T. Venkatakrishnama Charlu vs Karnam Arunachalam Pillay

It is found by the District Munsiff that the payment of a quit-rent by the plaintiff was made for the benefit of the defendant, who was liable for the

quit-rent. At the same time he has found that the payment was not made at the request of the defendant. The Munsif, however, finds upon the

facts, and no doubt rightly, that the plaintiff did not intend to make the payment gratuitously. u/s 70 of the Indian Contract Act, where a person

lawfully does anything for another person or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit

thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered."" The wording of the

section, as has been observed in a number of cases, is very wide and is wider than the rule of the English Common Law. But there are cases in

which a narrow interpretation has been placed on the word lawfully."" For instance in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das (1889) A.W.N. 67 ; 6 Ind. Dec.

577 it is stated by Straight, J., at pages 242 and 243; ""I pointed cut to Mr. Simeon that if you could read Section 70 of the Contract Act without

the word ''lawful'' in it, I might go to the full length of the contention set up by him. But I presume that the Legislature intended something when it

used the word ''lawful'' and that it bad in contemplation cases in which a person held such a relation to another as either directly to create or by

implication reasonably to justify an inference that by some act done for another person the party doing the act was entitled to look for

compensation for it to the pert on for whom it was done."" Reliance is also placed by the learned Vakil for the petitioner on the ruling of the Privy

Council in Ram Tuhul Sing v. Biseswar Lall Sahco 3 Suth. P.C.J. 136 where it is stated as a general proposition: It is not in every case in which a

man has benefited by the money of another, that an obligation to repay the money arises. The question is not to be determined by race

considerations of what may be fair or proper according to the highest, morality To support such a suit there must be an obligation, express or

implied, to repay. It is well settled that there is no such obligation in the case of a voluntary payment by A of B''s debt. Still less will the action lie

when the money has been paid, as here, against the Will of the party for whose use it is supposed to have been paid Stokes v. Lewis (1786) I T.R.

20 . Nor can the case of A be better because be made the payment not ex mero motu, but in the course of a transaction which, in one event,

would have turned out highly profitable to himself, and extremely detrimental to the person whose debts the money went to pay."" This is a

statement of law which is not based on the words of Section 70 of the Contract Act and if we read this proposition in the light of the facts, I think

the case is easily distinguishable from the present case. In the present case there can be no doubt that the payment by the plaintiff was made in

good faith; he certainly did not intend the payment to be gratuitous; he expected compensation for it. As has been pointed out by Pollock and

Mulla in their commentary on the Contract Act, Section 70 enacts a law wider than the English Common Law on the subject. The preponderance

of rulings in this High Court does not support the restricted view which found favour with the Allahabad High Court in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das

(1889) A.W.N. 67 ; 6 Ind. Dec. 577 or with the Calcutta High Court in Panchkori Ghosh v. Hari Das Jati 21 C.W.N. 394 ; 25 C.L.J. 325. It

was laid down in the latter case that ""to entitle a person to claim the benefit of Section 70 of the Contract Act, the payment must have been lawfully

made, that is, by a person having a lawful interest in making it and not some interest from the point of view of the payer."" If by that is meant that

there must be some interest like that mentioned in Section 69, I must, with great respect, observe that I find no warrant for any such limitation. On

the other hand as far back as Damodara Mudaliar v. Secretary of State for India 4 M.L.J. 205 it was held by this Court: ""Certainly there may be

difficulties in applying a rule stated in such wide terms as is that expressed in Section 70. According to the section it is not essential that the act shall

have been necessary in the sense that it has been done under circumstances of pressing urgency, or even that it shall have been an act necessary to

be done at sometime for the preservation of property. It may, therefore, be extended to cases into which no question of salvage enters, it is not

limited to persons standing in particular relations to one another; and, except in the requirement that the act shall be lawful, no condition is

prescribed as to the circumstances under which it shall be done."" This view of the law has found acceptance in later rulings of this Court. Yogambal

Boyee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar 3 Ind. Cas. 110 and Sapthaiishi Reddiar v. Secretary of State for India 28 Ind. Cas. 309; (1915)

M.W.N. 256. In the last mentioned case it was the view of Ayling, J., that the payment must be held to be lawful within the meaning of the section,

if it could be shown to have been made in good faith or that it was not an unlawful payment. It may not be easy to define what are the

circumstances in which the payment would not be lawful; the case, for instance, in which a payment is made against the protest of the defendant

would, I think, not be covered by Section 70, I think the ruling in Gajapathi Krishna Chandra Deo v. Srinivasa Charlu 20 Ind. Cas. 445 ; (1914)

M.W.N. 99 ; 14 M.L.T. 20 also supports the view which I am inclined to take in this care, and I do not think that the decision of the learned Chief

Justice and Srinivasa Aiyangar, J, in Jagapatiraju v. Sadrusannamarad 31 Ind. Cas. 255 ; 18 M.L.T. 464 lays down any proposition inconsistent

with Yogambal Boyee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar 31 Ind. Cas. 255 ; 18 M.L.T. 464 and the other rulings to which I have referred.

I, therefore, dismiss the petition with costs.