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Judgment
G.C. Mital, J. (Oral)
This order will dispose of nine connected appeals namely, Regular Second Appeal Nos. 380 to 382 and 422 of 1975 and Nos. 1446 to 1450 of 1975, as common question arises therein.
The Dialpura Bhaika Cooperative Agricultural Service Society Ltd., which is a Society registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), filed nine separate civil suits for recovery of possession in respect of the agricultural land of the Society against unauthorised occupants. The defendants contested the suits on various pleas. Out of these, in four cases both the Courts below decided all the material issues in favour of the Society and against the defendants and decreed the plaintiffSociety''s suits of possession. The defendants have come to this Court by way of Regular Second Appeals Nos. 380 to 382 and 422 of 1975. In the other five cases, both the Courts below held that the suits were not filed by duly authorised person. However, it was found that the defendant''s possession was illegal. The Society has filed Regular Second Appeals Nos. 1446 to 1450 of 1975 against the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, vide which their suits for possession were dismissed.
Three points arises for consideration :
(i) Whether the defendants were in possession as tenants ?
(ii) Whether the suits are timebarred ? and
(iii) Whether Babu Ram was duly authorised to file suits on behalf of the Society ?
In the first instance, the defendants claimed ownership of the land in dispute and, in the alternative, pleaded that they were tenants of the original owners form whom the property came to be vested in the Society and, therefore, they are the tenants of the Society. The defendants failed to prove any contract of tenancy. They also failed to bring any evidence of tenancy on the record by payment of rent and acceptance thereof. The only reliance was placed on some revenue entries wherein they were shown in occupation as tenantsatwill. By now, it is settled that any occupant of agricultural land, other than the owner, is generally entered as tenantatwill and it is the payment of rent which determines the status of an occupant. In the present case, in the column of rent, entry is made that they are in occupation by virtue of sales in their favour. Therefore, it is clear that it is not a case in which the defendants were in occupation as tenantsatwill but were in possession on the basis of some sales. They have not relied upon any sale deeds. Hence, I am in agreement with the Courts below that the defendants are not proved to be tenantsatwill of the land in dispute.
Adverting to the second point, i.e., limitation, a suit by owner for possession is now governed by Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suits could be barred by time only if the defendants had proved that they were in possession for more than 12 years upto the date of filing of the suits and had adverse title to the knowledge of the original owner. In this behalf, no evidence has been led. Mere possession for any number of years cannot be considered to be adverse in terms of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act.
Adverting to the third point, the decision of the lower appellate Court in Regular Second Appeals Nos. 380 to 382 and 422 of 1975 is that Babu Ram, was duly authorised to institute suits on behalf of the Society by virtue of the authority conferred on him by resolution passed by the Managing Committee, which resolution was good in the eye of law. On the other hand, in Regular Second Appeals Nos. 1446 to 1450 of 1975, both the Courts below held that the copy of the resolution, which has been produced on the record by Babu Ram, does not satisfy the requirements of section 36 of the Act read with rule 30 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) inasmuch as it was not proved that the books of accounts were regularly kept by the Society in the course of its business and, therefore, the certified copy was not admissible in evidence. On this technical ground, those five suits of the Society were dismissed.
On this matter, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the Courts below were in error in applying section 36 and rule 30 to the matter in issue in this case. I am of the considered view that bye law 36 of the byelaws of the Society was applicable, which authorised the Managing Committee to empower a person to conduct proceedings in any Court of law on behalf of the Society or to defend on its behalf. Such a decision had to be taken by the Managing Committee by passing an order and the Society passes orders which are termed as resolutions. Babu Ram appeared in the witnessbox and stated that the Society had passed a resolution authorising him to file the suits and produce a certified copy of the said resolution in the Court. He was not contradicted on this aspect in crossexamination nor was any rebuttal led by the defendants to prove that no resolution was passed by the Managing Committee of the Societies authorising Babu Ram to file suits on behalf of the Society. A Society is a legal entity and it works through its Managing Committee, as contained in Section 23 of the Act and byelaw 36 has further empowered the Managing Committee to authorise any person to conduct proceedings on behalf of the Society or defend on its behalf. If the defendants had disputed the genuineness of the original resolution, the Society could have produced it. At no point of time, the passing of the original resolution by the Society was disputed. Only a technical objection was raised that the certified copy of the resolution was not in accordance with Section 36 of the Act read with rule 30 of the Rules. As already observed, neither section 36 of the Act nor rule 30 of the Rules is applicable to the facts of the instant case. They relate to admissibility and mode of proof of a copy of any entry in a book of a Cooperative Society regularly kept in the course of its business and the production of certified copy from such books in a suit or legal proceedings has to be admitted as prima facie evidence for the existence of such entry as also the evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded just as the original entry itself is admissible.
Cooperative Society, Patur No. 7 v. Vasant Balkrishna and others, A.I.R. 1946 Nagpur 317 and United Bank of India Ltd. v. Nederlandsche Standard Bank, A.I.R. 1962 Calcutta 325, have been cited before me for the proposition that if copies of some books of account of a Society are to be produced in legal proceedings, then it must be proved that they are the copies of the books of account which were regularly kept in the course of its business. A reading of the aforesaid decided cases shows that there the copies which were produced before the Court were of the statements of account. Copies of the statements of account in the books of a Society, without the requisite endorsement or proof as is required under the Rules, are not admissible in evidence. The present case is not one of statement of account contained in the books of the Society and, therefore, neither section 36 of the Act nor rule 30 of the Rules is applicable.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the section 36 of the Act and rule 30 of the Rules were applicable, even then the production of certified copy of resolution authorising a person to conduct suits on behalf of the Society would not be equated with the proof which may be required for the fixation of liability on a defendant on the basis of mere copies alleged to be the copies of some books of account of the Society without further proof. In terms of section 23 of the Act, it is the Managing Committee which is to conduct the affairs of the Society and byelaw No. 36 of the Society''s ByeLaws authorises the Managing Committee of the Society to empower a person to conduct suits or proceedings on behalf of the Society in a Court of law. Such a matter would not be of keeping books of a Cooperative Society regularly in the course of its business but would be a matter of daytoday working of the Society. Production of a copy of such matter would be considered as prima facie evidence within the meaning of section 36 of the Act and it shall be deemed to be correct till contrary is proved. In the present case, the defendants have not been able to controvert that a decision was taken by the Society authorising Babu Ram to conduct the suits on behalf of the Society. Therefore, I uphold the decision of the courts below on this matter in Regular Second Appeals Nos. 380 to 382 and 422 of 1975 and upset the decision of the Courts below in Regular Second Appeals Nos. 1446 to 1450 of 1975 and hold that all the nine suits were filed by Babu Ram as duly authorised agent of the plaintiff Society.
For the reasons recorded above, Regular Second Appeals Nos. 380 to 382 and 422 of 1975 are dismissed and Regular Second Appeals Nos. 1446 to 1450 of 1975 are allowed and, after setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, the Society''s suits for possession are decreed, as prayed for. The parties are left to bear their own costs.