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Judgment
Rakesh Kumar Garg, J.—This judgment shall dispose of a bunch of 40 writ petitions i.e. 5065 of 2007, 8545, 12779 of 2004, 11680,
12499, 12218 of 2006, 4577, 6431, 11250, 6409, 9039, 5384, 4815, 11236, 11532, 8689, 6781, 6038, 6780, 759, 11516, 5325, 7829,
4578, 7820, 11447, 6733, 6734, 6784, 6785 of 2007, 6077, 6316, 5802, 5840, 2832, 5192, 6439 of 2008, 2295, 6906, 5880 of 2009 as
acquisition of land made by the respondents vide impugned notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') dated 2.8.2006 and 28.2.2007 respectively, (hereinafter mentioned as Phase III acquisition) and notifications
dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 respectively (known as Phase-II acquisition) on similar grounds and facts. However, the facts are taken from
CWP No. 5065 of 2007 which has been treated as a lead case vide order dated 27.1.2011. The petitioners are the owners of agricultural land
which has been acquired by the respondent-Chandigarh Administration for a public purpose i.e. ""the provision of city level infrastructure, the
regulated urban development of the area between Chandigarh and Manimajra, the planned development and expansion of Chandigarh Technology
Park and the protection of the ecology and environment of the Sukhna Choe watershed"". For the above said purpose, Chandigarh Administration
issued notification u/s 4 of the Act, dated 26.6.2006, 2.8.2006 and 1.10.2002 declaring its intention to acquire land measuring 104.83 acres,
167.50 acres in Phase-III and land measuring 575 kanals 13 marlas for Phase-II acquisition respectively. Objections were invited u/s 5-A of the
Act from the respective land owners and thereafter, impugned notifications u/s 6 of the Act were issued declaring that the land stood acquired for
the aforesaid purposes.
The land owners have filed these writ petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings on various grounds.
Vide order dated 3.4.2007, notice was issued to the respondent-Administration and dispossession of the petitioners from the land in question
was stayed.
It may also be relevant to mention that during the pendency of the writ petitions, two awards were passed by the respondents on 7.3.2008 and
26.2.2009 for Phase III acquisition and thereafter, the petitioners amended their writ petitions. It is the specific case of the petitioners that they
have not accepted and received the compensation as awarded by the respondent-Administration. Award was passed for the lands under Phase-II
acquisition on 15.12.2004.
In the writ petitions, challenge has been laid to the impugned acquisition on the grounds that the public purpose mentioned in the impugned
notifications for acquisition of land is vague and in the absence of a definite plan, it was not possible for the right-holders to raise effective
objections against the same and therefore, a valuable right u/s 5-A of the Act has been denied to the petitioners. The impugned acquisition has also
been challenged on the ground that the same does not meet the requirement of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India and the procedure
adopted by the Administration for acquisition of the land is contrary to the principles of natural justice and rule of law. A further ground has been
taken to challenge the acquisition that the same will disturb the ecological balance of the area and play havoc with the environmentally fragile area
and the wildlife inhabiting the reserve forest would be rendered extinct over the time and the green cover would be lost forever. Moreover, the
acquired land cannot be put to use for the said public purpose without the approval and sanction under the provisions of the Forest Act. A further
ground has been raised in writ petition to challenge the acquisition that there is no proper planning as no survey plan/master plan of the area under
acquisition was prepared before acquiring the land in question. Moreover, most of the area already acquired for Phase-I and Phase-II of the
Acquisition was still lying vacant and has not been utilized and the respondent-Administration has failed to apply the Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Policy 2007 issued by the Central Government and thus, prayer has been made in the writ petitions to set aside the impugned
notifications and subsequent proceedings for acquisition of the land in question.
The writ petitions have been contested by the respondent-Chandigarh Administration by filing written statement submitting that the land was
being acquired for a public purpose i.e. the planned development. It has been further submitted that for any planned development, land acquisition
is an essential feature without which proper planning cannot take place further and to achieve this object, the land was being acquired for the public
purposes as mentioned in the impugned notifications. It is further submitted in the written statement that the development of Phase-I and Phase-II
of the Chandigarh Technology Park would provide a direct employment to more than 30,000 professionals and an equivalent number of
professionals would be recruited in Phase-III of Chandigarh Technology Park for which purpose the present land was acquired to set up the IT
Industry to uplift the socio-economic profile of the region. The above figure of direct employment shall be further augmented by three times as each
IT job creates three indirect jobs. The total investment for the Chandigarh Technology Park was close to Rs. 6,000 crores and Software export
from the IT companies would touch to Rs. 4500/- crores by the end of year 2010. The project would provide better opportunities to unemployed
youths, provide international standards of jobs, create new business opportunities and also improve the living standard of the people of area. With
the setting up of this project, the entire region would also be benefited with the inflow of funds, taxes and revenue etc. which shall boost the socio-
economic profile of the entire area.
As per the written statement, the Chandigarh Administration has acquired the land measuring 104.83 acres and 167.50 acres of land falling in
Hadbast No. 375 in revenue estate of village Manimajra by issuing two notifications dated 26.6.2006 and 2.8.2006 u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act for public purposes namely:-
a) For the provision of City level infrastructure;
b) The regulated development between Chandigarh and Manimajra; and
c) For the planned development and expansion of Chandigarh Technology Park.
d) For the protection of the ecological and environment of the Sukhna Choe watershed.
and that the present acquisition is in continuation of ongoing process and the present land has been acquired for the expansion of the Chandigarh
Technology Park. Out of total 270 acres of land acquired under both the aforesaid notifications for Phase III, 76 acres of land will go towards
open spaces, road and other common infrastructure. The acquired land would be developed with the help of Engineering Department of the
Administration which will lay the access roads, internal roads, street lighting, sewerage, drainage, public health utilities, water supply and power
supply etc. for the city. The remaining land will be used exclusively for IT Industries and there would be no malls, hotels, habitat area etc. as the
same have been provided in Phase-I and Phase-II of the acquisition. The challenge to the acquisition on the basis of National Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Policy 2007 is misconceived as the said Policy is not applicable to the present acquisition which was initiated much prior to the
issuance of the aforesaid Policy vide notification dated 31.10.2007. The entire acquisition process has been completed by issuance of notification
u/s 6 of the Act on 28.2.2007 and with the passing of award dated 7.3.2008 for land measuring 104.83 acres and award dated 26.2.2009 for
land measuring 167.50 acres. However, the minimum benefit of alternate accommodation to all the eligible persons whose land has been acquired
in the present acquisition would be given under the scheme of Oustees framed by the Chandigarh Administration called ""Chandigarh Allotment of
Dwelling Units to the Oustees of Chandigarh, Scheme of 1996.
It was further stated that the notifications u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were duly published as per the mandatory provisions of law and
thereafter, the objections filed by the land owners u/s 5-A of the Act were considered and full opportunity was granted to them to put forth their
case and the objections were decided in accordance with law and thereafter, the declarations u/s 6 of the Act were issued and the awards were
passed. It was also submitted that 67 objections were received. Those who filed objections, 41 of them had constructed farm houses, out of which
38 were illegal and were constructed in violation of the Periphery Act of 1952. It was also mentioned in the written statement that in one of the civil
writ petition i.e. 759 of 2007 titled as ''Silver City Housing and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India and others, the petitioner has pleaded that he
proposed to invest Rs. 100 crores for setting up the Silver City IT Park including Information Technology Mall and Multi-cum-Entertainment
Centre which also includes Restaurants, Technology College, Food Courts, Two Multiplex Theater Complex and a Night club. Not only this, the
said petitioner has placed on record a Memorandum of Understanding signed by it with private owners of the land in CWP Nos. 11127 of 2006,
4578 of 2007 and 10177 of 2007. Thus, the petitioners who themselves wanted to set up their own IT Mall in the periphery of Chandigarh cannot
challenge the acquisition made by the respondents. The apprehension of the petitioners that project would cause environment degradation is wholly
misconceived as for maintaining equilibrium and pollution free atmosphere, the area of the project was being preserved by taking strenuous efforts
by the respondents. Out of the total acquired land in Phase-III of the acquisition, the respondents have reserved 41.71 acres of land for developing
the same as greenbelt. Thus, buffer zone on the outer periphery of the project is sufficient to maintain the area as ''Green Belt'' for preservation of
the land and for the development of social forestry. Apart from this, the Administration has undertaken meticulous planning for the harmonious
blending of the trees and other landscape elements with the buildings. Even the Forest Survey of India has reported an increase in the forest cover
from 23.5% in 1997 to 35.7% in the year 2007. Apart from enhancing the green cover, the Administration has also undertaken soil conservation
and habitat improvement in Sukhna Lake over an area of 25.42 sq. kms as Sukhna Wildlife Sanctuary in the catchment area. The Administration
has carried out soil conservation measures like control of inflow of silt to Sukhna Lake, construction of silt retention dams and development of
water bodies, check dams, gully plugging, choe training works, spurs and grade stabilizers and due to tremendous improvement in the natural
habitat for the wildlife, there is a proliferation of wildlife in the sanctuary. The massive afforestation supplemented with the soil conservation
measures in the Sukhna catchment area have resulted in sharp decrease in the flow of silt to Sukhna Lake. The land in question is a ''Controlled
Area'' and was kept reserved for the future development of the city Chandigarh and the same does not attract any violation of the Article 243-P to
243-ZG of the Constitution of India for the purpose of performing functions to carry out Urban Planning including Town Planning as provided. The
challenge to the acquisition on the ground of violation of Article 31-A read with second proviso of the Constitution of India is also refuted in the
written statement as the rights and interest of the land owners with regard to any increase in the value of acquired land between the period from the
date of publication of notification u/s 4 of the Act and to the date of taking over the possession of the land were protected by making a provision
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by awarding an interest. It was further submitted that the writ petitions which were filed earlier against the
acquisition of land for the proposed project of Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park, were dismissed by this Court vide its judgment
reported as Sampuran Singh and Others Vs. Union Territory and Others, , which was upheld by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. It was also
submitted that the development of Phase-I and Phase-II of the RGCTP was at an advanced stage and thus, it was submitted that the writ petitions
were liable to be dismissed.
It may also be relevant to mention at this stage that the petitioners have also relied upon the Report on Special Audit of Chandigarh
Administration conducted between 25.5.2009 to 5.6.2009 and 15.6.2009 to 22.5.2009 by the Government of India and National Rehabilitation
Policy to lay challenge to the present acquisition pointing out that the Government of India has found that there were violations in the utilization of
the land acquired under Phase-I and Phase-II of the acquisition.
The Union of India has also filed its reply wherein it has been submitted that an enquiry has been ordered to fix the responsibility of the erring
officials of the Chandigarh Administration. The terms of reference of Inquiry are as under:
� To examine the role and extent of involvement of various officers of Chandigarh Administration in the cases of irregularities as pointed out in
the Report of Special Audit conducted by a team headed by Chief Controller of Accounts (Home);
� To identify the officers who were/are responsible for the irregularities pointed out in the Report of Special Audit and the lapses on their part;
� To examine whether the lapses attributed to the various officers were intentional and/or clearly in excess or in violation of their entrusted
responsibilities.
However, an affidavit dated 24.9.2010 has been filed by the Sh. Pradip Mehra, Advisor to the U.T. Administration Chandigarh submitting that
the acquisition in question has not been considered by the Ministry of Home Affairs and neither has any such observation been forwarded to the
Chandigarh Administration by the Ministry of Home Affairs to indicate that there is any infirmity in the acquisition of land in question.
An affidavit of Sh. Rajiv Attri, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi has also been filed on behalf
of the Union of India through the Ministry of Home Affairs. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid affidavit reads as under:
That I am competent to swear this Affidavit on oath and am well conversant with the facts of the case. I further state that I have read the
contents of the present Affidavit and the same has been drafted under my instructions. The contents of this affidavit are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge derived from the records and from legal advice received.
That the Hon''ble Court vide order dated 28.9.2010 was pleased to direct the Union of India to file an affidavit to state whether the Union of
India wished the UT Administration to continue with the project/acquisition under challenge or to shelve it. Copy of the aforesaid order dated
28.9.2010 is annexed hereto as Annexure A-1.
The matter was thereafter taken up on 12.10.2010 whereby a short reply was filed by the Senior Standing Counsel on behalf of Union of India.
The Court directed the Union of India to file a proper affidavit before the next date of listing. Copy of the aforesaid order dated 12.10.2010 is
annexed hereto as Annexure A-2.
That pursuant to the said order, the Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, wrote to the Adviser to the Administrator, UT
Administration, UT Secretariat, Chandigarh apprising the said Adviser about the observations/conclusions of the Inquiry Officer.
It was further communicated to the Adviser that the Inquiry Officer''s Report had been considered by the Home Ministry and in view of the
observations made by the Inquiry Officer, a decision was arrived at with the approval of the Union Home Minister, that the acquisition of land for
IT Park, Phase III was to be put on hold.
The UT Administration was further advised to develop a plan of the periphery and get it approved by the Competent Authority and also
approach the Ministry of Environment & Forests to carry out prior Environment Impact Assessment in accordance with the development plan, for
any future acquisition. Copy of the communication dated 11.10.2010 is annexed hereto as Annexure A-3.
The land Acquisition Act, 1894, empowers the appropriate Government to take necessary action in respect of acquisition proceedings. In terms
of Section 5(ee) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the expression ""appropriate Government"" means, in relation to acquisition of land for the
purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the State Government.
Under Notification No. SO. 642(E) dated 14.8.1989, the power and functions of the appropriate Government in relation to a Union Territory
have been delegated to the Administrator of a Union Territory, within the respective Union Territory under:-
i) the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) except the functions exercisable by the Central Government under the proviso to sub-section(1) of
section 55 of the said Act; and
ii) the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.
The copy of the aforesaid notification is annexed hereto as Annexure A-4.
Notifications u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued in June-August, 2006 by the concerned officers of Chandigarh
Administration with the approval of the competent authority in the UT Administration. Similarly, action u/s 5-A was taken and declarations u/s 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued by the concerned officers of Chandigarh Administration.
The requirement of the land to be acquired for IT Park Phase-III had been worked out by the Administrator, UT of Chandigarh, who has
been delegated powers of the ""appropriate Government"" under The Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
A decision to continue with this acquisition or otherwise has to be taken by Administrator, UT of Chandigarh only who has been delegated
powers of the Appropriate Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and who had taken a decision to acquire land for this purpose. The
Ministry of Home Affairs (with the approval of the Home Minister) advised the Administrator, vide communication dated 11.10.2010 to put the
acquisition on hold. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs cannot issue any directions to the Administrator, UT Chandigarh, on this issue.
It may be pertinent to mention at this stage that for Phase-II Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park land measuring 447 kanals 12 marlas
was acquired vide notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively and award was passed on
15.12.2004 for the same public purpose as in Phase-III acquisition.
The present writ petition i.e. CWP No. 5065 of 2007 in which pleadings are complete was treated as a lead case.
In other writ petitions, i.e. CWP Nos. 15528 of 2007 and other connected matters i.e. CWP Nos. 4135 of 2005, 11127, 18024 of 2006,
10464, 10465, 11117, 11407, 10137, 10645, 10177, 11249, 9750, 10892, 10073, 10296, 10309, 10353, 10461, 10462, 10463 of 2007 in
some of which vires of the Periphery Act were challenged, were also ordered to be heard along with these writ petitions.
After hearing arguments on many dates in the lead case, this Court vide order dated 17.2.2011 reserved the judgment in the writ petitions
challenging the acquisition of Phase-II and Phase-III whereas the writ petitions wherein the only challenge was to the notices u/s 12(2) of the
Periphery Act and vires of the aforesaid Act, were separated.
In support of the present writ petitions, learned counsel has vehemently argued that notification issued u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is
defective as from the bare reading of the same, it is clearly established that the Collector was not sure of the need to acquire the land after making
enquiry u/s 5-A of the Act and therefore, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed on this ground alone. Elaborating his argument
further, Sh. Ashok Aggarwal, learned senior Advocate has pointed out to the language used in the notification (Annexure P-4) issued u/s 6 of the
Act which reads as follows:-
Whereas it appears to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh that the land in the locality specified below is likely to be needed for a public
purpose & namely ""the provision of city level infrastructure, the regulated urban development of the area between Chandigarh and Manimajra the
planned development and expansion of Chandigarh Technology Park in Village Manimajra, H.B. No. 375, Union Territory, Chandigarh. Now,
therefore, this declaration is made under the provision of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and with Govt. of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs. Notification No. SO 3612 dated 8th October, 1968 informing all to whom it may concern that the land mentioned in the specifications
noted below is needed for the above mentioned public purpose. The Land Acquisition Collector Chandigarh is hereby directed to take further
action for the acquisition of the said land u/s 7 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The plans of the land may be inspected in the office of Land Acquisition Collector, UT, Chandigarh.
By referring to the language used in Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the
legislature has consciously used different phrase u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act which reads as follows:-
Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.-(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] that land in
any locality [is needed or] is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company] a notification to that effect shall be published in the
Official Gazette [and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language], and the Collector
shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality [(the last of the dates of such
publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the notification)].
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either, generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and
workmen,-
to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality,
to dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of
any standing crop, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (unless with the consent of
the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days notice in writing of his intention to do so.
Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, [when the [appropriate Government]
is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made u/s 5A, sub-section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a
Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to
certify its orders [and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same
notification u/s 4, sub-section (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) u/s 5A, sub-
section (2)]:
[Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification u/s 4, sub-section (1),-
(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of
the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date
of the publication of the notification:]
[Provided further that] no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company,
or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
[Explanation 1.-In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in
pursuance of the notification issued u/s 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.]
[Explanation 2.-Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by
the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues].
(2) [Every declaration] shall be published in the Official Gazette, [and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate
of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the last of the date of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the
date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state], the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the
purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after
making such declaration, the [appropriate Government] may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing.
According to learned Sr. Advocate at the first instance, the intention of the Authorities to acquire the land is made known to the public by
issuing notification u/s 4 of the Act by giving a public notice that land is likely to be needed for a public purpose whereas u/s 6 of the Act the words
used are that the land is needed for public purpose and therefore, declaration is made. Thus, according to him, unless a need to acquire the land is
crystalized, no declaration can be issued u/s 6 of the Act and since in the present case from the wording used in the notification issued u/s 6 it is
clearly established that the Land Acquisition Collector was not satisfied regarding the need of the land for the public purpose, the acquisition is bad
and is liable to be set aside. It was further argued on behalf of the petitioners that there was no public purpose for acquisition of the land in view of
the fact that land acquired under Phase-I and Phase II of the acquisition proceedings was still lying vacant and un-utilized and therefore, there was
no need for expansion. According to the petitioners, the public purpose as mentioned in the impugned notifications is for expansion of Chandigarh
Technology Park and the same will arise only if there is any need and in view of the established facts on record that the area under acquisition of
Phase-I and Phase-II was still lying vacant, the acquisition was liable to be set aside being without any public purpose. Apart from this, it was
further argued that from the facts established on record, it was clear that the acquisition was being made for a mala fide purpose as in the report of
Special Audit that the Chandigarh Administration has been clearly indicted. A reference has been made to the fact that the Union of India is already
holding an enquiry into the role of the Officers of the Chandigarh Administration on various issues relating to the aforesaid acquisition.
Another argument has been raised by Sh. M.L. Sarin, learned Senior Advocate, specially in the writ petitions i.e. CWP Nos. 8545 of 2004
and 7820 of 2007 challenging Phase-II acquisition to the effect that the public purpose as mentioned in the impugned notifications were very vague
and in the absence of any definite plan/lay out plan, the petitioners could not raise objections effectively which amounts to denial of opportunity of
hearing as envisaged u/s 5-A of the Act. Shri Sarin, elaborating his argument further has submitted that land of the petitioners in CWP No. 8545 of
2004 is a forest area having more than 1,000 fruit bearing trees and in case a buffer is to be created along the eco fragile area i.e. Sukhna Choe,
the land of the petitioners could have been adjusted and there was no need for acquiring their land and thus, in this way the petitioners have been
prejudiced in the absence of the specific lay out plan and the acquisition was liable to be set aside.
Sh. Puneet Bali, learned Advocate appearing in CWP Nos. 12779 of 2004, 18024, 11127 of 2006, 4577, 4578, 759, 5325, 10137, 10645,
10177 of 2007 has further argued that valuable right of the petitioners has been deprived by compulsory acquisition of their land without giving
them a right of effective hearing before denying them their right to use and develop their land as per their own choice. In support of his case, Sh.
Puneet Bali, Advocate has relied upon a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Pure
Industrial Cock and Chem. Ltd. and Others, to contend that an owner of the land is entitled to use or develop the same for any purpose.
Regulations contained in a statute must be interpreted in such a manner so as to at least interfere with the right of property of the owner of such
land. Learned counsel has further relied upon a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra Housing and Area
Development Authority and Another Vs. Gangaram and Others, to contend that before initiating the proceedings for acquisition, there should be a
scheme or a plan prepared and action could be taken by the Government to acquire the land for the proposed scheme as the right to object for the
proposed acquisition is not an empty formality. It is a valuable right given to the landowners. Once the scheme is formulated and proposal has been
initiated for acquiring the land, it may be open to the landowners to point out by making relevant objections regarding the need of the land for the
proposed acquisition. It was further argued on behalf of the counsel for the petitioners that the observance of the procedure laid down by the
Statute before depriving a person of his property is necessary to generate the feeling that rule of law prevails in the country and when a procedure
is prohibited by the legislature, it is not for the Court to substitute it with different one. Learned counsel has further elaborated his argument that it is
the mandatory duty of the Collector to enquire into and give a hearing and make recommendations as provided u/s 5-A of the Act and his failure to
do so, would show that he did not exercise his jurisdiction. Counsel for the petitioners has argued that in the present case, there was no effective
hearing by the Collector as no record has been produced to show that before making his recommendations he made an enquiry on the basis of the
objections placed before him. The judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court i Munshi Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI), , was also
pressed into service to argue that the public purpose has to be particularized because unless that is done, the various matters which are mentioned
in Section 4(2) of the Act cannot be carried out.
Sh. Arun Palli, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some petitioners, has vehemently argued that in view of the stand taken by the
Union of India in its written statement, the acquisition proceedings must go as it is clearly established from the Audit Report that the acquisition was
done for the mala fide reasons.
Sh. G.S. Grewal, Senior Advocate appearing in CWP No. 4815 of 2007 has vehemently argued that notification issued u/s 4 of the Act has
not been made by the competent Authority as the same is in the name of Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh who is not the Governor in relation to
Chandigarh and therefore, whole of acquisition proceedings are liable to be set aside. It was further argued on behalf of petitioners that acquisition
of land of the petitioners is violative of the requirement of second proviso to Article 31-A and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed.
Elaborating his argument further, Sh. Grewal, learned Senior Advocate has contended that after the 44th amendment to the Constitution, especially
after the second proviso to Article 31-A is not permissible to acquire land under personal cultivation of the owner so long as his total holding was
within the ceiling limit. Sh. Grewal also raised an alternate plea that the market value assessed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is based on
the value determined on the date of notification issued u/s 4 whereas according to the provisions contained in Article 31-A it would have to be on
the date on which possession was taken away and thus, the acquisition was liable to be set aside.
On the other hand, Ms. Lisa Gill, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has defended the acquisition by submitting that the
land measuring 272.33 acres was acquired vide impugned notifications and on passing of the awards the compensation was deposited with the
Court and some of the land owners, other than the petitioners have already received the same. Moreover, many of the writ petitioners did not file
any objections u/s 5-A of the Act and there is no challenge to the non-compliance of any of the procedure i.e. publication of notifications, issuance
of notices etc. It was further submitted by her that after hearing the objections by the Land Acquisition Collector, the report was submitted to the
Government, which was accepted. It was further argued by her that acquisition was for a public purpose which has been clearly mentioned in the
impugned notifications and the same was very well known to the petitioners who have filed the detailed objections. Moreover, preparation of
master plan at the time of acquisition was not required as per the settled principles of law. The prior environmental clearance was also not required
and there was no legal bar under the provisions of the Periphery Act to acquire the land. It was also brought to the notice of this Court by Ms. Lisa
Gill that as per the lay out plan, a buffer is to be created along the eco-fragile area and it cannot be confined to a particular area and in the present
acquisition a lot of green covers have been left. It was also argued by her that acquisition cannot be invalidated on the ground that Section 6
notification is defective as the need to acquire the land had crystalized and sub-section (1) of Section 6 does not require that such satisfaction is
needed to be recorded in the declaration itself. In support of her case, learned counsel has referred to the judgment in Rai Bahadur Ganga Bishnu
Swaika and Others Vs. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society and Others,
Not only this, learned counsel for the respondents has also produced before this Court the official record wherein after hearing objections u/s
5-A of the Act, the competent Authority/LAO has recorded his satisfaction of the need to acquire the land in question. Learned counsel for the
respondents has also drawn our attention towards the fact that many of the petitioners have not filed objections u/s 5-A of the Act and there was
no challenge to the procedure adopted by the Administration for acquiring the land. In fact, no such ground is even raised in the pleadings before
this Court also.
Learned counsel further argued that implementation of the National Rehabilitation Policy which came into force on 31.10.1987 is prospective
and cannot be made applicable in the present acquisition proceedings which were initiated much earlier. It was further argued that no mala fide and
fraud etc. have been proved to quash the proceedings. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has further referred to the
Memorandum of Understanding placed on record by one of the writ petitioners in CWP No. 759 of 2007 to refer that on one hand objection to
the acquisition is being made and on the other hand, the petitioners themselves are collaborating with the big builders to construct malls etc. over
the land in question and therefore, there is no merit in the present writ petition.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and documents produced before this Court.
The argument raised by Sh. Ashok Aggarwal, Senior learned counsel, is not res integra. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ganga Bishnu
Swaika''s case (supra) has held as under:
Sub-section (1) provides that when the Government is satisfied that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, a
declaration shall be made ""to that effect"". Satisfaction of the Government after consideration of the report, if any, made u/s 5A is undoubtedly a
condition precedent to a valid declaration, for, there can be no valid acquisition under the Act unless the Government is satisfied that the land to be
acquired is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. But there is nothing in sub-section (1) which requires that such satisfaction need be
stated in the declaration. The only declaration as required by sub-section (1) is that the land to be acquired is needed for a public purpose or for a
Company. Sub-section (2) makes this clear, for it clearly provides that the declaration ""shall state"" where such land is situate, ""the purpose for
which it is needed"", its approximate area and the place. where its plan, if made, can be inspected. It is such a declaration made under sub section
(1) and published under sub-section(2) which becomes conclusive evidence that the particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a
Company as the case may be. The contention therefore that it is imperative that the satisfaction must be expressed in the declaration or that
otherwise the notification would not be in accord with section 6 is not correct.
It is also useful to refer to paras 28 and 36 of the judgment in Smt. Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, which read as
follows:
The Government has to be satisfied about both the elements contained in the expression ""needed for a public purpose or a company"". Where it
is so satisfied, it is entitled to make a declaration. Once such a declaration is made subs. (3) invests it with conclusiveness. That conclusiveness is
not merely regarding the fact that the Government is satisfied but also with regard to the question that the land is needed for a public purpose or is
needed for company, as the case may be. Then again, the conclusiveness must necessarily attach not merely to the need but also to the question
whether the purpose is a public purpose or what is said to be a company is a company. There can be no ""need"" in the abstract. It must be a need
for a ''public purpose'' or for a company. As we have already stated the law permits acquisition only when there is a public purpose or when the
land is needed for a company for the purposes set out in S. 40 of the Act. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to say that the conclusiveness
would attach only to a need and not to the fact that the need is for a public purpose or for a company. No land can be acquired under the Act
unless the need is for one or the other purpose and, therefore it will be futile to give conclusiveness merely to the question of need dissociated from
the question of public purpose or the purpose of a company. Upon the plain language of the relevant provisions it is riot possible to accept the
contention put forward by learned counsels.
Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied
about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the
Government will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be
open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it
can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the
Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose act all the action of the Government would be
colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the
declaration of the Government will be final.
This Court is in respectful agreement with the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court as mentioned in Ganga Bishnu Swaika''s case
(supra) and Somawanti''s case (supra) and the argument raised by Sh. Ashok Aggarwal, Sr. Advocate, is rejected.
The next argument of the petitioners is that the land acquired by the respondent-Administration under Phase-I and Phase-II acquisition
proceedings is still lying vacant and unutilized and therefore, there was no need for expansion and thus, the public purpose as mentioned in the
impugned notifications i.e. for expansion of Chandigarh Technology Park will arise only if there was any need and in view of the established facts
on record that the area under earlier acquisition was still lying un-utilized, the present acquisition proceedings are liable to be set aside being
without any public purpose. However, Ms. Lisa Gill, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents from her written statement has clearly
demonstrated that whole of the area under earlier acquisition stood utilized by making the allotment of the same for different purposes as per the
plan. Para 18-A of the written statement of the Chandigarh Administration reads as follows:-
The contents of paragraph No. 18-A are admitted to the extent that the answering respondents have issued notifications for development and
utilization of land for expansion of Chandigarh Technology Park. The contents of rest of paragraph are denied as incorrect. It is denied that the
process of development of Phase III of the Chandigarh Technology Park has been started without the success of Phase II of the project. The
Administration has completed the allotment process for whole of the land falling in Phase I and II of Chandigarh Technology Park. Accordingly, 2
Main Campus Sites (measuring 30 acres each), 1 Main Campus Site (15 acre) and 2 Small Campus Site 5 acres and 6 acres each) have been
already allotted to 5 leading IT Companies. Similarly, 19 Built to Suit (BTS) sites (measuring from 0.55 acres to 1.50 acres) have been allotted to
19 IT Companies. Apart from this, 12 acres of land have already been developed by DLF for providing 6,00,000 sq feet of built up space for IT
Companies. Presently, 22 IT Companies are operating from the RGCTP providing employment to more than 5000 professionals. The Companies
who have been allotted land are in various stages of site development and the progress of the same can be ascertained on the spot. This project is
in the advanced stage. The figures/shortcomings which have been pointed out by the petitioners are baseless and without any authentic proof. The
benefit of setting up a Technology Park is already explained in the preliminary submissions made hereinabove which may be read as part of this
paragraph. The proposed utilization of the proposed acquired land and which may be used for draft layout plan is explained in the Annexure which
is annexed herewith present petition.
It is correct that the Land was handed over to the Private Developer for development and complete infrastructural development of Chandigarh
Technology Park as a complete IT Habitat. This has been handed over in Public and private sharing basis to provide complete infrastructure to the
IT Sector particularly providing residential facilities to the persons coming in this IT Sector. The IT Park is the biggest project where trained
manpower can find jobs. The RGCTP is coming up in 351 acres of land in Phase-I and Phase-II and additionally 270 acres of land has been
acquired in the present process of acquisition. Such a big working place requires various supporting systems in terms of residential and
commercial, sports and recreational facilities etc. For providing these facilities an area of 123.79 acres of land was earmarked. Within this area,
49.51 acres of land is under residential use and is freehold and the balance of the land, which amounts to the majority of it, is under leasehold for
99 years. A due and transparent and well planned policy was evolved and reserve price of Rs. 350 crores was kept and details regarding which
development were to be carried, were mandated. After calling the offers through public notice, the highest bid at Rs. 821 crores, i.e. of M/s.
Parsvnath Developers was selected for allotment of this land. Since it was an open auction, apparently market forces have displayed their own
dynamics and highest possible price of this land at that point in time has been bid. Hence to say that this land would cost minimum of Rs. 15.00
crores per acre will not be appropriate. It must be appropriate to say that a smaller piece of land fetches higher per unit return compared to a
larger chunk of land. As such, the rate of this land measuring 123.79 acres in unit terms (per crore) cannot be compared to the Unit cost which 10
acres or 20 acres of land will fetch. Furthermore, once the respondents put the matter in the public domain and open bids are invited, anybody
who fulfills the requirements could have bid in the auction. The land use of 123 acres allotted to the developer is reproduced as below:
It is pertinent to mention that following infrastructure which will be developed and created by the private developer will be handed over to the
Chandigarh Housing Board/Chandigarh Administration free of cost;
i). School Creche
ii) Petrol Pump
iii) Fire station
iv) Bus Terminal
v) Poly clinic.
Thus, the value which has been fetched in the open bid has to be considered in the background of above. By and large, the area which is really
available for use by the Private developer is approximately 53.83 acres which are dedicated to residential and commercial component. This
project is not purely a project for providing supporting infrastructure in the IT park, but the same is linked to other social obligations of the
respondents for the construction of about 25000 dwelling units through Chandigarh Housing Board to rehabilitate the families who are living in the
slums and unauthorised colony. The revenue generated from this project will be shared between the Chandigarh Housing Board and Developer in
the ratio of 30% and 70% respectively and will be utilized for social re-engineering for implementing the above mentioned slum rehabilitation
project which will be developed at the cost of state exchequer.
The representation dated 22.3.2007 made by the ""Manimajra Farmers Welfare and Environment Protection Association"" is matter of record.
However, the request of the petitioners to grant the permission for the development of the land is baseless and without any legal mandate.
a) That the contents of sub-para (a) of 18-A are denied as incorrect. The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy-2007 on the basis of
which the petitioners are claiming benefits is not applicable to the case of petitioners. It has already been stated in the preliminary objections that in
the present case the acquisition process notifications for acquisition of the land was issued before the coming into force the National Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Policy-2007, therefore the benefits which are provided in this policy cannot be given to the petitioners. However, the answering
respondents in this respect have already framed scheme of 1996 for providing alternative accommodation to all the affecter persons under the
present acquisition. The National Policy of 2007 as already explained is prospective in nature therefore, the benefit under this policy cannot be
provided to the petitioners.
b) In reply to the contents of sub-para (b) of Para 18-a, it is submitted that the legislation for the amendment of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has
not been passed by the Parliament and the same is yet to be notified. However, on the other hand, the acquisition process in one scheme of
acquisition has already been completed with the announcement of award on 7.3.2008.
In view of the aforesaid averments made in the written statement, which could not be refuted, it cannot be said that the acquisition are liable to
be set aside as the area earlier acquired was still lying unutilized and there was no need for expansion. Even, it cannot be disputed that expansion is
an ongoing process which continues. Simply because some part of the earlier planning area has remained un-utilized due to non-execution by the
allottees or some other reasons, it cannot be said that there was no need for future expansion.
It was further argued before this Court that the acquisition under challenge was being made for a mala fide purpose. It is so established from
the report of Special Audit wherein the Chandigarh Administration has been clearly indicted. A reference has also been made to the effect that the
Union of India is already holding an enquiry into the role of the officers of the Chandigarh Administration on various issues relating to the earlier
acquisition.
The Union of India through Ministry of Home Affairs has also filed a short reply. According to the aforesaid reply, the terms on reference of
enquiry the Union of India has taken a specific stand that the scope of the enquiry is limited only on the aforesaid issues, referred to above, and the
Union of India is in no way involved in the matter of acquisition of land by the Chandigarh Administration and decision, if any, regarding the
acquisition of the land to continue with this acquisition has to be taken by the Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh. In view of the aforesaid facts, the
scope of enquiry being held by the Government of India is totally different and in the absence of any other material, it cannot be said that
acquisition was being made for a mala fide purpose.
The argument of Sh. M.L. Sarin, learned Senior Advocate who is representing the petitioners who have challenged Phase-II acquisition in
CWP Nos. 8545 of 2004, 12779 of 2004, 12218 of 2006, 12499 of 2006 and 11680 of 2006 that no effective opportunity of hearing as
envisaged u/s 5-A of the Act was given to the petitioners as they were not provided with the specific lay out plan/scheme of the area to be
acquired and further that the public purpose as mentioned in the impugned notifications was vague, is without any merit. It is not in dispute that the
petitioners did file the objections u/s 5-A of the Act and were also afforded an opportunity of hearing by the competent Authority. A perusal of the
objections filed by the petitioners which are available as Annexure P-5 with Civil Writ Petition No. 5065 of 2007, all possible objections were
raised by the petitioners. Not only this, the petitioners have clearly made objections to all the public purposes separately and distinctly as
mentioned in the impugned notifications. It has not been shown by the petitioners in the writ petition as to how they have been prejudiced in any
manner in this regard.
Moreover, the argument of Mr. M.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate that the public purpose as specified in the notification u/s 4 was not sufficient to
enable the petitioners to file objections u/s 5-A of the Act which amounts to denial of right of the petitioners to file objections effectively which
tantamounts to infringement of fundamental right of the petitioners, is liable to be rejected in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon''ble
Supreme Court in the case of Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, .
It is useful to refer to the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case which read as follows:
The question whether the purpose specified in a notification u/s 4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed u/s 5-A would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons,
the specification of the purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area,
it might be practically difficult to specify the particular public purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.
To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. ect. etc. Vs. State of Rajasthan
and others, wherein it has been reiterated that it is not incumbent upon the authorities to prepare a scheme before acquisition of land.
The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, has held that once the acquisition has been
made for planned development and the public purpose has been specified, the notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act is not vitiated on
account of fact that planned development was not specified with particularisation of the land in question needed for the public purpose.
It is also useful to refer to the observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sooraram Pratap Reddy and Others Vs. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy Distt. and Others, which are as under:-
Power of eminent domain can be exercised by the State in public interest. There is no dispute that an appropriate Government may exercise power
of eminent domain and acquire land for any ""public purpose"". Such public purpose implies that acquisition or requisition of property directly and
vitally subserves public interest. The expression ""public purpose"" includes a public purpose in which greatest interest of the community as opposed
to a particular interest of an individual is directly concerned. The expression ""public purpose"" is of very wide amplitude. A ''public purpose'' is
wider than a ""public necessity"". Purpose is more pervasive than urgency. That which one sets before him to accomplish, an end, intention, aim,
object, plan or project, is purpose. A need or necessity, on the other hand, is urgent, unavoidable, compulsive. ""Public purpose should be liberally
construed, not whittled down by logomachy."" The mere fact that the immediate use is to benefit a particular individual would not prevent the
purpose being a public one, if in the result it is conducive to the welfare of the community. Public purpose is not a constant. The scope of an
expression which conjugates general interest of the public must necessarily depend inter alia on social and economic needs and broad interpretation
of the democratic ideal. The application of the rule must rest on the modern economic system of a welfare State having its own requirements and
problems. The application of the rule would not be governed by right distinctions nor would the economic principle be allowed to be blurred by the
blending of forms and interests.
In State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. Vs. L. Krishnan and others etc., , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under:
The next question is whether the public purpose stated in the three notifications concerned is vague. It must be remembered that what is vague is a
question of fact to be decided in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. By saying that the public purpose in the said
notifications is vague what the respondents really mean is not that is not a public purpose but that since the public purpose is expressed in vague
terms and is not particularised with sufficient specificity, they are not in a position to make an effective representation against the proposed
acquisition.
In Aflatoon, the Constitution Bench dealt with the question whether the acquisition of a large extent of land for a public purpose, viz., ""the planned
development of Delhi"" was vague. Mathew, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench, stated that: ""According to the section.... it is only necessary to
state in the notification that the land is needed for a public purpose"" and then added:
The wording of Section 5-A would make it further clear that all that is necessary to be specified in a notification u/s 4 is that the land is needed for
a public purpose. One reason for specification of the particular public purpose in the notification is to enable the person whose land is sought to be
acquired to file objection u/s 5-A. Unless a person is told about the specific purpose of the acquisition, it may not be possible for him to file a
meaningful objection against the acquisition u/s 5-A.
The learned Judge then referred to the ratio of Munshi Singh and held:
We think that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification u/s 4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed u/s 5-A would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The learned Judge also referred to the decision in Arnold Rodricks and held:
(1) In the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can
only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be practically difficult to
specify the particular public purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.
[Emphasis added]
In Pt. Lila Ram etc. V. Union of India, another Constitution Bench held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification concerned therein,
viz., ""for the execution of the Interim General Plan for the Greater Delhi"", is specific in the circumstances and does not suffer from any vagueness.
The Court again pointed out that the notification does not pertain to a small plot but a huge area covering thousands of acres and in such cases, it is
difficult to insist upon greater precision for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered by the notification
may have to be utilised for different purposes set out in the Interim General Plan. Of course, that was a case where the Interim General Plan was
prepared and published by the Government after approval by the Cabinet as a policy decision for development of Delhi as an interim measure till
the master plan could be made ready.
The above decisions, and particularly the decision in Aflatoon, do establish that whether the public purpose stated in the particular notification is
vague or not is question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case and further that where a large extent of land is acquired,
it would not be proper to insist upon the Government particularising the use to which each and every bit of the land so notified would be put to.
The three notifications concerned herein, we are told, pertain to about 400 acres in all. The parties have not furnished copies of the notifications in
their entirety. Only Sri Ashoke Sen has supplied the full text of the notification dated 19-2-1975. It shows that a total extent of ninety-seven acres
one cent was proposed to be acquired, affecting the holdings of about twenty five persons, some of them holding such small extents of 0.26 or
0.25 acres.
So far as the decision in Munshi Singh (decided by the Bench comprising K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover and D.G. Palekar, JJ.) is concerned, it does
contain certain observations supporting the petitioners'' contentions but it must be remembered that this decision was referred to and explained in
Aflatoon. In Aflatoon, it was stated that whether the public purpose stated in a particular notification is vague or not is a question of fact to be
decided in each case and cannot be treated as a question of law. It was also emphasised that where large extents are sought to be acquired for
development or similar purposes, it would not be possible to specify how each owner''s bit would be utilised and for what purpose. We are of the
respectful opinion that the decision in Munshi Singh should be read subject to the explanation and the holding in Aflatoon which is a decision of a
Constitution Bench. As pointed out hereinbefore, in a subsequent decision in Lila Ram, another Constitution Bench has also emphasised the very
same aspect. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Munshi Singh does not come to the rescue of the writ petitioners-respondents in these matters.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no effective hearing was granted to the
petitioners in the absence of the site plan etc. and that public purpose as mentioned in the impugned notifications is vague, is without any merit.
The further argument of Sh. M.L. Sarin, learned Senior Advocate is that the land of the petitioners in CWP Nos. 8545 of 2004 and 7820 of
2007 is a forest area having more than 1,000 fruit bearing trees and in case a buffer is to be created along the eco-fragile area i.e. Sukhna Choe
being one of the public purpose, the land of the petitioners could have been adjusted and there was no need for acquiring their land and thus, the
petitioners have been prejudiced in the absence of any specific lay out plan and the acquisition is liable to be set aside.
The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been refuted by Ms. Lisa Gill, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Administration by submitting that green cover is not to be created only at a specific place and the same is to be created as per the planning made in
this regard. According to lay out plan/plan drawn shown to this Court, the green cover is to be created alongside the Chandigarh Technology Park
and even the green parks etc. have been left in the developed area itself and therefore, in view of the aforesaid stand taken by the learned counsel
for the respondents, we find no merit in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners as it is for the respondent-Administration to
see the planning and development of the area under acquisition as per the need and this Court cannot sit over such decisions.
At this stage, it may also be relevant to mention that the argument as raised by Sh. Bali, who is representing the petitioners in CWP Nos.
12779 of 2004, 18024, 11127 of 2006, 4577, 4578, 759, 5325, 10137, 10645, 10177 of 2007, is also liable to be rejected. No doubt the right
of filing objections and granting opportunity of hearing u/s 5-A of the Act, is a right akin to fundamental right. However, in pursuance to the
objections filed by the land owners, they were granted an opportunity of hearing. In fact, it is not their case that they were not granted any
opportunity of hearing. The argument raised is that an opportunity was not effective in the absence of any scheme/plan. Even the aforesaid
argument is without any merit as the public purpose to develop the city in a planned manner has been mentioned in the acquisition notifications and
the petitioners have filed detailed objections and it has not been shown that any prejudice has been caused to them and it is crystal clear that the
petitioners have claimed all possible reliefs.
It may be mentioned that petitioner-Hardyal Singh Johl has filed two writ petitions simultaneously claiming relief challenging the vires of the
Peripheri Act by filing CWP Nos. 11127 of 2006 and 18024 of 2006.
Not only this, one Ajay Johl, who is petitioner in CWP No. 10645 of 2007 is also a co-petitioner in CWP No. 10177 of 2007 claiming the
same relief. These facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners in their writ petitions. It is well settled that when the cause of action arises
simultaneously in respect of different reliefs, petitioner has to seek all the reliefs in one case. The petitioner cannot file separate writ petitions. Not
only this, the petitioner is also guilty of concealing the aforesaid facts.
Be that as it may, the petitioners have filed detailed objections to protest against the acquisition of their land, advancing all kinds of arguments,
and no prejudice has been caused to them in this regard. Therefore, the argument of Sh. Puneet Bali, Advocate that his clients were not given an
effective opportunity of hearing, is devoid of any merit.
A half-hearted attempt was also made by the counsel for the petitioners that no provision has been made for rehabilitation of the oustees and in
this way, the National Rehabilitation Policy has been violated. However, the National Rehabilitation Policy which has come into effect on
31.10.1987 is prospective in nature and cannot be made applicable in the present acquisition proceedings which were initiated much earlier.
Moreover, in Amarjit Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Others, , one of the questions before Hon''ble Supreme Court was whether
the absence of any rehabilitation measures renders the acquisition in question legally bad. Answering the aforesaid questions, the Hon''ble Supreme
Court observed as under:
Article 300-A of the Constitution rests on the doctrine of eminent domain and guarantees a constitutional right against deprivation of property save
by authority of law. It mandates that to be valid the deprivation of property must be by authority of law. That such deprivation in the present case is
by the authority of law was not disputed, for it is common ground that the property owned by the appellants has been acquired in terms of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a validly enacted piece of legislation.
It is also not in dispute that the provisions of Land Acquisition Act invoked by the State for the acquisition under challenge provide for payment of
compensation equivalent to the market value of the property as on the date of the preliminary notification apart from other benefits like solatium for
the compulsory nature of the acquisition, additional compensation and interest etc. The sum total of all these amounts undoubtedly constitutes a
reasonable compensation for the land acquired from the expropriated owners. Neither Article 300-A of the Constitution nor the Land Acquisition
Act make any measures for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners a condition precedent for compulsory acquisition of land. In the absence of
any such obligation arising either under Article 300-A or under any other statutory provision, rehabilitation of the owners cannot be treated as an
essential requirement for a valid acquisition of property.
We must, in fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he did not suggest that rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential part of any process of
compulsory acquisition so as to render illegal any acquisition that is not accompanied by such measure. He did not pitch his case that high and in
our opinion rightly so. The decisions of this Court in New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and Another Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and
Others, and Chameli Singh and others etc. Vs. State of U.P. and another, have repelled the contention that rehabilitation of the property owners is
a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render any compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for
want of any such measures.
In New Reviera''s case (supra) this Court held that if the State comes forward with a proposal to provide alternative sites to the owners, the Court
can give effect to any such proposal by issuing appropriate directions in that behalf. But a provision for alternative sites cannot be made a condition
precedent for every acquisition of land. In Chameli Singh''s case (supra) also the Court held that acquisitions are made in exercise of power of
eminent domain for public purpose, and that individual right of ownership over land must yield place to the larger public good. That acquisition in
accordance with the procedure sanctioned by law is a valid exercise of power vested in the State hence cannot be taken to deprive the right to
livelihood especially when compensation is paid for the acquired land at the rates prevailing on the date of publication of the preliminary
notification.
There is, thus, no gainsaying that rehabilitation is not an essential requirement of law for any compulsory acquisition nor can acquisition made for a
public purpose and in accordance with the procedure established by law upon payment of compensation that is fair and reasonable be assailed on
the ground that any such acquisition violates the right to livelihood of the owners who may be dependent on the land being acquired from them.
Though an argument was raised by Sh. G.S. Grewal, Senior Advocate appearing in CWP No. 4815 of 2007 that impugned notifications were
not issued by the competent Authority as the same were in the name of Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and not the Governor in relation to the
Chandigarh and therefore, acquisition proceedings are liable to be set aside. However, the aforesaid plea was not substantiated by the learned
counsel by making reliance upon any rule of business, notifications, law or precedents. Thus, the same is also liable to be rejected. With regard to
the second argument raised by Sh. Grewal, on the basis of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India, suffice it to say that such an argument was
rejected by a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 9060 of 2005 decided on 26.9.2006 titled as Amarjit Singh and others v. State of Punjab
and others. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:-
The contention of the counsel for the petitioners that after the 44th amendment to the Constitution, especially after the second proviso to Article
31-A stood inserted, it was not permissible to acquire land under personal cultivation of the owner so long as, his total holding was within the
ceiling limit does not appear to be well founded. The alternate plea that the market value that is assessed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is
based on the value determined on the date of notification issued u/s 4 whereas, according to the provisions contained in Article 31-A it would have
to be on the day on which possession was taken away and thus, the acquisition is unlawful also seems difficult to agree to.
Though in the written statement, an argument has been raised that before acquiring the land prior approval and sanction under the provisions of
the Forest Act and Environmental laws has not been received and therefore, the acquisition is liable to be set aside, it is suffice to say that approval
and sanction of the competent Authorities under the Forest and Environmental laws is not needed at the time of acquisition and the same is needed
only at the time when the land is to be put to use. We are fortified in our view by Division Bench judgments of this Court in CWP No. 4186 of
2009 (Diljit Singh and others v. Union of India and others) decided on 22.11.2010 and CWP No. 18278 of 2008 (Ram Karan and others v.
State of Haryana and others), decided on 25.1.2011.
It may also be relevant to mention that in one of the connected cases it has been averred that the land forming part of the controlled area on the
Periphery of Chandigarh cannot be acquired unless prior permission of the competent Authority under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery)
Control Act, 1952 is obtained. However, the aforesaid argument is liable to be rejected in view of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Sanjeet Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab 2001 (3) RCR (Civil) 398. In the aforesaid case, an argument was raised that land cannot be acquired
unless prior permission of the competent Authority under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 was obtained. However, the
aforesaid argument was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court holding that no such prior permission was required for acquiring the land as the
permission of the competent Authority under the aforesaid Act was needed only when one wants to erect or re-erect any building etc. or use the
land in question as per the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The aforesaid view was reiterated in a subsequent judgment cited a Rabindra Nath
Gupta, I.A.S. and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, . Even the view of the Division Bench of this Court in Sanjeet Singh Grewal''s case
(supra) was not set aside by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Sanjeet Singh Grewal and Others, . Thus, all the writ
petitions are devoid of any merit and are dismissed.