Survesh Kumar and others vs State of Punjab and another

M. M. Punchhi, J.—The late father of the petitioners, Kishan Chand, owned some land which was acquired by the State of Punjab. Notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 16-10-1970. The award was made on 27-3-1971. He received compensation to the tune of about Rs. 76,000 - in the year 1971 itself. He made an application u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Collector for referring the case to the District Judge. Since the application was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation, it was rejected and the result was communicated to him in the year 1972. The matter rested there.

Some others, who were aggrieved by the award of the Collector, made timely applications u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Their applications were referred to District Judge. In their cases, the District Judge decided the matter on 7-1-1986 enhancing compensation. Before that date, the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984, (Act No. 68 of 1984) had come into force. The District Judge taking note of the beneficial amendments gave the benefit thereof to the claimants before while enhancing the rate of compensation. This awakened the petitioners, since their father by that time had died, to ask the Collector u/s 28A of the Act to give them similar benefits and enhancement of compensation. Their request was declined by the Collector taking the view that since their application u/s 18 had been rejected as time-barred, they were not entitled to the benefits of the orders of the District Judge passed on 7-1-1986. This has brought them to this Court to seek a direction against the Collector in suitable terms.

Return has been filed. The facts as such are not disputed. Contrarily it is maintained that the rejection of the application of the petitioners u/s 18 by the Collector, way back in the year 1972, had finalised the matter and nothing was pending which could be activated under the Amendment Act, 1984.

There is a basic fallacy in the arg ument of the State. Section 28A, is not fettered by any such impediment. It postulates redeter-mination of the amount of compensation of one on the basis of the award of the court made in favour of another. The Court in the context means the District Judge. The right accrues to a person whose land was acquired by the same notification u/s 4, subsection (1) who may have been aggrieved by the award of the Collector and may noi have made an application to the Collector u/s 18, Mr. Sayal is at pains to contend that factually an application was made and since it was rejected, the case of the petitioners does not fall within the ambit of Section 28A, We do not agree with his contention. S. 28A is worth reproduction here :

"Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. (1) Where in an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector u/s 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification u/s 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector u/s 18; written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require thatthe amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1) conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference u/s 18".

Not making of an application, as con-iceived of in the aforesaid provision, is not only an application factually not made but also includes an application which when made is not entertained for whatever reason, by the Collector. It is different if an application is so made and is rejected on merits within the limited domain of the Collector on merits. An application which was not enter-jtained being time-barred was as good as an application not made. In this situation, we have no hesitation in holding that the peti-tioners are entitled to the benefit of section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. Holding so. we quash the order of the Collector Annexure P-2 and remit the case back to him directing him to decide the application of the petitioners in accordance with law. Parties through their counsel are directed to put in lappearance before him on 16-10-1989.

Petition allowed.