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Judgment
Veeraswami, J.—This petition is to quash an order of the second Respondent Tribunal agreeing with the Regional Transport Authority,
Thanjavur, granting a, variation of the route Melacauvery to Sakkottai as Melacauvery to Natchiarkoil. The first order was, dated May 6, 1959
and the Tribunal''s order was, dated June 8, 1960. The ground on which the Petitioner asked for a rule is that both the Regional Transport
Authority as well as the Tribunal were influenced by G.O. Ms. No. 547 (Home), dated February 25, 1959, directing an extension of the route.
The Petitioner claims that neither of the authorities below was entitled to consider this order of the Government and that, in any case, the
Government''s order itself was improper and illegal.
The variation, for the first time, would appear to have been asked for as early as October 1957 by the third Respondent. That application was
rejected on March 14, 1958 by the Regional Transport Authority on the ground that the sector was well served. Against that order the third
Respondent filed a revision petition before the State Transport Authority-This petition was finally disposed on June 26, 1958, the State Transport
Authority agreeing with the view of the Regional Transport Authority that there was no need for variation of the route. In the meantime two
members of the local legislature filed petitions on April 9, 1958 before the Governments or extension of the route. On April 3, 1958 the Regional
Transport Authority for some reason not obvious, invited applications for grant of permit from Kumbakonam bus stand to Natchiarkoil. This was
adjourned from time to time and was finally rejected on June 26, 1959, on the ground that on May 6, 1959 the Regional Transport Authority had
granted the variation asked for by the third Respondent. On the petition filed by the members of the legislature the Government asked on May 9,
1958 for the remarks of the Transports Commissioner. This Officer reported in his remarks that there was no need for the variation asked for. No
orders would appear to have been passed on the petition of the members of the legislature apparently because it was brought to the notice of the
Government that the matter was pending in revision before the State Transport Authority.
On October 1, 1958, the third Respondent moved the Government for an order u/s 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act directing a variation of the
route. In this petition the third Respondent did not invite the attention of the Government to the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal of
June 26, 1958, dismissing the revision petition relating to the very matter. On this petition again the Government asked for the remarks of the
Transport Commissioner, who replied on December 8, 1958, drawing the attention of the Government to the fact that the State Transport
Authority had dismissed the revision agreeing with the Regional Transport Authority that no variation was necessary. He also mentioned in it of his
own view that there was no need at all for the variation. The Government, however, considered that the variation should be ordered in public
interest and made its order, dated February 25, 1959. This is how the order reads:
It has been brought to the notice of the Government that the bus running between Melacauvery to Sakkottai in Kumbakonam Town (Route No. 3
of Town Service) passes through several streets in the town. This route is a circuitous one and consequently the bus is never full and it is not utilised
by the public to its fullest advantage. It has been represented that if this route No. 3 Melacauvery to Sakkottai is extended to Natchiarkoil it will
serve the public of Kumbakonam to go to Natchiarkoil and its environs without break of journey. Similarly it will be useful to the villagers of those
areas to go to the heart of the town, bazaar, hospitals, temples, banks, etc., without break of journey.
Government have examined the representation in consultation with the Transport Commissioner, Madras, and with reference to the conditions
specified in Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. They are satisfied that there is need for a direct bus service between Melacauvery and
Natchiarkoil and that the extension of the route No. 3, Melacauvery to Sakkottai, as Melacauvery to Natchiarkoil via Sakkottai will benefit the
residents of the area cited resulting in saving of time and convenience to the passengers arising from journeys not being broken.
Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 43-A(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939), the Governor of
Madras hereby directs the Regional Transport Authority, Thanjavur, to extend the route Melacauvery to Sakkottai as Melacauvery to Natchiarkoil
via Sakkottai.
This order was received by the Regional Transport Authority on February 27, 1959. That Authority reported to the Government on March 9,
1959 that action to implement the variation had been taken on February 28, 1959. In that communication the Regional Transport Authority added
that the third Respondent had applied for grant of variation as ordered in the Government Order and that the application was notified u/s 57(3) of
the Motor Vehicles Act on February 28, 1959. On May 6, 1959 the Regional Transport Authority passed the following order:
Parties heard. The variation will provide through facility from Melacauvery to Natchiarkoil without curtailment of the existing facilities. The variation
is hence in the public interest. The applications granted.
The Petitioner, who was one of the objectors, filed a revision petition against that order. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the revision petition
and it did so on the view which may be set out in its own words:
In my opinion, the Government had jurisdiction to pass the order Ms. No. 547, Home, dated 25th February 1959 and that is an end of the matter
in the sense that their opinion that it was necessary to grant the variation in the interests of the public cannot be canvassed before the Regional
Transport Authority and the Regional Authority which are creatures under the Motor Vehicles Act and are bound to obey the lawful orders issued
u/s 43-A(2). Even apart from this, it seems to me that the reasons given by the Government in their order, if I may say so with respect, commend
itself to me.
The Tribunal then proceeded to practically set out the reasons which weighed with the Government in making the said order. The Tribunal wound
up by saying that in that view it dismissed the revision petition. It is this order which is sought to be quashed in this petition.
The first ground of the Petitioner is that it is evident from the order of the Tribunal that it was very much influenced by the order of the
Government directing variation and that the Tribunal had practically surrendered its quasi-judicial functions and was merely led by the Government
order. It is urged that the Government order was entirely irrelevant to the matter under consideration by the Regional Transport Authority and the
Tribunal and that they should have decided the question of variation quite independently of the Government order. The second ground of the
Petitioner is that the Government order was improper and illegal because it, in effect, directed the quasi-judicial authorities to grant the extension
and that too in favour of a particular permit holder.
In considering these grounds it is first necessary to examine the relative statutory provisions. A stage carriage permit is granted u/s 48 of the
Motor Vehicles Act subject to certain conditions, and Sub-section (2) of the section, before its omission by Act III of 1964, stated that every
stage carriage permit should be expressed to be valid only for a specified route or routes or for a specified area. Clause (xxi) of Sub-section (3)
grants power to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving notice of not less than one month, to vary the conditions of the permit, or to attach to
the permit further conditions. Sub-section (2), as I said, having been dropped by Act III of 1964, it introduced Clause (i) after renumbering the
present Clause (i) as Clause (i-a) in Sub-section (3) to the effect that the stage carriage or stage carriages shall be used only on a specified route or
routes or in a specified area. The effect of this is that a route becomes a condition of a permit. Clause (xxi) of Sub-section (3) has also been
substituted by the new Act, and as substituted, the clause gives power to the Regional Transport Authority, after giving notice of not less than one
month, to vary, extend or curtail the route or routes or the area specified in the permit. This clause has a proviso, but, for the present purpose it
need not be noticed.
The grant of a permit has to be made after considering the matters provided u/s 47(1) and following the procedure laid down in Section 57.
Variation of a condition of a permit by inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area, or, by increasing the number of services above the
specified maximum, is provided for by Sub-section (8) of Section 57 which directs that for granting the variation the procedure applicable to grant
of a permit should be followed, treating the application for a variation as an application for the grant of a new permit. This sub-section was
construed by a Full Bench of this Court in Natesa v. Dhanapal Bus Service (Private) Ltd. ILR (1964) 1 Mad. 288 (F.B.) as not empowering
variation of the condition by extension or alteration of a route.
By Section 4 of Act No. III of 1964, in Sub-section (8) of Section 57 after the words by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area
are inserted the words or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit. Section 5 of the
amending Act makes special provision in regard to existing stage carriage permits and validation of certain proceedings and order granting variation
under the old Sub-section (8) of Section 57. The effect of this amending Act appears to be that route is made a condition of permit and power is
given to the Regional Transport Authority to alter the condition suo motu by variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area.
This power u/s 48 is not judicial in character and the only condition for its exercise is that the Regional Transport Authority should give notice of
not less than one month. The Regional Transport Authority is also given power to vary the conditions of a permit on an application by varying,
extending or curtailing the route or routes or the area specified in the permit. But this power is a quasi-judicial one and has to be exercised by
following the procedure prescribed for disposal of an application for grant of a new permit. Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A which was introduced
by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1954 gives power to the State Government to direct, on a consideration of the matters set forth
in Sub-section (1) of Section 47, the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority to open any new route or to extend an existing
route or to permit additional stage carriages to be put, or to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route. This power obviously is
administrative and the only condition of its exercise is that before making a direction the State Government should consider the matters mentioned
in Sub-section (1) of Section 47. The sub-section does not contemplate that before making such a direction the Government should act in a quasi-
judicial capacity, and, follow the procedure pertaining thereto, including giving of notices to interested persons, considering the representations and
hearing operators and other interested persons. Further, it may be noticed that Sub-section (2) is only concerned with a general direction to open a
new route or to extend an existing route, and, is not related to variation of conditions of permit which is the subject of Section 48(3) and Section
57(8). Section 57(8) applies only to applications for variation of conditions of permit, and while considering such applications, the Regional
Transport Authority necessarily has to decide with reference to the matters u/s 47(1) whether inclusion of a new route or extension of an existing
route will be called for in public interest. The power under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 to grant a new route or extension is necessarily incidental
to a disposal of an application for variation of a condition in the permit. If at all, it is this aspect which differentiates the power given to the
Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A and the power under Sub-section (8) of Section 57, it may be remembered that the subject of
motor transport is a concurrent subject. Though at first sight Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A which is a State enactment, may appear to overlap
to a certain extent and impinge upon Sub-section (8) of Section 67, which is a Central enactment under the concurrent power, a closer scrutiny will
show that the two powers do not trench upon each other, and, they were meant to be exercised in different circumstances. Sub-section (2) of
Section 43-A has nothing to do with permits or conditions of permit. It is concerned only with the question of opening a new route or extension of
an existing route or permitting additional stage carriages on any specified routes. Sub-section (8) of Section 57, on the ether hand, is only related to
variation of conditions of permit and that too on an application and not with the question of inclusion of a new route or extension of an existing
route in general. It is on this ground that this Court held in Writ Appeal No. 106 of 1962 that there is no repugnancy between the two sub-
sections. No doubt one of the grounds on which this Court so held is no longer available, but, the decision is still good on the other grounds
mentioned therein.
It is in the light of the foregoing provisions the question whether a Government order made under Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A could or
Could not be taken into consideration by the Regional Transport Authority, acting u/s 57(8), has to be considered. When once it is clear from the
statutory provisions noticed above that the power u/s 57(8) is a quasi-judicial one and has to be exercised only in the light of Section 47(1) and
following the procedure contemplated by Section 57, it will be plain that it is the duty of the Regional Transport Authority to apply its mind to the
question of variation in the light of the record and merits brought before it by means of and through the procedure prescribed by Section. 67. In
other words, the Regional Transport Authority has to come to a decision by following the quad judicial procedure prescribed and, applying its own
mine to the matters u/s 47(1) and the evidence placed before it. Whether a particular condition in a permit should be varied in public interest is not
and cannot be affected by any order u/s 43-A(2). Whether a new route should be opened or an existing route should be extended has to be
considered by the Regional Transport Authority independently of any order made u/s 43-A(2) though the Regional Transport Authority would do
so only as incidental to its deciding whether a condition in a permit should be permitted to be varied by opening a new route or extending an
existing route. That being the case, a Government order u/s 43-A(2) will be entirely irrelevant to a consideration by the Regional Transport
Authority of an application u/s 57(8). That is the view which a Full Bench of this Court hold in Swami Motor Transport Limited v. Raman and
Raman Limited ILR (1961) mad. 110, 121 (F.B.). This is what was observed in that case:
The first question which falls for decision is whether a consideration of the Government Order by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was
improper. We agree with Rajagopalan J., that it was. The Tribunal was invested with appellate and revisional powers in respect of orders by the
Regional Transport Authority. It was not a mere administrative or executive body. It should only deal with what may be generally described as
evidence on record"" though it may be that the Tribunal is not governed strictly by the sections of the Indian Evidence Act. The Government Order
cannot be said to be a piece of evidence.
In that case the Tribunal''s order was quashed on the ground that it attached importance to the fact that the Government had taken a particular
view of the question of extending a route which the Tribunal had to decide for itself.
In the instant case, the passage which I have extracted from the Tribunal''s order would unmistakably show that it was very much influenced by
the Government Order directing extension. In fact, the Tribunal went to the extent of stating that once a Government Order had been made
extending a route u/s 43-A(2) there was an end of the matter and that the Tribunal, as a creature of the statute was bound to follow the order of
the Government. This is a total misdirection as to its jurisdiction and only shows that the Tribunal had abdicated its quasi-judicial functions and
surrendered its judgment for the view of the Government in its order above referred to. On this ground the order of the Tribunal should be set
aside.
On that view the second ground of the Petitioner does not necessarily fall to be considered. But even here I am satisfied that the Government
Order was improper. It is true, unlike in the case of the Full Bench, when the Government made its order, dated February 25, 1959 there was
here no application for variation of a permit or appeal relating to that matter pending. But, in my opinion, that is not the only test. Once a quasi-
judicial authority decides u/s 57(8) that a variation of a condition of a permit by way of an extension of an existing route was not called for in public
interest, or there was no need for it, that order deserved respect at the hands of the Government, and I would even say, will be binding on it in a
sense. The schemes of Section 43-A(2) and Section 57(8) will, I think justify the view that once the quasi-judicial authority which is vested with
the jurisdiction expresses the view that an extension is not called for, the Government cannot disregard such an order and consider itself free to
come to its own decision on the question. What Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A states is that the direction by the Government is to be given to the
Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority. It is true that such an authority is administratively subordinate to the Government;
but, it should be remembered that when the very authority has in its quasi-judicial function decided that there should be no extension of a route as
there was no need for it, it is not contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 43-A that the State Government could ignore that decision of the
quasi-judicial authority, and, in exercise of its administrative power under that section, impose its own view on that very authority. I am, therefore,
inclined to think that the State Government cannot exercise its powers u/s 43-A(2) when an application for variation of a condition of a permit by
inclusion of a new route or extension of an existing route or an appeal arising therefrom is pending before a competent quasi-judicial authority and
also when such authority has applied its mind and decided against inclusion of a new route or extension of an existing route. I think this view will
also effectuate harmonious working of the powers u/s 43-A(2) and Section 57(8).
In the present case the Government, when it made its order, dated February 25, 1959, was well apprised of the earlier orders of the Regional
Transport Authority as well as the State Transport Authority that no extension of the route was required in public interest. That being the case, in
my opinion, the Government order was not only not proper but in excess of its powers u/s 43-A(2).
The result is, the impugned order of the Tribunal is hereby quashed. The Tribunal will dispose of the appeal afresh without in any way taking
into account, or being influenced by the order of the Government.
The petition is allowed with costs against the third Respondent.
