Surjit Kaur vs Surjit Kaur

Pritpal Singh, J.

The petitioners have sought the quashing of the orders dated August 6, 1986 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short called `the Act'').

The relevant facts are that the respondent Surjit Kaur filed a criminal complaint against a number of person, including the petitioners, under Sections 494 and 409 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. The trial Magistrate, vide an order dated January 24, 1985 summoned the petitioners and the other accused under Section 494 read with Section 109, Indian Penal Code. The petitioners questioned the summoning order by filing a revision petition which was heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda. The latter dismissed the revision by means of the impugned order dated August 6, 1986 on the ground that revision against the order of summoning was not maintainable.

It was held by the Supreme Court in Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and another, 1977 C.L.R. (SC) 242, that order of summoning the accused in a complaint case is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) of the Code and as such it is a revisable order. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, while dismissing the revision as unmaintanable had relied upon V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., AIR 1980 Supreme Court 962. This judgment is wholly inapplicable to the present case. Therein the point involved was whether the framing of the charge under the Special Courts Act, 1977 is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 11(1) of the said Act, which provides no that no appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order. In the context of the special Courts Act it was held that although ordinarily the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final, the same, however, could not be said of the Special Courts Act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and specified disposal. It was observed that the dominant purpose of the Act is to achieve not only speedy determination but a determination with the utmost despatch, therefore, the provisions of the Act must be interpreted so as to eliminate all possible avenues of delay or means of adopting dilatory tactics by plugging every possible loophole in the Act through which the disposal of the case may be delayed. In that background the order of framing of the charge was held to be an interlocutory order. The view that in the normal cases, being tried in the criminal Courts, the order of summoning or order of summoning or order of naming charge is revisable, was not departed from because such orders decide important aspects of the trial and it the duty of the Court to apply its judicial mind to come to a conclusion whether a prima facie case has been made out against the accused or not.

Thus, in the light of the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath (supra), the order of summoning of the accused in a complaint case must be held to be revisable. Consequently, the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda, is set aside and the learned Judge is directed to decide the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order of trial Magistrate dated January 24, 1985, on merits. The parties have been directed to appear before the revisional Court on March 30, 1987.

JUDGMENT accordingly.