Suresh Kumar and Another vs State of Haryana and Others

Rajiv Narain Raina, J.—The petitioners have been imposed major punishment of stoppage of two annual increments with permanent effect by order dated 8.4.2010 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Rohtak. The petitioners were charge-sheeted for taking illegal gratification from drivers or owners of vehicles coming from Hisar side to Rohtak ferrying cattle. A departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioners on 11.5.2009 by issuing a charge-sheet. There were eye witnesses to the incident cited in the charge-docket who appeared as prosecution witnesses. The Enquiry Officer submitted report returning findings that the petitioners and some of his co-delinquents were guilty of the charges levelled against them. Against the order of punishment, an appeal was filed before the Inspector General of Police Rohtak Range, Rohtak, which was partly accepted vide order dated 17.9.2010 and the punishment was reduced to stoppage of one future annual increment with permanent effect. The revision petition carried before the Additional Director General of Police (Administration), Haryana-cum Revisional Authority was rejected as being devoid of merit. It was observed that the petitioners had already got away lightly in a case of collecting illegal gratification on road. Heard Dr. Suresh Kumar Redhu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Sunil Nehra, learned Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana for the State.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to the concluding paragraph of the enquiry report in which the Deputy Superintendent of Police (HQ) Rohtak-cum-Enquiry Officer has recorded that during the course of enquiry neither any fact nor any witness came before him who had seen the petitioners taking money from vehicles passing by but it could not be ruled out that these officers had not taken money by stopping vehicles carrying cattle. It is argued that mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof. For this proposition the decision of the Supreme Court in Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others, is relied upon to urge that under no circumstances can suspicion be a substitute for legal proof. Guilt is required to be proved on some evidence which is legally admissible.

To counter this submission, Mr. Nehra, learned State counsel points out to the cross examination of Exemptee Head Constable Murari Lal who appeared as PW-4. He deposed that he was posted as a driver of the car of the Inspector General of Police, Rohtak Range, Rohtak. On 13.4.2009 after duty at about 12:30 a.m. He was waiting for a bus at Sukhpura Chowk to take him back home. He tried long unsuccessfully to signal buses to stop. During this waiting period he saw the policemen on a motorcycle of Hero Honda make. The petitioners alighted, parked the motorcycle and then he saw both of them stop vehicles only to release them after taking money from drivers/owners. Those vehicles which did not stop were chased by them and forced to stop and were let off only after taking money. He deposed he saw them both do this operation for about 6/7 drivers. EHC Murari Lal-PW-4 was cross-examined by the petitioner. He was asked a leading question by the petitioner if he had seen the petitioners taking bribe. He answered an emphatic "Yes". The witness was asked whether he had informed any higher authority of this. He responded that he informed the Inspector General of Police who had called these officials to his office in the morning with the motorcycle.

Dr. Redhu relies on defence witness-DW-1 Rajinder who is stated to run a tea stall at Guhana Road New Bye Pass Rohtak Chowk. He deposed that the petitioners had taken tea at his Rehri at about 12:30 a.m. He made a story that while they were at the tea stall one person in civil clothes came to the Rehri and requested that he be helped to board a vehicle and ''he was advised to go on a bus''. On this there was an altercation between those persons and the police officials. It later came to his notice that the person was the driver of Inspector General of Police. In order to prove that he recognized the driver, he deposed that the driver had in the past come to the Rehri to take tea 2-3 times and after taking tea and cigarettes left each time without paying money. He deposed that the petitioners neither stopped any truck nor took money. Similarly, the petitioners produced Sat Narain as defence witness. He was also a nearby tea stall owner at Guhana Road New Bye Pass Rohtak Chowk which remains open round the clock. He saw two officials namely the petitioners Suresh Kumar and Om Dutt on patrol duty around Sukhpura Chowk. They also took tea at 12:30 a.m. and rebutted the same story about some person in civil clothes doing the same thing as deposed by DW-1 Rajinder. A reading of the statement of Rajinder and Sat Narain shows that the petitioners took tea in two tea stalls at the same time i.e. 12:30 a.m. The depositions are similar and appear to be contrived to match the prosecution case and negate the statement on oath of EHC Murari Lal-PW-4 in cross examination. No credence can be placed on the testimony of such witnesses. In fact the Enquiry Officer has deliberately ignored the clear direct evidence of the prosecution witnesses and especially that of EHC Murari Lal-PW-4 who may have had no personal axe to grind. That evidence is both satisfactory and reliable. The petitioners have not alleged against the prosecution witnesses any animosity, vindictive-ness, malice or bias they may have had against them. The defence version inspires no confidence and is apparently contrived. It may be true that suspicion cannot take the place of proof but in this case the cross examination of EHC Murari Lal-PW-4 cannot be ignored and is direct evidence of corruption and reliable enough to hold against the petitioners on preponderance of probabilities. EHC Murari Lal-PW-4 may have been a chance witness but a chance witness is not a false witness. No interference is called for in the impugned punishment orders which are neither perverse nor arbitrary and have been imposed for good and sufficient reason in the reduced doze. The present is also not a case of no evidence or no corroborative evidence. Quantum of punishment already stands much reduced which in any case remains in the exclusive domain of discretionary choice of the punishing authority from the range of punishments available not calling for microscopic examination in secondary review jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

There is, therefore no merit in the present writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed but with no order as to costs.