Syndicate Bank vs Venkatarama Muralidhar Shenoy

Satyabrata Sinha, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated April 19, 1994 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the writ application filed by the writ Petitioner/Respondent, by quashing the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him.

The fact of the matter, briefly stated, is as follows:

On or about the January 7, 1977 the writ Petitioner was suspended from service by the Appellant bank, inter alia, on the ground that during his tenure as Sub-Manager at its the Netaji Subhas Road Branch, certain irregularities were detected in the account of a customer. The Petitioner filed a title suit in the City Civil Court praying for a declaration that the order of suspension was unlawful, illegal, void and of no effect and also for an injunction restraining the Bank from giving any further effect to the order of suspension and also restraining the Bank from taking any further steps in that regard. On March 2, 1977 an application was made by the writ Petitioner in the said title suit before the City Civil Court for a temporary injunction. On August 23, 1977 the learned Judge of the City Civil Court dismissed the application of the writ Petitioner for stay of the departmental enquiry. On September 9, 1977 an appeal was preferred against the said order before this Court. On September 15, 1977 a Division Bench of this Court passed an order restraining the Bank from proceeding with the departmental enquiry. On April 7, 1978 the said order of the Division Bench was modified by a Division Bench of this Court passed an order whereby the Bank was given liberty to proceed with the departmental enquiry but was directed not to give any effect to the result thereof if the same went against the Petitioner till disposal of the appeal. Thereafter the departmental enquiry was undertaken. Allegedly the said enquiry was postponed and adjourned on more than 15 occasions at the instance of the Petitioner on several grounds. Thereafter, as at the intervention of the Workers'' Union the enquiry could not be held, and the, same had to be postponed due to acute tension between the Management and workmen for which complaints were lodged with the Police and the Assistant Labour Commissioner. On or about April 26, 1983 the writ Petitioner once again moved this Court in its writ jurisdiction and made an oral application before the Court for his representation through a legal practitioner and stay of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court by an order stayed the departmental enquiry and directed the writ Petitioner to make a formal writ application. On May 5, 1983 the said writ application was dismissed. On May 17, 1983, on an appeal from the said order of dismissal a Division Bench of this Court passed an ad interim order staying the proceedings till May 21, 1983. On May 20, 1983 the ad interim stay of the disciplinary proceedings was confirmed till the disposal of the appeal by the Division Bench and hence according to the Appellant, it could not proceed with the enquiry.

Thereafter the plaint in the said Title Suit No. 308 of 1977 was amended by the writ Petitioner and the bank also filed additional written statement. It is stated that in June, 1988 the writ Petitioner moved the instant writ application on the self same cause of action as that in the Title Suit No. 308 of 1977 challenging the order of suspension and also praying for a declaration that the Syndicate Bank Officers'' Regulations, 1976 are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also for an. order restraining the Bank from giving any effect to the order of suspension and charge-sheet. On May 11, 1989 the Petitioner through his Counsel undertook to withdraw the aforementioned Title Suit No. 308 of 1977 pending before the City Civil Court within a fortnight from the said date. On November 7, 1990 the Bank was directed to produce all records and correspondences relating to the matter of suspension of the Petitioner passed between the Branch, Zonal and Head Office. In the meantime the enquiry was held from time to time and December 27, 1990 was fixed as the next date thereafter. On December 24, 1990 the enquiry was directed to be stayed till January 18, 1991 and the matter was directed to appear for orders on January 11, 1991. On December 27, 1990 the enquiry that was scheduled to be held was postponed till after January 18, 1991. On January 18, 1991 the departmental enquiry was stayed until further orders of Court by an order passed by Ajit Kumar Sen Gupta, J. By a judgment and order dated April 19, 1994, the writ petition was allowed.

Mr. Bikash Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Judge misdirected himself in holding that the disciplinary proceedings having not been concluded within a reasonable time, the same was liable to be quashed. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the delay caused in the continuation of the said disciplinary proceedings was not on account of the Appellant but on account of the writ Petitioner and, thus, the impugned judgment must be held to be vitiated in law. He further submitted that the learned Trial Judge while considering the validity or otherwise of the charge-sheet should not have gone into the question of bona fide thereof at this stage.

Mr. Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ etitioner/Respondents, however, submitted that keeping in view the totality of the circumstances, the judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge must be held to be a good one. It was also submitted that evidently the Appellant was free to conduct the enquiry proceedings from 1978 to 1983 as during the afore-mentioned period no order of stay was operative. The learned Counsel submitted that in view of the fact that the writ Petitioner had suffered unnecessarily, he had a legal right to question the validity of the departmental proceedings. It was submitted that the charges as against the Petitioner were vague. Mr. Roy further submitted that from a perusal of the charge-sheet it would appear that the disciplinary proceedings as against the Petitioner was initiated with a closed and biased mind. It was also submitted that the departmental proceedings had been initiated against the Petitioner purported to be for violation of Regulation 24 of 1976 Regulations which are not applicable in the case of the Petitioner inasmuch as the acts of omission and commission on the part of the writ Petitioner, if any, occurred much prior thereto. It was also submitted that there are enough materials to show that the purported admission of the writ petition was obtained dishonestly and under threat or coercion.

The learned Counsel further submitted that as regulations framed by the Appellant bank in the year 1966 known as ''Syndicate Bank Officers'' (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1966 was repealed and replaced by ''Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, no proceeding could be initiated for alleged misconduct on the part of the Petitioner as per the 1976 Regulation. It was submitted that as no proceeding was initiated against the Petitioner, prior to coming into force of the 1976. Regulations, the purported proceeding is invalid in law as the same was not saved under the Repeal and Savings clause of the said 1976 Regulations. According to the learned Counsel, keeping in view the fact that there exists a distinction between a Rule and Regulations and further in view of the fact that the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act have no appliation, no disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated against the writ Petitioner for an alleged misconduct in terms of 1976 regulations. In this connection reliance has been placed upon 1979 Lab. I.C. 1276 Union of India v. Samarendra Mohan Maitra 1979 Lab. L.C. 1276, Raj Bahadur, Mathur v. Union of India 1972 Lab. L.C. 1206 and Ram Gopal Bhattacharyya v. State of West Bengal 1987 Lab. L.C. 1617.

The writ Petitioner was placed under suspension by the Appellant bank on January 7, 1977. By reason of letter dated March 25, 1977 charge-sheet was submitted by the Staff Controller upon the Petitioner which reads as follows:

while you were working as Sub-Manager at N.S. Road, Calcutta Branch, the stock of aluminium colls held by M/s. National Screw and Wire Products Ltd. was verified by the bank, and it was observed that there was a shortage of 34 coils. On enquiry with the clearing agents they had produced 4 delivery orders issued by you under your signature instructing the Clearing Agents to deliver the goods to the Party. On verification of books and ledgers of the branch, it was found that no payment or adjustment was received for credit of Party''s account for effecting the deliveries. On verification of the Delivery Note files at the branch it was observed that the copies were not filed in respect of 4 delivery Notes issued by you without receiving consideration. It was further observed that the regular progressive number which ought to have been given to the Delivery Notes were also not given to these letters, but these were typed by you without entering in the Progressive Index Book of the Department, with ulterior motive. When you were questioned by your superiors in the matter on 17.10.1976, you admitted having issued the Delivery Notes without receiving credit in Bank Books and pleaded for mercy. Thus by issuing Delivery/ Notes without receiving corresponding cash payments, you had allowed the party M/s. National Screw and Wire Products Ltd. to take delivery of stock worth about Rs. 6.83 lakhs, exposing the Bank to financial risk and loss.

This act on your part is highly irregular and objectionable. You have thus violated Regulation 3(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 which constitute a misconduct under Regulation 24 of the said Regulations. Hence, we charge you for having committed an act of misconduct under Regulation 3(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. You are, therefore, required to submit within 7 days of receipt of this charge-sheet a written statement in your defence as per Regulation 6(3) of Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1976.

From the facts as noticed hereinbefore it appears that the writ Petitioner questioned the aforementioned order of suspension by filing a suit in the City Civil Court and obtained an order of injunction. It is true that by an order dated April 7, 1977 a Division Bench of this Court granted liberty to the Appellant to proceed with the departmental enquiry but it is evident from records, that enquiry could not be proceeded with in view of the obstructive attitude adopted on behalf of the writ Petitioner-Respondent and/or the Union.

The learned trial Judge in his impugned judgment upon taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case held as follows:

Taking a cumulative view of the circumstances, I feel that the Petitioner has suffered immensely for being on suspension continuously from 1977 till date. That the Bank''s real concern was not for the loss likely to be caused to the Bank by the reason of the Petitioner having issued the delivery notes without receiving cash payment from the party, whose credentials with the Bank were too high for apprehension that the Bank subsequently advanced to the party credits in excess of Rs. 1 crore. Having this fact in view, the Petitioner''s allegation that he was to issue the delivery notes at the insistence of his superior i.e. the Bank Manager, cannot be taken as an impossibility. The creditor to whom the Petitioner issued delivery notes was no doubt a very important and powerful client. May be, the Petitioner''s courage failed him when asked by the Branch Manager to oblige the said client. It is quite possible that the Petitioner in order to valid the tentrums of the influential client as also his superior acted obligingly, In that event the Petitioner could really be a scapegoat. Secondly, the confessional letter which is being used as on evidence by the Bank is also highly suspect. A person under suspension on charges of misconduct involving stake of Rs. 6.00 lacs would naturally be easy victim to the manipulations of the superior of false inducement. The extraction of a confessional letter from the Petitioner cannot also be ruled out as a total impossibility. The unusual nature of the circumstances surrounding the confessional letter have already been high-lighted.

I also notice the vageeness of the charge-sheet. It does not really disclose all the particulars of the charges. That besides, one single point detracts from the bona fides of the bank''s action. The bank was not really concerned about the risks and loss as it has no reservations in its mind about credit worthiness of the party receiving the benefit of the Petitioner''s supposed act of financial misconduct. Of one thing I am certain that the particular party involved had high credentials with the bank whom the bank considered worthy of crediting with a sum as high as Rs. 1,83,94,470.95.

A bare perusal of the aforementioned judgment would indicate that the learned Trial Judge has taken into consideration the defence of the writ Petitioner to which the Petitioner could have taken recourse to only before the enquiry officer. The findings of the learned Trial Judge are based on surmises and conjecters.

It is not for this Court to consider the merits and demerits of the charges at the threshold, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, the question as to whether the Appellant Bank suffered any real loss by reason of the acts of omission and commission on the part of the writ Petitioner as also the fact as to what impelled the Appellant bank to advance a huge amount subsequently to the concerned customer, is wholly irrelevant.

This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot enter into the thicket of a disputed question of fact as to whether the purported admission of the writ Petitioner admitting his misconduct was extracted one or not. Moreover, a bare perusal of the judgment of the learned Trial Judge clearly indicates that he has entered into the realm of appraisal of evidence which was yet to be adduced by the parties before the enquiry officer. Appraisal of evidence which may be adduced in the departmental proceedings, is within the exclusive domain of the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is neither concerned with the sufficiency of the materials nor is concerned with the appreciation thereof.

It is now well known that such a question should be left to be decided at the initial stage by an enquiry officer. In the case of The Management of Express Newspapers Ltd. Vs. Workers and Staff Employed under it and Others, it was held as follows:

The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to ask the Industrial Tribunal to stay its hands and to embark upon the preliminary enquiry itself. The jurisdiction of the High Court to adopt this course cannot be, and is indeed not disputed. But would it be proper for the High Court to adopt such a course unless the ends of justice seem to make is necessary to do so ? Normally, the questions of fact, though they may be jurisdictional facts the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence, should be left to be tried by the Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. If and after the Special Tribunals try the preliminary issue in respect of such jurisdictional facts, it would be open to the aggrieved party to take that matter before the High Court by a writ petition and ask for an appropriate writ. Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a preliminary issue brought before a High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We wish to point out that a in making these observations we do not propose to lay down any fixed or inflexible rule ; whether or not even the preliminary facts should be tried by High Court in a writ petition, must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue, raised between the parties. Having regard to the circumstances of the present dispute, we think the Court of Appeal was right in taking the view that the preliminary issue should more appropriately be dealt with by the Tribunal. The Appeal Court has made it clear that any party who feels aggrieved by the finding of the Tribunal on this preliminary issue may move the High Court in accordance with law. Therefore, we are not prepared to accept Mr. Sastri''s argument that the Appeal Court was wrong in reversing the conclusion of the Trial Judge in so far as the Trial Judge proceeded to deal with the question as to whether the action of the Appellant was a closure or a look out.

In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and Another, the Apex Court observed as follows:

The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a Government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the Government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the Courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the Government servant and once show cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the Government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that stage would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.

In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Upendra Singh 1994 S.C.C. 357 the Supreme Court deprecated interference of such departmental proceedings at the threshold these adoption of such Court by the Central Administrative Tribunal.

It was observed that the jurisdiction of Tribunal is a kin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Relying upon its earlier decision is T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, and Dyjen Bai v. State of U.P. 1994 S.C.C. 357 the apex Court observed that in such cases, a writ of prohibition would not lie except in exceptional circumstances. It further held:

In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The tribunal cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authorityh to go into. Indeed, even after conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the correctness of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as the case may be. The function of the court/tribunal is one of judicial review, the parameters of which are repeatedly laid down by this Court. It would be sufficient to quote the decision in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath and Sons. The Bench comprising M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as the then was) and A.M. Ahmadi, J., affirmed the principle thus: (S.C.C. p.317, para.8).

Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness as or reasonableness of a deision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of'' the decision-making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.

Now, if a Court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is ununderstandable how can that be done by the tribunal at the stage of framing or charges ? In this case, the Tribunal has held that the charges are not sustainable (the finding that no culpability is alleged and no corrupt motive attributed), not on the basis of the articles of charges '' and the statement of imputations but mainly on the basis of the materal produced by the Respondent before it, as we shall presently indicate.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Learned Trial Judge was not correct in quashing the departmental proceedings at that stage.

Mr. Roy, further, contended that no departmental proceeding could have been initiated against the Petitioner-Respondent for alleged violation of the provisions of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 and Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, inasmuch as the misconduct, if any, have been committed by the writ Petitioner prior to coming into force thereof. It appears that the Learned Trial Judge in his impugned judgment has negative the aforementioned contention of the writ Petitioner.

However, in my opinion, Mr. Roy rightly submitted that it is still open to him to raise the said contention before this Court in terms of the principles analogous to Rules. 22 & 33 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Mr. Roy, in support of his aforementioned contention, has relied upon Raj Bahadur Mathur v. Union of India(Supra) and Union of India v. Samarendra Mohan Maitra(Supra). Mr. Roy further submitted that the charge-sheet itself shows that the authority has prejudged the issue of holding the delinquent guilty and in support of his aforementioned contention relied upon Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (Supra).

It is not in dispute that the bank had framed Rules, known as Syndicate Bank Officers'' (Condition of Service) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to 1966 Rules). The said Rules had not been framed in terms of any Statutory Act or Rules. Rule 30 of the said 1966 Rules defines misconduct. It also inter alia provides that every officer shall be careful and efficient in the discharge of his duties and shall obey all the reasonable and lawful orders of the superiors and of the management.

Rule 35(5) enumerated the misconducts, which includes ;

Dereliction of duty ;

Negligence in performance of duties;....

6) Acting prejudicially to the interest of Syndicate;

....

12) Breach of any rule, regulation, direction or instructions for carrying on the business of the Syndicate or the administration ;

13) Any breach of these rules.

Rule 35(a)(1) to (4) provide for different punishments to be imposed as against an officer if he is found guilty of any misconduct.

The Appellant, therefore, in exercise of its powers conferred upon it by by Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition & Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, framed regulations known as Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Conduct) Regulations, 1976. It also framed regulations under the aforementioned provisions known as Syndicate Bank Officer Employees'' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The said regulations have been made in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The said Regulations had come into force with effect from January 1, 1977.

''Officer employee'' has been defined in Rule 2(g)(i) of Conduct Regulations in the following terms;

''Officer employee'' means a person who holds a supervisory administrative of managerial post in the bank or any other person who has been appointed and is functioning as an officer of the Bank, by whatever designation called and includes a person whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government or a State Government or any other Government undertaking or and other public sector bank or the Reserve Bank of India or any other organisation but shall not include casual work charged or contingent staff or the award staff.

Regulation 3 provides as follows:

General.

(1) Every oficer employee shall; at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the bank and discharged his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer.

(2) Every officer employee shall maintain good conduct and discipline and show courtesy and attention to all persons in all transactions and negotiations.

(3) No officer employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior.

(4) Every Officer employee shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all persons for the time being under his control and authority.

Regulation 26, upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Roy is in the following terms;

Repeal and saving:

Every Rule, regulation, bye law or every provision in any agreement or resolution corresponding to any of the regulations herein contained and in force immediately before the commencement of these regulations and applicable to the officer employees to whom these regulations are applicable is hereby repealed ;

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal any order made or action taken under the provisions so repealed shall be deemed to be made or taken under the corresponding provisions of these regulations.

The Discipline and Appeal Regulations define ''officer employee'' in the same terms. Regulation 4 provides for the penalties. Regulation 5 provides for the authority to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties, whereas Regulations 6 and 7 lay down the procedure for imposing major penalties. Regulation 13 provides for an appeal and Regulation 18 provides for a review. Regulation 22 contains the repeal and saving clause in the following terms;

Repeal and Saving:

(1) Every rule, regulation, bye-law or every provision in any agreement or a resofution corresponding to any of the regulations herein contained and in force immediately before the commencement of these regulations and applicable to the officer employees is hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal:

(a) any order made or action taken under the provisions so repealed shall be deemed to have been made or taken under the corresponding provisions of these regulations ;

(b) nothing in these regulations apply, of any right of appeal which had accrued to him under any of the provisions so repealed ;

(c) an appeal pending at the commencement of these regulations against an order made before the commencement of these regulations shall be considered and orders thereon shall be made, in accordance with these regulations ;

(d) any proceedings which have already been initiated but not yet been Completed at the commencement of these regulations shall be continued and disposed as far as may be, in accordance with the provision of these regulations, as if such proceedings were proceedings under these regulations.

The contention of Mr. Roy is that a distinction has to be made between a rule and a regulation and keeping in view of the fact that in the matter of regulation, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. It was contended that as by reason of the Repeal and Saving Clauses contained in Regulation 26 of the Conduct Regulations and Regulation 22 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, it has not been provided that a misconduct committed in terms of 1966. Regulation would be deemed to be misconduct committed under 1976 Regulations, no disciplinary proceedings could lie as against the Petitioner for violation of the 1S76 Regulations as prior to the coming into force thereof no disciplinary proceeding had been pending or was pending as against the Petitioners.

Admittedly acts of omission and commission on the part of the writ Petitioner No. 1, if any, was committed in September/October, 1976. The writ Petitioner, as noticed hereinbefore, was placed under suspension on January 7, 1977, i.e. after coming into force of the 1976 Regulations. The disciplinary proceeding had also been started as against the Petitioner after coming into force of the said 1976 Regulations.

30 In Raj Bahadur Mathur v. Union of India (Supra) a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court was considering the provisions of Civil Services (Conduct and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The said Rules were replealed by 1964 Rules. In 1964 Rules there was no rule corresponding to the proviso of Rule 15(2) of the 1955 Rules. The second proviso to Rule 25 of the 1964 Rules, which contained a repeal clause was added on January 3, 1969. Proceedings against the Petitioner commenced on May 31, 1965 and ended on December 5, 1968. In the aforementioned factual background, Orissa High Court held as follows:

The substantive part of the rule repeals the 1955 Rules, the immediate predecessor of the 1964 Rules. The first proviso saves only any order made or action taken under the 1955 Rules. If any such order had been made or action taken, then the same shall be deemed to have been made or taken under the corresponding provision of the 1964 Rules. Admittedly in this case no order had been made and no action had been taken against the Petitioner under the 1955 Rules. As the 1955 Rules stand wholly repealed and the saving clause is not applicable to his case the impugned penalty cannot be imposed upon him on the application of the Rule 15(2) of the 1955 Rule 7 though he violated the same.

The Court rejected the contention of the Union of lndia, that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would be attracted. In paras. 6 and 7 of the decision, it was held:

It is thus clear that a distinction has been made between a Central Act, enactment, Regulation and Rule. The 1955 and 1964 Rules have been made by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. They are statutory Rules but they do not constitute ''Central Act'', ''enactment'' or ''Regulation'' within the meaning of Section 3(7), (19) and (5) of the Act Section 6 of the Act only refers to that Act, a Central Act or Regulation as repealing any enactment. As both the 1955 and 1964 Rules do not come in any of this category-Section 6 has no application to the 1955 Rules after they are repealed.

Even assuming that Section 6 applies, the further question for consideration is whether a different intention appears in Rule 25 of the 1964 Rules that Section 6 of the Act would have no application. The first proviso to Rule 25 of the 1964 Rules only saves an order made or action take under the 1955 Rules. Such order or action shall be deemed to have been made or taken under the corresponding provision of the 1964 Rules. Nothing else has been said. In this case no order had been made or action taken against the Petitioner under the 1955 Rules before the same was repealed. Consequently the first proviso has no application. The insertion of the first proviso covering a part of the field comprised in Section 5 of the Act shows a different intention. On this ground also Section 6 has no application to the present case.

It is, thlerefore, clear that in the aforementioned case the Orissa High Court had held that if there is a substantive change in the provision which was not saved in the Rule and in the Clause, no disciplinary proceeding could have been initiated.

In Union of India v. Semarendra Mohan Maitra(Supra)-also the fact situation was entirely different. In that case Rules were framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application to such Rules. Proviso to Rule 25 of the 1964 Rules was given a retrospective effect. The Court held that Regulation does not include Rules. It further held that when the Department''s case throughout was that the contravention was that of Rule 18(2) of the 1964 Rules and not 15(1) of the 1955 Rules, punishment could not be saved on the ground that there was mistake on mentioning wrong statutory provision.

As indicated hereinbefore in the instant case 1966 Rules were not made under any statute. In that case the Division Bench held that the condition of service cannot be changed with retrospective effect. In the instant case the condition of service of the Petitioner is not affected. A bare comparison of 1966 Regulations with 1976 Regulations would leave no manner of doubt that the acts of misconduct, as defined in Rule 24, of 1976 Regulation which includes in its perview the general conduct of the employees, as contained in Regulation 3 thereof, particularly Regulation 3, CI.(1) thereof, covers Sub-clauses (1), (2), (6), (12) and (13) of Regulation 35 of 1966 Regulations with Clauses (1) and (4) of the Regulation 3. If a particular misconduct comes within the purview of 1966 Regulation as also 1976 Regulations, in my opinion the officer employee cannot get rid of a disciplinary proceedings on that account.

In this case on new offence has been made out by reason of 1976 Regulation. This delinquent officer is not being proceeded against for a misconduct under 1976 Regulations, which was not a misconduct under the preceeding one.

The Learned Trial Judge, in my opinion, has rightly rejected the contention of the writ Petitioner-Respondent in this regard. In my view, the repeal of the old Regulations by the new ones cannot prevent the issue of the order of suspension inasmuch as in this case the mischief of the new provision is not sought to be related back to any act of delinquencey, which ocured prior to the commencement of the repealing Rules.

I am also of the view that the charges are neither vague nor thereby the disciplinary authority has prejudged the entire issue. The charge-sheet issued by the Appellants, although, inter alia, is based upon the purported admission of the writ Petitioner, as the factual execution of the document by the writ Petitioner admitting his liability is not disputed and it has merely been contended before us that the said letter was procured under threat or coersion. It would, thus, be open to the writ Petitioner-Respondent to raise all contentions in that regard, which have to be considered by the Enquiry Officer in their proper perspective.

In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the decision of this Court in Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. State of West Bengal(Supra), has also no application to the facts and circumastances of this case.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained.

Before parting with this case it may be observed that Mr. Bhattacharjee, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, stated before as that the Appellant will have no objection if the writ Petitioner-Respondent is represented in the domestic enquiry by an Abvocate or a person having legal background. If the writ Petitioner is represented by an Advocate or any person having legal background, it goes without saying, the bank would also be so entitled. We, however, direct the Appellant-bank and its disciplinary authority to conclude the disciplinary proceedings at an early date and preferably within a period of 3 months from the date of communication of this order, subject to the condition that the writ Petitioner-Respondent renders all co-operation with the Enquiry Officer.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, it will be proper if no unnecessary adjournment is sought for by the parties and the Enquiry Officer helds the departmental enquiry in terms of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations regularly and preferably on day to day basis.

In the result, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and the order passed on April 19, 1994 by the Learned Single Judge is set aside with the aforementioned directions and observations. In the facts, and circumstances of this case, however, the parties shall pay and bear their respective costs throughout.