Sweety Rashid vs Bilal Ahmad Ganai And Another

N. Kotiswar Singh, CJ

The present application has been filed for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (for short the ‘Act’). The petitioner and respondent.1 are wife and husband, and the respondent no.2 is the sister-in-law of the petitioner. The three had set up a partnership firm under name and style, “M/s B. A. G. Enterprises” for which a Partnership Deed was executed on 12.04.2018. As per the Partnership Deed, the initial investment in the Firm was to be Rs. 50000/-, of which the petitioner had contributed Rs. 30000/- and respondent nos.1 and 2, Rs. 10000/- each. As per the Deed, the profit and loss were to be shared amongst the partners in the ratio of 80:10:10. There was also a clause, being Clause-12 in the said Partnership Deed which provided that in case of disputes, difference and question which may arise amongst the parties during the continuance of the partnership between the parties, shall be referred to an Arbitrator to be appointed by the mutual consent of the parties and the arbitration shall be regulated and governed by the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1997.

PETITIONER’S CASE:

According to the petitioner, after some time the relations between her and respondent no.1 turned sour which led to family disputes and also disrupting the partnership business resulting in the various litigations. In the process, the petitioner was allegedly thrown out of the house along with her two minor sons and the Triple Talaq was also pronounced upon the petitioner by respondent no.1 relating to which litigations are going on before different judicial fora. As a consequence, the respondents threw out thepetitioner from the business, though the petitioner had a major share and made the maximum investment in the partnership firm to the extent of 80% as mentioned above.

The petitioner contended that because of the aforesaid disputes, she was deprived of all the benefits of business of the said firm which are now being managed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 to the exclusion of the petitioner. Because the aforesaid disputes which have arisen out between the petitioner and the respondents, parties, the petitioner had also filed an application before the

4 thAdditional SessionsJudge, Srinagar under Section 9 of the Act and sought interim order to prevent the respondents from operating the Partnership Firm Account with the written permission of the petitioner and also to restrain them from running the business of the partnership firm. The said application was rejected by the4th Additional Sessions Judge against which an appeal was preferred underSection 37of the Act which is stated to be pending now. The petitioner also filed a suit for dissolution ofthe partnership firm and for rendition of accounts before the Court of Sub-Judge(CJM), Srinagar. However, the same was withdrawn by the petitioner as the petitioner wanted to pursue the appropriate remedy available by way of arbitration and, accordingly, the same suit was allowed to be withdrawn. Accordingly, in view of the differences which have arisen, the present petition has been filed by the petitionerinvoking Clause 12 of the partnership deed which provides for resolution of disputes by way of arbitration.

RESPONDENTS’ CASE:

The present petition has been vehemently opposed by the respondents contending inter alia that the said Clause 12 of the Partnership Deed, which the petitioner is claiming to constitute an arbitration clause within the meaning of the Section 7 of the Act, inasmuch as,there is no specific provision in the said Clause for providing finality into the resolution of dispute by arbitration as held by the Supreme Court incase titled Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander, (2007) 5 SCC 719 and State of Punjab vs. Dina Nath, (2007) 5 SCC 28in which it was held that mere use of word arbitration or arbitrator will not make an arbitration agreement unless parties had agreed that a decision of the arbitral tribunal in respect of dispute would be a binding on them. However, since no such stipulation exists inthe said Clause 12 of the Partnership Deed, it cannot be said to be anarbitration clause and as such, the present application under Section 11 of the Act is not be maintainable.

It has been further submitted that Clause 12 provides that the arbitration shall be governed and regulated by the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997. Since the said Acthas been repealed, the present application filed under the aforesaid Act is not maintainable.

Further, it has been pleaded that the petitioner had filed an application under Section 9 of the Act before the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar claiming certain interim relief which was dismissed, but the petitioner did not disclose the same in the application till it was disclosed by the respondents in the objection filed.

It has been further submitted that in respect of the application filed before the Court of the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar under Section 9of the Act, the said application was dismissed on 20.10.2020 on the ground that the account that petitioner claimsto be belonging to the partnership firm is the property of the respondents and not connected with the petitioner and that the petitioner had failed to show that any contract had been allotted to her after coming into existence of thefirm or the firm had executed any work and that any profit was earned and that any amount belonging to the petitioner was depositedin the Bank or that any transaction tookplace in which any dispute amongst the partners arose and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to any injunction as prayed for by her.

It has been submitted that the said application filed under Section 9 of the Act was dismissedprimarily onground that the petitioner had failed to establish prima facie case in her favour.

Drawing attention of this Court to aforesaid order dated 21.10.2020 passed by the Court of 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge inthe petition filed under Section 9 of the Act, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that it has been observed by the learned Additional District Judge that though it is an admitted fact that there is an Arbitration Clause in the partnership deed, perusal of the said clause would show that the said Clause can be invoked if there is a dispute or difference which may arise during the continuationof the partnership, and the petitioner had prima facie failed to show to any kind ofwork being allotted to the partnership firm after coming into existence,or any document mentioning the petitioner’s name or the name of partnership firm in any transaction. It has been submitted that the learned Additional District Judge further examined the allegations and counter allegations in depth and held that though Section 9 of theAct providesfor passingof interim measures for securing the amount in dispute in arbitrationor preservation of any property, the petitioner had failed to show that there was any amount to be protected or preserved which was earned by the partners after coming into existence of the firm in 2018. It was also submitted that it was also observed by the learned Additional District Judge that the accountwhich the petitioner referred toactually belongs to the sole proprietorship firm ofthe respondent no.3. The Learned Additional District Judge also observed that petitioner had failed to establish that irreparable loss, injurywill be caused to the petitioner and that balance of conveniencewas in favour of the petitioner and accordingly, the Court of Additional District Sessions Judge by holding that no prima facie has been made out for passing any interim protection dismissed the application vide order dated 21.10.2020. Accordingly, it has been submitted that since thereis a specific finding by the concerned Court that there was no dispute amongst the parties relating the said Partnership Deed and that all disputes infact relates to the business of respondents in which the portioner is not involved, the question of referring any alleged dispute to the arbitrator does not arise. Hence, the present application under Section 11 of the Act will not lie.

It has been also submitted that the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 21.10.2020passed by the 4thAdditionalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Srinagar, is pending before this Court and as such during the pendency of the said appeal, the present petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.

Learned counsel for the respondents also has submitted that the petitioner failed to disclose in the application that the petitioner had earlier approached the Court of the 3rdAdditionalDistrict Judge, Srinagar by filing asuit for dissolution of partnership deed and rendition of accounts which was withdrawn by the petitioner without seeking liberty of filing a fresh one and, as such, the present application is not maintainable. It has been submitted that all the allegations on the disputes pertain to the business affairs of M/s B.A.G. Enterprise which is sole propriety concern of the respondent no.2 and not to any business involving the present petitioner.

The respondents have also mentioned about the various kinds of litigations pending before other courts between the petitioner and the respondents which were not disclosed before this Court.

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT:

Thus, from the above, it is clearly evident that the present application for the appointment of the arbitrator has been contested by the respondents primarily on the following grounds:

(i) That the said Clause 12 contained in the Partnership Deed is relatable to the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1997 which is no more in existence and accordingly, the present application is not maintainable.

(ii) The said clause does not mention that an award made by the Arbitrator will be final and binding on the parties.

(iii) The petitioner had earlier approached the Court of 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Srinagar, seeking interim protection under Section 9 of the Act, but the learned Court had rejected such an application on the ground that the petitioner had failed to establish any prima facie case for passing any order seeking interim protection and, that the petitioner failed to make out any case that the disputes involve the partnership firm or that there was any business transaction involving the petitioner or the said such partnership firm of which the petitioner claims to be a partner.

(iv) The petitioner is also guilty of concealing of material facts which included the fact that the petitioner had earlier approached the 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Srinagar for dissolution of the Firm and for rendition of accounts, which was withdrawn by the petitioner without seeking liberty to file a fresh petition.

As far as the application filed under Section 11 of the Act isconcerned, scope of this Court is limited, viz., to ascertain whether there is any arbitration clause in the contract between the parties and whether, there is any live dispute which requires to be resolved by arbitration.

Accordingly, this Court will first proceed to ascertain as to whetherthere is any contractual relationship between the parties and whether such contract contains any arbitration clause. As far as that issue is concerned,the petitioner has relied on a Partnership Deed which was purportedly executed between the petitioner and the respondents forestablishment of a partnership firm. It is to be noted in the pleadings as well as in the submissions advanced in the Court there is no specific denial of said the existence of said Partnership deed executed on 17.04.2018, though the respondents have also sought to takea feeble plea that the firm, “M/s B. A. G. Enterprises” is a proprietorship firm of the respondent no.2, the husband of the petitioner. What has been vigorously agitated before the Court by the respondents is that no dispute had arisen relating to the said partnership firm by referring to the dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act before the 4th Additional Sessions Judge Srinagar.

This Court, however, having examined the partnership deed executed on 12.04.2018 is satisfied that there is a contractual relationship between the parties in the form of the partnership firm of which the petitioner and the respondents are partners and the said partnership deed contains an arbitration clause in the form of Clause 12 which provides that in case of disputes, difference and question which may arise amongst the parties during the continuance of the partnership between the parties shall be referred to an Arbitrator to be appointed by the mutual consent of the partiesand such arbitration shall be regulated and governed bythe J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997.

However, two issues are to be decided before this Court proceeds to consider the second aspect, as the Ld. Counsel for the respondents has contended that since the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 has been repealed, the said Clause 12 cannot be invoked, and further, the said clause does not provide that the decision of the arbitrator will be final and binding.

It is to be noted that when the said Partnership Deed was drawn up on 12.04.2018, in the then State of Jammu and Kashmir, the law holding the field relating to arbitration was the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and as such the said Act was mentioned in Partnership Deed. However, even if the said Act was not mentioned in the Partnership Deed, the arbitration proceeding would be governed by the said Act. Hence, merely, because the said Act was repealed by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, it would have no effect as far as the rights of the parties are concerned, in as much as the law which will govern the parties after the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 is the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 which became applicable on and from the day of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 came into force by virtue of Section 95(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. Hence, the present application is maintainable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996, even if the earlier Act stood repealed.

As regards the other contention of the respondents that Clause 12 cannot be said to be an arbitration agreement in absence of the specific provision that award will be final and binding, we may refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander, (2007) 5 SCC 719wherein it was held that,

“8.…………….. We may at this juncture set out the well-settled principles in regard to what constitutes an arbitration agreement:

(i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer their disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by the decision of such tribunal on such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. While there is no specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words used should disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration. Where there is merely a possibility of the parties agreeing to arbitration in future, as contrasted from an obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, there is no valid and binding arbitration agreement.

(ii) Even if the words “arbitration” and “Arbitral Tribunal (or arbitrator)” are not used with reference to the process of settlement or with reference to the private tribunal which has to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, it does not detract from the clause being an arbitration agreement if it has the attributes or elements of an arbitration agreement. They are: (a) The agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties should have agreed to refer any disputes (present or future) between them to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private tribunal should be empowered to adjudicate upon the disputes in an impartial manner, giving due opportunity to the parties to put forth their case before it. (d) The parties should have agreed that the decision of the private tribunal in respect of the disputes will be binding on them.

(iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes arising between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration, it is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a specific and direct expression of intent to have the disputes settled by arbitration, it is not necessary to set out the attributes of an arbitration agreement to make it an arbitration agreement. But where the clause relating to settlement of disputes, contains words which specifically exclude any of the attributes of an arbitration agreement or contains anything that detracts from an arbitration agreement, it will not be an arbitration agreement. For example, where an agreement requires or permits an authority to decide a claim or dispute without hearing, or requires the authority to act in the interests of only one of the parties, or provides that the decision of the authority will not be final and binding on the parties, or that if either party is not satisfied with the decision of the authority, he may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as an arbitration agreement.

(i) But mere use of the word “arbitration” or “arbitrator” in a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the parties for reference to arbitration. For example, use of words such as “parties can, if they so desire, refer their disputes to arbitration” or “in the event of any dispute, the parties may also agree to refer the same to arbitration” or “if any disputes arise between the parties, they should consider settlement by arbitration” in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, indicate that the clause is not intended to be an arbitration agreement. Similarly, a clause which states that “if the parties so decide, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration” or “any disputes between parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration” is not an arbitration agreement. Such clauses merely indicate a desire or hope to have the disputes settled by arbitration, or a tentative arrangement to explore arbitration as a mode of settlement if and when a dispute arises. Such clauses require the parties to arrive at a further agreement to go to arbitration, as and when the disputes arise. Any agreement or clause in an agreement requiring or contemplating a further consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration agreement, but an agreement to enter into an arbitration agreement in future.

In the present case, the desire or the intention of the parties are very clear in as much it has been very clearly spelt out that if any difference of dispute or question arises, the same will be referred to the Arbitrational and that the same will be governed by the provisions of J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 and it has been specifically provided under Section 35 of the Act.

The next issue to be examined by thisCourt is whether any dispute has arisen between the parties with reference to the said Partnership Deed, though as submitted before by the respondents, the respondents have specifically denied that there is no dispute between the parties involving the petitioner or said partnership firm, what has been urged by the respondents before this Court is that all disputes pertains to business matters in which the petitioner is not involved at all but only with the respondents. In other words, the contentions of the respondents in brief is that there is no dispute between the petitioner and the respondents and all the financial transactions and other business transactions does not pertain to partnership firm but the firm belonging to the respondents and all the allegations made by the petitioner about the alleged mis-appropriation of funds, misusing of funds of the partnership firm are all false. In other words, in short,the contentionof the respondents is that there is no dispute existing qua the aforesaid partnership firm and if there is no such dispute the question of resolution of non-existing dispute by way of arbitration does not arise. The said Arbitration Clause 12 cannot be said to be arbitration clause inasmuch as the said clause does not contained the specific provisions that any such decision of the arbitrator shallbe final and binding on the parties.’

Section 35 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 provides that the arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties. Section 35 reads as under:

„35. Finality of arbitral awards.

Subject to this Part an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.‟

Thus, when the said partnership deed was drawn, the relevant law applicable at that point of time was the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 even if, there was no specific mention in Clause 12 of the partnership deed that the arbitral award will be final and binding on the parties by virtue of Section 35 of the Act as quoted above, the said award is to be final and binding.

Further, the Supreme Court in Babanrao Rajaram Pund vs. M/s Samarth Builders and Developers, AIR (2022) SC 4161 held as under:

“22...Firstly, apart from the fact that Clause 18 of the Development Agreement uses the terms “Arbitration” and “Arbitrator(s)”, it has clearly enunciated the mandatory nature of reference to arbitration by using the term “shall be referred to arbitration of a Sole Arbitrator mutually appointed, failing which, two Arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party to dispute or difference”. Secondly, the method of appointing the third arbitrator has also been clearly mentioned wherein the two selected Arbitrators are to appoint a third arbitrator. Finally, even the governing law was chosen by the parties to be “the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any reenactment thereof.” These three recitals, strongly point towards an unambiguous intention of the parties at the time of formation of the contract to refer their dispute(s) to arbitration.

We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that the High Court fell in error in holding that the Appellant‟s application under section 11 was not maintainable for want of a valid arbitration clause. We find that Clause 18 luminously discloses the intention and obligation of the parties to be bound by the decision of the tribunal, even though the words “final and binding” are not expressly incorporated therein. It can be gleaned from other parts of the arbitration agreement that the intention of the parties was surely to refer the disputes to arbitration. In the absence of specific exclusion of any of the attributes of an arbitration agreement, the Respondents‟ plea of nonexistence of a valid arbitration clause, is seemingly an afterthought.

Even if we were to assume that the subject-clause lacks certain essential characteristics of arbitration like “final and binding” nature of the award, the parties have evinced clear intention to refer the dispute to arbitration and abide by the decision of the tribunal. The party autonomy to this effect, therefore, deserves to be protected.

The deficiency of words in agreement which otherwise fortifies the intention of the parties to arbitrate their disputes, cannot legitimise the annulment of arbitration clause.

Thus, I am satisfied that even if the aforesaid words that arbitral award will be final and binding on the parties, was not specifically mentioned in Clause 12 of the Partnership Deed, the said clause can be considered to be an arbitration clause.

From the above what is discernible is that though the respondents have categorically stated that there is no dispute between the petitioner and the respondents, inasmuch as, there is no contractual relationshipor business involving the petitioner in which a dispute has arisen, noteworthy thing is that the respondents have not denied the existence of the partnership deed though they have stated that there is no dispute relating to the business involving the said partnership firm. What has been stated by the respondent whatever dispute may be there it does not relate to said partnership firm but to other business of respondents with which the petitioner has nothing to do.

As regard this submission, this Court would like to observe that the actual existence of a dispute arising out of the partnership firm is something which can be examined by arbitrator and not by this Court. It has come up from the pleadings that there was certain claim made by the petitioner in connection with which the petitioner had sought interim protection by invoking Section 9 of the Act before the competent court, which however was dismissed by the competent court on the ground petitioner had failed to make out prima facie case for grant of any such interim relief. On perusal of the aforesaid dismissal order passed by the concerned court it appears that specific allegations were made by the petitioner which relate to the business of the partnership firm, operation of Bank account in name of M/s B. A G. Enterprises bearing General Account No. 0386010100000909 which was opened by respondent no.1, which the petitioner claims to be an account of the partnership firm. The plea of the petitioner was also that the partnership firm was doing business for about two years and thereafter, the other business partners started committing malpractice and by manipulating the account funds to the detrimental of the interests ofthe petitioner and the respondents have cheated the petitioner resulting in serious differences to the extent of separation of petitioner from respondent No.1 who pronounced Triple Talaq to the petitioner. As to whether the aforesaid dispute relates to Partnership Firmor not is a matter which can be examined by the adjudicating Forum after leading evidence by respective parties and, as such, the said consideration as to the correct nature of the dispute is beyond the scope of this Court. This Court in exercise of power under Section 11 of the Act is to merely to give a finding about the prima facie existence of any dispute between the parties.

I am also of the opinion that the refusal to the order passed by the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge in application filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act would be of help. In this connection finding of the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge has recorded in paragraph no. 14 would be of highly relevance, as such, same is reproduced as under:

“It is admitted case of both the parties that the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 are the husband and wife and furthermore that partnership firm under the name and style Ms B.A.G Enterprise had been established by the virtue of deed of partnership dated 12-04-2018 between the respondent no. 2 &3 and the petitioner. It is also admitted fact that in the partnership deed it has been mentioned in order to conduct and carry the business of civil and public contracts the above named enterprise had been established by the partners. The petitioner in his petition has claimed that huge investment has been made by the partners regarding the renovation of the office and the purchase of the machinery equipments for the execution of contracts and further the parties has also opened the bank account in the name of partnership firm bearing account no.0386010100000909 with the respondent no. 1 and staff has been employed for the execution of business in the firm. As per the petition various works had been executed buy the firm and profits earned by the firm. Furthermore , it had been mentioned that earlier on business had been carried out smoothly but thereafter respondent no. 2&3 resorted to mal practice.”

From the above, it is clear that the existence of the partnership deed between the petitioner and respondent no.1 and also opening of a joint account is also not disputed.

However, the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge proceeded to examine as to whether the prima facie case has been made out by the petitioner for seeking relief under Section 9 of the Act and proceeded to observe that the petitioner had prima facie failed to show any case in her favour though in paragraph no.15 it has been observed that it is admitted fact that there is an arbitration clause in the partnership deed and perusal of the said clause clearly reflect that this clause can be invoked only if there is dispute between the parties. However, according to the 4th Additional Sessions Judge the petitioner cannot make out any prima facie case. Though the 4th Additional Sessions Judge refused to grant any relief under Section 9 of the Act, it is apparent that the said relief was declined only on the failure of the petitioner to make out prima facie case to show irreparable loss and injury which may be caused to the petitioner.

From the above, it is clear that it cannot be said that merely because the petitioner has failed to make out prima facie case to get any relief under Section 9 of the Act, it cannot be hold that there is no merit in the matter as the same can be proved after adducing evidence which is required for the purpose of benefit under Section 9 of the Act.

The learned counsel for the respondents has relied heavily on the dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner before the 4ThAdditional Sessions Judge Srinagar under Section 9 of the Act to confront that no dispute exists between the parties. In this regard it is to be noted that said application was dismissed on the ground of failure of the petitioner to make out aprima facie case for passing interim protection. However, no plea has been raised in the said application that there is no Arbitration clause or that there is no dispute between the parties. What the Court below had observed that petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case onthe touchstone of three principles of passing in interim injunction, viz prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss and injury. The said Court did not make any judicial finding that there was no such Arbitration Clause. Thus, in my opinion the aforesaid view of 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge cannot come in the way of this Court in deciding as to whether there is any Arbitration Clause in the agreement between the parties and whether any such dispute arising between the parties can be referred to arbitration.

The finding by the 4th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Srinagar, cannot be said to be final and determinative of the issue as to whether there exists any disputes as the finding of the 4th Additional District Judge was based on prima facie satisfaction and it is not a decree finally deciding the issues raised after a full course trial involving adducing of evidence by the parties.

As discussed above, this Court cannot render any decisive finding as to whether dispute exist in the proceedings. However, if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a dispute exists in view of the assertions and denialsof the parties, the application under Section 11 of the Act cannot be non-suited at this stage. Further, opinion of the 4thAdditional District and Sessions Judge has not attained finality as the same is still pending before the Court below in an appeal. Thus, the aforesaid decision of the court below cannot come in the way of this Court in deciding the arbitrability of the disputes or for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act.

Regarding concealment of fact of pending cases alleged by the respondents, this Court is of the opinion that the issue is not of much relevance as in an application filed under Section 11 of the Act, this Court is primarily concerned that the existence of an arbitration agreement/clause and existence of dispute arising out of the agreement which contains the arbitration clause and the Court has to be satisfied prima facie of the existence of the aforesaid two ingredients, inasmuch. Further, as Section 16 of the Act also provides that the arbitral tribunal has competence to decide on its own jurisdiction with respect of existence or validity of arbitration agreement, the respondents can certainly agitate this matter before the arbitrator.

In the present case, this Court is prima facie satisfied that there is a dispute between the parties, inasmuch as, there is a specific assertion by the petitioner that the business of Partnership Firm has been misused by the respondents, though it has been vehemently denied by the respondents alleging that there is no business transaction involving the petitioner or the Partnership Firm.

Accordingly, this Court appoints Hon’ble Mr. Justice Muzaffar Hussain Attar, Former Judge of the High Court of J&K and Ladakh, Srinagar, as the Arbitrator who shall proceed in the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and make the Award within the time provided in the Act itself after charging the prescribed fee along with incidental expenses to be shared by the parties.

The Ld. Arbitrator may be informed accordingly by the Registry.

Arbitration Application is accordingly allowed and disposed of.