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Judgment
A.S. Venkatachalamoorthy, J.—Plaintiff in O.S.11 of 1986 on the file of Sub Court, Dharapuram is the appellant herein.
The plaintiff filed the said suit against the defendants praying the Court to pass a decree for division of suit properties into four equal shares with
reference to good and bad soil and allot one such share to the plaintiff and to put her in possession of the same contending as follows.
One Palanisamy Gounder, who admittedly entitled for 1/4 share in the suit property, sold the same on 8.4.1974 to one Veerammal. After the
purchase the said Veerammal and other sharers were enjoying definite portions by way of convenient enjoyment without any partition amongst
themselves by metes and bounds. It is the further case of the plaintiff that she purchased 1/4 share of Veerammal under a sale deed dated
29.10.1985 and since then she has been enjoying that portion of land which Veerammal was enjoying. According to the plaintiff, since the
defendants refused to heed to the request to partition the properties by metes and bounds, the present suit has been filed.
The second defendant filed a written statement inter alia denying various claims made by the plaintiff. The defendant disputed the claim of the
plaintiff that she is entitled to 1/4 share in the plaint schedule properties. Further case of the second defendant is that even assuming that the plaintiff
is entitled for 1/4 share as claimed by her, she would not be entitled for possession and that is because the second defendant took the property on
lease under a document dated 23.3.1973 for a period of three years from the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff viz., Palanisamy Gounder and
even after expiry of the said term, he continued to be in possession. A specific claim is made in the written statement that he is entitled to the
protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'').
At the trial, both the parties let in oral and documentary evidence. After considering the materials available on record, the trial Court came to the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4 share in the plaint schedule properties and that her share has to be demarcated. However, the Court
held that she would not be entitled to get possession of the same since the second defendant is the cultivating tenant of the plaintiff''s share of the
property. Being aggrieved by that part of the finding of the trial Court, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff.
The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the second defendant in his written statement has not pleaded that he is cultivating the suit
property with reference to the share of the plaintiff and even in his evidence he has not deposed that he is entitled to the protection under the Act.
According to the learned Counsel, the trial Court ought to have granted a decree for possession as well.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the fact that Palanisamy Gounder leased out the property to the
second defendant in the year 1973 has not been disputed and that further since he continues to be in possession even after expiry of lease period,
he satisfies the conditions contemplated in the Act to claim the status of a cultivating tenant. According to him, payment of kist and electricity
charges would further prove that he has been actually cultivating the plaintiff''s share of the suit property.
It has to be noted that in the appeal, the plaintiff has not claimed that she is in possession of a portion of the suit property by way of convenient
enjoyment. That being so, on the basis of the claims made by the respective parties, if this Court comes to the conclusion that the second defendant
is the Cultivating Tenant, then the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court has to be sustained. But on the other hand, if this Court arrives at a
finding that the second defendant is not the cultivating tenant as contemplated under the Act, then the plaintiff will be entitled for a decree for
possession in respect of her 1/4 share.
Firstly, this Court has to take up the exercise of examining the definition of ''Cultivating Tenant'' as found in the Tamil Nadu Cultivating tenants
Protection Act, 1955. While doing so, this Court has to bear in mind certain legal principles as laid down by the Supreme Court of India in various
decisions, which we enumerate as under.
(a) The Court must see the legislative intent and the underlying policy of the statute and the object sought to be achieved.
(b) Any interpretation should be as far as possible consonant with justice and reason.
(c) When the words in the statutes are not ambiguous, the Court has to go by the literal meaning of the words.
(d) Yet another golden canons of interpretation is that the legislature always avoids surplusage and attributes a definite meaning to each of the
words mentioned in the statute.
(Refer: State of Bihar and Another Vs. Bal Mukund Sah and Others, ; M/s. Atul Castings Ltd. Vs. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, ; Manohar Lal Vs.
Vinesh Anand and Others, ; Dental Council of India and Another Vs. Hari Parkash and Others, ; 2001 SCC 760 (Uday Mohanlal Acharya v.
State of Maharashtra)
The preamble of the Act reads as under,
Whereas it is necessary to protect cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Tamil Nadu from unjust eviction.
In Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder and Others Vs. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder and others, , the question arose was as to whether
the Revenue Divisional Officer while considering the Landlord''s complaint of arrears of rent and request for an order of eviction on that ground,
can pass an order granting time to pay the arrears within a stipulated time and further in the same order holding that in case of failure on the part of
the tenant, there will be an order of eviction. The Court answered in the negative and in the Judgment, the Court referred to the object behind
enacting the Act. After referring to the preamble, the Court observed as under,
It was a beneficent legislation for granting security of tenure to cultivating tenants of agricultural lands. It is a well-settled canon of construction that
in construing the provisions of such enactments the Court should adopt that construction which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act
rather than the one which would defeat the same and render the protection illusory.
Hence, it is abundantly clear that the Act is meant to protect only a cultivating tenant.
Now, the question is who is the Cultivating Tenant. Section 2(aa) reads as under,
Sec.2(aa) ""Cultivating tenant""-
(i) means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another,
under a tenancy agreement, express or implied; and
(ii) includes-
(a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement;
Admittedly in this case, the tenancy agreement entered into between second defendant and Palanisamy Gounder was for a period of three years,
i.e., it came to an end by 1976. While Section 2(aa)(i) deals with a case, where the tenancy agreement is in force, clause (ii)(a) deals with the case
where a person is in possession after the determination of tenancy agreement. The present case falls under the second category. As already stated,
while the appellant would contend that second defendant''s mere continuing in possession is not sufficient to claim the status of a cultivating tenant
and that he should further satisfy the Court that he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in cultivation of the land,
the claim of the respondent is that mere possession after expiry of the lease period is sufficient. Of course, the respondent would further contend
that even assuming it is not sufficient, the production of the documents such as electricity bills evidencing payment of electricity charges and
payment of kist would show that he was actually cultivating the land.
We would have readily accepted the submission of the counsel for the respondent that mere possession by the respondent would be sufficient
to claim the status of a Cultivating tenant, but for the word ''such'' occurring in Section 2(aa)(ii)(a). The question would arise as to whether that
word can be ignored. As already pointed out by us earlier, no word used by the legislature can be ignored unless the Court is driven to such a
conclusion having regard to the scheme, object and other relevant circumstances of the statutory provision.
In fact, a learned single Judge of this Court in Bright Brothers (Private) Limited Vs. J.K. Sayani, rightly pointed out as under,
It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation that no word used by the Legislature in a statute should be ignored or should be held to be
meaningless, superfluous or otiose, unless the Court is driven to such a conclusion, having regard to the scheme, object, and other relevant
circumstances of the statutory provision.
It is now relevant to refer to a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Mithilesh Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, where the
Supreme Court pointed out that the intention of the legislature has primarily to be gathered from the language used and rejection of words as
meaningless has to be avoided. The Supreme Court observed as under,
The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, and as a consequence a construction which results in rejection of
words as meaningless has to be avoided. It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside word(s) in a statute as being inapposite
surplusage; if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In the interpretation of
statute, the Court always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the
statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. The authorities were, therefore, justified in
holding that he was guilty of the offence of absence from duty without proper intimation.
No reason has been pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent for this Court to come to the conclusion that the word ''such'' (referred supra)
has to be ignored. In fact, no such argument was advanced. Then necessarily we have to analyse as to what the Legislature intended to convey by
employing the word ''such''.
In an endeavour to find out what exactly the meaning of the word ''such'' in the common parlance, we turned to the New Oxfort Dictionary of
English and we find that it gives the meaning as ''of the type previously mentioned''.
The Lexicon Webster Dictionary would explain the term ''such'' as ''of the kind, character, degree, or extent of that or those indicated or implied.''
In legal parlance, the said term is understood as under according to Black''s Law Dictionary,
Of that kind, having particular quality or character specified. Identical with, being the same as what has been mentioned. Alike, similar, of the like
kind. ""Such"" represents the object as already particularized in terms which are not mentioned, and is a descriptive and relative word, referring to
the last antecedent.
Coming to the rulings of the Courts, we find that a Division Bench of Punjab High Court, way back in the year 1957 in the case reported in
Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur, Simla Vs. Shree Jagan Nath Maheshwary, Amritsar, understood the word
''such'' to mean ''to the last antecedent''. It is useful to refer to certain portion of the said ruling which reads as under,
... In its grammatical usage, and in its natural and ordinary sense, the word ""such"" is understood to refer to the last antecedent, unless the
meaning of the sentence would thereby be impaired, which does not seem to be the case here. The word ""such"" indicates something just before
specified, or spoken of, that is proximately, and not merely previously. It particularises the immediately preceding antecedent, and not everything
that has gone before. It signifies what has preceded proximately and not just previously or formerly.
In Steinlein v. Halstead, 8 North Western Rep.881 (L), S.1697 of Revenue Statute, provided that:
Within 10 days after the execution of the assignment the assignor shall also make and file in the office of said clerk a correct inventory of his assets
and a list of his creditors, stating the place of residence of each such creditor and the amount due to each, which inventory and list shall each be
verified by his oath, and have affixed a certificate of the assignee that the same is correct according to his best knowledge and belief, and failure to
make and file such inventory and list shall render such assignment void, but no mistake therein shall invalidate such assignment or affect the right of
any creditor.
The controversy in that case was in relation to the use of the word ""such"" in the sentences:
and failure to make and file such inventory and list shall render such assignment void.
The Supreme Court of Winconsin held, that according to the natural, reasonable and grammatical construction, the word ""such"" referred only to a
correct inventory of assets and list of creditors, without any reference whatever to the oath of the assignor or the certificate of the assignee. In other
words it specified only the last preceding clause of the subject-matter.
In fact, the said ruling of the Punjab High Court was very much relied on by the learned single Judge of this Court in the ruling reported in Bright
Brothers (Private) Limited Vs. J.K. Sayani, in understanding the meaning of the word ''such''.
In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Wazir Singh, , a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court while considering a case under Rajasthan
High Court Rules, 1952, had occasion to consider how the word ''such'' has to be understood. The Court pointed out the word ''such'' refers to
previously indicated, characterised or specified and that ''such'' is an adjective, meaning the one previously indicated or refers only to something
which has been said before.
A Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, while considering a case arising u/s 34 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Banking Regulation
Act, 1949, had to examine the meaning of the word ''such'' in Central Bank of India Vs. Ravindra and Others, . We extract hereunder what the
Supreme Court observed,
Webster defines ""such"" as ""having the particular quality or character specified; certain; representing the object as already particularised in terms
which are not mentioned"". In New Webster''s Dictionary and Thesaurus, meaning of ""such"" is given as ""of a kind previously or about to be
mentioned or implied; of the same quality as something just mentioned (used to avoid the repetition of one word twice in a sentence); of a degree
or quantity stated or implicit; the same as something just mentioned (used to avoid repetition of one word twice in a sentence); that part of
something just stated or about to be stated"". Thus, generally speaking, the use of the word ""such"" as an adjective prefixed to a noun is indicative of
the draftsman''s intention that he is assigning the same meaning or characteristic to the noun as has been previously indicated or that he is referring
to something which has been said before. This principle has all the more vigorous application when the two places employing the same expression,
at the earlier place the expression having been defined or characterised and at the latter place having been qualified by use of the word ""such"", are
situated in close proximity.
Thus in this case, applying the principles laid down by various courts, it could be seen, the words ""such person"" refer to a person referred
earlier. The person referred earlier in Section 2(aa)(i) is one who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in
cultivation of any land. Or in other words, Section 2(aa)(ii)(a) has to be understood as any person who contributes his own physical labour in the
cultivation or that of any member of his family in the property in which he is in possession even after determination of tenancy agreement. If mere
possession is sufficient the Law makers would not have employed the word ''such'' in Section 2(aa)(ii)(a). Can a person, who after the expiry of
the lease period continues to be in possession, but runs a petty betelnut shop or an arrack shop instead of cultivating the land, claim the status of a
cultivating tenant. The answer is emphatically ''No''. The Act is to protect only a cultivating tenant. Any interpretation has to be in consonant with
justice and reason and should not be absurd.
We would like to refer to two rulings of Supreme Court at this juncture. In Bhatia International Vs. Bulk Trading S.A. and Another, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the Court while interpreting a statute should see to it that the interpretation should not result in inconvenience and
absurdity. We quote hereunder the exact words employed by the Supreme Court.
... A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and
friction in the system which should constitute purports to regulate as to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which
avoids such results. (See Johnson v. Moreton (1978)3 All ER 37: and Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. (1978) 1 All ER 948). In selecting out
of different interpretations, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things, as it may
be presumed that the legislature should have used the word in that interpretation which least offends our sense of justice. ...
Subsequently also, the Supreme Court laid down to the same extent in Shashikant Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh and Another, . In that case, the
Supreme court observed as follows,
That being the position, a reasonable and common sense approach deserves to be adopted and preferred rather than a construction that would
lead to absurd results. ...
Coming to the present case, second defendant has to plead and prove that even after determination of tenancy agreement he continues to be in
possession and cultivating the land contributing his own physical labour. It would not be sufficient if he simply says that he is in possession. In the
present case, second defendant has only pleaded in the written statement that he is a cultivating tenant. Nowhere he has stated that he is
contributing his physical labour and cultivating the land. That apart, he has not whispered anything in that regard in his evidence also. Even the plea
that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act has not been made.
Coming to the documents relied on by the respondent, it has to be remembered that admittedly the respondent has been in possession of more
than 1/4 share in the suit property. That being so, these documents would not advance the case of the respondent moreso in the absence of
necessary pleadings and oral evidence.
In these circumstances, it has to be held that second defendant is not a cultivating tenant as contemplated under Tamil Nadu Cultivating
Tenants Protection Act, 1955. Once we come to such conclusion, then necessarily we have to declare that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for
possession as well.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. There will be a decree to the following effect,
(a) The suit property shall be divided as four equal shares with reference to good and bad soil.
(b) On such division, plaintiff will be entitled to one such share.
(c) The plaintiff shall be put in possession of such share in the suit properties.
(d) There will be no order as to costs.