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Judgment
Dr. Anand, C.J.—The petitioner is an advocate of this Court and has filed this writ petition as ""public interest litigation"". The following reliefs
have been sought in the writ petition:
(a) that sections 4, 13 and 25 of the Indian Arms Act be struck down as ultra vires Articles J4, 19 & 21 of the Indian Constitution as applicable
to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in the alternative,
(b) for a writ of mandamus to the respondents to exempt those minorities that have suffered huge loss of life or properly in the States of U. P., M.
P. Maharashtra, Guiarat, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir due to communal frenzy during the past two years from the operation of the said Act and
in the alternative.
(c) If a comprehensive relief of the nature mentioned above cannot be legally granted for a direction to respondent No. 2 to liberalise the policy of
grant of licences for small arms for purposes of self defence in favour of Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir State; and
For a writ of Mandamus or a direction to respondent No. 2 to publish the statistical data showing how many licences for small arms have been
issued in favour of Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir State, contrasted with the number of licenses issued in favour of nonmuslim in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir for purposes of selfdefence of person and property. This relief is claimed under Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution;
And in view of:
the administrative apathy to protect the life of minorities in the States of U. P., M. P., Maharashtra, Gujarat. Punjab, Delhi and Jammu & Kashmir,
a direction under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to the Union of India to create:
(i) Special intelligence agencies that shall collect information about an impending communal riot about to take place in any one of these States. It
should be the bounden duty of these intelligence sources to keep the Chief Executives of the State informed of every heartbeat of the place which
is prone to communal tension for any reason whatsoever;
(ii) to create or consider the feasibility or creating a special All India antiriot force in which the representation of the minority communities like
Muslims, Sikhs Christians, Jews, Parsees and Harijans should be at least more than sixty percent. The personnel of this force must be drawn
mostly from the southern States of India which have remained free from communal violence;
(iii) to create or consider to create a special Union Riot Relief Fund or Riot Insurance for those who suffer during communal carnage irrespective
of the fact whether they belong to the minority or the majority community in a State.
The thread passing through the writ petition for claiming the relief, as noticed above, is the concern expressed by the petitioner on the growing
communal riots and communal frenzy in various parts of the country. The petitioner has quoted from the letter of his resignation as Central Govt.
Standing Counsel as also from certain articles appearing in different national newspapers to bring to the notice of the court that cemmunal riots are
on the rise and has on that account submitted that the policy for grant of licenses should be liberalised more particularly in the case of the members
belonging to the minority community.
Mr. B. T. Hussain has submitted that the provisions of Sections 4, 13 & 25 of the Indian Arms Act are ultravires Articles 14 & 19 of the
Constitution of India and that they be so declared or that in the alternative a direction be issued to the respondents to liberalise the policy for grant
of licences to possess fire arms more particularly in the case of members belonging to the minority community and that the Union Government be,
asked to amend the Arms Act accordingly.
Coming now to the first submission we find that in the writ petition nothing has been brought out to show as to how the provisions of Sections 4,
13 and 25 of the Arms Act are violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly, Indian Arms Act is apiece of legislation
applicable throughout the country to all citizens 11 is no discrimination practised in this regard. The Act as originally enacted and amended from
time to time, is aimed at prohibiting possession of fire arms by the citizens of the country without possessing a valid licence by the competent
authority. We agree with Mr. Hussain that a fire arm is a movable property and that citizens should have a right to possess any movable propeny
as guaranteed by Article 9 (1) of the Constitution of India but we find that Articles 19 (5) of the Constitution itself authorises the State, in the in
erest of the general public, to place reasonable restrictions. The Indian Arms Act itself provides restrictions for possessing fire arms and contains
provisions for grant of licences to possess the same as also the conditions under which the licences can be granted. The restrictions, in our opinion,
are reasonable restrictions. The submission of the petitioner that the Act creates different rights in favour of different people with regard to
possessing fire arms and ammunition, is misconceived. The Indian Arms Act, as a matter of fact, does not confer rights to possess arms and
ammunition. Those rights are inherent in the rights relating to property. All that the Act does is that it imposes restrictions on the exercise of
preexisting rights and nothing has been brought to our notice to show as to how the restrictions contained in the Act travel beyond the scope of the
Act or have no nexus with the object of the Act. Reasonableness of restriction depends upon the nature of the right claimed, objeot to be
achieved, means employed and the limitations imposed. The expression ""reasonable restriction"" connotes that the limitations imposed on a person
for enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public and considered in
this light, we find that the restrictions imposed by the Arms Act are 'reasonable restrictions' and have a clear nexus with the object to be achieved.
The restrictions are neither excessive nor arbitrary.
Coming now to the alternate submission of Mr. Hussain. Whereas we may share the concern of the petitioner about the rising communal riots
and the desire for checking the same to preserve the unity and integrity of the country, we are afraid that the question raised in the writ petition,
particularly the alternate submission, are purely of a political nature and relate to the executive policy and such questions cannot be decided by this
Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction The forum for agitating such questions is not the High Court. Whether there should be a change in the policy
for the grant of licences in favour of the minorities and whether any legislation is required to be brought in that behalf is a matter for the Union
ParliameHt and the central executive. In this connection it will be profitable to notice the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of
Himachal Pradesh versus Students Parent Medical College, SimlaAIR 1985 S C. 910in which case the Supreme Court disapproved the issuance
of the direction by the High Court to the State to initiate legislation making ragging illegal. The Supreme Court observed:
It is entirely a matter for the executive branch of the government to decide whether or not to introduce any particular legislation but the court
certainly cannot mandate the executive or any member of the legislature to initiate legislation, however, necessary or desirable the Court may
consider it to be. That is not a matter which is within the spheres of the functions and duties allocated to the judiciary under the Constitution. If the
Executive is not carrying out any duty laid down upon it by the Constitution or the law, the court can certainly require the Executive to carry out
such duties and this is precisely what the court does when it entertains public interest litigation........
But at the same time, the Court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the Executive and the Legislature under the Constitution and it cannot even
indirectly require the Executive to introduce a particular legislation or the Legislature to pass it or assume to itself a supervisory role over the law
making activities of the Executive and the Legislature"".
In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, we are of the opinion that no directions as requested for by Mr. Hussain, can be given to the
respondents The liberalisation of the concept of locus stand to make access to the courts easy with a view to ""utilise the initiative and zeal of public
minded personto move the courts to act for a general or a group interest, even though they may not be directly injured in their own rights"" (AIR
1982 S. C. 149) places on the courts a greater responsibility to see that they do not travel into the areas reserved for the legislature because it is
no function of the courts to legislate and the Courts do not issue directions which are not capable of being implemented and enforced because the
creditability of the courts for giving relief depends to a large measure on the enforceabillty of the relief granted by the Courts and where the relief
cannot be enforced, this Court should not issue any such directions.
Thus, for what has '.been said above, we find that neither of the alternative submissions made by Mr. Hussain warrant any interference by this
Court. The writ petition, therefore, fails aod is dismissed.