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Judgment
7 paragraphs · 2,659 wordsBOTH the appeals mentioned in the title above are directed against common order of the District Forum dated 8.8.95. Brief facts of the case are that Mr. Rajpaul Bansal, hereinafter referred to as the complainant, retired from the Indian Navy in the substantive rank of Commander w.e.f. 18.1.90. The Controller of Defence Accounts (Navy), Bombay issued Pension Pay Order (PPO) dated 9.11.90 to the Manager, Syndicate Bank, Central Accounts Office, 8-A, Bahadurshah Zaffar, Marg, New Delhi. The complainant had already opened saving fund account No. 5589 on 20.11.89 in Noida (Morna) Branch of the said Bank for receiving pension. A copy of the PPO was also received by the complainant. He contacted the said branch at Noida (hereinafter referred to as the paying branch). No attention was paid by the Bank on the plea that no such PPO had been received there. The complainant again contacted the Accounts Officer (Navy) who, by his letter dated 29.6.91, confirmed having despatched the PPO to the Bank. According to the complainant, the said PPO was located in the office of the Bank on 17.5.91 and an amount of Rs. 2,94,164/- was credited to his aforesaid account on 18.5.91. There was, thus, a delay of about seven months. Further according to the complainant, he was entitled to pro-rata pension @ 1469/- per month till the lump-sum payment had been credited to his account. Instead of crediting the pro-rata pension w.e.f. 18.1.90 till 18.5.91 the Bank had given a credit only of Rs. 4,407/- and that too at a belated stage on 23.7.92 i.e., after another 14 months without payment of any interest. According to the complainant, the Bank was guilty of deficiency in service and he claimed the aforesaid arrears as well as compensation and interest.
THE case was contested. On a consideration of the material on record District Forum-I held the Bank guilty of deficiency in service in causing delay in crediting the pensionary benefits inspite of various reminders and follow-up action and directed the Bank to pay interest on the amount @15% p.a. for the period 16.11.90 till 17.5.91. 16.11.91 was chosen as the presumed date on which the PPO was supposed to have reached the Bank and 17.5.91 was the date immediately preceding the date on which credit of the lump-sum amount was given by the Bank. THE Bank was also directed to pay costs amounting to Rs. 500/-. Both the parties felt aggrieved and hence these appeals. We have heard Mr. Ajant Kumar, Advocate for the Bank and Mrs. Deepti Jain, Advocate for the complainant and have carefully gone through the records.
The first contention of learned Counsel for the Bank is that the complaint itself was barred by limitation. Objection to this effect was taken in the written version. The District Forum, however, failed to deal with and decide the same. According to the learned Counsel the date of despatch of the PPO was 9.11.90. The amount was credited on 18.5.91. According to the learned Counsel since according to the complainant, the amount credited was less than the amount due, cause of action accrued on 18.5.91 and the complaint which was filed on 4.11.93 was barred by limitation which u/Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, is two years from the date of cause of action. It was emphasised that there was no application for condonation of delay and, accordingly, the District Forum could not, possibly, condone the delay. Learned Counsel argued that question of limitation relates to procedural law and the Law of Limitation applicable is as on the date of filing the complaint. The Consumer Protection Act was amended by the Amendment Act of 1993 w.e.f. 18th June ''93. In other words. Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act had come into being before the filing of the complaint. Reliance was placed on C. Beepathuma and Others, v. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolichaya & Ors. AIR 1965 SC 241. Learned Counsel also cited Mani Devi and Others v. Ram Prasad and Others, AIR 1968 Patna 70, Vijay Kumar Motilal Hirakhanwala and Others v. Ramprasad Degduram and Others, AIR 1960 Bombay 411 and Official Liquidator, Palai Central Bank Ltd. Ernakulam v. K. Joseph Augusti, Kayalachakam House, Palai and Others, AIR 1966 Kerala 121, for the proposition (a) that law of limitation as on date of institution applies; (b) that law of limitation being procedural law applies retrospectively; and (c) the material date for reckoning the period of limitation is the date of institution and not the date of cause of action (vide para 13 of AIR 1966 Kerala 121 at page 126 (supra).
PRIOR to the enactment of Section 24A by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 w.e.f. 18.6.93, there was no provision prescribing any period of limitation in the Consumer Protection Act. As a result of various decisions of the National Commission, however, the settled law was that the Fora would not accept stale matters on grounds of public policy. A matter was considered stale if it was sought to be brought before the Fora after expiry of the normal period of limitation. The question is, whether persons who had acquired a right as per the law prior to the enactment of Section 24A lost that right in view of the enactment providing a limitation of two years or the same continued to be available as before the insertion of Section 24A in the Consumer Protection Act. This question stands covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237. It was observed therein as under: "Even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it, but there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive the dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested rights of action by providing a shorter period of limitation. (emphasis added)" Their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rajati of Pittapur v. Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1960 Madras in which it was laid down by the Full Bench that amendment of law of limitation could not destroy the plaintiff''s right of action which was in existence when the Act came into force. It follows that the complainant acquired a vested right and action could be filed within three years of the accrual of cause of action. From the decision of the Apex Court extracted above it is clear that though the general rule regarding law of limitation is that it is a procedural law and the law of limitation, which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it, there are certain well-recognised exceptions to the said rule. One such exception is where the law of limitation provides a longer period, subsequent legislation providing for a shorter period of limitation cannot suddenly extinguish vested rights of action. We, therefore, hold that the complaint was not barred by limitation.
THE next contention of Mr. Ajant Kumar is that the Fora had no territorial jurisdiction in this case. It was submitted that only the Noida (Morna) Branch of the Bank was the concerned branch which was allegedly guilty of deficiency in service and, accordingly, the Fora situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh had territorial jurisdiction. We do not accept this contention. THE PPO issued by the Controller of Defence Accounts is addressed to the Syndicate Branch, Bahadurshah Zafar Marg, New Delhi. We are not impressed by the submission that the said branch in New Delhi was only processing such PPOs which are forwarded to the particular branch concerned which is required to credit the amount to the individual pensioners'' accounts. We are unable to accept that the New Delhi branch of the Bank can be considered as two entities namely the Bank properly so called and the Central Accounts Office. It is for the convenient transaction of business that the Bank has constituted what is called Central Accounts Office in the New Delhi branch. For all applicable purposes, the fact remains that the PPO was received by the New Delhi branch of the Bank and, therefore, processed further. A part of the cause of action, thus, arose within the territorial limits of New Delhi and the Fora under the Act had territorial jurisdiction. This brings us to a consideration of the merits of the case. The PPO, in question, opens with the recitation of the fact that the complainant, on his permanent absorption in Pawan Hans Limited, New Delhi, a Public Sector Undertaking of Government of India, w.e.f. 8.1.90, had opted to receive the pro-rata gratuity and lump-sum amount in lieu of pension. Consequently, he was entitled to receive a total sum of Rs. 2,67,005/- in lieu of pro-rata monthly pension of Rs. 1469/- which amount was directed to be paid to the complainant forthwith. In addition to the above, the complainant was also to be paid death-cum-retirement gratuity amounting to Rs. 49,988/- which after adjusting a sum of Rs. 22,829 /- outstanding against him a sum of Rs. 27,159/- was payable to the complainant. This is followed by para 3 of the PPO which reads as under: "3. Pro-rata monthly retiring pension of Rs. 1469/- (Rs. One thousand four hundred sixty nine only) will also be admissible to the officer w.e.f. 18.1.90 till the date of payment of lumpsum amount of pension as above or three months from the date of issue of this PPO whichever is earlier. The pension thereafter be reduced to Nil."
It is this direction in the PPO which has given rise to conflicting interpretations by the two sides. To recapitulate the material dates, the date of issue of the PPO is 9.11.90. Lump-sum payment in terms of the PPO was credited to complainant''s account on 18.5.91. The pro-rata monthly retiring pension was payable w.e.f. 18.1.90 and it was restricted to payment for three months from the date of the issue of the PPO or till date of payment of the lump-sum amount in lieu of pro-rata retiring pension whichever was earlier. In the facts of the case, that the difficulty has arisen in giving effect to the various conflicting directions because of the obvious delay in issuing the PPO. On the one hand, the PPO states that prorata monthly pension is to be given w.e.f. 18.1.90, the payment has been restricted to three months from the date of issue of the PPO, which in the facts of this case, works out to 18.2.91. It seems that PPO is expected to be issued on or about the date of actual retirement, preparations for the same being made in advance. In the facts of the present case, however, the issuance of the PPO was delayed by 10 months and hence difficulty in interpreting the order. As already stated the Bank has given credit of Rs. 4407/- representing three months pro-rata monthly pension. According to the complainant he was entitled to receive pension upto a period of three months from the date of the PPO which as stated above worked out to February ''91. It is evident that the bank is not expected to pay any amount from its own funds as it has only entered into an arrangement with the Controller of Defence Accounts to disburse the various pensionary benefits granted by the Controller and the Bank is entitled to reimbursement of the amounts paid as retiring pension or lump-sum payment in lieu thereof. The Bank sought a clarification in this behalf but failed to elicit any reply. We do not think that we are called upon to construe the words especially when the Controller of Defence Accounts is not before us and we are not informed of the various provisions which are relevant in this behalf. We, therefore, refrain from expressing any considered view on the question whether the payment already made, i.e., of Rs. 4.407/- is in accordance with the direction in the PPO or is a short payment. We leave it to the complainant to have the matter settled with the Controller of Defence Accounts and to have his remedy according to law, in case he is held entitled to any further payment under this head. We do not think that in view of the bona fide doubt and dispute and in the peculiar facts of this case the Bank was guilty of any deficiency in service. Before the District Forum there was controversy as to when the PPO was received by the Bank. The District Forum held that the PPO was despatched from Bombay on 9.11.90 and should have normally reached the addressee i.e., the Bank on 16.11.90. The District Forum, therefore, allowed interest @ 15% p.a. on the amount from 16.11.90 till the amount was credited on 18.5.91. From the material on record the link branch vide its letter dated 30.11.90 forwarded two PPOs relating to the complainant and one Mr. R.B. Johri (vide page 57 of the paperbook in the appeal filed by the Bank). In other words, the PPO relating to the complainant must have been received towards the end of November ''90. the credit was given only on 18.5.91 causing the delay of about 51/2 months. It was conceded before us that the Noida-Morna branch of the Bank which is the paying branch, did not write a single letter to the complainant to personally appear in the Bank at Noida-Morna and produce a copy of the PPO endorsed to him and also proof of his identity. We are, therefore, unable to accept the explanation tendered by the Bank that the amount could not be credited earlier as the complainant himself failed to appear in the Bank and produce the copy of PPO endorsed by the Controller of Defence Accounts directly in favour of the complainant as well as proof regarding his identity. The complainant was to receive a sizable amount of Rs. 2,94,164/- and it is quite consistent with the probabilities of the case that he must have followed up with the paying branch regarding the said amount. As against his version it is difficult to accept that the complainant allowed a period of 51/2 months to expire and he failed to produce his copy of the PPO and proof regarding his identity. Our conclusion finds support from the further fact that the complainant had opened an account in order to facilitate the receipt of pension as well as the lump-sum payment in lieu thereof way back on 20.11.89 and he had no reason not to appear before the Bank and produce his copy of the PPO and furnish proof regarding his identity. The fact that while payment was credited to the other officer, Mr. R.B. Johri, without delay also indicates that our above conclusion is right because both PPOs were sent by the link branch to the paying branch by one forwarding letter dated 30.11.90. We, therefore, hold that the Bank was guilty of delay in locating the papers which had been forwarded to it by the link branch towards the end of November 90 and the payment was credited only on 18.5.91.
FOR these reasons, we partly allow the Bank''s appeal and direct the Bank to pay interest @ 15% p.a. on the sum of Rs. 2,94,164/- from 1.12.90 to 17.5.91. With regard to the pro-rata monthly retiring pension the complainant will seek necessary clarification from the authorities and in the light of the clarification seek further remedy according to law. Both the appeals are disposed of in these terms. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances there will be no order as to costs. A copy of the order be conveyed to both the parties as well as District FORum-I. Appeal partly allowed.
