Surjit Singh vs Harbans Singh

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

Petitioner, Surjit Singh filed a criminal complaint against the respondent with respect to offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 326, 148 and 149 Indian Penal Code that on 30.11.1986, when the petitioner, alongwith his brother and father was coming home from the fields, respondent No. 1 to 5 caused injuries to the petitioner and his brother; and that again on 7.12.1986 when the petitioner alongwith his father and one Shinder Kaur was coming from Civil Hospital respondents No. 1 and 2 caused grievous hurt to the petitioner. After the respondents were summoned, Shinder Pal Kaur was examined and she deposed that occurrence took place on 8.12.1986, though in her statement during preliminary evidence, she had stated date of occurrence as 7.12.1986.

In the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Mansa, Petitioner''s counsel prayed for permission to crossexamine the witness and vide order passed on 28.11.1990, she was allowed to be crossexamined. RespondentHarbans Singh filed a revision petition in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda and learned Addl. Sessions Judge concluded that witness can be declared hostile when he is suppressing the truth. He cannot be declared hostile merely because the fact deposed is not suited to the party. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the revision petition and directed the learned Judicial Magistrate to complete the statement of Shinder Kaur.

Aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the present petition has been filed.

Subsection (2) to Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure restricts the power of Court while hearing revision petition and is being reproduced below for the sake of facility :

"397 (2). The powers of revision conferred by subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal inquiry, trial or other proceedings.

The language used by subsection (2) to Section 3917 Criminal Procedure Code is clear and unambiguous. The powers of revision cannot be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. This question as to what would be an interlocutory order contemplated in subsection (2) to Section 397 Cr. Procedure Code came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, 1978 Supreme Court Reports, 749. Therein Shri Limaye filed an application that complaint should be dismissed as the Court had no jurisdiction. The Sessions Judge rejected the contention of Shri Limaye and framed a charge. Revision petition was filed in the High Court and it was concluded by the High Court that it was not maintainable in view of subsection (2) to Section 397, words have to be interpreted in a manner, which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the Statute. There may be an order passed during the course of proceedings, which may be not final and yet it may not be interlocutory order, but for other orders, which are purely interlocutory orders, revision petition will not be maintainable.

Subsequently in the case of V.C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 962, the same question again came up for consideration. The Supreme Court referred with approval to the definition of interlocutory order by Wharton''s Law Lexicon (14th Edition, P. 529) which reads as under :

"An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties."

Thereupon the Supreme Court summed up the legal position in the following words :

"Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all."

It is obvious from the aforesaid that interlocutory order is one which is passed at some intermediate stage of a case to advance the case or to dispose of an application for final determination of rights between the parties. It is a step in aid to the disposal of the main case. The term interlocutory order must be used in a restricted sense. It need not be purely a temporary or interim order. Interlocutory order invariably does not lead converse to the final order. Ordinarily if rights of parties are not decided or effected, it will be taken as an interlocutory order for purposes of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the present case, the learned trial Court had simply permitted the witness to be crossexamined by the party producing the said witness, or in other words to put questions in the form of crossexamination. It must be taken to be an interlocutory order against which no revision petition would be maintainable. This is for the reason it was a step in aid for concluding the statement of the witness. No rights have been decided. Respondents still have the right to crossexamine the witness in accordance with law. No final determination of any such right has taken place.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore fell into an error in entertaining the revision as such. Therefore, ends of justice require that by enabling powers the orders of learned Addl. Sessions Judge should be quashed.

For these reasons, I allow the petition and set aside the order passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda and restore that of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Mansa.