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Judgment
B. Rajendran, J.—The writ appeal arises out of the Order dated 05.10.1999 passed in WP No. 3453 of 1992 by a learned single Judge of
this Court. The said Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner/appellant praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the first
respondent in G.O. Ms. No. 1007, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 21.06.1991 so far as it relates to the lands of the
petitioner in Survey Nos. 350 to 371 i.e., 369/4A, 369/4B, 369/5, 371/1, 371/2, 362/2A, 362/2B, 363/6, 368/1, 369/1A, 369/2, 369/3, 352/7,
353/9, 352/1, 350/10A, 350/8, 350/9, 350/10B, 363/1A, 363/4, 363/1B, 363/2, 363/3, 350/11A, 350/11B, 352/4, 352/5, 352/6, 350/1,
365/6, 365/2A, 365/3, 365/4, 365/6A, 365/6B, 366/1A, 367/1 and quash the same.
The appellant, claiming to be the Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Technical Educaton Department Staff Co-operative House-Building Society,
comprising of 200 members, who are Government servants, has filed the above writ petition contending interalia that the society has been formed
with a view to get suitable lands for constructing houses for the members. It was also contended that the members of the appellant-society are the
purchasers of the plots for valuable sale consideration in a lay out area comprised in Survey No. 350 to 371 at No. 155, Sholinganallur Village,
Saidapet Taluk, Chengai MGR District. The members of the appellant-society also stated to have obtained patta in their favour in respect of their
respective lands. According to the appellant, the appellant purchased 14.18 acres of land in the name of the society for valueable consideration.
The appellant-society also applied for layout of the house sites in various survey numbers measuring an extent of 8.865 acres with Madras
Metropolitan Development Authority and the layout approval was also granted vide letter dated 30.11.1989. Pursuant to the obtaining of the
approval, the appellant-society also has executed gift deeds in favour of the Sholinganallur Town Panchayat for the purpose of laying roads as per
the condition of approval. Subsequently, the Sholinganallur Town Panchayat has also given its approval for the layout as per the proceedings dated
04.01.1990 after collecting the development charges. It was further contended that the society is also in possession of lands to an extent of 5.32
acres which is intended for distribution among the remaining members, who have paid the full cost. While so, the Government issued notification u/s
4(1) and 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ''The Act) vide G.O. Ms. No. 474, Housing and Urban Development
Department dated 30.05.1990 for acquisition of 82.84.0 hectares of wet, dry and Manavari lands in Survey Nos. 350 to 371 etc., for
implementation of Sholinganallur Neighbourhood Scheme Phase III, sponsored by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. The said notification was also
published in the official gazzette on 03.04.1990 and also in one issue of Tamil Daily Dinakaran on 16.06.1990. Thereafter, the appellant-society
submitted their objections on 26.06.1990. According to the appellant, the objectinos were not properly considered and they have been overruled
on 01.03.1991 without any reasons. However, the notification u/s 6(1) of the Act and it was also published in one issue of Tamil Daily
''Dinakaran''. In the meantime, the appellant society has submitted a letter dated 07.09.1990 to the first respondent praying to delete the lands
belonging to the appellant-society from the purview of acquisition proceedings, but the same was rejected and intimated to the appellant on
22.02.1991 vide letter No. 30255/LA dated 03.04.1990 stating that the Government has decided to proceed with the acquisition proceedings and
it is not feasible to consider the request of the appellant society for deletion of the lands from the purview of acquisition proceedings. Under those
circumstances, the appellant society has filed the above writ petition before this Court contending that the purpose for which the society purchased
the lands and the purpose for which the said lands are sought to be acquired by the respondents are one and the same and therefore the entire
acquisition proceedings are vitiated. It is also contended that since the layout plan has been approved by Madras Metropolitan Development
Authority, the Government cannot thereafter acquire the said lands.
Before the learned single Judge, the respondents have not filed any counter affidavit, however, the learned Government Advocate contended
justifying the purpose for which the lands were sought to be acquired.
The learned single Judge, after hearing the submission of both sides, came to the conclusion that the appellant-society has failed to make out any
case in their favour and therefore, interfering with the orders impugned in the writ petition is not warranted. Accordingly, the learned single Judge
dismissed the writ petition which has given rise to the filing of the present writ appeal.
Before us, the respondents have filed a counter affidavit contending interalia that the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was issued for acquisition of
82.84.0 hectares of lands comprised in Survey Nos. 235/1A, 235/1B1, 235/1B2, 235/1C1 etc., of Sholinganallur Village for formation of
Sholinganallur Neighbourhood Scheme,Phase III and it was also approved in G.O. Ms. No. 474, Housing and Urban Development Department
dated 30.05.1990. The said notification was also published in the Government Gazzette on 13.06.1990 as well as in Tamil Dailies ''Murosoli'' and
''Dinakaran'' on 16.06.1990. The substance of the 4(1) notification was also published in the Village on 02.07.1990 as required under the Act.
Further, the notice in Form III seeking objections from the land owners and other interested persons was published in the Village, besides, Form
III(A) was also served on all the interested persons. The enquiry u/s 5(A) of the Act was conducted on 05.09.1990 and objections of the land
owners were received. On receipt of the objections, the same were tabulated and forwarded to the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing Board along
with the objection petitions in original vide letter dated 06.11.1990 for receipt of remarks. The Chairman of the Housing Board, by letter dated
03.01.1991 stated that the objections have to be overruled and to submit the draft declaration u/s 6 of the Act. The remarks so offered by the
requisition body namely Housing Board was also communicated to the objectors vide letter dated 29.01.1991. Thereafter, the enquiry under Rule
3(b) of the Act framed u/s 55(1) of the Act was conducted on 27.02.1991. The persons who attended the 3(b) enquiry did not raise any new
grounds than the one raised by them at the time of enquiry u/s 5-A and therefore the Land Acquisition Officer, after duly considering the
objections, by proceedings dated 01.03.1991, overruled the objections and pursued further action.
It is also stated in the counter affidavit that the draft declaration u/s 6 of the Act was approved in G.O. Ms. No. 1007, Housing and Urban
Development Department dated 21.06.1991, which was published in the Government Gazzette on 25.06.1991. Thereafter, the direction u/s 7 of
the Act to appoint the Special Tahsildar to perform the functions of the District Collector was approved by the Government vide Government letter
dated 30.09.1991, which was also published on 16.10.1991 in the Government Gazzette. Subsequently, the notice u/s 9(1) and 10 of the Act was
published in Sholinganallur Village on 05.02.1993 as required under the Act. Further, the notice in Form 7 u/s 9(3) and 10 of the Act were served
on the land owners and interested persons. Thereafter, the enquiry u/s 16 of the Act was conducted on 24.06.1993. In the meanwhile, as the
appellant society has filed the above Writ Petition before this Court in which interim stay was granted only to the extent from disturbing the
possession of the lands, the other proceedings went on and ultimately, the award was passed on 30.06.1993 under Award No. 5 of 1993. Since
the writ petition was dismissed on 05.10.1999, the present appeal has been filed. Inasmuch as the Government has approved the notification under
Sectin 4 (1) of the Act for acquisition of lands to an extent of 82.84.0 hectares in Sholinganallur Village, including the lands of the members of the
appellant society for formation of Sholinganallur Neighbourhood Extension Scheme Phase III, the subject matter of the lands are essentially
required for implementation of the scheme formulated by the Government. Apart from this, the Government has approved the notification u/s 4(1)
of the Act in G.O. Ms. No. 454, Housing and Urban Development Department dated 23.05.1990 for acquisition of lands to an extent of 21.83.0
hectares for the purpose of formation of Sholinganallur Neighbourhood Scheme, Phase II for Housing Scheme of Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
In the counter affidavit of the respondents, apart from the above averments regarding compliance of the procedural formalities, the Government
has raised a specific plea that on verification whether there exists any society in the name of Tamil Nadu Technical Educaton Department Staff Co-
operative House-Building Society, it was found that there was no such society in existence at all. The appellant society has not at all been
registered. The person who have sworned the affidavit in support of the writ petition and claiming himself to be the Secretary is working as
Superintendent in the Technical Education Department. The appellant society is not registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. The details of
the members of the society, the extent of land which is sought to be released from the purview of acquisition is neither mentioned in the affidavit nor
the list is produced. It was also pleaded that u/s 159 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Society Act, 1983 (Act 30 of 1983, only a registered society
can use the word ''co-operative'' or its equivalent in any regional language without the sanction of the Government. Therefore, the appellant society
is not a juristic person and the writ petition filed by an unregistered society is not maintainable. Furthermore, the respondents have also taken a
specific plea that the owners of the lands are the persons who are having an interest in the lands which are sought to be acquired have not
challenged the acquisition proceedings. As the association has sold the property to individual members and they have not challenged the acquisition
proceedings even though notice u/s 9 and 10 have been issued to them individually, the writ petition is not maintainable. When the owner of the
lands have not challenged the notification issued under the Act, the appellant society has no legal right to file the writ petition at all. It was also
contended that once an award is passed even the land owner or interested party can maintain an writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the writ
appeal.
We have heard the argument of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
Government and the learned standing counsel for the requisitioning body.
The learned senior counsel for the appellant mainly argued that when once the layout approval has been granted by the competent authority
namely Madras Metropolitan Development Authority in respect of certain lands, the Government is estopped from issuing the notification u/s 4(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the appellant society has been formulated for the
purpose of allotting lands to enable their members to put up construction of house sites and for the very same purpose, the lands of the members of
the appellant society is sought to be acquired by the respondents and therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. Lastly it was
contended by the learned senior counsel that the objections submitted by the society has not been considered at all by the Land Acquisition Officer
and they were simply overruled without assigning any valid reasons. In fact, the objections were overruled on the basis of the remarks offered by
the requisitioning body namely Housing Board which indicates the non-application of mind on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer, therefore
also, the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated.
Per contra, the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents argued that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as the
appellant society is neither a registered society and the appellant, which is an unregistered society, cannot use the word ''co-operative'' as it has
been prohibited u/s 159 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act. Since the appellant is not a juristic person, the writ petition is not at all
maintainable. The order passed by the Land acquisition Officer, overruling the objections raised by the appellant is not an order simplicitor
following the recommendations or remarks offered by the Housing Board and therefore it is valid. Further, merely because layout plan sought for
by the appellant in favour of their members has been granted, it is not a bar for the respondents to proceed with the acquisition proceedings. The
learned Additional Advocate General would lastly contend that no writ petition would lie after an award has been passed. In this case, an award
was passed as early as in the year 1993. Moreover, the original owners namely the alleged members of the appellant society, who have been
issued with individual notices in respect of the enquiry u/s 9 and 10 of the Act have not chosen to challenge the acquisition proceedings and
therefore, on their behalf, the appellant society cannot maintain the writ petition as it is not an aggrieved person.
We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective counsel for the parties. At the outset, we are inclined
to deal with the question as to the maintainability of the writ petition.
The appellant society is styled as Tamil Nadu Technical Educaton Department Staff Co-operative House-Building Society, which would
indicate that it is a co-operative society formed for the purpose of accommodating its members, who are government servants. As seen from the
affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, more than 200 government servants joined together and formed the society. The society had purchased
more than 14 acres of lands and registered the property in the name of the society. It is very clearly admitted that the scoiety is not a registered
society. The society is not registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. When the society is an unregistered society and it is only an association
of persons, then it is not a juristic person. In fact, even if a society is registered, the society, by itself, cannot file a writ petition and it has to be
represented by an elected body like Secretary, President or any one authorised by the bye-law of such society. In this case, the appellant society,
having admitted that it is not a registered society, it is not known under what authority the person claiming to be the Secretary of the Society has
filed the writ petition. From the records, we are unable to see the names of members of the society and their address furnished along with the writ
petition. It is well known that there exist certain salient differences between a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, on the one
hand, and a company corporate, on the other, principle amongst which is that a company is a juristic person by virtue of being a body corporate,
whereas, the society, even when it is registered, is not possessed of these characteristics. Moreover, a society, whether registered or unregistered,
may not be prosecuted in a criminal court nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name, as has been
held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Illachi Devi (D) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans
India and Others, Therefore, the society cannot sue or be sued in its name only. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf,
which is like a corporation, which cannot be sued by itself. In this case, there is no whisper in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition to
sustain the maintainability of the writ petition or how and when the Secretary was authorised to file the writ petition. It is not known how the
appellant society, which is a mere association of persons, could file the writ petition under the name and style of society, particularly without
disclosing the names of the members of the society. Therefore, the writ petition cannot be entertained. Even otherwise, the words used in the name
of the society is ''Housing Building Society''. u/s 159 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act (Act 30 of 1983), there is a specific bar for the
use of the word ''cooperative'' or any equivalent. It will be useful to extract the provisions of Section 159 of the Act, which is as follows:
Prohibition of the use of the word ''co-operative'' or its equivalent:-- (1) No person other than a registered society shall trade or carry on
business under any name or title of which the word ''co-operative'' or its equivalent in any regional language is part without the sanction of the
Government;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the use by any person or his successor in interest of any name or title under which he traded
or carried on business at the date on which the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 (Central Act II of 1912) came into operation.
(2) Whoever contravenes the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees and in the case
of a continuing offence with further fine of fifty rupees for each day on which the offence is continued after conviction thereof.
It is evident from Section 159 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act that no person other than a registered society can use the word
co-operative or its equivalent without the sanction of the Government. In this case, the appellant is neither a registered society nor it has got any
approval or sanction from the government for using the word ''co-operative'' in their name. In fact, in the counter filed in this writ appeal, the
respondents have categorically stated that no such co-operative society appears to be in existence. Under those circumstances, the writ petition
filed in the name of Tamil Nadu Technical Educaton Department Staff Co-operative House-Building Society, by using the word ''co-operative''
without any sanction from the government is not maintainable as it is barred by Section 159 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act.
Furthermore, it is also brought to our notice that the society itself, though claims to have purchased the property in the name of the society, had
subsequently sold the property to its members and registered the property in the name of the individual members after getting the land approval.
The fact that the property has been registered in the names of the members would clearly indicate that the society was not concerned with the
housing building or future holding of the land. The moment the land is registered in the name of an individual member, such member became the
absolute owner of the property. Thereafter, the society cannot be construed as an owner of the property. In this case, at the time of enquiry u/s 5-
A of the Act, notices have been issued and objections have been called for and accordingly objections have been made by the society and also
participated in the enquiry. The objections submitted by the society have been duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and forwarded the
same to the requisitioning body namely the Housing Board. The Housing Board, after going through the objections, rejected the objections made
by the appellant society. Such report of the requisitioning body was also communicated to the appellant society. Only thereafter, the land
acquisition proceedings were proceeded further. Thereafter, as per Section 9 and 10 of the Act, notices have been sent to the individual members
of the society, as, by then, the lands have been registered in the name of the individual members and they became owners of the lands. Thereafter,
when the enquiry under Rule 3B of the Act was conducted, the individual members have participated but not raised any new objections.
Therefore, on a cumulative reading of all the above said facts, we are unable to see as to how the society can thereafter represent their members
and file the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings, inasmuch as the society is an unregistered society. The individual members have
not filed any separate writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, it is not open to the society, a conglomerate or association of
person to challenge the notification issued u/s 4(1) of the Act. The writ petition is not maintainable as it has been filed by a non-juristic person.
Furthermore, as stated supra, the writ petition is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the individuals namely actual owners/alleged members
of the society have not challenged the acquisition proceedings inspite of the fact that separate notices have been issued to them under Sections 9
and 10 on finding that the lands have been registered in their name. Earlier notices have been issued to the society because by then, the lands were
registered only in the name of the society. In any event, the writ petition is not maintainable and it is liable to be dismissed on that ground.
The next question arises for our consideration is whether the objections submitted by the society has been duly considered by the Land
Acquisition Officer or not. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that after the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was issued, enquiry
u/s 5A of the Act was conducted in which the appellant society participated and raised objections. Such objections were not considerd by the
Land Acquisition Officer and the objections were overruled on the basis of the instructions given by the requisitioning body namely Housing Board.
We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant. The Land Acquisition Officer, on receipt of the
objections from the land owners, including the appellant society, has forwarded the same to the requisitioning body. The requisitioning body, after
going through the objections instructed the Land Acquisition Officer to reject such objections. The remarks offered by the requisitioning body was
also communicated to the appellant society and only thereafter, the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made. After the declaration u/s 6 was
published, the notices u/s 9 was sent to the individual owners of the land, since, by then, the society had registered the lands in favour of their
members. The individual members have also participated in the enquiry conducted u/s 3-A of the Act but they did not raise any objections other
than the one raised earlier in the enquiry conducted u/s 5-A of the Act. Under those circumstances, we do not find any illeglaity or irregularity in
overruling the objections filed by the appellant society by the Special Tahsildar.
The learned senior counsel for the appellant would contend that the order passed by the Special Tahsildar is not a speaking order and such
order was not passed by application of mind. He further contended that a reading of the order would indicate that the objections submitted by the
appellant society were not properly considered, but the objections were overruled only on the basis of the remarks offered by the requisitioning
body. When the order has been passed by the Special Tahsildar without application of mind and without assigning any valid reasons, the entire
acquisition proceedings are vitiated.
We have perused the order dated 01.03.1991 passed by the Special Tahsildar (LA) and it is extracted hereunder:
The Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras - 35 in Rc. 74080/LA.3-4/87 dated 03.01.1991 and 04.02.1991 has
requested this office to over rule all the objections raised during the 5A enquiry as all the lands notified for acquisition are essentially required for
Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
The opinion of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board was communicated to the objector in this office Rc.11986/B7/G1/29.01.1991 and to hear any
objections on the opinion of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Madras - 35 as provided under Rule 3(b) of the Rules framed under the Land
Acquisition Act was fixed on 27.02.1991.
During this enquiry under Rule 3(b) the Land owners and other interested persons filed their objections which are enumerated in the annexure.
Since no new additional grounds have been made out by the objectors and since all of them have reiterated their earlier objections and since Tamil
Nadu Housing Board (Housing) required this land and also requested to over rule all the objections raised during 5A enquiry. In the circumstances,
it is ordered that all the objections raised during the enquiry u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act held in this case and also the objections during
enquiry under Rule 3(b), be overruled and Draft Declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the notified lands ordered to be sent of
the Government for approval and publication.
A reading of the order passed by the Special Tahsildar would clearly indicate that the Chairman and Managing Director of the Housing Board
had requested that the objections made by the objectors be overruled and offered their remarks. It is also made clear in that order that such
remarks offered by the Housing Board was also communicated to the objectors and only thereafter, the enquiry u/s 3B was fixed on 27.02.1991.
Even in that enquiry u/s 3B, the objectors have participated, which is evident from the annexure to the order dated 01.03.1991. The appellant has
not chosen to produce the annexure along with the order in the writ petition. Ultimately, the Special Tahsildar, as stated above, has stated that as
there was no new additional grounds raised and all of them have been dealt with earlier in the enquiry conducted u/s 5A of the Act, the objections
raised by the land owners were overruled. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the Land Acquisition Officer has simply followed the request made
by the Housing Board, but he has independently applied his mind and passed the orders. Therefore, the argument of the learned senior counsel for
the appellant is not legally sustainable.
The learned senior counsel for the appellant relied on the decision reported in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. Revamma and
Others, and contended that the right to property is a human right. This decision will not be of any use to the appellant as the Honourable Supreme
Court, in that decision had dealt with a case arising out of adverse possession and only in that context, it was held that right to property is a human
right.
The learned senior counsel also relied on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in (R. Pari v. The Special Tahsildar ADW,
Devakottai and Anr.) 2006 (4) CTC 609. In that decision, the Full Bench was constituted to consider the following legal issues namely:
Is it necessary for the Collector to give a personal hearing to the owner in the context of his objections and the remarks of the Tahsildar?
Is the owner entitled to a copy of the report of the Special Tahsildar or not?
Should the Collector record his reasons in his order while dealing with the objections of the owner?
The third question formulated by the Full Bench is relevant for our case. After formulating the above issues and after considering the various
aspects, the Full Bench concluded as follows:
In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusion are as follows:
The owner should be furnished with a copy of the report/recommendation of the authorised officer. Thereafter, he should be given two weeks time
to makie further representation, if any, before the District Collector. It is not necessary for the District Collector to give a further personal hearing
or make any further enquiry. However, mere non-furnishing of the report would not have the ipso facto effect of vitiating the proceedings and the
question of prejudice to the land owner is required to be considered in each case depending upon the facts and circumstances. The District
Collector is expected to reflect the reasons, but merely because the communication to the land owner does not contain the reasons, the decision of
the Collector is not ipso facto vitiated and it would always open to the concerned authority to prove before the Court, if such action of the
Collector is challenged, that thee has been application of mind and the reasons are available in the relevant records relating to such acquisition. The
necessity to record the reasons is applicable where the Collector himself makes the enquiry and also when the Collector takes an appropriate
decision on the basis of the report/recommendation made by the authorised officer.
The answer to the third question formulated by the Full Bench, which is relevant to our case, is that the District Collector is expected to reflect
reasons in his order, but merely because the communication to the land owner does not contain the reasons, the decision of the Collector is not
ipso facto vitiated and it would always open to the concerned authority to prove before the Court, if such action of the Collector is challenged, that
thee has been application of mind and the reasons are available in the relevant records relating to such acquisition.
In the light of the above decision of the Full Bench of this Court, if we consider the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant, it
has to be stated that in this case, the respondents have complied with all the required formalities including communicating the remarks offered by
the requisitioning body namely Housing Board to the individual land owners. Thereafter, when the enquiry u/s 3A of the Act was conducted, the
individual land owners also participated, but did not raise any objections. Therefore, the Full Bench decision relied on by the learned Senior
counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the benefit of the, whereas, it would be in favour of the respondents as the Collector has taken an
appropriate decision.
The learned senior counsel for the appellant further relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in (The District Collector
North Arcot Ambedkar District Vellore and Ors. v. Manickam) 2005 3 MLJ 123. By referring to this decision, the learned senior counsel for the
appellant contended that administrative orders when it is passed without proper application of mind by the administrative authority, then the entire
proceedings are vitiated and are liable to be quashed. As far as the present case is concerned, by the proceedings dated 01.03.1991 of the
Special Tahsildar has simply overruled the objections of the appellant without considering the same by application of mind. This decision is also not
applicable to the facts of the case as in that decision, the Division Bench found that the District Collector has passed the order in a mechanical
manner without proper application of mind by filling up cyclostyled format, but it is not so in this case.
The learned senior counsel for the appellant also relied on the decision reported in The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India
Ltd. Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Another, for the proposition that an authority, whomakes an order in exercise of quasi judicial function
must record reasons for his conclusion. In that decision, the Honourable Supreme Court considered the question as to what is the correct amount
of import duty chargeable on pot motors when imported separately from Rayon Spinning frames and whether they fall within item 72 (3) or item 73
(21) of the First Schedule to the Indian Customs Tarrif. Moreover, in the case on hand, as stated above, the Special Tahsildar has taken into
consideration the objections submitted by the appellant society and also communicated the decision taken by the requisitioning body to the
individual land owners and thereafter proceeded further with the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, this decision also do not come to the rescue of
the appellant to sustain their case.
In this context, we are fortified by a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Sam Hiring Co. Vs. A.R. Bhujbal and others,
wherein in para-6, the Honourable Supreme Court held as under:
The Land Acquisition Officer is not a judicial authority or a quasi-judicial authority. He exercised the power u/s 5-A as an administrative
authority. But the Act requires that he should consider the objections and if asked, to give an opportunity of hearing. In this case, opportunity of
hearing was given and the objections raised were considered. The principle of natural justice has been complied with. He was not required to
elaborately deal with each of the objections and submit the report. Considered from this perspective, we do not think that there is any error of law
warranting interference.
As held by the Honourable Supreme Court, the Land Acquisition Officer is not a judicial authority or a quasi-judicial authority. He exercised
the power u/s 5-A as an administrative authority. What is required to be dealt with by him is that he should consider the objections and to give an
opportunity of hearing, if need be. He was not required to elaborately deal with each of the objections and submit the report. Therefore, following
the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court mentioned above, we hold that the Land Acquisition Officer, in exercise of his administrative
powers has rightly overruled the objections submitted by the appellant society as well as the land owners and the order dated 01.03.1991 passed
by the Special Tahsildar is legally sustainable.
It is also useful to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others,
in which the Honourable Supreme Court has held in Para Nos. 51, 52 and 53 as follows:
It is true that Section 6 uses the words ""particular land"" but in our view while referring to its satisfaction in regard to the need to acquire the
entire land, the Government need not refer to every piece of particular land. It is sufficient if the authority which conducts the Section 5A inquiry
has considered the objections raised in relation to any particular land. Even where the said authority accepts the objections, that is not binding on
the Government which can take a different view for good reasons. Where the Government agrees with the report u/s 5-A, the declaration u/s 6
need not advert to the reasons or facts concerning each piece of land. Hence, the wide observations made in Balak Ram Gupta case cannot be
accepted.
In Abhey Ram as well as in the judgment in the civil appeals, it has been clearly stated that those claimants who have not filed objections to the
Section 4 notification cannot be permitted to contend before the Court that Section 5-A inquiry is vitiated so far as they are concerned. Nor can
they be permitted to seek quashing of Section 6 declaration on that ground. We shall elaborate this aspect further.
Now objections u/s 5-A, if filed, can relate to the contention that (i) the purpose for which land is being acquired is not a public purpose, (ii)
that even if the purpose is a public purpose, the land of the objector is not necessary, in the sense that the public purpose could be served by other
land already proposed or some other land to which the objector may refer, or (iii) that in any event, even if this land is necessary for the public
purpose, the special fact-situation in which the objector is placed, it is a fit case for omitting his land from the acquisition. Objection (ii) is personal
to the land and Objection (iii) is personal to the objector.
It is evident from the above decision of the Honourable Supreme Court that objection is personal to the land as well as the objector. As stated
earlier, in this case, the some of the lands have been vested with the individual land owners by the appellant society and therefore, the society is not
having any interest over the lands or owner of the lands. When the land is not in possession of the society and the land owner/alleged member of
the society in whose favour the lands has been alloted has not come forward to challenge the acquisition proceedings or submitted his or her
objections when they were called upon to do so, the writ petition itself is not maintainable. The Honourable Supreme Court also held that it is
sufficient if the authority which conducts the Section 5-A inquiry has considered the objections raised in relation to any particular land. Even where
the said authority accepts the objections that is not binding on the Government which can take a different view for good reasons. Where the
Government agrees with the report u/s 5-A, the declaration u/s 6 need not advert to the reasons or facts concerning each piece of land.
It is pertinent to point out that the appellant society, dehors making objection for acquisition, has submitted to the authorities seeking for release
of lands or exempting the lands from the purview of acquisition proceedings. The Government, after careful consideration of such request has
rejected the same by proceedings dated 03.09.1990 and thereafter it was also intimated to the appellant on 22.02.1991. The appellant has not
challenged the said proceedings dated 22.02.1991 and consequently the Government proceeded further and completed all the formalities in regard
to acquisition proceedings. Therefore, at this stage, it is not open for the appellant to challenge the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act.
It is well settled that this Court, in exercise of its powers, cannot interfere with the decision of the administrative authority, unless there is error
apparent on the face of the record or it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court. In this
context, it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. K.G. Soni, it
was held in Para No. 14 as follows:
The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator�s decision unless it was
illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral
standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the
administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the
deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.
Therefore, even on the question of merits, we hold that the appellant has not made out any case at all to interfere with the well considered
decision of the learned single Judge.
We next deal with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the society has been formed for the purpose of allotting
lands to their members for construction of house site. For the same purpose, the lands of the appellant are sought for by the respondents for
implementation of a housing scheme sponsored by the Housing Board and therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated. Furthermore, when both
the purpose are one and the same, the appellants should be permitted to continue in possession of the lands. As stated earlier, the society itself is
an unregistered society and even the society has transferred or conveyed some of the lands in favour of its alleged members, who are now the land
owners. The so-called object of forming the society by the appellant cannot be compared or equivated with that of the object of the Housing
Board, which is going to utilise the lands for the welfare and well being of the public at large. Under those circumstances, we are not inclined to
accede to the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the same is hereby rejected.
Lastly, it was argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that when once the layout approval in respect of the lands has been
granted by the competent authority, namely Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, the respondents are estopped from invoking the
acquisition proceedings in respect of those lands. The Honourable Supreme Court and this Court, have time and again stated that mere granting of
permission or approval for layout cannot be a bar for the Government to acquire the lands if the Government thinks it desirable for implementation
of a public purpose. In this context, we are fortified by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in (Velusamy and anr. v. The
Government of Tamilnadu rep. by its Secretary Housing and Urban Development Department Chennai -2 and Anr.) 2000 CTC (1) 530 wherein
in para-7, it was held as under:
The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has further submitted that the local authority has approved the layout, and the second
respondent has issued No Objections for issuance of such lay-out. But, as held by the learned Judge, there is no prohibition under the said Act to
proceed with the acquisitions, if the lay out has been approved with respect to the land in question.
In the result, we confirm the order passed by the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ appeal. No costs. Consequently, connected
miscellaneous petition is closed.