order dated 21.9.2012 (Annexure P-12) and 21.2.2013 (Annexure P-13). Vide Annexure P-12 Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh State Employment Guarantee Council has called upon Commissioner to cause a fact finding enquiry in respect of misuse the fund allocated under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and take action against the persons found guilty; whereas, order dated 21.2.2013 is in fact an F.I.R. lodged with the Superintendent of Police for setting the criminal machinery in motion against the persons who are found prima facie guilty of misusing of the fund allocated under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

It is contended by the petitioner that he has been falsely implicated and the F.I.R. lodged against him in respect of availing the benefit under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act has no foundation. To substantiate the submission petitioner has placed reliance on undated report (Annexure P-11) to be furnished by the Sub Divisional Officer and Executive Engineer, Rural Engineering Service Division, Sagar as also various correspondence and the resolution passed by Gram Panchayat under whom the retention wall has been constructed from the fund allocated under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.

Trite it is that an F.I.R. is only an information for setting the criminal machinery in motion. It is not a punishment and is purely an administrative act which does not warrant an appropriate opportunity of hearing before lodging a complaint.

In Union of India and another Vs. W.N. Chadha, it has been observed:

The principle of law that could be deduced from the above decisions is that it is no doubt true that the fact that a decision, whether a prima facie case has or has not been made out, is not by itself determinative of the exclusion of hearing, but the consideration that the decision was purely an administrative one and a full-fledged enquiry follows is a relevant and indeed a significant factor in deciding whether at that stage there ought to be hearing which the statute did not expressly grant.

Applying the above principle, it may be held that when the investigating officer is not deciding any matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining whether a prima facie case is made out or not and a full enquiry in case of filing a report under S. 173(2) follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant to the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that stage rule of audi alteram partem superimposes an obligation to issue a prior notice and hear the accused which the statute does not expressly recognise. The question is not whether audi alteram partem is implicit, but where the occasion for its attraction exists at all.

Under the scheme of Chap. XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there are various provisions under which no prior notice or opportunity of being heard is conferred as a matter of course to an accused person while the proceeding is in the stage of an investigation by a police officer.

Under S. 235(2), in a trial before a Court of Sessions and under S. 248(2) of the trial of warrant cases, the accused as a matter of right, is to be given an opportunity of being heard. Unlike the above provisions which we have referred to above by way of illustration, the provisions relating to the investigation under Chapter XII do not confer any right of prior notice and hearing to the accused and on the other hand they are silent in this respect.

In view whereof no case is made out for causing interference at the stage of lodging of an F.I.R. In view whereof no interference is caused. Petition fails and is dismissed.