Surinder Singh vs State of Punjab

I.S. Tiwana J. (Oral)

The petitioner who was detained under Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 vide order dated 29th of July, 1986, impugns his detention primarily on the ground that his statutory representation has not been disposed of expeditiously and on that account his detention has been rendered void. In order to appreciate this contention, the following facts which are not disputed and are otherwise available from Government record, deserve to be noticed.

The representation in question was received by the State Government on 26th of August 1986. The same was forwarded to the District Magistrate, Amritsar, on the same day for his comments. Since the latter failed to deal with the matter urgently, he was issued remainders to send his comments to 3rd September, 4th September and 5th September. It was only on 8th September, 1986 that he responded to the urgent message sent by the Government and submitted his comments. The matter was then referred to the Law Department for its opinion which was expressed by the next day i.e. 9th of September, 1986. Then once again,the file started travelling from one table to another in the Secretariat and it was only on 16th September, 1986 that the representation was finally rejected by the Chief Minister. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that firstly, there is no explanation as to why the District Magistrate could not deal with the matter from 26th of August, 1986, when the representation was received by him per special messenger till 8th of September, 1986, and again why could not the State Government deal and dispose of the matter expeditiously from 9th of September, 1986 to 16th September, 1986. In order to sustain his stand, he relies on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Harish Pahwa v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 1982(1) C.L.R. 65:

"The case of the State is that the representation was with the Customs Authorities who were formulating their comments from 7th June, 1980 to 12th of June, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the Government of four days from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 its Law Department from 17th June, 1980 to 19th June, 1980 and then against under its own consideration for six days from 19th June, 1980 to 24th June, 1980.

In our opinion, the manner is which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representations made by the persons detained without trial. There is no explanation at all as to why on action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th, 5th and 25th of June, 1980. It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department, nor it is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all.Again, we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to (sic) for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear as we have done on numerous earlier occasions, that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments, seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representations the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up consideration as soon as a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance is connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. This not having been done in he present case we have no option but to declare the detention unconstitutional. We are accordingly, allow the appeal and direct that the applicant be set at liberty forthwith".

All that is being highlighted by Mr.Saron, Assistant Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the respondent, it that there was no unusual or abnormal delay in the disposing of the petitioner''s presentation. I,however, cannot countenance this argument in the light of the above noted authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The petition, thus, stands allowed and detention of the petitioner is quashed.