Suresh Gope vs Airport Authority of India Ltd. and Others

S. Chandrashekhar, J.—Seeking quashing of order dated 11.30.2015 in L.A. Case No. 6 of 2008-09, the present writ petition has been filed.

The petitioner claims himself descendant of one Mana Mahto who and one Mahli Mahto were the recorded tenant in respect of land comprised in R.S. Khata No. 134, Plot No. 180 admeasuring about 2.01 acres in village Hetu. Both Mana Mahto and Mahli Mahto were entitled for equal shares in the said property. The petitioner is the son of one Basudeo Gope who was grand-son of said Mana Mahto. It is claimed that the legal representatives and successors of Mana Mahto are still continuing in possession over his share in the aforesaid land. For expansion of Birsa Munda Airport, Ranchi, land was acquired vide L.A. Case No. 6 of 2008-09. The aforesaid land of the petitioner is also acquired and award No. 51 was prepared. It is stated that for the aforesaid land, award was prepared in the name of Mana Mahto and other and notice under section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 25.07.2011 to the interested persons. In the said proceeding, Bhagat Sahu, Dhumeshwar Sahu and others claiming title over the aforesaid land comprised in Plot No. 180 by virtue of a sale-deed executed on 27.02.1959 by one Mani Nath Mahto, S/o. Mahli Mahto, staked claim for compensation. The petitioner and other legal representatives of Mana Mahto had no knowledge of the sale-deed dated 27.02.1959 and mutation with respect to the said land was done behind the back of the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner disputed the claim of Bhagat Sahu, Dhumeshwar Sahu etc. and contended that the matter may be referred for adjudication under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. However, vide impugned order dated 11.03.2015, the District Land Acquisition Officer has ordered payment of compensation to the legal heirs and successors of Chintamani Sahu and Deonath Sahu.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of provision under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the dispute raised by the petitioner pertains to a dispute of title which the District Land Acquisition Officer should have referred to civil court for adjudication however, the District Land Acquisition Officer has decided the title of the petitioner vis-�-vis Chintamani Sahu and Deonath Sahu, which is illegal and without jurisdiction.

From the facts disclosed in the present proceeding, it is gathered that notice dated 25.07.2011 in L.A. Case No. 06/2008-09 was issued to Mana Mahto and others for award of compensation. The petitioner filed a written objection in L.A. Case No. 06/2008-09 reiterating that Mana Mahto and Mahli Mahto both had equal shares in Khewat No. 16 and Mani Nath Mahto had no right to sell the land comprised in Plot No. 180 and thus, the alleged purchasers cannot claim to have came in possession of the half share of Mana Mahto by virtue of sale-deed dated 27.02.1959. Disputing right, title or interest of the purchasers in the land by virtue of sale-deed dated 27.02.1959, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that neither the legal heirs and successors of Mana Mahto nor the petitioner had any knowledge of the said sale-deed and the purchasers never came in possession over the said land. I find that in the proceeding of L.A. Case No. 06/2008-09, the purchasers also filed applications seeking compensation whereupon, notices were issued to the purchasers for producing documents and other evidence in support of their claim. Vide order dated 11.03.2015, the District Land Acquisition Officer rejected the objection of the petitioner and directed payment of compensation to the legal heirs and successors of Chintamani Sahu and Deonath Sahu.

Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides that when a dispute arises as to apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court. There is another provision namely, Section 18 under which, the Collector can make a reference to the Court. However, the powers under the two provisions are distinct and may be invoked in different contingencies, which do not overlap. Under Section 30, the disputes which are referable are; (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation or part thereof is payable. The provision under Section 30 is available to a person, who claims on the basis of a title coming into existence post-award besides, to the persons who were neither present nor represented through the proceeding before the Collector nor were served notice under Section 12 of the Act. A right accrued may be determined in a reference under Section 30 depending on the Collector''s discretion or alternatively, such a right may be left open by the Collector to be adjudicated upon in an independent legal proceeding. In the present proceeding, the petitioner was served notice under Section 12(2) of the Act and he appeared before the Collector and filed his objection. The right claimed by the petitioner is not post-award right accrued to him. The basic difference between Section 18 and Section 30 of the Act is that while the Collector is bound to refer the matter to the reference court if conditions under Section 18 of the Act are fulfilled. Under Section 30, it is the discretion of the Collector/District Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to civil court for adjudication. If on the basis of materials produced before the District Land Acquisition Officer, the said authority is satisfied that the objection raised by a person need not be referred to the civil court, such decision can be challenged only on the ground that refusal to refer the matter under Section 30 to the civil court is contrary to law. There is a sale-deed executed in favour of Chintamani Sahu and Deonath Sahu, which is a registered deed executed on 27.02.1959. The purchasers have got their names mutated in the revenue record and rent receipts upto the year, 2012-13 were also issued in their name. The petitioner-objector did not produce any material even before this Court to establish his right over the land in question. In view of the registered sale-deed dated 27.02.1959, the District Land Acquisition Officer was bound to award compensation to the legal heirs and successors of the purchasers. The plea taken by the petitioner that the sale-deed dated 27.02.1959 is null and void and in-operative could not have been adjudicated by the District Land Acquisition Officer nor the dispute could have been sent to the civil court for adjudication. It was for the petitioner to approach the civil court by filing a suit seeking a declaration in this respect. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if a direction is not issued restraining the payment of compensation to the legal heirs and successors of the purchasers, even after the petitioner succeeds by filing a separate civil suit, the compensation may not be paid to the petitioner. This contention merits no acceptance. The claim of the petitioner for the land in question, if the petitioner succeeds in getting a declaration of his right, title and interest over the same, would be against the State and not against the private respondents. It would be the duty of the State to pay compensation to the petitioner, if the petitioner establishes his right, title and interest over the land in question.

Considering the above facts, I find no merit in the writ petition and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.