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Judgment
B. Rajendran, J.—Heard both sides. The main writ petition is taken up for disposal at the admission stage itself.
The prayer in the writ petition is for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to consider the petitioner''s representation dated 03.05.2014.
The case of the petitioner is that the third respondent issued a notice dated 29.11.1999 to acquire the lands of the petitioner situated at Sriperumbudur Taluk, Kanchipuram District as part of its TACID plan and also directed the petitioner to approach him at his office for getting suitable compensation. The petitioner vide his letter dated 22.12.1999 replied to the said notice and also sought for enhanced compensation. Thereafter, the petitioner did not do anything further. In the meanwhile, the entire acquisition process were already over and the compensation amount also has been deposited by the authority concerned. Subsequently, after a decade, viz., during the year 2009, the petitioner sent a letter to the third respondent giving the change of address; thereafter also he kept quite. Since there was no reply for the said letter, the petitioner again wrote a letter only on 16.09.2013 seeking allotment of some other property to him. When no reply came, he once again sent a representation to the Central Grievance Cell on 24.09.2013. For the said communication he received a reply from the third respondent dated 18.12.2013 stating that the total compensation has been fixed at Rs. 4,195/- and an award to that effect came to be passed vide Award No. 4 of 2000 dated 31.05.2001. The communication further stated that the petitioner can collect the same from the authority concerned after production of certain documents. According to the petitioner, the said communication also stated that the petitioner can seek enhanced compensation by approaching the second respondent under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. The further case of the petitioner is that by letter dated 16.01.2014 addressed to the second and third respondents, the petitioner had sought for an enhanced compensation according to the current market value. Since there was no reply for the said communication also, the petitioner once again sent a representation on 03.05.2014 and even for that representation there was no reply. Hence, he has come forward with the present writ petition.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the second respondent gave a press release for acquisition of lands for extension of Chennai Airport in the nearby villages offering Rs. 18,00,000/- per ground or Rs. 750/- per sq.ft., whereas the petitioner was awarded only a meagre compensation of Rs. 4,195/- for 4,880 sq.ft. Hence, he made a representation to the second and third respondents seeking enhanced compensation as per the current market value as the petitioner''s property is also situated in the same district. Accordingly, he would pray for a direction to the respondents by considering his representation dated 03.05.2014.
Learned Additional Government Pleader appearing on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 would submit that normally a mandamus cannot be issued in a case where that cannot be considered. He would further submit that Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would be applicable only to those claimants, who had failed to apply for a reference under Section 18 of the Act, aggrieved against the award passed by the Collector and that too if the same is filed within a period of three months from the date of the award. In this case, the petitioner has not chosen to approach the Court within the prescribed time; however, after a period of more than 14 years, he has approached this Court for the issuance of a mandamus. Accordingly, he would pray for the dismissal of the writ petition as it is barred by limitation.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of SIPCOT/R3 would also submit that the petitioner''s case is purely barred by limitation and he has got no right to challenge the award dated 31.05.2001 after a period of nearly 13 years. Accordingly, she also would pray for the dismissal of the writ petition.
From a mere reading of the facts stated above, it is seen that this is a clear case where a mandamus cannot be issued for the simple reason that what cannot be construed under law cannot be directed to be considered especially, when there is an inordinate delay of more than a decade.
From the narration of dates and events, it is very clear that the lands were originally sought to be acquired by the third respondent as early as 29.11.1999 and the petitioner was also aware of the proceedings. He had even replied as early as 22.12.1999, when the third respondent sought for relevant documents. Even at that point of time, not satisfied with the compensation fixed at Rs. 250/- sq.ft., the petitioner sought for enhanced compensation as per the market value. Thereafter, the third respondent has also taken over the land. The award also has been passed even in the year 2001; but the petitioner kept quite for a period of ten years and for the first time, he woke up in the year 2009, sent a letter to the third respondent asking for the current position and also made a representation to the Grievance Cell on 24.01.2003. Thereafter, the third respondent replied by letter dated 18.12.2013 informing him about the award passed and the deposit of the amount. It is further stated in the said letter that the petitioner may get remedy under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, for higher compensation. At that point of time, the petitioner gets a clue and again sent a letter dated 16.01.2014 to the third respondent that he is prepared to produced all the relevant documents provided that he gets the enhanced rate of compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq.ft. When that has not been considered, the present representation dated 03.05.2014 has been sent by the petitioner and has also come before this Court seeking to consider the same.
The prayer sought for by the petitioner seems to be innocuous and the innocuous prayer is leading to the consequent extension of time. What he could not achieve through a Civil Court or any other Court, the petitioner by merely making the present representation, seeks to extend the time. This has been deprecated by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining Indus. Est. and Another, , wherein their lordships have categorically pointed out as follows:
''''8. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying to such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation.
The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any "decision'''' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to ''''consider''. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to ''''consider''''. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.
Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.
The present case is a typical example of ''''representation and relief''''. The petitioner keeps quiet for 18 years after the termination. A stage is reached when no record is available regarding his previous service. In the representations which he makes in 2000, he claims that he should be taken back to service. But on rejection of the said representation by order dated 09.04.2002, he filed a writ petition claiming service benefits, by referring the said order of rejection as the cause of action. As noticed above, the learned Single Judge examined the claim, as if it was a live claim made in time, finds fault with the respondents for not producing material to show that termination was preceded by due enquiry and declares the termination as illegal. But as the petitioner has already reached the age of superannuation, the learned Single Judge grants the relief of pension with effect from 18.7.1982, by deeming that he was retired from service on that day. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could declare a termination in 1982 as illegal in a writ petition filed in 2005. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could find fault with the Department of Mines and Geology, for failing to prove that a termination made in 1982, was preceded by an enquiry in a proceedings initiated after 22 years, when the Department in which the petitioner had worked had been wound up as long back as in 1983 itself and the new Department had no records of his service.''''
Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M. Ingaci Vs. The Commissioner, Devekottai Municipality and Others, , in which I am also a party, wherein the Division Bench held that there are several instances where unscrupulous petitioners have misused the direction issued to "consider". It was further held that there are large-scale misuse of the orders "to consider". The Division Bench also relied on para Nos. 18 to 20 of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in the case of A.P.S.R.T.C. and Others Vs. G. Srinivas Reddy and Others, , wherein in Para Nos. 18 to 20, it was held as under:-
"18. We may also note that sometimes the High Court dispose of the matter merely with a direction to the authority to ''consider'' the matter without examining the issue raised even though the facts necessary to decide the correctness of the order are available. Neither pressure of work nor the complexity of the issue can be a reason for the court to avoid deciding the issue which requires to be decided, and disposing of the matter with a direction to ''consider'' the matter afresh. Be that as it may.
There are also several instances where unscrupulous petitioners with the connivance of ''pliable'' authorities have misused the direction ''to consider'' issued by Court. We may illustrate by an example. A claim, which is stale, time-barred or untenable, is put forth in the form of a representation. On the ground that the authority has not disposed of the representation within a reasonable time, the person making the representation approaches the High Court with an innocuous prayer to direct the authority to ''consider'' and dispose of the representation. When the court disposes of the petition with a direction to ''consider'', the authority grants the relief, taking shelter under the order of the court directing him to ''consider'' the grant of relief. Instances are also not wanting where authorities unfamiliar with the process and practice relating to writ proceedings and the nuances of judicial review, have interpreted or understood the order ''to consider'' as directing rant of relief sought in the representation and consequently granting relief''s which otherwise could not have been granted. Thus, action of the authorities granting undeserving relief, in pursuance of orders to ''consider'' may be on account of ignorance, or on account of bona fide belief that they should grant relief in view of the court''s direction ''to consider'' the claim, or on account of collusion/connivance between the person making the representation and the authority deciding it. Representations of daily-wagers seeking regularisation/absorption in to regular service is a species of cases, where there has been large-scale misuse of the orders ''to consider''.
Therefore, while disposing of the writ petition with a direction ''to consider'', there is a need for the High Court to make the direction clear and specific. The order should clearly indicate whether the High Court is recording any finding about the entitlement of the petitioner to the relief or whether the petition is being disposed of without examining the claim on merits. The court should also normally fix a time-frame for consideration and decision. If no time frame is fixed and if the authority does not decide the matter, the direction of the court becomes virtually infructuous as the aggrieved petitioner will have to come again to court with a fresh writ petition or file an application for fixing time for deciding the matter."
Thus, it is evident from the decisions cited above that what could not be considered cannot be directed to be considered by this Court. Following the decisions cited supra and also for the reasons stated above, I am inclined to dismiss the Writ Petition as the petitioner by way of making the representation seek to extend the time of limitation, which has barred long ago. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.