Suresh Chandra vs State of Uttarakhand & others.

Having heard learned counsel of all concerns, we would like to reproduce the history of this long lingering litigation as has been enumerated by us in order dated 14.09.2017:-

"2. At the outset, it is relevant to note that Writ Petition No. 984 (S/S) of 2012 was presented on 25.07.2012 by Shri Suresh Chandra for certain reliefs, inter alia, including that the concerned Authorities be directed to handover the charge of officiating Principal to him in Kissan Intermediate College, Peerumadara, Nainital, because he was the senior most teacher in the college. Such Writ Petition was dismissed at the threshold on 27.07.2012 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court adorned by Hon''ble Mr. Justice Tarun Agarwal on the ground that order of District Education Officer dated 28.02.2011, rejecting the contention of the petitioner, found that Mr. S.S. Yadav was the senior most teacher and was rightly appointed as the Principal on officiating basis. This order had attained finality because it has not been challenged by the petitioner. It was further held that no relief can be granted to the petitioner nor the petition can be entertained at this belated stage.

After dismissal of such writ petition at preliminary stage, another Writ Petition No. 1142 (S/S) of 2012 was presented almost for the same reliefs, but this time the order of District Education Officer was also put to challenge. This writ petition was allowed on 24.04.2015 by another Coordinate Bench of this Court adorned by Hon''ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia whereagainst Special Appeal No. 237 of 2015 was presented by Smt. Pushpa Budhani (officiating Principal at that time) as well as Special Appeal No. 408 of 2015 by Kissan Intermediate College, Peerumadara, Nainital. Such appeal was heard by Division Bench and adjudicated on 16.03.2016. It was allowed predominantly on the ground that Writ Petition No. 1142 (S/S) of 2012 was barred by principles of res judicata as well as Order II Rule 2 of the C.P.C.

Thereafter, Review / Recall Application No. 242 of 2012 was moved with delay of 1320 days'' praying from the Court to recall its order dated 27.07.2012. Such Review / Recall Application was dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 18.10.2016 holding that there is absolutely no reason to recall/review order dated 27.07.2012. In view of the limited scope provided under Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. an interference in a review application cannot be made."

In addition to the above particulars, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that history of this litigation commenced even before way back from 2006, when appellant-Suresh Chandra had filed

Writ Petition No. 346 (S/S) of 2006 raising identical controversy regarding his seniority viz-a-viz to the officiating Principals, who were Mr. Vijay Pal Singh and Mr. Sher Singh Yadav and thereafter, Smt. Pushpa Budhani, who is currently working on the post which is being claimed by the petitioner/appellant. Such writ petition of 2006 was dismissed on 06.08.2010 on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. Mr. Suresh Chandra (appellant) was asked to move a representation before the District Education Officer. He pursued such liberty granted by the Court. He moved representation which was rejected by the concerned authority on 28.02.2011. Then he filed Writ Petition No.984 (S/S) of 2012 and, thereafter, a number of Writ Petitions, Special Appeals, Review Petitions, etc. have been filed, which we have already reproduced in the judgment.

The learned counsel of the respondents has drawn our attention to the views/observations as held out by the Division Bench of this Court on 16.03.2016 while adjudicating Special Appeal Nos. 237 of 2015 and 408 of 2015 and in the fitness of things, the same is reproduced as under:-

"In this case, quite clearly, noticing the reliefs sought in the second writ petition and going on the basis that nothing prevented the writ petitioner from challenging order dated 28.02.2011, it is inevitable that the principle embodied in Order II Rule 2 would prevent the writ petitioner from seeking to omit a relief in the earlier round and to revive the litigation in the last writ petition. Such a course is clearly impermissible and will produce grave injustice, which is the basis of the principle of res judicata or the principle, which prohibits piecemeal litigation. All the reliefs, which a party can seek in a writ petition, must be sought in the same. If he wants to continue the litigation again in respect of the same cause of action, he can do it provided he gets leave of the court. No such leave was obtained when the second writ petition was disposed of. The learned Single Judge, who disposed of the writ petition, found that the second writ petition could not be entertained at a belated stage when the impugned order, namely, order dated 28.02.2011, had attained finality. We do not know, on what basis, the finality, which had been attained in the matter, could be unsettled by the writ petitioner by filing another writ petition. The learned Single Judge was in error in overruling the preliminary objection based on the earlier litigation and the result of the earlier litigation and the conduct of the writ petitioner."

After the view so expressed by the Division Bench, the Review Application with delay of 1320 days was moved on 08.04.2016 and delay was sought to be condoned on the ground that writ petitions were pending at different levels. Such review application has been rejected by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 18.10.2016. Now, by means of this Special Appeal, rejection order dated 18.10.2016 as well as order dated 27.07.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 984 (S/S) of 2012 has been put to challenge.

The learned counsel of the appellant has argued that along with the review application, he had also moved an amendment application seeking permission to amend the Original Writ Petition No. 984 of 2012 including the challenge to the order of District Education Officer dated 28.02.2011 (entailing the rejection of the representation of the petitioner).

We are of the view that if this is permitted to happen, the sanctity of whole judicial process in the system will be shattered. All told, we have not been persuaded to allow the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. Delay condonation application also stands dismissed.