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Judgment
M. Katju, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The petitioner has challenged the validity of the impugned notice dated 25-11-2003 (Annexure-7 to the petition).
It is admitted that the petitioner-company took a loan from the respondent Bank, but it did not re-pay the loan amount as Scheduled. Hence the impugned notice dated 25-11-2003 was issued by the Bank to the petitioner calling upon it to pay u/s 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Securitisation Act).
The validity of the aforesaid Act has already been upheld by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Garlon Polyfab Industries Ltd. and Others Vs. State Bank of India and Another, We respectfully agree with the view taken therein.
Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the respondent Bank had filed O.A. No. 84 of 2003 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad for recovery of its dues, and hence no action could be taken u/s 13(2) of the Act. We do not agree with this submission. The Act is special law and hence will override the general law contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. At any event, the Securitisation Act provides an additional remedy for recovery of debts apart from that provided in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. As held by the Supreme Court in Secretary Thirumurugan Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha 2004 ALJ 172 an Act can provide an additional remedy.
Learned counsel for the petitioner then prayed that this Court should fix instalments or granting one time settlement. In our opinion this Court cannot direct fixing of instalments or grant one time settlement as such a direction really means re-scheduling of the loan which can only be done by the Financial Institution or Bank which granted the loan.
There are well settled limitations on the exercise of power under Article 226, and this Court should exercise self-restraint in this connection. It can only interfere if there is violation of law or error of law apparent on the face of the record. No such violation or error has been shown in this case. Petition is dismissed.
