T. ARMSTRONG CHANGSAN vs SMT. NEIKOL CHANGSAN

(1) This criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC is filed praying for quashing the proceeding under Section 12 of the Protection of Woman from

Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act for short) in Misc. Case No. 50M/2014 pending in the Court of the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate

(SDJM), No. 1, Kamrup, seeking relief under Section 18, 19 and 20 of the Act.

(2) The brief facts leading to the present petition are that the respondent No. 2 and petitioner were married in the month of May, 1994 as per Karbi

rites and customs. They could not pull on well together, consequently, the marital boat moved into rough weather and ultimately the relationship broke

down resulting in separation in the year 2010. There was a decree of divorce passed on 23.02.2011 by the Court of Dima Hasao Autonomous Council

Court in T.S. No. 2/2011. The said decree of divorce was challenged by the respondent No. 2 in appeal. However, later on, the appeal was withdrawn

and the decree of divorce attained finality.

(3) The petitioner was residing at Pretoria in South Africa in connection with his employment, where he received an e-mail, whereby the petitioner

was directed to appear before the SDJM, Kamrup (M) in connection with Misc. Case No. 50M/2014, instituted by the respondent No. 2. It was

alleged in the complaint lodged by the respondent No. 2, that in the month of February, 2000, the petitioner physically assaulted the respondent. In the

month of June, 2000, there was a quarrel and the petitioner hit the respondent, for which she had to come back to India for treatment and rest. She

was again assaulted by the petitioner in the month of August, 2001. It was further stated that there was quarrel between the husband and wife in the

month of December, 2007, at night and in course of such quarrel, the petitioner dragged the respondent by holding her hair and she was also dealt with

kicks and blows in presence of her mother and elder sister. In the month of September, 2008, there was argument between them and petitioner

assaulted her. In the month of September, 2010, the petitioner left for Delhi in connection with his official work and did not return home to live

together with the respondent No. 2, where they were living. It was further stated that the respondent was facing financial hardship and therefore filed

the application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. Learned Magistrate passed an ex-parte order granting interim maintenance in favour of the

respondent @ Rs. 20,000/- and another Rs. 5,000/- for educational expenses of the child per month.

(4) Being aggrieved by the order passed in Misc. Case under the D.V. Act, the petitioner filed the instant petition under Section 482 CrPC for

quashing the proceeding in Misc. Case No. 50M/2014.

(5) Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A.K. Das, submits that because of the decree of divorce passed by competent court, there was no

‘domestic relationship’ between the parties and they were living separately since 2010 and as such, the application under Section 12 of the D.V.

Act was not maintainable. Further contention of the learned counsel was that the alleged domestic violence took place long back in the year 2008 or

before, and the petition under Section 12 of the D.V. Act was filed after about six years, that too after dissolution of marriage by divorce, and as such,

the petition was not maintainable on that count too. To buttress the submission, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the

Apex Court in Inder Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2011) 12 SCC 588.

(6) Refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent Mr. H.S. Kalsi placing reliance on a decision

of the Apex Court in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni Vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori reported in (2014) 10 SCC 736 submits that once the domestic violence is

committed during subsistence of ‘domestic relationship’ subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the perpetrator from the liability and the

court cannot also deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person was entitled under the D.V. Act.

(7) The rival contention of the learned counsels, thus, raises the following two questions in this revision.

(i) Whether an application can be maintained under Section 12 of D.V. Act seeking relief under Section 18, 19 & 20 of the Act when domestic

relationship between the parties ceased to exist due to divorce?

(ii) Whether a petition under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is maintainable after long six years of domestic violence in the form of physical assault?

(8) Before adverting to the submission of the learned counsel, let me reproduce here certain relevant provision of the D.V. Act for proper appreciation

of the controversy involved in the case. Section 12 of the D.V. Act reads as under: “12. Application to Magistrate.â€

(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate

seeking one or more reliefs under this Act: Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any

domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.

(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without

prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed

by the respondent: Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the

aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the

amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any

other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off.

(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.

(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the

court.

(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first

hearing.â€​

(9) The expression ‘aggrieved person’ and ‘domestic violence’ are defined as under: “Section 2(a) ‘aggrieved person’ means

any woman who is or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence

by the respondent.

(f) ‘domestic relationship’ means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared

household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living

together eras a joint family.

(g) ‘domestic violence’ has the same meaning as assigned to it in section 3.â€​

(10) An application under Section 12 of D.V. Act can be filed either by ‘aggrieved person’ or the protection officer or any other person on

behalf of the aggrieved person. The petitioner for being an ‘aggrieved person’ as defined in clause (a) of Section 2, she has to be in domestic

relationship with the respondent as defined in Section 2 (f). Thus for getting any relief provided under the D.V. Act, the aggrieved person or the one,

who files the application on behalf of the aggrieved person, has to satisfy two conditions, i.e. the woman (aggrieved person) is or has been in domestic

relationship with the respondent and should be subjected to domestic violence as defined in Section 3 of the D.V. Act.

(11) Section 2 (f) provides that the domestic relationship may be by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage and

adoption. In the instant case, the relationship between the parties was by marriage and evidently the marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce in

the month of February, 2011. Although, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 sought to put forward an argument, that divorce was obtained by

fraud, the factum of divorce has not been disputed. Thus, from the allegations made in the application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act and the

materials brought on record makes it clear that the parties were separated since 2010 and domestic relationship ceased because of dissolution of

marriage by divorce on 23.02.2011.

(12) The ratio laid down in the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) was that when there is a decree of divorce, even if such decree is void or

voidable, unless such decree is set aside by a competent court, criminal court cannot sit over the finding of the competent court passing a decree of

divorce, and hold that the decree was void. In the said case, relief sought by the petitioner under the D.V. Act was resisted on the ground that there

was a decree of divorce, consequently, no domestic relationship subsisted and therefore, no relief could be granted under the D.V. Act. The

complainant took the plea that the decree was obtained fraudulently and even after obtaining the decree, the parties were living together and therefore,

domestic relationship still subsisted. The Apex Court held, that even if a decree is void, a declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person

aggrieved by the decree, and such declaration cannot be obtained in a collateral proceeding. The Apex Court on the fact of the case held, that the

decree of divorce having not been set aside, there was no domestic relationship and quashed the criminal proceeding under the D.V. Act.

(13) The Apex Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury & Anr. reported in (2016) 2 SCC 705 having confronted with the question

whether the appellant (wife) ceased to be an “aggrieved person†because of decree of judicial separation, distinguishing the effect of

‘divorce’ and judicial separation, held as under:

“In view of the aforesaid pronouncement, it is quite clear that there is a distinction between a decree for divorce and decree of judicial separation;

in the former, there is a severance of status and the parties do not remain as husband and wife, whereas in the later, the relationship between husband

and wife continues and the legal relationship continues as it has not been snapped. Thus understood, the finding recorded by the courts below which

have been concurred by the High Court that the parties having been judicial separated, the appellant wife has ceased to be an “aggrieved personâ€

is wholly unsustainable.â€​

(14) What therefore follows is that, once divorce takes place, it snaps the marital relationship and the parties do not remain as husband and wife,

though, the situation in case of judicial separation is different, because, a decree of judicial separation does not sever the relationship and the parties

still remain as husband and wife, though there might be some restriction on the marital rights. Thus, there is no doubt about it, that once divorce takes

place severing the relationship of marriage, the ‘wife’ ceased to be an ‘aggrieved person’ and necessarily a person, who ceased to be an

aggrieved person cannot maintain an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. Next question arises in the context of factual situation of the

present case is whether, a person who ceased to be an ‘aggrieved person’ because of severance of domestic relationship by means of divorce

can maintain an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act for any domestic violence committed during subsistence of domestic relationships.

 (15) The Apex Court in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni (supra) while answering the question posed above, held that when domestic violence has been

committed during subsistence of domestic relationship, it is immaterial whether at the time of filing application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act,

parties were in domestic relationship or not. If the complainant has been in domestic relationship with the respondent, when she was subjected to

domestic violence by respondent, complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is maintainable, even though subsequently such relationship ceased to

exist. Once the domestic violence is committed while domestic relationship existed, subsequent dissolution of marriage by divorce would not debar the

wife from filing an application under Section 12 of D.V. Act. The Apex Court held in paragraphs-30 and 31 as under:

“30. An act of domestic violence once committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability of the respondent from the offence

committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, compensation under Section 22 and

interim or ex parte order under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence, 2005.

Both the Sessions Judge and the High Court failed to notice the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the fact that the FIR was lodged much prior to

the alleged divorce between the parties and erred in holding that the petition under Section 12 was not maintainable.â€​

(16) The Apex Court in V.D. Bhanot Vs. Savita Bhanot reported in (2012) 3 SCC 183 approved the view taken by Delhi High Court that petition

under the D.V. Act is maintainable by a woman, whoever subjected to domestic violence prior to the coming into force of the D.V. Act, even when

the woman was no longer residing with her husband, at the time of filing the petition and observed as follows. “We agree with the view expressed

by the High Court that in looking into a complaint under Section 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into

force of the PWD Act, could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High

Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force,

would still be entitled to the protection of the PWD Act, 2005.â€​

(17) What therefore abundantly clear is that when domestic violence is committed during subsistence of a domestic relationship, subsequent severance

of the domestic relationship by means of divorce or otherwise shall not debar an application seeking relief under the D.V. Act. Thus, the point No. 1 is

answered in affirmative.

(18) The next point for consideration is whether the application filed after about six years of committing domestic violence of ‘physical assault’

is maintainable and this question necessarily takes us to the relevant question, whether law of limitation shall come in the way of an application under

Section 12 of the D.V. Act in the present case.

(19) Learned Single Judge of Tripura High Court in Crl.Rev. No. 19/2014 (Smt. Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury & Anr.) referring to

the decision of the Apex Court in Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab (supra) held that the complaint under the D.V. Act filed after more than

one year of accrual of cause of action is barred by limitation in view of Section 468 CrPC. Hon’ble High Court held as under: “……Learned

counsel for both the sides relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., reported in (2011)

12 SCC 588, wherein it has been held that the provision of CrPC is applicable in a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act and as per the

provision of Section 468 of CrPC, a complaint ought to be filed within one year from the date of cause of action arose……..â€​

(20) The domestic violence alleged in Krishna Battacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury (supra) was in respect of deprivation of stridhana coming within

the purview of ‘economic abuse’ as defined under Clause (iv) of Explanation 1 to Section 3 of the D.V. Act. The Apex Court having

considered the nature of domestic violence involved in the said case i.e. ‘economic abuse’ in respect of stridhana, observed that concept of

‘continuing offence’ gets attracted in a case of domestic violence of ‘economic abuse’ and held that so long as the status of the person

remains and stridhana remains in custody of the husband, the wife can always put forth her claim under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. Setting aside the

judgment of the Tripura High Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury (2016) 2 SCC 705, the Apex Court held as under:

“Regard being had to the aforesaid statement of law, we have to see whether retention of stridhan by the husband or any other family members is

a continuing offence or not. There can be no dispute that wife can file a suit for realization of the stridhan but it does not debar her to lodge a criminal

complaint for criminal breach of trust. We must state that was the situation before the 2005 Act came into force. In the 2005 Act, the definition of

“aggrieved person†clearly postulates about the status of any woman who has been subjected to domestic violence as defined under Section 3 of

the said Act. “Economic abuse†as it has been defined in Section 3(iv) of the said Act has a large canvass. Section 12, relevant portion of which

have been reproduced hereinbefore, provides for procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs. It has been held in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) that

Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to the said case under the 2005 Act as envisaged under Sections 28 and 32 of the said Act

read with Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. We need not advert to the same as we are of the considered

opinion that as long as the status of the aggrieved person remains and stridhan remains in the custody of the husband, the wife can always put forth

her claim under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. We are disposed to think so as the status between the parties is not severed because of the decree of

dissolution of marriage. The concept of “continuing offence†gets attracted from the date of deprivation of stridhan, for neither the husband nor

any other family members can have any right over the stridhan and they remain the custodians. For the purpose of the 2005 Act, she can submit an

application to the Protection Officer for one or more of the reliefs under the 2005 Act.†“Regard being had to the said concept of continuing

offence and demands made we are disposed to think that the application was not barred by imitation and the courts below as well as the High Court

had fallen into grave error by dismissing the application being barred by limitation.

(21) The Apex Court in Saraswati Vs. Babu reported in (2014) 3 SCC 712 evolved the concept of “continuing domestic violenceâ€. In the said

case, the wife was thrown out of the matrimonial house, allegedly for non-fulfillment of demand of more dowry. There was litigation under Hindu

Marriage Act from both the sides, the wife filed petition for restitution of conjugal right and husband also filed suit for divorce and eventually wife filed

an application under the D.V. Act, seeking relief under Section 19, 20, 22. Learned Metropolitan Magistrate passed protection order, monetary relief

as well as residence order and also directed the police to assist in the implementation of the protection order. Husband did not comply with the order

of the court. The Apex Court upheld the findings of the trial court regarding commission of domestic violence in the form of ‘economic abuse’

and observed that there was ‘continuous domestic violence’ committed by the respondent husband for not allowing the wife to reside in the

shared household even after the order of the Magistrate. The Apex Court held in para-21 and 22 as under:

“21. Section 2(g) of DVA, 2005 states that “domestic violence†has the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 3 of DVA, 2005. Section 3

is the definition of domestic violence. Clause (iv) of Section 3 relates to “economic abuse†which includes prohibition or restriction to continued

access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the

shared household as evident from Explanation I clause (iv) (c) to Section 3.

In the present case, in view of the fact that even after the order passed by the Subordinate Judge the respondent-husband has not allowed the

appellant-wife to reside in the shared household matrimonial house, we hold that there is a continuance of domestic violence committed by the

respondent-husband against the appellant-wife. In view of the such continued domestic violence, it is not necessary for the courts below to decide

whether the domestic violence is committed prior to the coming into force of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and

whether such act falls within the definition of the term ‘Domestic Violence’ as defined under Section 3 of the DVA, 2005.â€​

(22) What therefore, follows from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee (supra) as well as Sarswati Vs. Babu (supra) is

that the concept of ‘continuing offence’ gets attracted to domestic violence of ‘economic abuse’. Section 472 of the CrPC provides that

in case of continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. However,

the expression ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined anywhere in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Apex Court in Uday Shankar

Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2013) 2 SCC 435 observed that it is one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation and

therefore, a formula of universal application cannot be formulated in this respect. The Apex Curt however, held that in case of continuing offence the

ingredients of the offence continue i.e. endure even after the period of consummation, whereas, in an instantaneous offence, the offence takes place

once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes place. Thus, it can perhaps be said that in a continuing offence, there is an element of continuity and

therefore, question of limitation or bar of time, more or less becomes insignificant or immaterial in case of continuing offence, as there cannot be a

fixed starting point of limitation.

(23) The horizon of the expression ‘domestic violence’ as defined in Section 3 of the D.V. Act is very wide. It provides that any act, omission

or commission or conduct of the respondent shall amount to domestic violence in certain circumstances. It includes, amongst others, causing physical

abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse or economic abuse which are explained in Explanation I to Section 3 of the Act. Explanation II to

Section 3 provides that for the purpose of determining whether any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes domestic

violence, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration. Thus, having regard to the wideness of the definition of

domestic violence and concept of continuing offence, what is important to note from the facts of the case in Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi

Choudhury (supra) as well as Saraswati Vs. Babu (supra) is that whether the concept of ‘continuing offence’ will get attracted to a domestic

violence committed in a particular case shall depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of domestic violence.

(24) The Apex Court, in Krishna Bhattacharjee (supra) though, referred to the observation made in Inderjit Grewal Vs. State of Punjab (supra)

regarding application of Section 468 of the CrPC to the case under the D.V. Act, did not feel the necessity of adverting to the question of limitation,

reason being that the Apex Court took the view that domestic violence of ‘economic abuse’ involved in the said case attracted the concept of

continuing offence. The concept of ‘continuing domestic violence’ or invoking the concept of ‘continuing offence’ to the domestic

violence, makes one thing abundantly clear that law of limitation shall apply to the D.V. Act. In Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra), the issue before the

Apex Court was not the question of limitation. However, while making a comment on the submission made by the learned counsel, the Apex Court

observed in para-32 as under:

“Submissions made by Shri Ranjit Kumar on the issue of limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., that the complaint could be

filed only within a period of one year from the date of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions of Section 28 and 32 of the Act

2005 read with Rule 15(6) of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which make the provisions of CrPC applicable and

stand fortified by the judgments of this court in japani Sahoo v. Chnadra Sekhar Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762; and Noida Eenterpreneurs Association

v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508â€​.

(25) From the above observation of the Apex Court, it is not difficult to understand that, no ratio was laid down by the Apex Court in Inderjit

Grewal’s (supra) case to the effect that application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act has to be filed within one year.

(26) Before proceeding further, it will be beneficial to have a look at the provision of Section 467 & 468 of the Cr.P.C., which reads as under:

“467. Definitions. For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires,"" period of limitation"" means the period specified in

section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence. 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.

(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub- section (2),

after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be-

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only

Provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to certain economic offences, see the Economic Offences (Inapplicability of Limitation) Act, 1974 (12 of

1974)

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to

the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.]

(27) A plain reading of the provision of Section 468 CrPC makes it clear, that period of limitation for certain categories of offences provided in Section

468 CrPC relates to the quantum of punishment provided for those categories of offences. Section 468 CrPC however, does not provide any period of

limitation for offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding three years. Section 468 of the CrPC applies to the offences where punishment

prescribed for the offence is fine or imprisonment upto a period of three years. The various period of limitation have been provided in Section 468

CrPC depending on the quantum of punishment for a particular offence. When offence is punishable with fine only, the period of limitation is 6

months. When the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the offence is not exceeding one year, limitation period is one year and when such

punishment is exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years, limitation is three years. In respect of offence punishable by imprisonment for period

of more than three years, no limitation is prescribed under Section 468 of the CrPC. Though Section 468 of the CrPC provides that period of limitation

is for taking cognizance by the court. The Apex Court in Japari Sahu Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty reported in AIR 2007 SC 2762 elaborated the

provision and held that limitation has to be calculated from the date of commission of offence till filing of the complaint or FIR. If the complaint or FIR

is filed within the prescribed period of time, requirement of Section 468 CrPC is satisfied. It is therefore, the date of filing of the complaint/FIR and not

the date when the Magistrate/court actually takes cognizance, which is relevant for computing the period of limitation. This view was subsequently

approved by a five judges Bench of the Apex Court in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62.

(28) Let me pause here for a moment and reproduce certain relevant provisions of the D.V. Act and Rules i.e. Section 28, 31, 33, 34 and Rule 15(6)

of the Protection of Woman From Domestic Violence Rules and Section 4 of the CrPC for better appreciation of the issue.

(a) Section 28 procedure:(1) save as otherwise provided in this Act, all proceedings under Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and ‘offences’

under  Section 31 shall be governed by the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974).

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of application under Section 12 or sub-section

(2) of Section 23 of the D.V. Act.

(b) “Section 31. (1) A breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall be an offence under this Act and shall

be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand

rupees, or with both.

(2) The offence under sub-section (1) shall as far as practicable be tried by the Magistrate who had passed the order, the breach of which has been

alleged to have been caused by the accused.

(3) While framing charges under sub-section (1), the Magistrates may also frame charges under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)

or any other provision of that Code or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961), as the case may be, if the facts disclose the commission of an

offence under those provisions.

(c) Rule 15(6) of the Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Rules provides as under: “When charges are framed under section 31 or in

respect of offences under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or any other offence not summarily triable, the Court may

separate the proceedings for such offences to be tried in the manner prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and proceed to

summarily try the offence of the breach of Protection Order under section 31, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).â€​ (d) 32. Cognizance and proof.â€

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 shall be

cognizable and non-bailable.

(2) Upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved person, the court may conclude that an offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 has been committed

by the accused.

(e) 33. Penalty for not discharging duty by Protection Officer.â€"If any Protection Officer fails or refuses to discharges his duties as directed by the

Magistrate in the protection order without any sufficient cause, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.

(f) 34. Cognizance of offence committed by Protection Officer.â€"No prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Protection Officer

unless a complaint is filed with the previous sanction of the State Government or an officer authorised by it in this behalf.â€​

(29) Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “all offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into,

tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provision (CrPC) but subject to any enactment for the time being in force, regulating the manner

or place of investigating, enquiring into trying or otherwise dealing with such offence.

(30) Thus a conjoint reading of Section 28 & 32 of the D.V. Act and Rule 15(6) of the D.V. Act & Rules as well as Section 4 (2) of the CrPC,

makes it abundantly clear that save as otherwise provided in the D.V. Act all the proceeding under Section 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23 shall be

governed by the provision of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, sub-section (2) of Section 28 of the D.V. Act envisaged that court may lay down

its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2). It can be noticed that section 12 of the D.V. Act itself

provides the procedure. Thus, in addition to the procedure laid down in Section 12 of the D.V. Act the Magistrate has also been empowered by virtue

of sub-section “save as otherwise provided in the Act†in Section 28 of the D.V. Act, Sub-section (2) of Section 28 read with sub-section (2) of

Section 4 of the CrPC leaves no semblance of doubt that the procedure laid down in the D.V. Act for disposal of application under Section 12 shall

prevail over the Criminal Procedure Code.

(31) Plain reading of Section 32, 33 and 34 makes it clear that the D.V. Act makes only two offences i.e. offence under Section 31(1) for breach of

protection order and offence under Section 33 punishable. Section 31 of D.V. Act provides penal provision in respect of breach of any protection

order and Section 33 provides penalty against protection officer for not discharging duty. The punishment for offence of breach of protection order

under Section 31 is prescribed as imprisonment for a maximum period of one year and fine, which may extend to Rs. 20,000/-. Similar punishment has

been provided for offence under Section 33 of the Act. Save and except Section 31 and 33, no other provision is made punishable under the D.V. Act.

The offence under Section 31 has been made cognizable and non bailable. Whereas offence under Section 33 is non-cognisable as would appear from

the provision of Section 34 D.V. Act.

(32) Section 12 of the D.V. Act provides the procedure for obtaining an order for relief under the Act. As per Section 12 of the Act an aggrieved

person or a protection officer or any person on behalf of the aggrieved person may file an application seeking one or more reliefs under the D.V. Act

and if the Magistrate finds that domestic violence has been committed, Magistrate shall grant reliefs provided in the Act. Section 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and

23 provides the various reliefs that can be granted to the ‘aggrieved person’ under the D.V. Act. Section 18 provides for protection orders,

Section 19 - Residence orders, Section 20 â€" Monetary reliefs, Section 21 â€" Custody orders, Section 22 â€" Compensation orders. Section 23 â€

provides the power to grant interim and ex-parte relief. None of the above relief, which can be granted by Magistrate on an application under Section

12 of the D.V. Act can be construed as penal, as all such reliefs are of civil nature.

(33) The object and purpose of the legislation (D.V. Act) to provide civil remedy to the victim of domestic violence is also amply clear from the

‘statement of object and reason’, more particularly, clause 2 & 3 of the Statement of Object and Reason which, I may reproduce herein below:

“2. The phenomenon of domestic violence is widely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. Presently, where a women is

subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives, it is an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The civil law does not however

address this phenomenon in its entirety.

It is, therefore, proposed to enact a law keeping in view the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a

remedy under the civil law which is intended to protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic

violence in the society.

(34) Section 12 of D.V. Act provides for presentation of ‘application’ and not complaint. As per Black’s Law Dictionary,

‘application’ means a request for an order not requiring advance notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the order is issued. As per

Oxford dictionary, ‘application’ means a formal request to an authority, whereas the expression ‘complaint’ is defined in Section 2(d) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure as under: “(d) ""complaint"" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking

action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation.- A

report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non- cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a

complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.â€​

(35) Offence is defined in Section 2 (m) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as under: “Offence means any act or omission made punishable by any

law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act 1871 (1

of 1871).â€​

(36) Thus from the object of the legislation (D.V. Act), the nature of relief provided therein and the relaxation in respect of applicability of the

Criminal Procedure Code for disposal of an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, makes it abundantly clear that, ‘domestic violence’ as

defined under Section 3 of the D.V. Act are not made punishable and the remedies are also not intended to be penal, rather civil in nature. It is

altogether a different matter, that an ‘abuse’ or a particular domestic violence may be of such nature, that it may constitute a criminal offence

under the IPC or under any other penal provision of law, for the time being in force. In such a case, when the domestic violence discloses an offence,

such offence obviously shall be enquired into or tried as per the Code of Criminal Procedure as mandated by Section 28 of the D.V. Act. Sub-section

(3) of Section 31 of the D.V. Act provides that while framing charge under Section 31 (1) of the D.V. Act, court may also frame charges under any

other provision if the fact discloses commission of offence. Rule 15(6) of the D.V. Act & Rule 2006 also makes the provision clear as to the trial of

an offence.

(37) When the domestic violence per-se is not made punishable under the D.V. Act nor violation of all orders under the D.V. Act is made punishable;

except the offence as contemplated in Section 31 & 33 of the Act. Therefore, applicability of Section 468 CrPC in case of D.V. Act shall be limited

only in case of offences under Section 31 & 33 of the D.V. Act and the said provision of Section 468 CrPC cannot be invoked in case of filing an

application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act for any relief under Section 18, 19, 20, 21 or 22.

(38) However, from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court that concept of continuing offence gets attracted to domestic violence, it can be held as

corollary that law of limitation shall apply to an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, though Section 468 CrPC may not be made applicable in

case of filing an application under Section 12 of D.V. Act, having regard to the scheme and object of the act and the relief prescribed under various

provisions of the D.V. Act as well as the scope of the provisions of Section 468 of the CrPC. Needless to say, that when application under Section 12

of D.V. Act is filed seeking relief under the D.V. Act alleging domestic violence, which from the nature of violence attracts the concept of continuing

offence, the same necessarily shall be governed by the concept of continuing offence, so far the starting point of limitation is concerned. When the

provision of limitation as provided by Section 468 of the CrPC is limited to the offence only, necessarily question will arise, what shall be the period of

limitation for filing an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act which does not deal with any offence under the D.V. Act. Having regard to the

object and scheme of the Act, this court is of the view that general law of limitation i.e. Limitation Act shall apply to an application under Section 12 of

the D.V. Act.

(39) Coming to the facts of the case in hand, as indicted above, the domestic violence to which the respondent was allegedly subjected to, in the

instant case was ‘physical abuse’ on various dates and the last assault as per domestic violence report took place in the month of December,

2009 and as per, September, 2008. Be that as it may, even if December, 2009 being the last incident of ‘physical abuse’ as per domestic

incident report is taken into account, in that case, the application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act in the instant case, was filed after about 5 years of

committing domestic violence. But from the relief claimed it would appear that besides ‘physical abuse’ the aggrieved person also alleged

economic abuse, inasmuch as, as per allegations she was deprived of financial assistance for study of the child and other needs. In fact, learned

Judicial Magistrate also granted interim monetary relief by the impugned order. Since allegations of both ‘physical abuse’ and ‘economic

abuse’ were brought against the respondent, and domestic violence of ‘economic abuse’ attracts the concept of ‘continuing offence’,

‘the domestic violence’ of ‘economic abuse’ continues till the deprivation of monetary requirement continues. Therefore, even without

adverting to the question, whether domestic violence of ‘physical abuse’ attracts the concept of continuing offence, it can be held that the

application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act in the present case is not time barred as the concept of continuing offence gets attracted to ‘economic

abuse’. Thus, the point No. 2 is answered in favour of the respondent.

(40) In view of the reasons stated above, the petition is held to be devoid of merit and dismissed.

(41) Send back the LCR.