Susant Kumar Sahu vs State Of Odisha (Vig.)

S. K. Sahoo, J

The appellant/petitioner Susant Kumar Sahu who was the V.L.W. in Gania Block in Nayagarh District has filed this interim application under section 389 of Cr.P.C. for stay of his conviction passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar in T.R. Case No.01 of 2011 vide impugned judgment and order dated 20th February 2023 in convicting him under section 7 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter '1988 Act') and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-(Rupees two thousand), in default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of two months for the offence under section 7 of the 1988 Act and to undergo R.I. for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand), in default, to undergo R.I. for a further period of two months for the offence under section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The prosecution case, in short, is that on 21.12.2009, one Milu Rai lodged a written report before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Nayagarh Unit, Nayagarh addressing to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar stating therein that he was an inhabitant of village Dhobabarai under Gania Block and a sum of Rs.20,000/-(Rupees twenty thousand) was sanctioned for construction of the platform of his village well and he was selected as V.L.L. in Palli Sabha of his village to construct the platform of the said well and in his name, the work order was issued which was signed by the Sarpanch seven to eight days prior to the lodging of F.I.R. Thereafter, the informant approached the petitioner four days prior to the lodging of F.I.R. who was supposed to issue the work order but the petitioner demanded a sum of Rs.2,000/- (rupees two thousand) as bribe to issue the work order. On 21.12.2009 at about 2.00 p.m., when the informant again approached the petitioner and expressed his inability to pay the demanded amount, the petitioner refused to issue the work order, however he reduced the demanded bribe amount from Rs.2,000/- (rupees two thousand) to Rs.1,800/-(rupees one thousand eight hundred) and asked the informant to pay the amount by 22.12.2009 to get the work order.

The written report being received by the D.S.P. (Vigilance), Nayagarh Unit, Nayagarh was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Bhubaneswar Division, Bhubaneswar, who directed the Officer in-charge of Vigilance Police Station, Bhubaneswar Division, Bhubaneswar to register the case and Shri Srinibasa Padhy (P.W.5), Inspector, Nayagarh Vigilance Unit was directed to lay a trap and further directed the Inspector of Police (Vigilance) Ms. Harapriya Naik (P.W.7) to take up investigation of the case. Accordingly, Bhubaneswar Vigilance P.S. Case No.52 dated 21.12.2009 was registered under section 7 of the 1988 Act against the petitioner.

P.W.5 made a preparation to lay the trap on 22.12.2009, issued necessary instruction to the informant to come ready with the bribe money of Rs.1,800/-(rupees one thousand eight hundred) on that day and basing upon the requisition of D.S.P., Vigilance, the witnesses, namely, Naran Murmu (P.W.2), Asst. Engineer and Jagdish Prasad Majhi (P.W.3), Junior Engineer reported before him and thereafter he along with the other witnesses assembled in the office room of D.S.P., Vigilance, Nayagarh where the informant was introduced by P.W.5 to the team members. The informant produced a sum of Rs.1,800/- (rupees one thousand eight hundred) having three numbers of 500 rupees denominations and three numbers of 100 rupees denominations before P.W.5. The constable P.K. Acharya showed a demonstration during which he prepared sodium carbonate solution and dipped his fingers inside the solution, but the colour of the solution remains unchanged. He thereafter, treated the currency notes with phenolphthalein powder and handed over the same to the informant inside a four-fold paper with instruction to pay the same to the petitioner only on demand. The constable thereafter dipped his fingers inside the prepared solution and the colour of the solution turned pink. The solution was preserved in a glass bottle duly labeled and sealed. P.W.2 was selected to accompany the informant to the office of the petitioner, to overhear the conversation between the informant and the petitioner and to relay the signal by rubbing his forehead after the transaction of passing the bribe money. A preparation report was duly drafted by P.W.5 marked as Ext.2. On the same day at about 4.25 p.m., they reached at Gania Block and the informant and the accompanying witness (P.W.2) went inside the Gania Block office by walking and other team members followed them and took positions inside the campus of the Block. At about 5.00 p.m., P.W.5 received the signal from P.W.2 and immediately, they proceeded to the computer room of I.C.D.S. building and found the informant and the petitioner available in room. The informant identified the petitioner to P.W.5 and clarified that he had paid the bribe amount to the petitioner on demand. Thereafter, P.W.5 collected the hand wash of the petitioner in sodium carbonate solution which turned pink in two separate glass bottles being duly labeled and sealed. On instruction, the petitioner handed over the tainted money to P.W.3 by brining it from his right side pant pocket and then P.W.3 compared the number and denomination of the currency notes with that mentioned in the copy of preparation report and found it tallied. Both hand wash of P.W.3 which turned pink taken in prepared solution was collected and the solution was preserved in separate glass bottles duly labeled and sealed. The right pant packet wash of the petitioner which also turned pink was also collected and the solution was preserved in separate glass bottles duly labeled and sealed. P.W.5 also sealed the collected wash, tainted money, four fold paper, copy of the preparation report with necessary endorsement by P.W.3 and the connected file regarding issuance of work order in respect of platform of a well. Then P.W.5 collected the impression of seal on a paper and left the seal on zima of P.W.3 and prepared the spot map marked as Ext.16 and also the detection report (Ext.10) at the spot and arrested the petitioner and subsequently, handed over the seized materials, connected documents and the petitioner to P.W.7 for further investigation.

The Investigating Officer (P.W.7) took charge of investigation of the case from P.W.5 as per the direction of S.P., Vigilance, Bhubaneswar, Division, examined the witnesses and forwarded the petitioner to the Court. On 11.01.2010, she forwarded the seized exhibits to the Director, S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar for its chemical examination. On her prayer before the Court, the statements of the informant and overhearing witness were recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. On 17.03.2010, she sent the requisition to Sarpanch, Chhamundia G.P. of Gania Block to produce the proceeding of the Palli Sabha of village Dhobabarai in which it was decided that the village well platform would be done by the informant. She received the chemical examination report from S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh on 22.03.2010 in which it was opined by the examiner that phenolphthalein was detected in sodium carbonate solution contained in the glass bottle marked as Ext. R, L, P, W and D. On 18.06.2010, she seized the Palli Sabha book of village Dhobabarai and the resolution book of Chhamundi G.P. from one Nalini Jani marked as Ext.18 and the Palli Sabha khata marked as Ext.19. On 08.07.2010, she seized the personal original file of the petitioner along with its certified copy, original posting order of the petitioner and duty assignment order of the B.D.O on the strength of seizure list marked as Ext.14. On 19.10.2010, she received the sanction order of Collector, Nayagarh vide letter dated 05.10.2010 marked as Ext.20 (with objection). On completion of investigation, she submitted the charge sheet against the petitioner under section 7 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act to stand his trial in the court of law.

On assessing the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court came to hold that the defence has failed to rebut the presumption under section 20 of the P.C. Act, even at the touch stone of preponderance of probability. It was further held that the prosecution has also proved the original sanction order against the petitioner vide Ext.20 and the same further fortifies that all the material documents were produced before the sanctioning authority and that after going through all the documents, the sanction order has been passed by the then Collector, Nayagarh.

It was further held that when the sanction order has been proved and it gives detailed account of discussion with the I.O. (P.W.7) which is corroborated by the ocular testimony of the I.O. and when no infirmity has been brought out on record by the defence in the process of the grant of sanction, mere non-examination of the sanctioning authority cannot vitiate the prosecution against the petitioner. It was held that the prosecution has successfully proved the sanction order against the petitioner as per true norms and spirit of section 19(1) of the P.C. Act, 1988, aaccordingly, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the offences under section 7 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act has been committed by the petitioner and the petitioner was found guilty of such charges.

Mr. Devashis Panda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the learned trial Court has illegally convicted the petitioner under section 7 and section 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act. He further argued that the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment has picked and chosen only the portion of evidence of the prosecution to be utilized against the petitioner and discarded the rest evidence in favour of the petitioner without any justifiable reason. It was further asserted that the deposition of the witnesses of the prosecution during the cross-examination was not taken into account. He further argued that the informant died for which he could not be examined during trial and the overhearing witness (P.W.2) had deposed falsely that he could see the transaction and heard the conversation as it was not possible on his part either to see or to overhear the alleged demand from where he was standing. A spot map was prepared by the trap laying officer at the spot itself, where the position of the witness (P.W.2) was near the store room in an open field and the said store room was in between the position of the witness and the place of occurrence. He further asserted that despite being conscious of the fact that P.W.2 neither could see nor could hear while the transaction was done still it presented a false set of facts before the Court to criminally implicate the appellant. He further argued that had the learned trial Court considered the evidence available in favour of the petitioner and not ignored the same, the impugned order of conviction would not have come into existence. The finding recorded by the learned trial Court is out and out perverse and without any application of its judicial mind and therefore, the impugned judgment is bad in the eye of law. He further submitted that the apprehension of losing the job may not be the sole criteria for granting stay of conviction, but the exceptional and special circumstances which exist in the facts of the case sufficiently indicate that the present litigation is luxury litigation on the part of the prosecution at the cost of the petitioner. Therefore, when the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the petitioner to the hilt, this Court may be pleased to pass an order of stay of conviction. To substantiate his stand, learned counsel has relied upon in the case of Neeraj Dutta - Vrs- State (Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi) reported in 2023 Supreme Court OnLine SC 280 wherein it is held as follows:

“12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:

Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under:

In the absence of evidence of the informant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant Under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.”

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Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 7, as existed prior to 26th July 2018, was different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to "any gratification". The substituted Section 7 does not use the word "gratification", but it uses a wider term "undue advantage". When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the Accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption Under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable Under Clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable Under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of 26th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences Under Clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.”

Mr. Sanjaya Kumar Das, learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department appearing for the opposite party vehemently opposed the prayer for stay of conviction and also filed his objection to such petition. It is contended that the learned trial Court after going though the evidence on record in detail has rightly found the petitioner guilty and since stay of conviction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and in rare cases where failure to stay conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences, nothing having been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that

respect, no favourable order should be passed in his favour. It is further contended that besides getting legal remuneration, demanding and accepting bribe has come a ‘MANTRA’ in the public institutions by the public servants. It has become a contagious disease in the society, which needs social reforms and judicial inference to get rid of the same. He further submitted that so far as the contentions of suspension/stay of conviction and sentence of the petitioner is concerned, the interim application is liable to be dismissed because of his conviction and sentence for committing the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and being held to be a corrupt public servant by accepting illegal gratification as a ‘motive’. He further submitted that as the law is equal to all and to be judged impartially, the petitioner does not stand in a different footing to be considered in any special circumstances, when he has been found guilty for adopting corruption by thinking it to be his official act. He further contended that the petitioner ought to have thought of the consequences regarding demand and acceptance of bribe money against discharging the official duties. He also contended that in the event, the petitioner succeeds in the criminal appeal preferred by him before this Court, he would be at liberty to claim all of his consequential benefits from the Government and in view of the above, the I.A. should be dismissed.

First, let me deal with the ambit and scope of section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. relating to stay of judgment and order of conviction by the appellate Court as were placed by the learned Standing Counsel for the vigilance department.

In  the  case  of  K.C.  Sareen  -Vrs.-  C.B.I., Chandigarh reported in (2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 584, it is held as follows:-

“11. The legal position, therefore, is this: though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction, the Court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The Court has a duty to look at tall aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate Court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior Court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, dehors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is different matter.

Corruption by public servants has now reached a monstrous dimension in India. Its tentacles have started grappling even the institutions created for the protection of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functions of the public offices, through strong legislative, executive as well as judicial exercises, the corrupt public servants could even paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby hinder the democratic policy. Proliferation of corrupt public servants could garner momentum to cripple the social order if such men are allowed to continue to manage and operate public institutions. When a public servant was found guilty of corruption after a judicial adjudicatory process conducted by a Court of law, judiciousness demands that he should be treated as corrupt until he is exonerated by a superior Court. The mere fact that an appellate Court or revisional forum has decided to entertain his challenge and to go into the issues and findings made against such public servants once again should not even temporarily absolve him from such findings. If such a public servant becomes entitled to hold public office and to continue to do official acts until he is judicially absolved from such findings by reason of suspension of the order of conviction, it is public interest which suffers and sometimes even irreparably. When a public servant who is convicted of corruption is allowed to continue to hold public office, it would impair the morale of the other persons manning such office, and consequently that would erode the already shrunk confidence of the people in such public institutions besides demoralising the other honest public servants who would either be the colleagues or subordinates of the convicted person. If honest public servants are compelled to take orders from proclaimed corrupt officers on account of the suspension of the conviction, the fall out would be one of shaking the system itself. Hence, it is necessary that the Court should not aid the public servant who stands convicted for corruption charges to hold only public office until he is exonerated after conducting a judicial adjudication at the appellate or revisional level. It is a different matter if a corrupt public officer could continue to hold such public office even without the help of a Court order suspending the conviction.”

In the case of State of Maharastra through C.B.I. -Vrs.- Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar reported in (2012) 53 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 1233, it is held as follows:-

“12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, a clear picture emerges to the effect that, the Appellate Court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the Court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The Court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examined whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done.

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The aforesaid order is therefore, certainly not sustainable in law if examined in light of the aforementioned judgments of this Court. Corruption is not only a punishable offence but also undermines human rights, indirectly violating them, and systematic corruption, is a human rights' violation in itself, as it leads to systematic economic crimes. Thus, in the aforesaid backdrop, the High Court should not have passed the said order of suspension of sentence in a case involving corruption. It was certainly not the case where damage if done, could not be undone as the employee/Respondent if ultimately succeeds, could claim all consequential benefits. The submission made on behalf of the Respondent, that this Court should not interfere with the impugned order at such a belated stage, has no merit for the reason that this Court, vide order dated 9.7.2009 has already stayed the operation of the said impugned order.”

In the case of State of Punjab -Vrs.- Deepak Mattu reported in A.I.R. 2008 Supreme Court 35, it is held as follows:-

“7. While passing the said Order, the High Court did not assign any special reasons. Possible delay in disposal of the appeal and there are arguable points by itself may not be sufficient to grant suspension of a sentence. The High Court while passing the said Order merely noticed some points which could be raised in the appeal. The grounds so taken do not suggest that the Respondent was proceeded against by the State, mala fide or any bad faith….”

In the case of Pruthwiraj Lenka -Vrs.- State of Odisha (Vigilance) reported in (2022) 85 Orissa Criminal Reports 667, it is held that law is well settled that possible delay in disposal of the appeal and/or presence of arguable points in the appeal by itself may not be sufficient in staying the order of conviction of the trial Court without assigning any special reasons. An order granting stay of conviction is not the Rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. As order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative.

In the case of Om Prakash Sahani -Vrs.- Jai Shankar Chaudhary and another etc. reported in (2023) 91 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 84, it is held as follows:-

“33.…The Appellate Court should not reappreciate the evidence at the stage of section 389 of the Cr.P.C. and try to pick up few lacunas or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such would not be a correct approach.

In the case on hand, what the High Court has done is something impermissible. High Court has gone into the issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the F.I.R., some over-writings in the First Information Report etc. All these aspect, will have to be looked into at the time of the final hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts. Upon cursory scanning of the evidence on record, we are unable to agree with the contentions coming from the learned Senior Counsel for the convicts that, either there is absolutely no case against the convicts or that the evidence against them is so weak and feeble in nature, that, ultimately in all probabilities the proceedings would terminate in their favour…..”

In the case of A.B. Bhaskara Rao -Vrs.- Inspector of Police, CBI, Visakhapatnam reported in A.I.R. 2011 Supreme Court 3845, it is held as follows:-

“19. From the analysis of the above decisions and the concerned provisions with which we are concerned, the following principles emerge:

a) When the Court issues notice confining to particular aspect/sentence, arguments will be heard only to that extent unless some extraordinary circumstance/material is shown to the Court for arguing the matter on all aspects.

b) Long delay in disposal of appeal or any other factor may not be a ground for reduction of sentence, particularly, when the statute prescribes minimum sentence. In other cases where no such minimum sentence is prescribed, it is open to the Court to consider the delay and its effect and the ultimate decision.

c) In a case of corruption by public servant, quantum of amount is immaterial. Ultimately it depends upon the conduct of the delinquent and the proof regarding demand and acceptance established by the prosecution.

d) Merely because the delinquent lost his job due to conviction under the Act may not be a mitigating circumstance for reduction of sentence, particularly, when the Statute prescribes minimum sentence.”

The appreciation of evidence in detail at the final stage of hearing of criminal appeal is not to be adopted at the stage of dealing with interim application for stay of judgment and order of conviction inasmuch any finding on the merits of the case by way of appreciation of evidence at the stage of consideration of interim application for stay of conviction is likely to prejudice either of the parties.

There is no doubt that in view of settled position of law, the appellant has to make out a rare and exceptional case for the grant of stay against conviction under section 389 of Cr.P.C. There must be special and compelling circumstances in justification for the grant of such stay against conviction. There should be irreversible consequences leading to injustice and irretrievable damages in the event of non-grant of stay against conviction. The impugned judgment of conviction should be based on no evidence or against the weight of evidence, which must prima facie appear on the face of it without conducting a detailed analysis into the merit of the case. Possible delay in disposal of the appeal and that there are arguable points by itself may not be sufficient to grant stay of conviction.

In view of the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions and keeping in view the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it is to be seen whether the petitioner has made out a very rare and exceptional case for grant of stay of order of conviction. What the evil that is likely to befall on the petitioner, if the order of conviction is not stayed? Whether failure to stay the order of conviction would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences?

There is no dispute that the informant Milu Rai could not be examined as he died during trial. Therefore, there is no evidence relating to the demand stated to have been made to the informant four days prior to the lodging of F.I.R. and even on the date of lodging F.I.R. as stated in the F.I.R., which is not a substantive piece of evidence and its utility in evidence is very much restricted by law and it can only be used corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 of Evidence Act, or to contradict it under section 145 of the Evidence Act.

The most important witness to prove the demand and acceptable of the bribe money is none else than P.W.2. P.W.2 has not only stated about the preparation proceeding in the office of D.S.P., Vigilance Unit, Nayagarh but also stated that he accompanied the informant to the Block Office, Gania where he noticed about the demand of money by the petitioner to the informant, the informant handing over the tainted money to the petitioner which was counted by the petitioner and then keeping it in his pant pocket. He also stated about the recovery of the money from the possession of the petitioner, comparison of the denomination of notes and hand washes of the petitioner being taken in sodium carbonate solution changing colour to pink. Whether in view of the position of P.W.2 as shown in the spot map (Ext.16) prepared by P.W.5, he could notice the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the petitioner from the informant is to be adjudicated at the final stage of hearing of the criminal appeal. The evidence of P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.5 proves the stand of the prosecution that the petitioner had demanded and accepted the bribe money of Rs.1,800/- (rupees one thousand eight hundred) from the deceased-informant and the evidence of Scientific Officer (P.W.1) with Ext.1 (C.E. report) fortified the same as held by the learned trial Court. The stand taken by the petitioner that the informant have Rs.1,800/-(rupees one thousand eight hundred) to him which he had taken as hand loan from him in the year 2009 has not been accepted by the learned trial Court and the evidence of D.W.1 was found to be not credible. The sanction order against the petitioner was found to be as per true norms and spirit of section 19(1) of the 1988 Act.

After carefully and meticulously analyzing the finding of the learned trial Court, the submissi ons made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and the evidence on record, I am of the humble view that at this stage, it cannot be said that it is a case of no evidence against the petitioner. Whether the evidence available on record would be sufficient to uphold the impugned judgment and order of conviction of the petitioner or on the basis of points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, benefit of doubt is to be extended to the petitioner is to be adjudicated at the final stage when the appeal would be heard on merit. Giving any finding on the merits of the case is likely to cause prejudice to either of the parties. This Court will certainly have a duty to make deeper scrutiny of the evidence and decide the acceptability or creditworthiness of the evidence of witnesses at the final stage of hearing of the appeal on merit. At this stage, reappreciation of evidence by conducting detailed analysis and trying to pick up lacunas or loopholes in the case of the prosecution is not permissible. No extraordinary circumstance/material is shown to this Court for granting the desired relief to the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner has been dismissed from the government service by the order of the Collector & Disciplinary Authority, Nayagarh and that he is likely to face financial hardship and there is no chance of early hearing of the appeal are not the grounds for granting the reliefs sought for.

Therefore, I am of the humble view that for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether stay of order of conviction be granted or not, I find that the petitioner has failed to make out a very exceptional case or special reasons for keeping the conviction in abeyance and as such, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the relief sought for by the petitioner for staying the order of conviction cannot be granted.

Accordingly, the interim application being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.

By way of abundant caution, I would like to place it on record that whatever has been stated hereinabove in this order has been so said only for the purpose of disposing of the prayer for staying the order of conviction of the petitioner. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as expression of a final opinion on any of the issues of fact or law arising for decision in the case which shall naturally have to be done at the final stage of the hearing of the criminal appeal on merit.

Urgent  certified  copy  be  granted  on  proper application.

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