Surinder Kumar vs The State of Haryana and Others

Mahesh Grover, J.—The petitioner impugns the order dated 18.11.1993 (Annexure P-7) by which he has been dismissed from service on the ground that he stood convicted pursuant to a case having been registered against him vide F.I.R. No. 13/86 under Sections 148/149/323/325/452 I.P.C. at Police Station Chhapar. Initially, the J.M.I.C., Jagadhri who tried the case, convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to undergo RI for two years, but in appeal, the petitioner was released on probation. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order Annexure P-7 has been passed without even affording an opportunity of hearing to him and by taking into consideration the conviction awarded to him. He has further referred to the impugned order to contend that merely because he had been convicted, would not be a reason to dispense with the issuance of the show cause notice to him.

The respondents, on the other hand, have justified the impugned order by stating that the petitioner having been convicted by the Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence under Sections 148/149/323/325/452 I.P.C., is an adverse reflection on his conduct and therefore, is unfit to be retained in government service.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.

Rule 7.2(b) of the Haryana Civil Service Rules which has been invoked to dispense with the propriety of hearing the petitioner before terminating his services, is extracted here below:-

7(2)(b) The provisions of the foregoing sub-rule shall not apply where any major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon a person on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or where an authority empowered to dismiss or remove him, or reduce him in rank is satisfied that, for some reasons to be recorded by him in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to give him an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, or where in the interest of the security of the State it is considered not expedient to give to that person such an opportunity.

The aforesaid provision of law obligates the respondents to take into consideration the conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge in the event of a proposal to impose major penalty.

The next question that would need to be determined is as to whether every conviction would ipso facto imply that a person has to be dismissed from service or is it that there are offences which would invite such an extreme measure.

This Court in Parvesh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and in another case titled State of Haryana and another Vs. Ram Chander, has elaborately dealt with these issues while relying upon various precedents of the Hon''ble Supreme Court and has concluded that simply because a person has been convicted on a criminal charge, his dismissal may not be a desired feasibility unless his conduct which leads to his conviction is evaluated to indicate moral turpitude which also may be a loose definition of a conduct which can be considered to be the one amounting to moral turpitude.

If the facts of the case are to be seen, the petitioner was indeed convicted under Sections 148/149/323/325/452 I.P.C. for getting embroiled in a violent incident with his neighbours. But this took place in the year 1986 and the impugned order was passed in the year 1993 after the conviction was recorded, but as noticed above, the impugned order is absolutely silent regarding the evaluation of the conduct of the petitioner leading to his conviction and passed without hearing him. The grievance of the petitioner is amplified further when it is noticed that in the reply it has been admitted that the conduct of the petitioner in discharge of his duties was satisfactory with no complaints. In this eventuality, it was imperative upon the respondents to atleast hear the petitioner and pass an order thereafter by taking into consideration the accepted parameters of evaluation of the conduct leading to conviction which is also a mandate of Rule 7(2)(b). For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has been prejudiced and thus, the impugned order Annexure P-7 is set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefit arising therefrom, except the monetary benefits to which the petitioner is not entitled to on account of the principle of ''no pay for no work''. He would, however, be entitled to the notional benefits emanating from such continuity of service which may be considered for the grant of pension.

Petition stands disposed of.