Suthersanam Maistri vs Narasimhulu Maistri and Another

The Chief Justice stated the facts of the case and agreed with the learned Judge below that the alleged partnership between the plaintiff and the

1st defendant was not proved and proceeded as follows:

In the view I take of the facts, it is not necessary for me to consider the question of limitation. With regard to this question, however, I am of

opinion that if there ever was an agreement between the brothers in the nature of a partnership agreement, that agreement came to an end in 1894

and the plaintiff''s claim is consequently barred by limitation.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Bhashyam Aiyangar, J.

This is an appeal preferred by the plaintiff against the Judgment of Mr. Justice Boddam in C.S. No. 159 of 1900, dated 16th January 1901,

dismissing the suit with costs. The suit was brought by the plaintiff for taking an account of property alleged to have been jointly acquired by the

plaintiff and the 1st defendant as undivided brothers, for ascertaining the respective shares of plaintiff and 1st defendant therein and for a decree

awarding to him his share in such properties.

The cause of action, as disclosed in the plaint, is that the plaintiff and the 1st defendant carried on jointly some contract business until the year

1894, when disputes and differences having arisen between them, the 1st defendant and his wife, the 2nd defendant, left the house in which they

were till then living with the plaintiff, as members of an undivided family, and went and lived separate. The property acquired from the funds of the

contract business both prior to 1894 and apparently subsequent thereto, is estimated at rupees 60,000 and a schedule of such property is annexed

to the plaint. The plaintiff charges that the 1st defendant as the senior brother and member of the joint family, consisting of himself and the plaintiff,

has been and continues to be in possession of such property and that he has fraudulently transferred or pretended to transfer a portion of this

property to his wife, the 2nd defendant. Though it is not stated in the plaint that the plaintiff is entitled to an equal share with the 1st defendant in

such property, yet it is evident that he claims an equal share on the footing that the property, of which an account is sought to be taken forms the

joint property of an undivided family, consisting of himself and his brother, the 1st defendant, such property representing the profits of the contract

business carried on by himself and his brother with the aid. and assistance of their sister, though not with the aid of any ancestral property belonging

to them.

The 1st defendant while admitting the relationship alleged in the plaint denies that he carried on any joint contract business with the plaintiff or

that they were members of a joint and undivided-family, and jointly acquired the property in question ; he Also relies on the plea of limitation, if the

suit is regarded as based on an alleged partnership between himself and the plaintiff in the business referred to in the plaint.

Of the issues framed in the case, the only two which have to be considered in this appeal are the 1st and the 5th, viz.:

(i) Whether the plaintiff and the defendant joined in a contract business and jointly acquired therefrom the property mentioned in the plaint.

(ii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation.

Whether the 1st issue was intended to raise only the question that the acquisitions form joint family property under the Mitakshara Law, on

which footing the suit is evidently based, or also in the alternative, the question as to whether the plaintiff and the 1st defendant carried on the

contract business, as partners, is not clear.

The question chiefly argued on behalf of the appellant are:

(i) that the property in question forms the joint family property of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, having been acquired by their joint labour and

exertions and that as such it is liable to partition between them;

(ii) that, even if it cannot be regarded as joint family property, the plaintiff as partner with the 1st defendant is entitled to an equal share in the profits

of the contract business ; and

(iii) that, in either view, the suit is not barred by the law of limitation.

In support of the first contention, the learned Advocate-General strongly relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council in Rampershad Tewarry

v. Sheochurn Doss 10 M.I.A. 490 of Mayne''s Hindu Law and Usage (6th Edition). Assuming that the contract business in question was carried

on by the joint labour and exertions of the plaintiff and 1st defendant, the present case is, in my opinion, clearly distinguishable from the above

case, the fundamental difference being that the business in the above case was carried on by and on behalf of all the members of the joint family,

viz., the five undivided brothers--whereas in the present case the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, are only two out of five brothers, who, with their

father, constitute an undivided Hindu family, possessed of some joint ancestral property, which it is stated in paragraph 3 of the plaint is being

employed by the father and the three elder brothers of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant since 1874, when the plaintiff and the 1st defendant

alleged to be of 6 and 9 years of age respectively at the time, left their family house and went to live with their married sister, who maintained and

brought them up, and about 1887, three years after her husband''s deaths advanced them in business by her influence with the Madras Railway

Company, with whom her husband was carrying on contract business on an extensive scale. The 1st defendant married his sister''s step-daughter in

1881, and the plaintiff, her own daughter, in 1891; and until some time in 1893, the two brothers with their wives were living together in their

sister''s family.

It appears from Exhibit B, the draft of a partition deed, and from the oral evidence relating thereto, that an attempt was made in 1898 to effect

a partition among the six members of the family, viz., the father and the five sons; but it fell through and was not completed owing, apparently, to

certain of the members not acquiescing in the proposed distribution and allotment of the property among the various members.

Bearing these facts in mind, I shall now proceed to consider the principles of Hindu Law which, in my opinion, bear upon the determination of

the question whether the plaintiff and the 1st defendant can be regarded as owning the property in question as members of a joint family.

The Mitakshara doctrine of joint family property is founded upon the existence of an undivided family, as a corporate body (Gansavat

Balsavant v. Narayan Dhond Savant ILR 7 B. 467 and Mayne''s Hindu Law and Usage, 6th Edition, paragraph 270) and the possession of

property by such corporate body. The first requisite, therefore, is the family unit, and the possession by it of, property is the second requisite. For

the present purpose, female members of the family may be left out of consideration, and the conception of a Hindu family is a common male

ancestor with his lineal descendants in the male line, and so long as that family is in its normal condition, viz., the undivided state--it forms a

corporate body. Such corporate body with its heritage is purely a creature of law and cannot be created by act of parties, save in so far that, by

adoption, a stranger may be affiliated as a member of that corporate family. Persons, who by birth or adoption are not members of a Hindu family,

cannot in the absence of a custom having the force of law, by mere agreement, become or be made members of a joint family.

According to the above conception of a faintly, there may, of course, be one or more families all with one common ancestor, and each of the

branches of that family, with a separate common ancestor.

As regards the property of such family, the ""unobstructed heritage"" devolving on such family with its accretions is owned by the family as a

corporate body; and one or more branches of that family, each forming a corporate body, within a larger corporate body, may possess separate ''

unobstructed heritage'', which, with its accretions, may be exclusively owned by such Branch as a corporate body.

The main family and its branches may possess joint property, not only by operation of law but also by act of parties. Property acquired without

the aid of joint family property, by one or more individual members thereof--whether they belong to different branches or to one and the same

branch of the family--may, by act of parties, be incorporated with the joint property of the main family or of one of its branches; and a stranger

may also give property to the family as a whole (vide Radhabhai v. Nana Rao ILR 3 B.151 or to one of its branches (vide Kunhacha Umma v.

Kutli Mammee Hajee ILR 16 M.201 as a corporate body. Even if the undivided family is not possessed of any nucleus of property which has

come to it as ''unobstructed heritage it may be that, by act of parties, property acquired jointly by all the members or separately by one or more

members thereof, can be impressed with the character and incidents of unobstructed heritage or joint property belonging to the main family or to

any of its branches. Property devolving by inheritance as ''unobstructed heritage'' on all the members of a joint family (vide Gopalasami v.

Chinnasami ILR 7 M. 458 or upon any one of them, may likewise be impressed with the character of joint family property. But so long as a family

remains an undivided unit, two or more members thereof,--whether they be members of different branches or of one and the game branch of the

family,--can have no legal existence as a separate independent unit; but if they comprise all the members of a branch or of a sub-branch, they can

form a distinct and separate corporate unit within the larger corporate unit and hold property as such.

Such property may be the self-acquisition or ''obstructed heritage'' of a paternal ancestor of that branch as distinguished from the other

branches,, which property has come to that branch and that branch alone as '' unobstructed heritage,'' or it may be the self-acquisition of one or

more individual members of that branch, which by act of parties has been impressed with the character of joint property, owned by that branch

and that branch alone, to the exclusion of the other branches.

Mr. Mayne in paragraph 277 of his book while laying down that property acquired by the members of a joint family by their joint labour,

would form their joint property, suggests a doubt as to whether their male issue would by birth alone acquire a right in such property. Apparently

he inclines to the opinion that they would not, and it also appears to be the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Chatturbhooj v. Daramsi ILR

9 B. 438 cited by Mr. Mayne.

If the joint acquirers intended to hold the property so acquired as co-owners and not as joint family property in the Mitakshara sense of that

expression, this view would be perfectly sound. But, if, as supposed, the property was acquired by all the members of the undivided family, by

their joint labour, it would, in the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary be owned by them as joint family property and in that case

their male issue, who, by their birth, become members of such undivided family, necessarily acquire a right by birth in such property. The natural

persons, forming for the time being the members of an undivided Hindu family, fluctuate both by births and deaths in the family and any such person

may also retire therefrom by civil death (Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage, 6th Edition, paragraph 603) or by renunciation on his part acquiesced

in by the Remaining . members, provided such renunciation and acquiescence are manifested by an overt act, namely, the giving him ''some trifle''

out of the family property (Mit. Oh, II, Section 11, verses 11 and 12, Stokes'' Hindu Law Books, page 380 Manu, Oh. IX, page 207; .

Yajnavalkya 2--117). With all deference to Garth, C.J., I find myself wholly unable to concur in the proposition enunciated by the learned judge

that ""a mere declaration by one member, that he was separate from the others, would seem to be sufficient to effect the separation"" (in Radha

Churn Doss v. Kripa Bindhu Dons ILR 5 C. 477.

In any one of the contingencies the normal undivided state of the family and its legal character as a corporate body is in no way affected or

disturbed.

But if one or more members become divided by partition, it is not equally clear that the status of the remaining members of an undivided family

in its normal condition, continues unaffected. ""By some of the Hindu lawyers a separation, such as to give one or more members their several

shares is regarded as necessarily involving a general partition. Those who have not separated, are, on this theory, looked on as re-united (West &

Buhler''s '' Hindu Law,'' 3rd Edition, page 685). This view was adopted in some of the earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court (vide Jaudub

Chunder Ghose v. Benodbeharry Ghose 1 Hyde''s Rep., page 214 ; Petambur Dutt v. Hurrishchandra Dutt 15 W.R. 200 Sham Narain v. The

Court of Wards 20 W.R. 197 Kesabram Mahapattar v. Nandkishor Mahapattar 3 B.L.R. 7 but is dissented from in a later decision of the same

High Court (Upendra Narain Myti v. Gopee Natha Bera ILR C. 817. So far as this Presidency is concerned, though there is no reported decision

bearing on the point, (Peddayya v. Ramalingam ILR 11 M. 406 the principle generally recognised and acted upon is that though there can be no

compulsory partial partition either in respect of the joint property belonging to the family or in respect of the persons constituting the undivided

family yet by mutual agreement of parties, the partition can be partial either in respect of the property or of the persons constituting the family, and

according to usage and custom the remaining member''s of an undivided family from which one or more alone have become divided, continue as an

undivided family in its normal state and not: as members, who after partition have become united.

It is, therefore, impossible to regard the plaintiff and 1st defendant as forming in themselves an undivided family owning, joint family property as

a corporate body. I am aware'' that. In Sham Narain v. Court of Wards 20 Suth. W.R.197 which was not cited in the argument, it was held by a

Division Bench of the Calcutta. High Court that two, out of three undivided brothers forming a joint Hindu family, who between themselves held in

common an acquired estate to the exclusion of the remaining undivided brothers, might be regarded as having become divided and then re-united in

respect of their shares of ancestral property and incorporated their common acquisition with their shares in the ancestral property.

In the present case, it has not been contended that the plaintiff and the 21st defendant should be regarded in respect of the property, of which

an account is sought to be taken, as re-united brothers and a partition effected between them on that footing. But even if such contention were

open upon the pleadings in the cause and. had been actually raised, I should have no hesitation in overruling the same and dissenting from the

above decision of the Calcutta High Court. Unless some foundation were laid in fact for the theory of re-union which necessarily pre-supposes a

division inter partes, there is no warrant for importing a fiction of division followed by a fiction of re-union for the purpose of impressing property

acquired or owned exclusively by some members of an undivided family who do not in themselves form a branch family, with some of the incidents

of joint family property. I say advisedly ''some'' of the incidents of joint family property, for the re-united shares of re-united brothers and property

acquired by them jointly after re-union are not on the same footing as the joint property of an undivided family in its normal condition. Such an

estate is separately defined by the Hindu lawyers and partakes partly of the incidents of joint family property and partly of the incidents of separate

property. (Vide Ramasami v. Venkatesam ILR 16 M. 440 ; Mayne''s Hindu Law and Usage, 6th Ed., paragraphs 496 and 586; Mitakshara Ch.

II, Section IX).,

It is next argued on behalf of the appellant that even if the contract works carried on by the 1st defendant cannot be regarded as the joint

family business of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, it must be treated as a partnership business between the two brothers. It is not alleged that

there was any express agreement of partnership, but that as the plaintiff regularly combined his labour with that of the 1st defendant in carrying on

the contract business an agreement of partnership should be implied between them--especially as they were related as brothers. On the other hand

the position taken by the learned Counsel for the respondent is that the business was the sole business of the 1st defendant, but that the plaintiff

was sometimes deputed by his brother to go and superintend the contract work when he, the 1st defendant, was unable to attend and that the

plaintiff in order to receive training was now and then associated with him in superintending the contract business. The oral evidence on both sides

as to the degree of attention paid by the plaintiff to the business and the supervision exercised by him over the same is. as usual conflicting. But the

preponderance and credibility of evidence is decidedly in favour of the plaintiff, and I am satisfied that he was regularly and continuously

contributing his labour and attention to the execution of contract works from 1888 to about the end of 1893 ; and I do not attach any importance

to the defendant''s contention that the plaintiff was too young to take any part in the contract business. Even according to the evidence of the

defendant himself, the plaintiff was 15 years of age in 1887, if not older, and considering the nature of the contract works the plaintiff was of

sufficient age to attend to them. The Madras Railway Company, no doubt, entrusted the contract work to the 1st defendant only, and it was he

alone that dealt with the Company and had the financial management of the business. Admittedly, it was the sister of the plaintiff and 1st defendant

who introduced the 1st defendant to the Railway Engineer and secured to him the contract business by her recommendation. It is clear from her

evidence as plaintiff''s first witness that she intended the contract business for the benefit of both her brothers and that she regarded both of them as

jointly carrying on business, but there is nothing to show that she communicated either to the plaintiff or to the let defendant that such was her

intention in introducing the latter to the Madras Railway authorities. The business was started in 1887 with funds supplied to the 1st defendant from

time to time by way of loan by one Chelvapillai Naidu under an arrangement that out of two and a half shares Chelvapillai was to have one share of

the profits, the sister, half a share and the defendant, the remaining one share. If the plaintiff was a partner with the 1st defendant,'' this one share

would of course belong to both of them.

The first contract appears to haveended in a loss in 1890, and the sum of 803 odd rupees then found due to Chelva Pillai was repaid to him by

the 1st defendant from a loan advanced to him by his sister. It does not appear from the evidence that, beyond the said amounts, any capital was

contributed for the business. The loan no doubt, was raised by the 1st defendant, but it cannot be regarded as capital contributed by him, for, if the

plaintiff was a partner with him in the business, the debt will bind both equally.

There being no express agreement between the brothers in regard to the contract business, the question that presents itself is whether, under

the above circumstances, a contract of partnership should be implied or whether the proper inference to be drawn is that there was no legal

relation between the brothers in respect of the business, but that tho plaintiff regularly and systematically assisted his elder brother in carrying on the

work in view to learn business himself or in expectation that his elder brother would deal with him generously if profits were realised from the

business or with both these objects.

In deciding this question one should of course have special regard to the social customs of the Hindus and to the fact that the plaintiff and the

1st defendant were brothers who were brought up and educated by their sister into whose family they married and with whom they lived that the

business in question was secured through the instrumentality of the sister, that the nature of the business was such that combination of labour was

more important for success than contribution of capital and that the plaintiff''s association with his brother in the business for a period of nearly six

years was not casual but regular and continuous. It is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff bestowed upon the business as much time and attention

and exercised as effective and as great a degree of supervision over it as his elder brother, the 1st defendant. But for the plaintiff''s conduct

subsequent to 1898 and a portion of his evidence in this suit--both of which will be presently adverted to--I should have no hesitation in holding as

a juryman that both, the plaintiff and his sister (who introduced the 1st defendant into the business) all along bona fide entertained the belief that

plaintiff was interested equally with the 1st defendant in the business, that the 1st defendant must have been fully aware that the sister introduced

him into the business expecting that both the brothers who were living with her were to be benefited by it arid that the plaintiff was devoting his time

and attention to the business, fully believing that he was equally entitled with his elder brother to the profits of the business. Under these

circumstances an agreement of partnership would be implied by law; and adverting to the principles of the law of estoppel embodied in Section

115 of the Indian Evidence Act which is the same as the English law, I may also add that it was the duty of the 1st defendant to speak out his mind,

if it was his intention that the business was to be exclusively his own and that the plaintiff was to have no interest in it as a partner. His silence was

culpable, and he is estopped from contending that the plaintiff was not his partner in the business. (Sarat Chander Dey v. Gopal Chander Laha 19

I.A. 203

This conclusion receives support from the circumstance that some time after there was first a breach between the 1st defendant and his sister in

1893 and subsequently the relations between the brothers themselves became rather strained, and the 1st defendant removed to another house of

his own, leaving the plaintiff to continue to live with his sister, she exerted her influence with the Railway authorities and secured separate contracts

directly to the plaintiff himself. Since then, the plaintiff has been working the contracts he secured to himself separately, and the 1st defendant

working his contracts separately and sometimes in partnership with one or other of his brothers. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant however, were

sometimes helping each other in regard to their respective contracts, but the plaintiff''s proposal to take the 1st defendant as his partner in his

Ennore contract, was not accepted by the latter. During all this time and until the 4th August 1900 the date of Exhibit 43 the plaintiff does not

appear to have asserted any claim to any of the properties acquired by the 1st defendant. The suit itself was instituted on the 19th September 1900

within Section 6 weeks after the date of the Exhibit.

As regards the draft partition deed Exhibit B, dated 24th May 1898, I think it highly probable that the 1st defendant was the author and

moving spirit of it and that the plaintiff, whether under advice or not, refused to consent to its terms and declined to sign it. It is not clear whether he

then advanced a claim to a half share of the earnings made by the 1st defendant from the contract business. It is possible that but for this attempt at

partition the plaintiff might not have advanced any claim to the properties in question. The proposal having fallen through, the 1st defendant

naturally grew anxious and had recourse to certain benami transfers of property in the name of his wife, the 2nd defendant.

The exhibit which is most unfavourable to the plaintiff''s case is Exhibit II (14th December 1893, in which the plaintiff refers to one of the

properties comprised in the plaint schedule as the garden of ''his brother'' the 1st defendant while in the same letter he refers to the garden house of

his sister in while he was living with her as ''our garden'', identifying himself apparently with his sister. If, as now claimed, the brother''s garden

therein referred to, was the joint and common property of himself and his brother, it is very curious that he should refer to it as his brother''s

garden. Further, in his deposition, he states as follows: ""After the award, my brother went to live in the house"" (referred to in Exhibit II as the 1st

defendant''s garden) ""we both erected at Madaakum, because he was displeased with my sister. Sometime after, there was a quarrel between us.

He would not give me money, I asked for, while I was working for him * * * We quarreled because my brother would not give me money. ""No

questions have been put to the plaintiff about this statement in view to its elucidation. Prima facie the statement indicates that plaintiff expected to be

rewarded or remunerated for his having worked with the defendant in connection with the contract. If the earnings had been regarded as the joint

family property of himself and the 1st defendant or as the profits of the 1st defendant''s business in which plaintiff was a partner, he would not have

simply demanded money for his having worked with the defendant in the business--a demand which implies that he expected reward or

remuneration far his trouble--but he would have demanded his one half share in the defendant''s earnings, a considerable portion of which was

converted into house or landed property. He was not even paid any money as demanded by him. This was about the end of 1893 or beginning of

1894, and the plaintiff took no action whatever to assert his claim. This conduct on the part of the plaintiff coupled with the allusion in Exhibit 11 to

one of the properties mentioned in the plaint schedule as his brother''s garden, leads to the inference that, for some reason or other, which is not

apparent on the record, the plaintiff when he was attending to the contract business of his brother and superintending it, did not do so with the

understanding that he was to have a share in the profits of such business that he only expected to be rewarded for his trouble and generously by his

brother. In deciding whether or not the two brothers carried on the business as partners I attach no significance to the arbitration proceedings in

1893 between the sister and the defendant in the matter of the contract business. There was then no occasion to define or refer to the relation

between the plaintiff and the defendant in respect of the contract works. There was then no dispute between the brothers in regard to those works,

and the arbitrators had only to decide what amount was due to the sister.

I now proceed to consider the question of limitation. If the properties, of which an account is sought to be taken, were the joint family property

of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant the plea of limitation will clearly be of no avail. But, if the plaintiff and the 1st defendant were partners in the

contract business, which partnership, if any, clearly terminated about the end of 1893 or beginning of 1894, the suit is clearly barred by the law of

limitation and in this view the plaintiff''s suit fails, even if the contract business in question was carried on in partnership between the brothers. It is

apparently in anticipation of the plea of limitation that the plaintiff claims a share not only in the profits of the contract business which was carried on

until about the beginning of 1894, but also in the profits of the business subsequently carried on by the 1st defendant, the profits of which latter

business appear to have been much larger than the profits made till 1894.

A reference to the evidence 6f the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and their sister clearly shows that if there was any partnership between the

plaintiff and the 1st defendant, it came to a termination--which is the same as a dissolution --sometime in 1894 and that, as already mentioned, the

1st defendant thereafter continued that business on his own account and also undertook and carried on fresh contract business by himself or

sometimes in partnership with one or other of his other brothers and that the plaintiff too obtained from the Railway authorities other contract work

for himself and carried on the same on his own account. The plaintiff says that the Ennore contract work which he obtained in 1894 and which he

was carrying on for four years and which resulted in a profit of about Rs. 3,000 was his own concern and not a joint undertaking with the 1st

defendant. But on the other hand he says that he claims a half share in the profits of the 1st defendant''s contract works even subsequent to 1894

not on the ground that he was working with his. brother as before in the execution of the work, but by reason of an undertaking with his brother

that the latter ''should deal with him as he had been doing before and should not think of injuring him.'' The understanding herein referred to is

vague and indefinite, and there is no reliable evidence in support of it.

From the year 1894, therefore, the plaintiff ceased to be a member of the alleged partnership (vide Section 253, Clause 7 of the Indian

Contract Act), and in fact he retired from the partnership which had not been entered into for any fixed term (cl. 8 of Section 253, Indian Contract

Act). It is therefore clear that the present suit viewing it as one for winding up the affairs of the partnership which terminated or was dissolved in

1894 is barred by the Law of Limitation. The fact that after retirement of one of two partners, the remaining partner carries on the same business

makes no difference (Knox v. Gya. L.R 5 H.L. 656. The case of Noyes v. Crawley L.R. 10 Ch. D. 3 cited on behalf of the respondent is in point

and at page 39, Malins, V.C. expresses his full concurrence in the following statement of the law by Lord Lindley in his treatise on ''Partnership''

4th Ed ; page 966-- ""So long indeed as a partnership is subsisting and each partner is exercising his rights and enjoying his own property, the

statute has, it is conceived, no application at all; but as soon as a partnership is dissolved or there is any Exclusion of one partner by others, the

case is very different and the statute begins to run."" The same learned author, on the authority of Pearce v. Lindsay 3 De G.J. 139 says that a

dissolution of a partnership at will, may be inferred from circumstances, e.g., a quarrel although no notice to dissolve may have been given (Lindley

on Partnership, 5th Edition, page 572). Having regard to the above authorities and Clauses 7 and 8 of Section 253 of the Indian Contract Act, it is

impossible to accede to the contention of the learned Advocate-General that there has yet been no dissolution of the alleged partnership between

the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and, that therefore the suit is not barred by Article 106 of the Indian Limitation Act. In support of this contention,

he strongly relied upon the recent decision of the Privy Council in Moung Tha Huyin v. Mha Thein Myah ILR 28 C. 53. In that case, however, no

plea of limitation was raised, but the defence relied upon was that the plaintiff who was admittedly a partner in the business abandoned all his right,

title and interest in the partnership business and his share in the concern and was therefore not entitled to sue for an account. It was found by both

Indian Courts that there was no dissolution and that the plaintiff did not abandon his interest in the partnership. It is impossible to gather from the

report, whether upon the facts of the case, the plea of limitation could have been taken, though as a matter of fact it was not taken in any of the

Courts. At p. 59, their Lordships of the Privy Council observe as follows:

There was, however, no more evidence of express abandonment than of consent, and there was some evidence of the plaintiff''s subsequent

intervention in the partnership affairs""--If such subsequent intervention was within three years before the date of the suit, there could be no

foundation whatever for raising a plea of limitation The whole judgment and the English authorities cited by Counsel in argument and in the

judgment of the Privy Council clearly show that the question of limitation was not at all before their Lordships and that the decision proceeded on

the ground that ""there has been no abandonment on the part of the plaintiff or loss of his interest in the partnership by laches."" In the present case, if

there was a partnership between the brothers, it cannot be, and is not, contended that the plaintiff abandoned his interest therein until its termination

but only that his right to sue for an account is barred by the Law of Limitation.

It was further contended by the learned Advocate-General that the three years period of limitation prescribed by Article 106 would be

inapplicable to houses and lands purchased by the 1st defendant from the profits of the partnership. This contention would certainly hold good, if it

Has been alleged and proved that, from time to time, portions of the assets of the partnership were, by the agreement of the partners, withdrawn

from partnership and converted into land or house to be owned by the partners as co-owners (Lindely on Partnership, 5th Edition, pages 334 and

335).

In the absence, therefore, of any such allegation and proof, lands and houses bought in the name of partner and paid for by the firm or from the

profits of the partnership business are prima facie partnership property [Nerot v. Burnand 4 Russ. 247 and 2 Bligh (N.S) 215; Wedderburn v.

Wedderburn 22 Beav. at P. 104].

The case is, therefore, governed by the ordinary rule that, unless a contrary intention appears by express agreement, or by the nature of the

transaction, property brought with money belonging to the firm, is deemed to have been bought on account of the firm (Ex parte M'' Kenna, In re

Rank of England 3. DeG. F and J 645).

If the plaintiff''s suit on the footing of partnership were sustainable and the same be not barred by limitation, the remedy he would be entitled to

in this suit would be, not to a decree for partition of partnership properties, but to an order for winding up the business of the partnership by sale of

its effects including lands and houses, providing for the payment of its debts, if any, distributing the surplus of the sale proceeds according to the

shares of the plaintiff and 1st defendant respectively.

In my opinion, therefore, the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs.