Swaran Kaur vs The State of Punjab

C.G. Suri, J.—The Appellant''s claim u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act has been dismissed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Amritsar on the ground that it was time barred. The accident was found to be the result of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the Punjab Roadways bus involved in the accident, and the claim of Rs. 10,000/- put forth by by the Appellant was described as reasonable. There could be no cross-appeal by the Respondent, State of Punjab, who owned the bus involved in the incident, and the findings with regard to the rash and negligent driving or the quantum of compensation have not been disputed in any cross-objection or in the arguments before me. The claimant, however, feels aggrieved against the Tribunal''s failure to exercise its discretion in her favour under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act.

The Appellant was riding the piilion of her husband''s bicyle when she was knocked down by the Punjab Roadways bus No. PNJ 1348 on 9th August, 1968 on the G.T. Road between Butari and Raiya near Baba Bakala. She had sustained serious injuries which had necessitated the amputation of her right arm She remained an indoor patient in a hospital at Amritsar from 9th August, 1968 to 10th September, 1968 and had to be admitted to that hospital twice again for about 4 or 5 days on each occasion during the last weeks of October 1968 and June 1969. When the accident had taken place tiiere was no Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in existence. This tribunal had been abolished on 8th September, 1968 and was re-constituted by a Gazette Notification on 9th September, 1968.

According to Section 110-A (3) of the Act, the claim should have been filed within a period of 60 days of the date of accident. This period expired on 8th October, 1968. The claim was, however, filed on 6th December, 1968, that is to say, after a delay of very nearly two months.

The only question for decision is whether the Appellant was prevented by any sufficient cause from not filing the claim in time. The proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act under which the delay could be condoned, does not say that there should be any application in writing for the condonation of delay. There is a prescribed proforma for filing such claims, which has no column in which a claimant is expected to state the cause of delay in filing the claim. In Ramashray Singh v. Tarabati Kuer and Ors. 1968 A.C.J. 168, a Single Bench of the Patna High Court had held that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal can condone the delay in filing a claim even though there is no application in writing containing such a prayer. It was observed by the learned Judge that the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Act casts no obligation on the claimant to make an application in writing and that the making of such an application is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the Tribunal''s discretion in favour of the claimant. The Tribunal could of its own accord after being satisfied, condone the delay in filing a claim.

According to the Orthopaedic Surgeon in the V.J. Hospital, Amritsar, the Appellant was an indoor patient from 9th August, 1968 to 16th September, 1968. She had a crush injury on her right arm and a guillotine amputatiom was carried out on 11th August, 1968. This was followed by a regular amputation on 10th September, 1968. The Appellant had suffered a permanent disability and the loss of her earning capacity was assessed at 80 per cent. She has become unfit to do any household work and cannot even take a bath or dress herself up without help. This serious disability is sure to have caused a great emotional, if not mental, upheaval in the mind of a housewife who cannot now attend to her domestic chores.

Another reason which could have led to the delay was that when the accident took place there was no Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal functioning. The Appellant or her male relatives, who were expected to attend to the timely filing of claim, were led to have the impression that they had limitation period of full year for filing the suit for damages, A Claims Tribunal was, however, constituted by a Gazette Notification on 9th September, 1968 while the Appellant was still an indoor patient in the hospital. She was undergoing the physical and mental agony on the prospect of the amputation of her most useful limb, namely, the right arm. The period of limitation that was available to her at the time of the accident had been drastically curtailed by a Gazette Notification and it cannot be said that she or her relatives attending on her were supposed during this calamity to be looking up the official gazette from day to day to keep themselves posted with the information regarding the constitution of a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In any case, the Appellant or her relatives cannot be held guilty of gross laches or negligence. In almost similar circumstances a Division Bench of this Court had observed in Unique Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Kartar Singh and Ors. 1964 P.L.R. 1083, as follows:

The learned Counsel for the company laid a great deal of emphasis on the difficulties that would arise with regard to applications to be filed before the Claims Tribunal relating to accidents which occurred prior to its constitution in the matter of limitation. It is pointed out that if a claimant waits for a year for which period he was fully entitled to wait for institution of suit but before the expiry of the year the Tribunal comes into existence the application filed before it would be very much belated as the period prescribed by Section 110-A is sixty days. This argument loses much force when it is borne in mind that the Tribunal has been given the power to condone the delay and in cases of this nature unless the claimant has been guilty of gross laches or negligence even after the constitution of the Tribunal, the delay would normally be condoned as has been done in the present case

In State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Jagdip Singh Pathania 1970 A.C.J. 216, a Single Bench of this Court had condoned the delay of about four months in almost similar circumstances. The claimant in that case had sustained serious injuries. He had not been able to file claim application in time. There were no allegations of inaction or negligence on his part. The Claims Tribunal had condoned the delay, and order was held to be fully justified on appeal. It was observed that the provisions had to be liberally construed so that substantial justice was advanced. In Shivcharan and Ors. v. Nawal Kishore and Anr. AIR 1955 N.U.C. 68, a Single Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Circuit at Gwalior had held that where the delay in filing an appeal is due to mistake and wrong advice of a pleader who did not know of a recent change in the law curtailing the period of limitation ; the delay should be excused u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, which was applicable. In that case it was observed that the words ''sufficient cause'' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act are very wide and comprehensive in their meaning and that no attempt should be made to define precisely or rigidly their scope. The Legislature had in its wisdom left unfettered discretion on the facts of each case with the object of furthering substantial justice.

In Kulbir Chand v. Bahadur Chand and Ors. 1970 A.C.J. 175, a Single Bench of Delhi High Court may appear to have taken rather a strict view. In that case the claimant''s counsel had mixed up the plea that he was not aware of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal with a number of other untenable grounds. The strength of the plea got diluted and weakened by being mixed up with a wholly untenable plea that the counsel had been waiting for the decision of the appeal in the criminal case against the driver of the motor vehicle. Relying on the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Unique Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Bombay''s case AIR 1955 N.U.C. 68, I am inclined to condone the delay of about two months in filing the claim in the present case. The Appellant had no advantage to gain by delaying the filing of the claim and no ulterior purpose was being served by this delay. It may also be observed that to meet such hard cases the Act has recently been amended to enlarge the period of limitation to six months.

I would, therefore, condone the delay in the filing of the claim. The appeal is accepted and the claim is allowed for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as compensation for true injury. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs throughout as the Appellant had not come to Court within the normal period.