T. Ramanujam vs Commr., Corporation of Madras and Another

Rajagopalan, J.—This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders passed

from time to time by the officers of the Madras Corporation and by the Standing. Committee to which the petitioner appealed against the orders of

these officers.

The petitioner was employed in 1950 as the Head-master of one of the elementary schools maintained by the Corporation of Madras. On 23-

8-1950 two charges were framed against him and he was called upon to explain. The petitioner applied for copies of certain documents to enable

him to submit his explanation. But on 12-2-1951 the very act of asking for copies was treated among other things as an act of insubordination, and

the petitioner''s pay was reduced from Rs. 80 to Rs. 78. He was also transferred. Apparently the petitioner did not join his new post.

The petitioner applied for leave with permission to retire. The petitioner''s contention was that though it was the Commissioner of the Corporation

that was the competent authority to grant the leave and the permission to retire that the petitioner sought on 10-3-1951 the Educational Officer

refused the leave and framed fresh charges against the petitioner for disobedience, in that he did not join duty at the post to which he had been

transferred.

On 14-3-1951 the petitioner made a written representation asking for a personal hearing. That was followed up on 8-11-1951 by appearance of

the petitioner before the Deputy Commissioner and the Educational Officer, when four further charges were framed against him, that he was called,

upon to furnish an immediate explanation. He furnished an explanation and asked for a further opportunity. But on 13-11-19S1 orders were

passed reducing the pay of the petitioner still further from Rs. 76 to Rs. 70. He was also reverted as art assistant. The petitioner appealed to the

Standing Committee against this order dated 13-11-1951 and that appeal was discussed.

With the correctness or otherwise of the orders set out above I do not propose to concern myself at this stage. I merely set out these facts to

explain what followed:

On 9-9-1952 the petitioner applied to the Commissioner of the Corporation for permission to move this court under Article 226 of the

Constitution to question the validity of the orders, particularly those reducing the pay once front Rs. 80 to Rs. 76 and subsequently from Rs. 76 to

Rs. 70. On 25-10-1952 the Commissioner called upon the petitioner to withdraw that application. The petitioner did not withdraw that

application, though apparently at one stage he had offered to withdraw that later if he was accorded an interview by the Commissioner. The

Commissioner accorded the interview, but nonetheless the petitioner did not withdraw his application.

On 5-11-1952 a charge was framed against the petitioner that he had been disobedient, in that he had failed to carry out the orders of the

Commissioner to withdraw the application he had preferred to the Commissioner for permission to move the court under Article 226 of the

Constitution. Pending enquiry into"" that charge the petitioner was suspended from service. On 4-12-1952 the petitioner submitted his written

representation to the charges dated 5-11-1952. On 28-12-1952 the Commissioner directed the removal of the petitioner from the service of the

Corporation. The petitioner appealed to the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee modified the order of the Commissioner and directed

that the petitioner should be reinstated in service, but that his pay should be further reduced from Rs. 70 to Rs. 65. The period of absence from

duty was directed to be treated as leave on loss of pay.

I propose to go only into the validity of the order of the Commissioner dated 28-12-1952 and the order on appeal of the Standing Committee

dated 6-6-1953 modifying the punishments awarded by the Commissioner. (6) The charge on the basis of which the punishments awarded by the

Commissioner and modified by the Standing Committee was that the petitioner had disobeyed the Commissioner who ordered that the petitioner

should withdraw his request for permission to move this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. If that had been a legal order disobedience of

such a legal order could certainly have been met with disciplinary action. I am however unable to subscribe to the view, that any authority can issue

an order that a given person shall not exercise the right conferred upon him by the Constitution to move the court under Article 226 of the

Constitution and call it a lawful order. Whether the petitioner required the Commissioner''s permission or not to move this Court under Article 228

of the Constitution to question the validity of any of the orders that had been passed by the Com missioner or other officers of the corporation, it is

not necessary for me to decide. The petitioner did ask for permission, and instead of granting that permission the Commissioner directed the

petitioner to withdraw that application for the grant of such permission. Such an order the Commissioner bad no legal authority to issue; and the

disobedience of such an order can by no stretch of imagination be viewed as disobedience of any lawful order which the Commissioner was

competent to issue. The basis of further proceedings was this unlawful order, and therefore there could really be no question of punishment of the

petitioner for not obeying an order which the Commissioner had no legal authority to issue. That the petitioner did not withdraw his request is

obvious. Even if the petitioner had undertaken subject to conditions that he would withdraw the request and subsequently failed or even refused to

withdraw, the Commissioner had no authority to countermand his exercise of the rights of the petitioner conferred upon him under Article 226 of

the Constitution.

Since the basis of the whole disciplinary enquiry was an unlawful order issued by the Commissioner, the entire proceedings taken by the

Commissioner and subsequently by the Standing Committee are without jurisdiction. Therefore direct that all the proceedings commencing with the

charges dated 5-11-1952 be quashed as without jurisdiction.

As I said I am not going into the validity or otherwise of the prior orders. The petitioner should have confined himself to one relief in this

application for a writ and he is not entitled to ask this court to review the entire history. But I trust the Commissioner or the legally constituted

authority will review the past orders also; and if any of them was not lawful or if any of them was passed without observing the due formalities

including a real opportunity being given to the petitioner for any defence, I am sure the Commissioner will himself correct the errors, if any. I have

confined myself to the order of removal from service dated 28-12-1952 and the subsequent order of the Standing Committee on appeal, and these

I have held to be without jurisdiction.

The petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from the first respondent, that is the Corporation.

Counsel''s fee Rs. 100.