Syed Abdul Azoozkhan vs The Divisional Accounts Officer Southern Railway, Madras

Ramakrishnan, J.—The decree holder in O.S. No. 61 of 1961 on the file of the District Munsif''s Court, Sholinghur, obtained transmission of the decree from that Court to the Court of Small Causes, Madras, for execution of the decree by attachment of an amount lying to the credit of the judgment debtor''s provident fund and gratuity account in the Southern Railway, Madras. The amount sought to be recovered under the decree was Rs. 4,532-15. The Registrar of the Court of Small Causes who heard the execution petition, dismissed it on two grounds-(1) the amount sought to be attached being in the nature of a provident fund amount, could not be proceeded against in execution and (2) under O. 21 R. 4, C.P.C., the Court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction to transfer the decree for execution to the Court of Small Causes, Madras. The decree-holder filed a New Trial application against the said order. In the judgment of the Judges who heard this application, no reference is found to the objection in regard to the amount sought to be attached being in the nature of a provident fund amount. But they confirmed the Registrar''s finding that order 21 rule 4 21, R. 4 of the C.P.C. barred the case from the cognisance of the Court of Small Causes, Madras. It is against this decision that the present revision petition is sought to be filed by the decree-holder. Learned Counsel for the decree-holder relied upon the decision of a Bench of this Court in Abdulla Sahib v. Ahmed Hussain Sahib where the view has been expressed that where a decree is sent to another Court for execution on the application of the decree-holder himself, and not by the Court of its own motion, the question of competence by jurisdictional value of the Court to which the decree is sent, does not arise. The Bench was required to consider in that particular case, distinction between the two limbs of S. 39 C.P.C., S. 39 (1) dealing with a case where a decree, on the application of the decree-holder, is sent for execution to another Court, and S. 39 (2), which deals with a case, while the Court of its own motion sends the decree passed by it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction while in S. 39 (2) the words "of competent jurisdiction" are found, they are not found in S. 39 (1). Consequently, the Bench held that the jurisdictional value will not apply to decrees sent, on the application of the decree-holder, by the decreeing Court to another Court for execution. This provision in S. 39, C.P.C. is a general provision. O. 21 R. 4 of the CPC must be considered as a special provision to be applied where transfer of the decree is sought from the decreeing Court to a Court of Small Causes, and in that event the money value of the decree prescribed in O. 21, R. 4 will apply. The provisions of O. 21, R. 4 have also to be complied with by the Court which passed the decree before it proceeds to transfer the decree to another Court for execution. If the amount of the decree exceeds the pecuniary value set down in O. 21, R. 4, the decreeing Court has to comply with that provision and therefore, it is not empowered to transfer the decree for execution to the Court of Small Causes, Madras but it should transfer the decree to some other Court, like the City Civil Court, Madras. Or. XXI, R. 4 C.P.C. really provides a rule of procedure for the decreeing Court to adopt, depending upon the value of the decree sought to be transferred for execution. The decision in Jagannatha v. Appalasami AIR 1914 Mad. 206 does not at all deal with the scope of O. 21, R. 4. The observations in that decision apply only to the distinction between S. 39 (1) and S. 39 (2) C.P.C. and cannot be relied upon in this case where the provision of law to be interpreted is O. 21, R. 4, C.P.C. Further S. 121, C.P.C. states that the rules in the First Schedule shall have effect as if enacted in the body of the Code. The Rules have therefore valid effect along with the main sections of the Cede and we have to read O. 21, R. 4 and S. 39, C.P.C. in a harmonious manner without spelling out an inherent conflict between them. This general principle of interpretation is consistent with the view that I have expressed above regarding the relative scope of O. 21, R. 4 and S. 39 of the Code. I see no grounds to admit this revision petition, which is dismissed.