Swami Triguna Nand vs Mahabir Dal of Kalka

Falshaw, C.J.—This a revision petition riled by a tenant Swami Triguna Nand against whom an order of ejectment passed by the Kent Controller has been affirmed by the Appelate Authority.

The only qestion in the revision petition is whether the ejectment of the tenant could properly be ordered on the ground that the landlord required the premises in suit, which consisted of a single room leased for residential purposes, for his own occupation. The landlord in this case is not an individual person, but a juristic person, Shri Mahabir Dal of Kalka, and it is not disputed that the purpose for which this body requires the premises in suit is the storing of such thing as the uniforms of its volunteers.

The question whether a landlord who is only a juristic person and not an individual can sue for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement has now been settled, so far as this Court is concerned, by decisions of two Division Benches in Municipal Committee Abohar v. Daulat Ram ILR 1959 P&H 1131, and Siri Kishan v. Ghanesham Das (1962)64 P.L.R. 1141, Civil Revision No. 347 of 1960 decided on the 27th of August 1962. In neither of these cases, however, was the precise point at issue in the present case decided. The decision of G. D. Khosla, Acting C.J. and Dulat J. in the first mentioned case dealt with rented land which a Municipal Committee required for its own use as provided in Section 13(3) (a) (ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. In the other case the premises were residential and the landlord, a body called Dharmik Industrial School Trust of Ludhiana, sought ejectment of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for the landlord''s own occupation as provided in Section 13(3) (a) (i) of the Act, the purpose for which the premises were required being the starting of an industrial school in them. Although, however, in a lengthy judgment the question whether such a trust could bring an application for ejectment was decided in favour of the landlord, the question of whether it could eject a tenant from residential premises for some purpose other than residential was not decided as the decision of the Appellate Authority that there was no bona fide requirement established was up-held.

The Petitioner''s contention in the present case is that whereas the term ''his own use'' as applied to a landlord in Section 13(3) (a) (ii) may be capable of wide interpretation the words used in respect of residential premises in Section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) ''his own occupation'' must be strictly limited to occupation tor residential purposes and that therefore the ejectment of the tenant in the present case from residential premises could not be ordered on the ground that they were required by the corporate body for use as a store room. This contention is supported by reference to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act which provides that no person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential buila-ing except with the permission in writing of the Controller and also certain observations of the learned Judges in the case of Municipal-Committee, Abohar ILR 1959 P&H 1131, in which a clear distinction was drawn between the words ''use'' with reference to rented land and ''occupation'' with reference to residential premises. It was held that the word ''use'' has a very extensive meaning in the present context, but in the case of a residential building the use is restricted and a landlord can only obtain possession of it ii he requires it for his own ''occupation''.

Since the requirement of rented land by Municipal Committee was the subject of that case the reference to the case of landlord as regards residential premises is obviously merely an obiter dictum, and although I am inclined to agree with that view and my own opinion, as at present advised, is that a landlord who requires residential premises for his own occupation must be intending to occupy the premises for residential purposes, I realise that there may possibly be a conflict of opinion on this point if the matter is left to the decision of different Single Judges of this Court, these decisions in revision petitions not being liable to be challenged in Letters Patent Appeal, with the consequent necessity of referring the question later to a larger Bench. I therefore, consider it advisable to refer the matter to a larger Bench at this stage, and I order accordingly.

JUDGMENT OF THE DIVISION BENCH

Jindra Lal, J.

The only point which requires determination is whether an order of ejectment of a tenant can be validly passed, with regard to residential premises when the landlord, who is not an individual but a juristic person, requires the same for its own occupation.

The landlord in the present case, i. e., Civil Revision No. 807 of 1961 is Mahabir Dal, Kalka, admittedly a juristic person. It filed an application for the ejectment of Swami Triguna Nand u/s 13(2) and (3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict ion Act, 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act. Swami Triguna Nand was a tenant of house No. 133 J. L., Ward No. 4 in the town of Kalka. The application for ejectment was made on two grounds: (1) non-payment of rent and (2) that the landlord required the premises for its own occupation. Various pleas were raised by the tenant. We are not concerned with the first ground, the tenant having deposited the requisite amount on the 1st day of hearing.

As regards the second ground, that is on the ground that the premises were required for the personal occupation of the landlord, it is conceded that the premises are required by the landlord for the storage of sticks, durries etc., which are used by the landlord, which is a public body, for the training of the youth. It was argued by the tenant that as the premises were rented for residential purposes, the landlord by storing sticks and durries was changing the nature of the property and also being a juristic person, it could not require the premises for its own occupation. The Rent Controller held that the use of the premises for storing of sticks and durries belonging to the landlord could not amount to changing or converting residential premises into non-residential. He referred to the definitions of "non-residential" and "residential" promises in the Act and came to the conclusion that since non-residential buildings are those which are used solely for carrying on any trade or business, and, as the storing of sticks and durries by Mahabir Dal could by no stretch of imagination be considered to be trade or business, the nature of the property was not being changed. He further remarked that it was not urged before him, although it might be urged, that the house is not required for any residence and that there may be some force in this contention if properly raised, but as it had not been raised he was not dealing with it. Consequently the learned Rent Controller passed an order directing the tenant to put the applicant in possession of the house in dispute within two months.

Being dissatisfied with that order, the tenant appealed and by its order, dated the 1st of December, 1961, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. It came to the conclusion that as a residential building is one which is not a "non-residential building" and as nonresidential building is defined as a building used solely for business or trade, the landlord intending to use the house as office-cum-store cannot be said to be using the premises for any trade or business. Consequently he agreed with the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal.

The tenant has come up in revision, as stated above, and the matter has been referred to a Division Bench.

Counsel for the Petitioner made three submissions. He contended that a juristic person cannot be said to reside in a building and because the words " residential " occurs in Section 13(3)(a) (i), it obviously follows according to him, that a person must require the building for his personal residence before he can get possession u/s 13(3)(a)(i)(a).

Secondly he contended that since a juristic person could not personally reside in a building, a juristic person cannot ask for eviction of a tenant for this purpose. His third contention was that, since the premises were residential, the landlord would be changing the nature of the building to non-residential by storing goods there.

Now it appears to me that there is a fallacy in this argument. It has already been noticed that for the purposes of the Act ''non-residential building'' means "a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade: provided that residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it shall not be deemed to convert a ''non-residential building'' to a "residential building". ''Residential budding'' means "any building which is not a non-residential building. "

Now, a Division Bench of this Court in Siri Kishan and Ors. v. Ghanesham Dass (1962)64 P.L.R. 1141 has held that a juristic person (like a trust) is entitled to take advantage of Section 13 Sub-section (3) Clause (a) Sub-clause (i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and that therefore the trustees can ask for the ejectment of a tenant from a residential building in order to start a school in the said building. That case first came up on the revisional side before Mr. Justice Dua but as the question was of considerable importance it was referred to a Division Bench and the matter ultimately came before Mr. Justice Mehar Singh and Mr. Justice Shamsher Bahadur. After considering the arguments and the authorities cited at the Bar, the Division Bench came to the conclusion as stated by me above.

The argument advanced by learned Counsel before us was that by using the premises for the storage of sticks and durries, the landlord in this case was converting the nature of the building, that is to say, converting a residential building into a non-residential building without the permission in writing of, the Controller in violation of Section 11 of the Act. A reference to the definition of the words ''nonresidential building'' and ''residential building,'' however, would show that it is only where a residential building is going to be used for any ''business or trade '' that the conversion as contemplated in Section 11 would take place. In the present case I am of the view that by no stretch of imagination can it be held that a body like the Mahabir Dal, Kalka, by using the premises, which are residential premises, for the storage of sticks and durries is converting a residential building into a non-residential building.

Learned Counsel then urged, that although in Municipal Committee, Abohar v. Daulat Ram ILR 1959 P&H 1131 a Division Bench of this Court has held that a juristic person can get possession of rented land if he requires it for his own use, it cannot be argued that a juristic person can also get possession of a building for its own occupation, because he argues that the word ''use'' is of a much wider significance than the word ''occupation''. Now, it may be noted that in Section 13(3)(a) (i) the words are ''requires for his own occupation.'' The words are not ''for his own residence'' and it appears to me that a juristic person is capable of occupying a building or can require a building for its own occupation as a natural person, otherwise it will be holding that a municipal corporation or a bank or joint stock company cannot occupy premises for its own use.

Consequently this revision is dismissed, but in view of the circumstances of the case I would make no order as to costs.

Falshaw, C.J.

I agree.