Sushila and Another vs Delhi Union Territory and Others

D.S. Tewatia, J.—Claimant-Appellants Sushila Devi widow of Brahma Parkash and Bablu minor son of Brahma Parkash claimed a sum of rupees two lacs by way of damages caused by the Respondents on account of the death of Brahma Parkash, aged 26 years, in an accident with D.T.C. bus No. DHP 3371 driven by Karan Singh RW 3 on 26th June, 1981 at 9.00 a.m. in front of Agriculture Office on Rewari-Narnaul Road. The claim petition was dismissed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Hence the present appeal.

The claimants examined, inter alia, PW 6 Ram Kumar and PW 7 Radhey Shyam as the eye-witnesses of the occurrence while on behalf of the Respondents, besides the conductor and the driver of the bus, namely RW 1 Daya Nand and RW 3 Karan Singh, Ram Pat, an alleged passenger in the bus at the time of accident, was also examined as RW 2,

The stand taken by the Respondents was that at the time of the accident a truck happened to be proceeding ahead of the scooter blocking the view of the bus driver Karan Singh, Respondent, of the scooterist when the latter took a right turn. The deceased scooterist who was coming from the opposite direction towards the offending bus, took a sudden turn to the right towards the Agriculture Office where he was employed as Assistant Agriculture Development Officer in the Agriculture Department; that the bus was proceeding at a slow speed and despite all efforts and applying brakes the accident could not be avoided and that the accident occurred as a result of the negligence of the deceased.

The pleadings of the parties led to the framing of as many as 8 issues. The Tribunal after giving its findings on issue No. 2 in favour of the Respondents dismissed the claim petition and did not examine the other relevant issue regarding the quantum of compensation. Primary issue in the present case no doubt is issue No. 2 which is in the following terms:

Whether the automobile accident resulting in the death of Brahma Parkash took place on account of negligence, reckless or any other fault on the part of driver of bus No. DHP 3371 as alleged?

The Tribunal in my opinion has not appreciated the evidence examined on behalf of the claimant-Appellants. Stray sentences made in cross-examination by Ram Kumar were utilised as corroborative of the Respondents'' version.

Ram Kumar in his examination-in-chief has stated that the bus was coming with high speed; that the deceased had started giving signal by hand from a distance of 5 or 6 feet. The bus was then at a distance of 40 or 50 feet when the signal was given. The bus dragged Brahma Parkash upto a distance of 6 or 7 feet before stopping. In cross-examination he said that Brahma Parkash turned towards the right suddenly; that it was wrong to suggest that the bus after accident stopped at a distance of 2 or 3 feet. It stopped at a distance of 2 or 3 paces.

Radhey Shyam PW 7 had stated that the bus was coming with great speed. Brahma Parkash before taking a turn gave signal. The bus stopped at a distance of 20 yards after hitting the scooter. In cross-examination he stated that the scooter was at the speed of 7 or 8 km. per hour at the time of accident. There was no truck ahead of the scooter when the accident had happened. He denied that the bus was coming at a speed of 25 km. per hour when the accident took place. He also denied the suggestion that the bus stopped at a distance of 2 or 3 feet from the place of accident.

It deserves highlighting that to Ram Kumar PW 6 it was not put as to whether there was a truck ahead of the scooter. Ram Kumar is emphatic about the high speed of the bus at the time of the accident. He is also positive about the distance between the-scooter and the bus when the scooterist tried to take the turn, which he stated to be 40 or 50 feet. The Tribunal sought to utilise two circumstances from the statement in cross-examination in favour of Respondents version. One is that the deceased turned towards the gates suddenly and the other that the bus stopped at a distance of 2 or 3 paces. So far as the first circumstance is concerned, it may be observed that in examination-in-chief this witness had said that the deceased had given signal from a distance of 5 or 6 feet before he took the turn. In the fact of this data it would be just a question of opinion whether this turning could be considered a sudden turning. This may be his personal opinion but if a person before taking the turn, gives signal 5 or 6 feet before that and the vehicle whose path he is likely to cross at that point is 40 or 50 feet away from him, the turning cannot be said sudden at all by any stretch of imagination. According to Ram Kumar, bus had stopped at a distance of 2 or 3 paces. This, of course, is consistent with his statement in examination-in-chief also where the distance was mentioned in terms of 6 or 7 feet. Three paces comes to 6 or 7 feet. This circumstance would not show that the bus was not driven at a high speed as stated by this witness. The bus was at a distance of 40 or 50 feet from the place of occurrence with a clear vision of the scooterist and yet it happened to drag the scooterist after hitting him for 6 or 7 feet. This could happen only if the vehicle was driven at a high speed. Otherwise the vehicle would have stopped much before the place of accident if it had been at a speed mentioned by the witnesses of the Respondent. Ram Kumar had witnessed the occurrence by standing in front of the office gate which happened to be right in front of the place where the accident took place and therefore, was in a position to witness the occurrence. He cannot be said to be a chance witness. Radhey Shyam, who was a passenger in the bus, had corroborated his statement on all material points except regarding the distance at which the bus had stopped after accident. According to Radhey Shyam, the bus stopped at a distance of 20 yards. The Tribunal otherwise accepted their presence.

Now coming to the witnesses of the Respondents, it may be observed that the conductor and driver of the bus were both interested witnesses and they were, of course, interested to give a version favourable to themselves. The only allegedly independent witness RW 2 Ram Pat admitted the fact that he was not examined by the police. If he had witnessed the occurrence and if that fact had been known to other Respondents then he was bound to be examined by the police. Neither RW 1, Daya Nand, conductor, nor the driver himself in their statements have stated that the occurrence had been witnessed by RW 2 Ram Pat. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept that this witness had witnessed the occurrence and was a passenger in the bus at the time of accident. The version that there was a truck ahead of the scooter was not put to Ram Kumar as already observed. PW 7 Radhey Shyam denied that version when it was put to him. RW 1 Daya Nand and RW 3 Karan Singh cannot be believed in this regard. They were bound to put up some such version.

For the afore-mentioned reasons I hold that the offending bus was driven rashly and negligently and the driver of the bus alone was responsible for the accident that took place in which a well placed young man lost his life.

The other issues were not contested either before the Tribunal or here. The only other material fact that has been contested relates to the quantum of damages. There is no dispute about the fact that the deceased was drawing Rs. 971.70 per month as his salary as Assistant Agriculture Development Officer in the Department of Agriculture, Haryana Government. There is also no dispute about his age which was 26 years.

Mr. Gandhi had argued that at the best the deceased might have been spending upon himself about Rs. 271/- or Rs. 272/- exclusively having regard to the fact that some of the expenses like the expenditure on the living accommodation and on boarding would be common with other members of the family. The net loss to the claimants, therefore, comes to Rs. 700/- per month which would include some savings and the actual amount spent on the claimants which amount has been put at about Rs. 600/- by Sushila Devi appearing as PW 5. The net loss thus to the claimants comes to Rs. 8,400/- yearly. There is controversy in this Court as to the multiplier that should be applied to a case like this. A Full Bench of this Court in Lachman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur 1979 ACJ 170 (P &H) had fixed the maximum multiplier of 16. This was diluted in a later judgment in Asha Rani v. Union of India 1983 ACJ 52 (P &H), wherein basing on Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Bhairagarh Bhopal v. Sudhakar Yfll ACJ 290 (SC), it was observed that the multiplier could go upto 20. R.N. Mittal, J. in Tehil Singh v. Jaswant Singh 1985 ACJ 94 (P &H), adopted the multiplier of 16 in the case of the deceased who was 26 years old. G.C. Mital, J. in a later case reported as Rajinder Singh Jasbir Singh v. Urmil 1987 ACJ 35 (P &H), adopted the multiplier of 20 in the case of deceased who was 25 years old. In Pushpa Sharma v. Punjab State through Secretary Transport 1987 ACJ 1043 (P &H), D.V. Sehgal, J. adopted a multiplier of 18 for a deceased aged 35 years.

Neither the Full Bench which for the first time floated in this Court the theory of multiplier has given any scientific basis for arriving at a correct multiplier in a given case nor any concrete formula has been spelt out in any other decision following the Full Bench judgment. The result is that it remained a rule of thumb. Judicial precedents, however, show a tendency towards liberality in adopting the appropriate multiplier. Therefore, I am of the view that in view of the young age of the deceased and the fact that he was employed as an officer with a bright future in the Government service multiplier of 20 would be very appropriate in this case. I, therefore, award damages to the tune of Rs. 1,68,000/- to be paid by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 jointly and severally with 12 per cent interest from the date of the filing of the claim petition. The amount of damages shall be shared by the two claimants equally. The share of the child shall be deposited in fixed deposit renewable upto the age of 18 years. The interest accruing on that amount shall be paid to the widow in order to spend the same upon his upbringing. Since in this case the Appellant had paid court fee before the Tribunal the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.