High CourtsDivision Bench(1979) 02 AP CK 0007

Tanduri Chenchiah and Others vs The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad and Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 16 February 1979 · Citation: AIR 1980 AP 12

HON’BLE JUDGES
A. Sambasiva Rao, C.J · P. Ramachandra Raju, J
CASE NUMBER
Writ Appeal No. 141 of 1977

AI Structured Summary

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Judgment

14 paragraphs · 1,338 words

Sambasiva Rao, C.J.—Condition No. 6.14 of the terms and conditions for supply of electricity made by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board under S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 reads thus:-

"Where any consumer, having more than one service defaults in payment of dues relating to one of the services and U.C.M. charges due in respect of any new connection, the Board may cause the other services also to be disconnected till all the arrears due on all services and arrears of U.C.M. charges in respect of the new connection are paid notwithstanding the fact that the services are separate and are covered by separate agreements and notwithstanding that one or other of the services is under is connection for non-payment of charges or other reason."

The point now is as to what the true meaning and application of this condition is?

2.

The petitioner was the managing partner of a firm Balaramakrishna Rice Mill. On behalf of the firm he entered into an agreement with the State Electricity Board for supply of energy to the Rice Mill. Because of certain legal troubles, the Rice Mill could not function and consequently, the firm fell into arrears to pay the unconnected minimum charges as per the terms of the agreement in a sum of Rs. 23,310. The Board instituted a suit for the recovery of the unconnected minimum charges against the firm and its partners. In addition to the filing of the suit, the Board took resort to the power which it thought fit had under the above condition No. 6.14 to disconnect the personal electrical power supply service, standing in the name of the petitioner.

This proposed disconnection of his personal electrical power supply service in the process of recovering the dues payable by Messrs. BalaramaKrishna Rice Mill was challenged in the Writ Petition.

3.

Our learned brother Jeevan Reddy, upheld the proposed action of the Electricity Board. In the reasoning of the learned Judge, the petitioner was a partner and he was liable for the debts of the partnership firm Balaramakrishna Rice Mill. The arrears due by the firm constituted debt and the petitioner as a partner was liable for the debts incurred by the partnership. In this connection, he also referred to the circumstance that the Board had filed a suit against the firm and the partners, including the petitioner, to recover the amount of arrears. The learned Judge pointed out that if the suit is decreed, the Board can proceed against the petitioner personally for realising the debt. On the basis of this reasoning, the learned Judge upheld the action of the Electricity Board to disconnect the personal electrical supply service to the petitioner.

4.

This decision of our learned brother is challenged in this Writ Appeal.

5.

To complete the narration of facts, it is to be noted that the suit filed by the Board against the firm and its partners, including the Writ Petitioner, was dismissed by the trial court and an appeal is now pending before this Court.

6.

Now, the question is whether the Board can disconnect the other service of the petitioner as a measure to collect the arrears due by Messrs. Balaramakrishna Rice Mill of which he was a partner. There is no doubt that the firm owed some money towards the unconnected minimum charges. There is also no denial of the fact that as a partner of the firm, the petitioner would be liable to pay the amount of arrears if it is decreed. There is also a default in payment of the dues by the firm. But the crucial factor which would enable the Board to take recourse to the action permitted under Condition NO. 6.14 is that the consumer who has defaulted in payment of dues should have more than one service. If he has more than one service, the other service may be disconnected till at the arrears due on services and arrears of unconnected till all the arrears due on services and arrears due on services and arrears of unconnected minimum charges are paid. If the same consumer has more than one service, it does not matter that service are separate and are covered by separate agreements. But the same consumer must have more than one service, so that the Board can apply this procedure to recover the arrears prescribed under Condition No. 6.14. Therefore the question which emerges for decision in the case is whether the petitioner who has an individual private service of his own can be said to have another service, namely, service in favour of Messrs. BalaramaKrishna Rice Mill. It would be farfetched, if not untenable, to say that the petitioner has connection in favour of Messrs. Balaramakrishna Rice Mill as well as his own private service. Even though he was a partner of the firm, the consumer was the firm and not the petitioner.

The petitioner was consumer only in respect of his personal and private service connection. Simply because he was a partner of the firm, which was a consumer in relation to the other service, he cannot be called consumer in respect of the service standing in the name of the firm. It is well established that the firm constitutes a legal person and in fact it was the firm that entered into the service contract with the Board. The Board recognised the firm as the consumer, and not any individual partner or the managing partner. The petitioner as the managing partner. The petitioner as the managing partner entered into the contract on behalf of the firm. He merely represented the firm in entering into the contract. By no stretch of imagination could he be called the firm itself. That does not detract from his legal liability to pay the dues of the firm, but he does not become the firm itself. When he is not the firm, he cannot be considered the consumer in respect of the connection which the firm had. Consequently, when the firm committed default and fell into arrears, to recover them, the Board cannot disconnect the private and personal service connection of the petitioner.

7.

We may usefully refer to the decision of our learned brother Alladi Kuppuswami and Sheth, JJ. in Writ Petn. No. 4862 of 1974, D/- 4-10-1976. In that case, for the dues payable by one firm, another firm''s connection was sought to be disconnected. Dealing with that question, Alladi Kuppuswami J. who spoke for the Division Bench observed that Condition No. 6.14 presupposes that the consumer who has defaulted is the same as the consumer against whom disconnection is sought to be made. However, the composition of the two firms was different, and therefore, the proposed disconnection of the second firm''s service connection was held to be untenable. In the present case also, it is quite clear that the firm is not the same as the petitioner whose connection is now sought to be disconnected. This view of the Division Bench supports what we have stated above.

8.

Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the Electricity Board on a decision of one of us (Sambasiva Rao J.) in Writ Petn. No. 1342 of 1972, D/- 18-4-1974. Going through the said order, it is clear that the person who owned the service connection which was sought to be disconnected was the consumer in regard to the connection which fell into arrears. Therefore, this decision does not help the Board''s proposed action.

9.

Now, the above discussion shows that the threatened action of the Board to disconnect the private personal connection of the petitioner is not warranted by Condition No. 6.14. We, therefore, with respect, set aside the order of our learned brother, Jeevan Reddy, J. and allow the Writ Appeal and the Writ petition, to the extent that the personal connection of the petitioner shall not be disconnected by the Board for the purpose of collecting arrears due from Messrs. Balaramakrishna Rice Mill. There will be no order as to costs.

10.

Appeal allowed.