Syed Nooroodeen Saib and Others vs Syed Ibrahim Sahib and Others

The suit is by a Muhammadan for partition of half share of properties both movable and immovable on his wife''s death. The defendants, among

whom are the other sharers, do not set up adverse possession. Even assuming that possession became adverse at some time within the last 12

years, there is no reason to suppose that it was adverse before the 27th November 1893, while defendants Nos. 27 to 31 were impleaded on the

27th November 1905. We must hold that the suit as regards immovables is not time-barred. In this view, it is unnecessary to express any opinion

on the other points argued. But we think that the District Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the deduction of the time spent

in prosecuting the suit before the Munsif. The question was one of market-value and the plaintiff paid substantial court-fee. We are not prepared to

say that the Judge was wrong in holding that the plaintiff''s valuation was bona fide

Mr. Rangachariar raised an ingenious contention, on the authority of Mahomed Riasat Ali v. Hasin Banu I.L.R (1893) 21 C 157 (P.C.) that the

Article applicable was 120 of the Limitation Act. The Privy Council applied that Article as regards a claim for movables by the heir of a deceased

person. In Runchordas v. Parvati Bai ILR (1899) 23 B. 725 (P.C.) the Judicial Committee decided that a Hindu reversioner suing for the property

of a deceased Hindu was entitled to come within 6 years as regards movables and 12 years as regards immovables. Mr. Raugachariar, however,

argues that this is a suit for partition and that a share can only be. allowed after taking into account both movables and immovables. That is no

doubt so, and if the plaintiff withholds movables after 6 years from the date of the death of the intestate, his share of the immovables may be

affected. But this has nothing to do with limitation as regards the claims to immovables. Article 144 of the Limitation Act must be applied to the suit

as regards immovable property. There is no foundation for the contention that the claim for immovables is time-barred.

The second appeal is dismissed with costs.